

# MEASURING SECURITY

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Contact is welcome but reply is not instant. Slides are yours to use though I would appreciate acknowledgement if it is possible to do so.

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When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science.

-- William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, 1883

To measure is to know.

-- James Clerk Maxwell, 1831-1879

The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that the future is more than a whim of the gods and that men and women are not passive before nature. Until human beings discovered a way across that boundary, the future was the mirror of the past or the murky domain of oracles and soothsayers who held a monopoly over knowledge of anticipated events.

-- Peter Bernstein, 1996

Amateurs study cryptography;  
professionals study economics.

-- Allan Schiffman, 2 July 04

Security folks are from Mars.  
Business people are from Wharton.

-- Adam Shostack, 19 October 04

Measurement motivates.

-- John Kenneth Galbraith

# OUTLINE

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- Outline
- Measurement for a reason
- State of the art
- Breaking new ground
- Sustainability is not simple
- Wrapup

An outline in spirit -- this is what we'll cover, but we'll do it over and over, not once per bullet.

# WHY MEASURE?

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- There's never enough <X> to go around
- To play better, you must keep score
- Discipline is easier with numbers

Each is sufficient and collectively more so; if you are allocating scarcity then you need to know how much scarcity you have. If you want to improve performance, then you need a performance measure. If many people have duties, then you need a way to say what those duties are such that most anyone can tell if the duties are actually being performed.

# TRADE-OFFS

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- Security is about tradeoffs; but you know that
- It is easier to make tradeoffs when you have a measure to compare them with
- Even then, it is not necessarily easy

All security is about tradeoffs, and tradeoffs are easier to make in the common language of numbers commonly agreed upon, and that that is so is understandable to tinkers, tailors, soldiers, sailors, rich men, poor men, beggar men, thieves, doctors, lawyers, and indian chiefs alike.

# METRICS

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- Other industries have theirs, why not us?
  - Logistics: \$/mile, percent full loads
  - Warehouses: \$/□, turn-rate
  - Telecom: \$/connection, saturation

What can we do here in security? What should we measure or, for that matter, what can we measure?

## METRICS: OUR VERSION

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- How secure am I?
- Am I better off than this time last year?
- Am I spending the right amount of \$\$?
- How do I compare to my peers?
- What risk transfer options do I have?

These are precisely the questions that any CFO would want to know and we are not in a good position to answer. The present author was confronted with this list, exactly as it is, by the CISO of a major Wall Street bank with the preface “Are you security people so stupid that you cannot tell me....”

This particular CISO came from management audit and therefore was also saying that were he in any other part of the bank, bond portfolios, derivative pricing, equity trading strategies, etc., he would be able to answer such questions to five digit accuracy. The questions are sound.

# MEASURE WHAT?

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- We'll come to that, but...
- Early on: anything you can
- Later: what models tell you to

Start from where you are and go to where you want to be.

# WHERE DO WE BEGIN?

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- With whatever we have
  - Beg, borrow, steal
- Driven by need-to-decide

No one is without enough resources to begin. To the extent you have any choices, choose (and we will say this over and over) to be decision support.

# THE VIRTUE OF THEFT

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- Public Health
- Insurance
- Accelerated Failure Time testing
- Portfolio Management
- ..., *etc.*

There are others. We will steal from them and everyone else. We will use the skill sets that have already had their evolutionary morphing and apply them to our field. Why, because WE DO NOT HAVE TIME TO START FROM SCRATCH.

# **TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT**

## DEFINITIONS

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- Computer security has tended to reinvent terms when perfectly good terms already exist
- Hence, we have to be careful about terms

All fields reach a point at which they begin to have specialized words. This is sometimes good -- the field may have concepts that need the marker of a word to go with them -- and it is sometimes bad -- using words that are unfamiliar when there are perfectly good non-specialist uses, a phenomenon that is generally due to making a guild out of some set of practitioners.

## DEFINITIONS

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- Vulnerability
- Threat-Source
- Threat
- Risk, systematic & unsystematic
- Risk Management

These are some of the terms for which we need agreed upon, common understandings. In most ways, what we agree upon is not as important as that we agree.

# VULNERABILITY

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NIST SP 800-30

A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised and result in a security breach or a violation of a system's security policy

SP 800-30: Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, July 2002.  
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf>

# THREAT-SOURCE

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NIST SP 800-30

Either (1) intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or (2) a situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability

ibid

# COMMON THREAT-SOURCES

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NIST SP 800-30

- Natural - flood, earthquake
- Human
  - unintentional (drop vase)
  - intentional (throw vase)
- Environmental - chemical tank leak

ibid

# THREAT

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NIST SP 800-30

The potential for a threat-source to exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) a specific vulnerability

ibid

# THREAT LIKELIHOOD

NIST SP 800-30

controls opponent	are effective	are ineffective
has capability & motivation	Medium	High
does not have	Low	Low

ibid

# RISK

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ISO Guide 73

The combination of the probability of an event and its consequence

By quotation; ISO standards are not open source (which is preposterous, but not today's focus).



# RISK, SYSTEMATIC

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RIMS

Chance of loss that is predictable under relatively stable circumstances

(fire, wind, or flood produce losses that, in the aggregate over time, can be accurately predicted despite short-term fluctuations)

Risk & Insurance Management Society: <http://www.rims.org/MGTtemplate.cfm?Section=Glossary&template=Magazine/GlossaryDisplay.cfm&GlossaryID=1545>



# RISK, UNSYSTEMATIC

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RIMS

Chance of loss that is unpredictable in the aggregate because it results from forces difficult to predict

(recession, unemployment, epidemics, war-related events, etc.)

Risk & Insurance Management Society: <http://www.rims.org/MGTtemplate.cfm?Section=Glossary&template=Magazine/GlossaryDisplay.cfm&GlossaryID=1547>



# RISK DIVERSIFICATION

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- Systematic risk can be diversified away
- Unsystematic risk cannot

*Therein lies a huge difference*

[http://www.riskglossary.com/link/risk\\_aversion.htm](http://www.riskglossary.com/link/risk_aversion.htm)

(first mentioned in Markowitz H : "Portfolio Selection," Journal of Finance, v7 p77-91, 1952.)

## DIVERSIFICATION AGAINST SYSTEMATIC RISK

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- TCP/IP assumes diverse paths
- Data centers rely on diversified power and bandwidth
  - Lessons learned in Manahattan, 9/11
- Reciprocity / mutual aid agreements
- Subject to measurement and models

## PREPARATION AGAINST UNSYSTEMATIC RISK

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- Disaster recovery / fallback plans
  - Diminished modes of operation
- Unsystematic risks can affect all parties
  - Reciprocity / mutual aid may fail
- Not directly subject to measurement

# RISK MANAGEMENT, WHAT

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Bernstein

The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we have some control over the outcome, while minimizing the areas where we have absolutely no control over the outcomes and the linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us.

Bernstein P: *Against the Gods*, John Wiley & Sons, 1996.

# HAZARD

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AM Best glossary

A circumstance that increases the likelihood or probable severity of a loss

(storing explosives in the basement is a hazard: it increases the probability of an explosion)

A.M. Best's glossary is everywhere (except on the company's own website).

# PERIL

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AM Best glossary

The cause of a possible loss

ibid

## WHY MEASURE? (AGAIN)

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Premise: We measure to support decision making, possibly under fire

Consequent: Knowing which way you err can more vital than suppressing error

So, why are measurements made? To support decision making and, therefore, errors only matter if they bias decisions. As such, suppressing error can be useful or it can be useless. The question is often more the latter, at least insofar as knowing that you are high or low, east or west, etc., is often all that is needed to decide whether to ascend or descent, to go left or to go right.

## IMPLICATIONS

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- We have to be careful with what we claim to be measuring
- We have to make sure that our readers have some understanding what it is that we are measuring

If we are, however, making decisions then it does pay to be careful what we put into those decisions. As has been said since the 1950s, “garbage in , garbage out” and for measurement-driven decision making that is oh, so true.

# MEASUREMENT

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- If we are going to measure,  
Then what is measurable?
  - States
  - Rates

That which can be measured really comes down to two categories of measurements, viz., states and rates. If this reminds you of Heisenberg, well, it should. You can measure the position of something or you can measure the momentum of something. This is not atomic physics, so we can perhaps do both at once.

# RISK MANAGEMENT

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ISO Guide 73

The process of determining an acceptable level of risk, assessing the current level of risk, taking steps to reduce risk to the acceptable level, and maintaining that level of risk

ibid

# NSF GRAND CHALLENGES

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- By 2013
  - No further large scale epidemics
  - COTS tools for certifiable systems
  - Low/no skill required to be safe
  - **Info. risk mgmt.  $\geq$  financial risk mgmt.**

In November, 2003, the Computing Research Association held a limited attendance, invitation only retreat in Virginia at the behest of the National Science Foundation. The purpose was to set the ten-year research agenda in information security <<http://www.cra.org/Activities/grand.challenges/security/home.html>>. Here are the results in lay terms: An end to epidemics, commercial off the shelf (COTS) tools for building certifiable systems, improvements in semantics and user interface such that one need not be an expert to be safe, and information risk management of a quantitative sophistication as good as that of financial risk management.

These are high goals, and at the same time it is horrifying that any of them could take a decade to deliver. On the other hand, if they do take as much as a decade, then starting now is crucial.

See <http://www.cra.org/Activities/grand.challenges/security/home.html>

# RISK MANAGEMENT, CULTURE

J.Reason

Pathologic	Bureaucratic	Generative
Don't want to know	May not find out	Actively seek
Messengers "shot"	Heard if they arrive	Messengers rewarded
Responsibility shirked	Compartmentalized	Responsibility shared
Failure punished	Local repairs only	Failures beget reforms
Ideas discouraged	Ideas beget problems	Ideas welcomed

Reason J: *Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997.

# RISK MANAGEMENT, WHAT

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Borge

Risk management means taking deliberate action to shift the odds in your favor – increasing the odds of good outcomes and reducing the odds of bad outcomes.

Borge D: *The Book of Risk*, John Wiley & Sons, 2001.

Dan Borge was in charge of risk management for Bankers Trust when they made more money than anyone else and did so because, explicitly, of their ability to take better chances.

# RISK MANAGEMENT, WHY

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Borge

The purpose of risk management is  
to improve the future,  
not to explain the past.

ibid

## **SECURITY METRICS...**

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... are the servants of risk management

## **AND RISK MANAGEMENT...**

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...is about making decisions

# THEREFORE

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The only security metrics we are interested in are those that support decision making about risk for the purpose of managing that risk.

This is a real bias. If the metric does not have a role in decision making, leave it to someone else to do if ever.

**SO, WHAT DO GOOD  
METRICS LOOK LIKE?**

# A GOOD METRIC MUST (1/4)

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Jaquith

Be consistently measured

- ▶ The criteria must be objective.
- ▶ The criteria must be repeatable.

Andrew Jaquith as quoted in Berinato S, "A Few Good Metrics," CSO Magazine, July 2005; see <http://www.csoonline.com/read/070105/metrics.htm>

## A GOOD METRIC MUST (2/4)

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Jaquith

Be cheap to gather

- ▶ Using automated tools helps
- ▶ ...such as scanning software or password crackers.

ibid

## A GOOD METRIC MUST (3/4)

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Jaquith

Contain units of measure

- ▶ Time, dollars, or some numerical scale should be included
- ▶ ...not just, say, “green,” “yellow” or “red” risks.

ibid

## A GOOD METRIC MUST (4/4)

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Jaquith

Be expressed as a number

- ▶ Give the results as a percentage, ratio or some other kind of actual measurement
- ▶ ...not just subjective opinions such as “low risk” or “high priority.”

ibid

## **& ANSWER RM CHALLENGES**

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- How secure am I?
- Am I better than this time last year?
- Am I spending the right amount of \$\$?
- How do I compare to my peers?
- What risk transfer options do I have?

Those challenges were risk management challenges. How secure am I leads directly to looking at that very fact over the timeline so that you can say whether you made progress in the previous interval. The right amount of dollars, as we shall see, is like Goldilock's porridge -- it can be too hot, too cold, or just right. If you are rather different from your peers either you're crazy or they are; care to know which? And, of course, if someone will take your risk but let you keep your reward, then by all means let them. You can cry all the way to the bank, if you must.

# **KINDS OF NUMBERS**

# TYPES

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- Continuous – infinite number of values
  - What is your weight?
- Discrete – countable number of values
  - How many children do you have?

Discrete variables are almost always counts of things. Continuous variables are usually measurements. Not a big distinction in terms of decision support but does have some implications in how to handle statistics if you have enough data to do statistics.

# SCALING

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- Nominal: named, no numeric meaning
- Ordinal: lined up,  $a < b < c \Rightarrow a < c$
- Interval:  $22 - 14 = 8 = 42 - 34$
- Ratio: 8 is to 4 as 4 is to 2

Numbers for comparison purposes come in several flavors called “scales” (scales in the sense of music, not in the sense of having 100,000 computers on your internal network). The four scales are nominal scale, ordinal scale, interval scale, and ratio scale.

# NOMINAL SCALE

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- Classification data, *e.g.*, {M, F}
- No ordering, *e.g.*,  $M > F$  meaningless
- Arbitrary labels, *e.g.*, {M, F} or {1, 0}

Standard definitions follow, but this text copied from <http://www.stat.sfu.ca/~cschwarz/Stat-301/Handouts/node5.html>

In a nominal (“name only”) scale, the categories are nothing but categories and the labels are nothing but labels.

## ORDINAL SCALE

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- Ordered data, differences between values are not comparable, *e.g.*,
- Political parties on left to right spectrum given labels 0, 1, 2
- Rank on a scale of 1..5 your degree of satisfaction (“Likert Scale”)
- Good enough for decision support

In an ordinal scale, the categories and the labels are still just categories and labels, but now there is an unambiguous sense that there is a natural sequence to them as otherwise arbitrary as they are. That this is a weak condition is not an insult; it is a benefit in that weak conditions bias outcomes less than strong conditions and this weak condition is good enough to produce the decision support we seek.

## INTERVAL SCALE

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- Ordered data, constant scale, but no natural zero
- Differences make sense, but ratios do not, *e.g.*:
  - $30^{\circ} - 20^{\circ} = 20^{\circ} - 10^{\circ}$ , but
  - $20^{\circ} / 10^{\circ}$  is not twice as hot

An interval scale has fixed intervals between items of like kind. In the example, we see that thirty degrees is ten degrees warmer than twenty degrees just as twenty degrees is ten degrees warmer than ten degrees. That does not mean that twenty degrees is twice as hot as ten degrees. The intervals are subject to addition and subtraction but not to multiplication or division.

## RATIO SCALE

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- Ordered data, constant scale, has a natural zero
- Ratios do matter, *e.g.*,:
  - Height, weight, age, length

Whereas an interval scale can support addition and subtraction, now we get multiplication and division. Praise be to the inventor of “zero.”

## TABLE/PROGRESSION

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	order?	constant scale?	natural zero?
nominal	no		
ordinal	yes	no	
interval	yes	yes	no
ratio	yes	yes	yes

Perhaps easier to visualize using this table.

# ACCURACY & PRECISION

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
- Accuracy is unbiased; errors don't lead
- Precision is narrowness, even if skewed

Accuracy is the “freedom from mistake or error” while precision is “exactness and thus limited” (per the Merriam Webster Unabridged).

As used here (and not just here) accuracy is free from misleading bias while precision is free from fuzzy lack of clarity. For trend analysis and then decision making, the consistency of which accuracy speaks is the more important.

# ACCURACY & PRECISION

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Visual depiction instead.

# CONSISTENT


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- Precision and accuracy are nice, but for trend analysis, consistent is all you need
- Consistent is a weaker condition of constant bias and constant scatter, improving the estimate as more data becomes available

Put differently, “consistent estimators” converge on the true value. That they converge means precision increases and that they converge to the true value means that bias is not present.

# CONSISTENCY

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Consistency is a state of measurement where additional measurements enable greater precision. Sampling a random number does not have this characteristic, but otherwise a consistent measure is possible and preferred.

Note that unless there is a consistency to your measure you will not be able to identify the outliers as the sense of outlier -- different in substantial ways to the central tendency -- cannot be identified if there is no consistency to the underlying measure.

## ASSUMPTIONS MATTER

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- “A spherical cow of uniform density”
- All vulns are equally easy to find, therefore good guy finding is pointless
- Good guys should try to find all easy vulns so only hard ones are available
- Known vulns are easy to exploit

In any place where numbers and estimates around them are used and made, there will be assumptions. The first is a classic in the physics lecture -- “Assume a spherical cow of uniform density.” But in our world we can make leaps of equal reach; we might assume that all vulnerabilities are equally easy to find which, as a matter of logic, would tell Good Guys to stop trying to find them since they could not reduce supply for Bad Guys as the Bad Guys would just find different vulns equivalently easily. The contrasting assumption, that the difficulty of finding vulns is ordinal, not nominal, would encourage Good Guys to find as many of the easy to find vulns as possible as the remaining vulns would be more costly for the Bad Guys to find. Closer to fact than to assumption, we might still wonder whether or not that a vuln is known means that the vuln is exploitable. That could be an hypothesis and we could then seek data to confirm or deny it.

# NORMALIZATION

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- Technically correct meaning: to make an unknown distribution look like the Normal distribution
- Colloquial meaning: to make it possible to realistically compare two different distributions

Several times in the following material we'll normalize a number. Normalization means to bring varied measures to a common scale, often a dimensionless relative scale, for the purpose of making the disparate comparable. It is to make "normal" which usually means relative to a well understood base state. In the precise meaning of mathematical statistics, it is to convert a distribution to something resembling a "Normal" distribution. In general work, it is less precisely means to make multiple distributions comparable.

## NORMALIZATION, CONT.

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- As Normal as possible:  $Z = \frac{X - \mu}{\sigma}$
- Subtract the mean to mutually center data sets
- Divide by standard deviation to get common scale
- Many other options; use with care

You need not subtract the mean if you want, say, each distribution to start with an initial value at a common time. You may not divide by the standard deviation if you want to highlight, say, rates of change (where dividing each distribution by its own median might be a better idea). As with most general topics, this is as far as we can go without examples.

# TESTING

# TESTING

test \ truth	+	-
+	a	b
-	c	d

a = true positives  
b = false positives  
c = false negatives  
d = true negatives  
accuracy =  $(a+d)/t$

true positives

a = positive testers who have disease

true negatives

d = negative testers who are without disease

false positives

b = positive testers who are without disease

false negatives

c = negative testers who have disease

And the accuracy of the test is the number right as a fraction of all tested, i.e.,  $(a+d)/t$

# TESTING

test \ truth	+	-	
	a	b	a+b
+	a	b	a+b
-	c	d	c+d
	a+c	b+d	t

$(a+c)/t$  = prevalence

$a/(a+c)$  = sensitivity (recall)

$d/(b+d)$  = specificity

$a/(a+b)$  = predictive value positive (precision)

$d/(c+d)$  = predictive value negative

prevalence

$(a+c)/t$  = fraction of population that has disease

sensitivity

$a/(a+c)$  = what fraction of those with disease test positive

specificity

$d/(b+d)$  = what fraction of those without disease test negative

predictive value positive

$a/(a+b)$  = what fraction of positive tests have disease

predictive value negative

$d/(c+d)$  = what fraction of negative tests are without disease

# INTERPRETATION

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- Get a negative for highly sensitive test?
  - Likely a true negative (“rule out”)
- Get a positive for highly specific test?
  - Likely a true positive (“rule in”)

<http://www.poems.msu.edu/EBM/Diagnosis/Diagnosis.htm>, specifically, <http://www.poems.msu.edu/EBM/Diagnosis/SensSpec.htm>

## INTERPRETATION, CONT.

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- Predictive value depends on the prevalence of the condition (rows)
- Sensitivity, specificity do not (columns)

*∴ we can describe how good the test is without knowing prevalence, but we cannot say what an individual test result predicts without prevalence estimates.*

This is important: while the specificity and sensitivity of a test are characteristics of the test independent of the population on which that test is used, the predictive values positive and negative are dependent on those populations. Put differently, a test of constant specificity and constant sensitivity will have a different predictive value when the true rates of disease change. In the table shown before, this is whether you are working with columns or rows. Go back and look.

## CHOOSING TESTS

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- If false negative is serious,  
Then favor sensitivity (& treat false pos)
- If false positive is serious,  
Then favor specificity (& lose false neg)

One might favor sensitivity if the treatment is painless and cheap but the disease is serious; re-imaging a virtual machine when there is any doubt about its integrity, say.

One might favor specificity if the treatment is painful or costly while the disease is mild; complete emergency patch rollout to correct a spelling error, say.

# TESTING IN SECURITY

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- AVS signature finding
- IDS anomaly identification
- Automated code analyses
- Firewall packet inspection
- Patch management performance
- ... and on and on ...

There are many testing and testing-like activities in security, as listed here in hint form.

## MULTI-STAGE TESTING

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- Maximizes cost-effectiveness

Stage 1 “screen”: dirt cheap, high sensitivity

Stage 2 “confirm”: expensive, high specificity

- Combination has higher specificity at expense of sensitivity, *e.g.*, policing the blood supply for HIV

A multi-stage test is one where testing is done sequentially. As such, the results of any one stage are conditional on the results of the previous stage. This can have significant economic impact.

As a rule of thumb, you cannot increase sensitivity and specificity at the same time. For a reasonably rare disease, non-cases will strongly outnumber cases hence a negative test result is more likely. Working with that, you have a first stage that confirms negative status, i.e., it is highly sensitive resulting in false positives but, in turn, low false negatives. In other words, the first test releases as many as possible (and no more) from further work-up. The second stage wants no false negatives so it is highly specific and, if indeed most subjects were rejected in the first stage, that second stage test can be quite expensive (and definitive).

## MS-TESTING IN SECURITY

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- Many examples
  - Router logs (S1) post-processed by log-analysis tools (S2)
  - Anomaly detection (S1) reviewed by human eyes (S2)
  - SIGINT traffic analysis (S1) to sieve which crypto is worth breaking (S2)

We have many examples of multi-stage testing in security, as outlined here. There are others, and it might pay us to look harder at multi-stage security testing.

## WORKED EXAMPLE

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- Situation
  - $10^6$  to screen
  - Prevalence = 1%
- Problem: Identify those 10,000

A million people, lines of code, or whatever to screen and the idea that 1% of them are the problem -- just which 1% is now our problem.

# TESTING

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test \ truth	+	-	
+			
-			
	10,000	990,000	$10^6$

1% = prevalence  
 $10^6$  = population size

This is what we know.

## S1: RULE-OUT NEGATIVES

test \ truth	+	-	
+	99.99%	10%	
-	.01%	90%	
	10,000	990,000	$10^6$

99.99% = sensitivity (our focus here)

90% = specificity

$10^6$  = test population

We begin with a test that is sensitive, i.e., which misses few true positives at the cost of a meaningful number of false positives, and for which a negative result is not enormously meaningful.

## S1: RULE-OUT NEGATIVES

test \ truth	+	-	
+	9,999	99,000	108,999
-	1	891,000	<del>891,001</del>
	10,000	990,000	$10^6$

- 99.99% = sensitivity, and so 1 false negative
- 90% = specificity, and so 99,000 false positives
- .999999 = predictive value negative
- .09 = predictive value positive

So, with a sensitivity of 99.99% we get one false negative and we can forget about 89% of the population. At this prevalence, a negative result is .999999 likely to be correct (odds of 1 in 10,000,000 of being wrong).

## S2: RULE-IN POSITIVES

test \ truth	+	-	
+	90%	.01%	
-	10%	99.99%	
	9,999	99,000	108,999

90% = sensitivity (no longer the focus)

99.99% = specificity (now our focus)

108,999 = test population

Now we take just the remainder and use a second that has, for convenience, the reverse sensitivity and specificity.

## S2: RULE-IN POSITIVES

test \ truth	+	-	
+	8,999	10	9,009
-	1,000	98,990	<del>99,990</del>
	9,999	99,000	108,999

90% = sensitivity, and so 1,000 false negatives

99.99% = specificity, and so 10 false positives

.9989 = predictive value positive

.99 = predictive value negative

This test gets us 10 false positives and 1,000 false negatives, but as a matter of management we ignore any negative results

## S1 | S2: OVERALL

test \ truth	+	-	
+	8,999	10	9,009
-	1,001	989,990	<del>990,991</del>
	10,000	990,000	$10^6$

89.99% = sensitivity with 10 false positives

99.999% = specificity with 1,001 false negatives

.9989 = predictive value positive

.99899 = predictive value negative

We now have a compound result in which the predictive value of the compound test is high both for positives and for negatives, which is arguably what we would want though debate may ensue on the downstream cost of a false negative versus a false positive.

# COST EFFECTIVENESS

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**S1** @ 30¢ / test  $\Rightarrow$  \$0.3M & 99,001 wrong

**S2** @ \$30 / test  $\Rightarrow$  \$30M & 1,099 wrong

☞ **S1 | S2**  $\Rightarrow$  \$3.6M & 1,011 wrong

**S2 | S1**  $\Rightarrow$  \$30M & 1,011 wrong

If we did S1 alone at a cost of 30¢ per test, we'd spend \$300,000 and have nearly 100,000 incorrect results. Similarly, if we did S2 alone at a cost of \$30 per test, we'd spend \$30,000,000 and have over 1,000 incorrect results.


Whether we do S1 or S2 first and the other second, we still get just over 1,000 incorrect results but with S1 first we spend \$3,600,000 rather than \$30,000,000.

# TRADEOFF TO MINIMAX



As with all of security, you are doing tradeoffs. In this case it is unduly easy to get that minimax solution: the maximal favorable result at minimal cost. However, as you can appreciate, a very large differential between the general cost effects of false positives versus false negatives.

# PREVALENCE 70%, NOT 1%



The effect of converting from 1% prevalence to 70% prevalence makes this a harder decision.

# PREVALENCE .05%, NOT 1%



The effect of converting from 1% prevalence to .05% prevalence further highlights the choices to be made, and how they are sensitive to the prevalence of the disease.

# CALIBRATION?

---

- So what if your test gives a value, not a binary result?
- How do you decide what is a positive and what is a negative (since, after all, you have to make a decision)?

Do I treat or not treat? Rebuild or not rebuild? – Questions like that need binary decisions even if the test I am doing is returning not a “Yes/No” response but rather a value. This leads to a different class of problems.


## CALIBRATION: ROC

---

- “Receiver Operating Characteristic”
  - Analysis of the test itself
  - You adjust the sensitivity  $v$  specificity
  - Simple idea: what is cutoff value?
- Works for any kind of data

This is all about setting cutoffs on continuous scales so that above value  $X$  you say “Yes” and below  $X$  you say “No” - but what is the right value of  $X$ ?

## PICK A CUTOFF VALUE




In this example, the true negatives get a test result that is centered around a low value while the true positives get a test result that is centered around a higher value. The problem is that the tails of the distributions overlap, so it is not possible to avoid some false positives or negatives. You have to pick a threshold value below which your test calls “negative” and above which it calls “positive.”

# PICK A CUTOFF VALUE


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$$\text{ROC} = \frac{\text{true positives}}{\text{false positives}}$$



The ROC is the ratio of true positives to false positives as you vary the cutoff point.

# ROC



Sensitivity, the fraction of true positives that test positive, is traded off against specificity, the fraction of true negatives that test negative. A useless test is one where you cannot increase either the specificity or the sensitivity, and effectively where whether a test returns positive or negative has no meaning. A perfect test has no false positives and no false negatives. A reasonable test is one where

## ROC, WHY BOTHER?

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- Allows calibration of a practical test by a definitive but expensive one
- Lets you make tradeoffs based on whether false positives or false negatives are more critical
- Works with any data (Likert scales, say)

For more, see the Wikipedia entry and follow the links, or just search, or just look up Wilcoxon and/or Mann-Whitney testing in a statistics text if you can read those.

Also see <http://glue.umd.edu/~acardena/Papers/Oakland06.pdf> and [../AAAI06-255.pdf](http://glue.umd.edu/~acardena/Papers/AAAI06-255.pdf)

# PROBABILITY

## TWO MAIN SCHOOLS

---

- Frequentist
  - Probability: a measure of repeatability
- Bayesian
  - Probability: an accumulation of belief

These are not just idle differences; they really lead somewhere (or not, since the arguments around them have been going on amongst specialists for decades now).

In any case, the frequentist focus is on frequency, i.e., that a coin flip has equal probability of heads or tails is something that is the observable result of flipping that coin over and over and over. By contrast, the Bayesian viewpoint is that you have come to believe that the heads and the tails are of equal odds and you will make your decisions not on the sceptical repetition of innumerable coin flips but on the belief you have, a belief possibly well bolstered by experience but not derived purely from that experience.

# BAYESIAN

---

$$\Pr(H|d) = \frac{\Pr(d|H) \times \Pr(H)}{\Pr(d)}$$

$\Pr(H|d)$  = belief in H if data d obtains

$\Pr(d|H)$  = probability of d if H is true

$\Pr(H)$  = prior probability of H

$\Pr(d)$  = prior probability of d

The math is not otherwise necessary, but this is Bayes Rule. It allows you to reverse a set of probabilities you might know to get at one you might not know and thus change your belief in the Hypothesis based on the data as observed.

## BAYESIAN'S STRENGTH

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- Makes use of non-repeatable data
- Directly valuable for decision making
- Handles multiple hypotheses easily

$$\Pr(d) = \sum_i \Pr(d|H_i) \times \Pr(H_i)$$

Because of its focus on belief, non-repeatable data that would, by its non-repeatability, be out of scope for the frequentist can be used by the Bayesian. This is good for real world decision making but not so good for basic scientific research.


Also in Bayesianism's list of advantages is that you can handle multiple hypotheses at the same time.

## OUT OF SCOPE

---

- No time here to cover statistics and probability or simulation for that matter
- Already in use in security in, *e.g.*, Bayesian spam filters

Bayesian and frequentists methods are implicitly in use all the time in security, but the Bayesians have the upper hand. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that Bayesian spam filters are the ones to use. In some sense, you don't want to have to do repetitive spam experiments -- you get plenty of those as it is -- and you certainly do not want to rely on repeatability when the opponent is trying to make every spam e-mail different from every other (thus requiring you to learn, if learn you will, from non-repeatable data).



Huff D : How to Lie with Statistics, W. W. Norton & Company, 1952. (reissue edition, September 1993)

I cannot recommend this enough. You might also like:

Paulos JA : A Mathematician Reads the Newspaper, Anchor, March, 1996.

# DECISION MAKING

# DECISION MAKING

---

- Rational decisions are not enough
- Need to also allow for your preferences
  - Technical term: Utility
  - Factors in your risk tolerance, &c.

Decision making is at its best when it is rational. Or is it?

Actually, it isn't. What is needed is a way to represent your preferences, not just the cold hard facts, since your preferences are the only thing that matters for part of the decision making process. The technical term for this is utility, and we are now talking about "decision analysis."

## A GAMBLE

---

- Draw one card from a fair deck
  - \$1,000 for A♠
  - \$100 for any other ♠
  - -0- otherwise

Q: Play or don't play for \$20?

You pay me \$20. I put a deck of (fair) cards on the table. You draw one card. If it is the Ace of Spades, I give you \$1,000. If it is not the Ace but is still a Spade, I give you \$100. Otherwise I give you nothing.

Want to play?

## A: TAKE THE BET

---

A♠	1.9%	X (\$1,000 - \$20) =	\$18.846
♠	23.1%	X (\$100 - \$20) =	\$18.461
<del>♠</del>	75%	X (\$0 - \$20) =	-\$15.000
			<hr/>
			\$22.308

All in all, you should indeed play as factored over every possible outcome you should expect to get \$22.308 on average per game. This is, in other words, a purely frequentist view -- you play the game over and over and over and eventually the winnings will average \$22.308 per round.

## WHY IS THAT SIMPLE?

---

- We took the “expected value”

$$\Pr(X) * X = E(X)$$

- This works when decision making is rational

This worked simply because we calculated the “expected value” by simply multiplying the probability of any particular outcome by the value of that outcome, discounting that outcome, if you will, by the chance of getting it.

This is precisely what a purely rational decision making process looks like.

## NOT ALWAYS SO SIMPLE

---

- Flip a fair coin
  - Heads, I give you \$50,000
  - Tails, you give me \$50,000
- Completely fair, yet few will play

So, let's play a different game. It is completely, completely fair. I flip a coin and one of us gives the other one \$50,000. Despite being fair, few will play.

## A LITTLE HARDER

---

- Flip that fair coin again
  - Heads, I still give you \$50,000
  - Tails, you give me \$40,000
- Odds in your favor; still few will play

Few will play even when the odds favor them rather strongly -- the expected value of this game is \$5,000 positive for you. Nevertheless, except at high-roller tables in Las Vegas, bets of this sort don't come up very often.

# RISK AVERSION


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- The issue is risk aversion
- You can be averse to risks you know
- You can be averse to risks you don't
- You can be blind to one or another risk

The issue is "risk aversion" -- the desire to avoid risk. As it says, that can be risks which you know and understand or it can be otherwise.

# RISK TOLERANCE

Raiffa



How big can  $R$  be  
for you to still play?


$$E = \frac{R}{4} > 0$$

Howard Raiffa used this in his (Harvard Business School) lectures. A fair toss of a fair coin and you get  $\$R$  for heads and you lose  $\$R/2$  for tails; how big an  $R$  will you play for? The expected value is positive throughout at  $\$R/4$ .

Raiffa H: *Decision Analysis*, Addison-Wesley, 1968.

## RISK TOLERANCE, CONT.

Raiffa



$E = \$50$ ; sell for  $\$G$

$G < 50 \Rightarrow$  risk averse

$G = 50 \Rightarrow$  risk neutral

$G > 50 \Rightarrow$  risk loving

$E - G =$  risk premium

A fair toss of a fair coin (the circle symbol) and you win \$100 or you lose nothing. This is certainly in your favor, with an expected value  $E$  of \$50.

What amount of money would you accept to skip the coin toss? If it is, say, \$40 you will note that \$40 is less than \$50 and your risk aversion actually has a name ("risk premium") and a numeric value (\$10). At \$50 exactly, you are exactly risk neutral. Over \$50 and you prefer the risk to the payoff -- you are risk seeking.

# RISK AVERSION

---

Friedman&Savage

- “When facing choices with comparable returns, agents tend to chose the less-risky alternative”
- Risk aversion is why people buy insurance, even though...

There is nothing wrong with risk aversion; it is perfectly natural and it explains why people buy insurance.

Friedman M & Savage LP: "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, v56 pp279–304, 1948.

## RISK AVERSION, CONT.

Baker

Type of gamble	Expected return
Individual health insurance	You lose 40% of each bet
Large group health insurance	You lose 10% of each bet
Roulette	You lose 5% of each bet

If you buy individual health insurance (which, incidentally, it is illegal to sell in Massachusetts), you will generally collect \$60 in benefits for every \$100 in premiums you pay. Large groups tend to suppress the loss, generally to the tune of losing \$10 per \$100 of premium. Roulette is a better bet than either.

[ In the American version, there are 38 slots of which 2 (0,00) are for the house and the payout is 35-to-1:  $(35 - 37)/38 \times 100 = -5.26\%$  The European version has only one (0) which is for the house, and it, too, pays at 35-to-1:  $(35 - 36)/37 \times 100 = -2.70\%$  ]

Baker S: course notes, Univ. of South Carolina, 2001, at <http://hspm.sph.sc.edu/COURSES/ECON/RiskA/RiskA.html>

## TERM OF ART

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- Read annual report for BC/BS
  - The “Medical Loss Ratio”  $\cong 90\%$
  - $1-MLR \cong 10\% \equiv$  your expected loss
- Unless you lose, BC/BS goes bankrupt
  - Your risk aversion makes the business

If you read the annual report for a health insurer like Blue Cross Blue Shield, find the phrase “medical loss ratio” which is the converse of your loss ratio; 90% for them is 10% for you, but if it wasn't your loss they wouldn't still be in business.

## USE IN SECURITY

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- Can we understand the risk tolerances of our clients?
- Can we make security decisions based on risk pricing?
- Do we see risk-aversion or -seeking?

So, let's ask, does this have use in security? Is the risk tolerance of our clientele something we can gauge or, to the point, make decisions on or with? Are our consumers risk-averse (as they probably are or they would not hire us)?

# SECURITY RISK TOLERANCE

---

- What are the gains and losses that we are working with in security?
- That's part of the problem, we are not all that ready for risk management
  - Information poor  $\Rightarrow$  risk averse
  - We need to be less poor

And what are those tolerances for risk?

We don't know. In fact, we don't know much. Here's one of the crystalline truths in this entire lecture: Being more information poor makes you more risk averse.

## GETS TO THE HEART OF IT

---

- Risk aversion is why a General Counsel will say that if you could have lost data you have act as if you did
- Risk aversion is why some keep no records
- What is your reputation worth?

A bank in New York had a Chief Information Security Officer. This CISO wanted to invest in identity management. The system involved cost real money. The CISO got the money by asking what is essentially a risk aversion question: "This investment is worth it if the reputation capital of the firm is at least as much as one basis point of our market cap" (basis point = .01%). No officer of that bank was willing to bet the reputation of the firm as being worth less than .01% of the market value of the firm, and so the CISO got his identity management system. True story.

**MINING WHAT WE HAVE**

## SECURITY METRICS

---

- How do we get less information poor?
- What is our starting point?
- How do we measure success?
- What are the minimum assumptions?
- When does the game end?

So let's try this again... How do we, in fact, get to be less information poor given that we are starting from where we are, there are assumptions to be made, success is itself a measurement question and while this may be a life's work for some of us may it please the Court that the game at least end at some point.

# “LAWS OF LOG ANALYSIS”

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Ranum

1. Never keep more than you can conceive of possibly looking at
2. The number of times an uninteresting thing happens is an interesting thing
3. Keep everything you possibly can except for where you come into conflict with the First Law

Marcus Ranum's three laws of log analysis according to Marcus Ranum, found variously, e.g., <http://seclists.org/lists/firewall-wizards/2004/Oct/0018.html>

Ranum built the first firewall, which became DECSeal.

# WHERE TO START

---

- Steal techniques from other fields
- Mine data we have at least
- Make testable hypotheses
- Share data where we can

So, to be less information poor what do we do? We steal from other fields, that's what we do, and we will never again have as many security practitioners trained in other fields as we do today. While they are still present, let's mine their brains, let's examine data we already know how to collect before we tackle data we don't know how to collect and by all means let's put up some hypotheses to prove or disprove.

## VIRTUOUS THEFT, AGAIN

---

- Public Health
- Insurance
- Accelerated Failure Time testing
- Portfolio Management
- Physics

These are just examples of fields from which we can steal.

# **PUBLIC HEALTH**

# PUBLIC HEALTH

---

- Concern is disease spread, not disease
- Does not require knowledge of causality if control is possible without it
- Epidemiology “invented” by tracing cholera’s transmission
- Focus on practical intervention, e.g., hygiene

Public health concerns itself with the spread of disease regardless of whether it is understood; indeed early efforts at community hygiene bore fruit before underlying biology could explain why they did. The classic case is On the Mode of Communication of Cholera, London, 1855, where John Snow concluded what it was that transmitted cholera without knowing what cholera was.

## MECHANISM & STYLE

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- Experimental / interventional
  - lab scientist, entrepreneur, gambler
- Non-Experimental / observational
  - epidemiologist, naturalist, demographer

A lab scientist or an entrepreneur or a gambler intervenes in their world to see what happens. An epidemiologist, a naturalist, or a demographer doesn't intervene but instead observes.

# THINGS TO MEASURE

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- Disease processes
  - Incidence
  - Prevalence
- Generally: density, rate, proportion
- Models correct for biases

If it is public health we are measuring then the states and rates include incidence and prevalence. Where models are relevant is when absent models we have bias that is uncorrectable.

# INCIDENCE

---

BMJ

The rate at which new cases occur in a population during a specified period:

$$I = \frac{\textit{number of new cases}}{\textit{person-years at risk}}$$

The definition of the British Medical Journal.

<http://bmj.bmjournals.com/epidem/epid.2.html>

# INCIDENCE IN SECURITY

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Symantec

- 361 new Win32 viri / week
- 9,163 hosts / day join botnets
- 1.5 new variants of Spybot / hour
- 5,500 phishing e-mails / minute

Symantec Threat Report IX, March, 2006 [ requires registration, and, of course, it is not expressed as incidence the way we express it here. ]

# PREVALENCE

---

BMJ

The proportion of a population that are cases at a point in time:

$$P = \frac{\textit{number of cases}}{\textit{size of population}}$$

British Medical Journal, again.

<http://bmj.bmjournals.com/epidem/epid.2.html>

# PREVALENCE IN SECURITY

---

Symantec

- 85% of today's e-mail is spam
- 56% of today's spam originated in U.S.
- 1 of 119 last year's e-mails were phishes
- 50% of home computers are unpatched

ibid, except that 85% figure is from Message Labs rather than the Symantec report listed earlier

# RELATIONSHIPS

---

$$\textit{Prevalence} = \textit{Incidence} * \textit{Average Duration}$$

$$\text{Bot fraction} = \text{Owned} / t * \text{delay}(\text{patching})$$

How the arithmetic works, and an example from the security world: The fraction of hosts that are members of botnets is the rate at which hosts are Owned times the delay in patching. Symantec's number is 30,000/day while Qualys' number is patching delay of 45 days, on average, hence the Bot-prevalence is 30,000 hosts/day incident times 45 days duration hence 1,350,000 hosts in botnets. This is probably a serious underestimate as detection and duration figures alike are likely low, but it illustrates the idea of the relationship between prevalence, incidence, and average duration.

# PREVALENCE SAMPLING

---

- You cannot have perfect knowledge
  - So you sample
    - You must be aware that you are
- How you sample has impact on what inferences you can draw

As with any sample, you are sampling because perfect knowledge is itself not possible and thus you must attend to how the sampling is done lest the sampling introduce a bias that you did not anticipate and thus do not correct for.

## SAMPLING, 1/3

---

- Sampling fraction  $f = N/M$ 
  - Sample of size  $N$
  - Population of size  $M$
  - If  $M$  is unknown, so is  $f$

The simple form of analyzing a sample.

## SAMPLING, 2/3

---

- For much of what we care about,  $M$  and therefore  $f$  are indeed unknown
- How many computers are there on the Internet?
- How many privately held exploits are there?

In the security arena, we don't know the population size hence it is difficult to estimate the sampling fraction. The two sub-bullets are examples of how hard it is to know what the sampling fraction is. That is not insurmountable in and of itself, but it must be acknowledged in any analysis.

## SAMPLING, 3/3

---

- If  $f$  is unknown but nevertheless stable,  
Then trend data can still be valid:

$$\text{trend}_N \propto \text{trend}_M$$

- Also connects incidence to prevalence

Trends that are true in the population will be equally true in the sample if the sampling fraction is stable.

## SELECTION BIAS

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- $N = Mf$ , again where
  - $N$  = reported incidence
  - $M$  = true incidence
  - $f$  = fraction of vulns reported
- If  $f \neq \text{constant}$  (or just not predictable),  
Then  $\text{trend}_N$  does not track  $\text{trend}_M$

If, however, the sampling fraction is unstable (or, to be precise, not predictable) means that the trends evident in the sample may or may not track any trend truly present in the population at large.

# SECURITY SELECTION BIAS

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Symantec

“Symantec speculates that while the number of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities could decrease, the window of exposure to potential threats could increase [if] details about vulnerabilities are held privately for greater periods of time.”

This is Symantec saying precisely that a sampling fraction instability produces a possibility of misleading inference. If a changing sampling fraction is related to an effect of interest, then trends that are correlated with that effect will be likely misleading.

# EPIDEMICS

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
- Characteristics of infectious processes
  - $\Pr(\text{infection} \mid \text{exposure})$
  - interval from infection to infectious
  - duration of infectiousness
  - interval from infection to symptoms
  - duration of acquired immunity

The math for modeling epidemics is well developed, as is the math for accelerated failure time testing, actuarial science, portfolio management, and others. There is no need, and no time, to invent new science before progress can be made. Steal these skills, and do so while the senior practitioners in security still include people with these sort of skills learned elsewhere.

# EPIDEMICS ARE CHAOTIC

$PR(I|E)=2\%$ ,  $N(E)=50\pm 10\%$

Gladwell



This is simply the example used in Malcolm Gladwell's The Tipping Point, Little Brown, 2000. It illustrates the chaotic nature of epidemics which is to say that small changes in initial conditions produce large changes in downstream values. This example is where the initial number of cases is 1,000, the probability of infection given exposure is 2%, the number of exposure events while infectious is 50 plus or minus 5 (10%), and the downstream shows that in only 20 days at -10% the disease will die out while in only 20 days at +10% the epidemic will be well underway.

## WORST CASE DISEASE

---

- $\text{Pr}(\text{infection} \mid \text{exposure}) = 1.0$
- interval from infection to infectious = 0
- interval of infectiousness = open ended
- interval from infection to symptoms = indef
- duration of acquired immunity = 0 (mutates)
- non-lethal to carriers

If you were designing a pessimal disease, it would be perfectly transmissible (100% chance of getting the disease once exposed and no acquired immunity), no symptomatic sign of infection, and an instantaneous conversion from pre-infection to infectious (or from prey to predator, if you prefer).

The above describes worm propagation, or DDOS zombies, or the stockpiling of unannounced vulnerabilities.

Does the law have an answer for designer disease with pessimal characteristics and self-obscured authors? Is "terrorism" an appropriate model or is it more like mandatory seat belt laws?

# PUBLIC HEALTH STRATEGY

---

- Immunization efficiency
- Limit contacts with the infected
- Slow rates of transmission

To “steal” from Public Health, then, one might also look at strategy. Within that field, strategies around disease control tend to involve immunization efficiency, the limitation of contacts between infected and susceptible individuals, and taking steps that otherwise slow transmission rates.

## USE IN SECURITY

---

- Immunization efficiency
  - Patching trades reliability risk for penetration risk
  - Infections peak at one rev off current
  - Either keep up (immunize) or stay behind (diversify over version)

Infections peak at one revision off of current. Current revisions have fewer attacks probably because they are new; older revisions have few attacks probably because they are old. In other words, either keep up or fall behind.

## USE IN SECURITY, CONT.

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- In any case, measure your own patch latency against
  - Information at risk
  - Organizational features

A direct example of how a measurement tactic would exactly mirror the public health style; information at risk is the analog of susceptibility and organization features relate to the level of contact between the infected and the susceptible.

## USE IN SECURITY, CONT.


---

- Limit contacts with the infected
  - Internal role for quarantine
  - Care-givers need especially to be careful
  - Security products are care givers

Infections spread by contact. Having everyone on a flat network or similarly universally reachable catalyzes transmission rates. Internal segmentation -- often a side effect of regulation anyhow -- serves to limit the number of infectible parties the already infected can contact. In the real world of, say, an Ebola outbreak, it is care givers who suffer most and may represent the most significant transmission vector. Ebola, because of its lethality, is not the best example of transmission but it well illustrates that care givers and themselves be vectors.

# SECURITY TOOLS TARGETED


Yankee Group



Security products have high privilege and market penetration, hence they, too, are attack targets. Symantec is currently the (unfortunately for them) reigning king of attackable vulnerabilities so this chart tells you how a given vendor's number of vulnerabilities in 2003 (horizontal) and 2004 (vertical) compare to the leader (Symantec). For example, CheckPoint had 20% as many flaws as Symantec in 2003 but 40% as many in 2004, meaning it is being could be targeted more. Note that we say "could" - if there is a non-declining percentage of vulnerabilities that are exploited then these vulnerability counts are forward-looking indicators of future attacks. This display is a analytic method that is valuable in many situations; search for "bivariate scatter plot" to see more.


Jaquith A & Singer J, "Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas: The Hackers Turn Pro," Yankee Group Trend Analysis, May 25, 2005.

# SECURITY TOOLS TARGETED




A different analysis using the NVD (national vulnerability database) in its XML form as found at <http://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm>

# SECURITY TOOLS TARGETED




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# SECURITY TOOLS TARGETED




Continuing the analysis using the NVD (national vulnerability database) in its XML form as found at <http://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm>

# TRACKING PERFORMANCE




Converting to time-line form

# TRACKING PERFORMANCE



Converting to time-line form

# TRACKING PERFORMANCE



Converting to time-line form

## USE IN SECURITY, CONT.

---

- Slow rates of transmission
  - Throttle network demand spikes
  - Egress filtering
    - If you wouldn't let it, why would you let it out?

Third, when an infection occurs, do something about rates of transmission. As shown by a team at the U of New Mexico, a sharp uptick in network transmission demand should be met with a sharp reduction in available bandwidth. See "Technological Networks and the Spread of Computer Viruses," Balhrop, et al., Science, v304 n23 p527-52, April, 2004.

## CDC MODEL

---

- Centers for Disease Control
  - Longitudinal trending to calibrate models and identify excess incidence
  - Away teams for emergencies
  - Mandatory reporting of communicable diseases

This is what the Centers for Disease Control do, what makes them what they are. The first item is the one the others are based on -- check into a hospital with Bubonic Plague and medical privacy notwithstanding, your case will be on the CDC's agenda the same day. The mandatory reporting gets them the very data to base longitudinal trend analysis on so that questions like "How many cases of tuberculosis in Atlanta is too many?"

The away teams are for when, say, a hemorrhagic fever like Ebola shows up.

Mandatory reporting is the lynchpin for public health; can we get it for digital security?

## CDC MODEL, CONT.

---

- Share information
  - Cannot tell whether you are a target of choice or chance unless you do
  - Share normal data more than exceptions
  - Include security in DR procedures

If you can, join the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for your sector. Don't expect miracles, but do demand them. Information sharing is a stupendously important thing to do and never easy to get people to do. Corporate general counsels are hard to convince that the short term risk of exposure is worth it since the gain from sharing is diffuse and deferred. If you don't share normal data then questionably abnormal has no comparand. Finally, disaster recovery (DR) plans have to include security as well.

## MANDATORY REPORTING

---

- Can we get this in the digital world?
- Jurisdiction
  - A mess, globalized, define “disease”
- Technical
  - De-identification / anonymization essential?

Mandatory reporting is the lynchpin for public health; can we get it for digital security?

On the jurisdictional side, mandatory reporting in one locale would force events to officially occur in other locales. As to the technical side, no corporate counsel will agree to sharing attack and protection data if he thinks it can be traced back hence de-identification may be a technical requirement.

# MANDATORY REPORTING

---

- But we can get it in the enterprise
- Make sure you do

Mandatory reporting, however hard it is to do at sector-wide or national scale, is possible within the enterprise and is essential for all to do.

# QUARANTINE

---

- Usually managed locally
  - Applies to border control as well
- Requires finding of dangerousness
  - Can be open-ended
- Alternative to vaccination

There is a long history of quarantine powers being reserved to the state, going all the way back to leper colonies two millenia ago. Infection control in hospitals can require quarantine, but in the public health arena everyone has heard of Typhoid Mary.

When the (2004) Witty Worm was imminent, U Cal Berkeley and Lawrence Berkeley Labs took different approaches. UCB warned systems administrators to administer a patch. LBL scanned their computers and only those who had taken the patch were allowed on the network. UCB had 800 infections; LBL had 1. Quarantine works if there are diagnostic tests.

## USE IN SECURITY

---

- “Measure” by scanning for known vulnerabilities
- Isolate them at the switch until they patch
- One good natural experiment

Scanning for known vulnerabilities is a confirming tactic for assessing susceptibility at the population level.

When Witty broke out, there was a 48-hour warning interval. At U Cal Berkeley, lab heads and system administrators were notified and offered the patch. At the nearly identical Lawrence Berkeley Labs (25% the size of UCB), scanning and isolation at the switch was done. The scorecard? At UCB: 800 infections. At LBL: 1 infection.

# VACCINATION

---

- Coverage  $< 100\%$  and / or Effect  $< 100\%$
- Hence a choice whether to
  - Vaccinate against impact
  - Vaccinate against transmission

Because vaccination (patching) is never fully effective, either because of not getting 100% coverage or because the vaccine is not 100% effective, in the public health situation one is left with a choice of whether to steer the vaccination program by impact reduction or by transmission suppression.

## AGAINST IMPACT

---

- Ordering to minimize harm
  - Worst failures get first protection
- Real world: flu vaccine to old / young
- Security: patch important machines first
  - Worst = side effects like data loss

If vaccination against harm, then you supply the vaccine to those who would suffer most. In health, the sick and the weak get first intervention. In security, the juiciest targets (data or control) get first intervention. Scoring this is by relative risk of harm measured before and after or at milestone intervals.

## AGAINST TRANSMISSION

---

- Ordering to maximize herd immunity
  - Prevent replacement of cases
  - Vaccination failure  $\equiv$  Susceptible
- Real world: flu vaccine to nurses / docs
- Security: patch chatty machines first

If vaccinating against transmission, the term of art is “herd immunity” which means what it sounds like -- making the herd immune rather than the individual. In the real world, you vaccinate those most likely to transmit such as care givers themselves. In security, machines with the greatest number of connectable counterparties (perhaps instant messaging servers, say).


## SO WHY PUBLIC HEALTH?

---

- Macro scale effects due to micro scale events
- How many of event X is too many?
- Where are the hot spots?
  - Visualization thus has a role, especially in comparing against baselines

How many of event X is too many and/or “compare and contrast departments by such and such a measure.


# TREEMAP VISUALIZATION



Ben Schneiderman's "Tree Map" is something you probably want to learn about but which is too much for today's discussion to do justice to. His home page, <http://www.cs.umd.edu/~ben/>, has several references.

The picture is fictional data to illustrate how patch latency might be described for management purposes. In this case, it is a location by function breakout where size of a block is scaled to number of seats while the color indicates latency -- in this case black is lowest latency (hence no concern) and runs upward through green, yellow, and finally to red where latency is highest. In this fictitious data set, one might conclude that operations has a common and quite effective latency minimization while US Engineering apparently ignores patching, etc.

# ANOTHER TREE MAP



This is a classic treemap -- one of disk space by file type done, in this case, by [Disk Inventory X], see <http://www.derlien.com/>

# PUBLIC HEALTH LESSONS

---

- Get baseline numbers but be consistent
- Share data where you can
- Keep an eye on anomalies
- At least one of {Quarantine,Immunize}

More interesting/useful information at various sites on the Internet at large, on finance in particular (through the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center), and the CDC's "Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report" which shows what sharing gets the practitioners of the public health discipline.

<http://www.usenix.org/events/sec02/stanford.html>  
<http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/news/2004/nb0419.html>  
<http://www.caida.org>  
<http://www.fsisac.com>  
<http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr>

# INSURANCE

# INSURANCE MODELS

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1. Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE)
2. Market pricing of risk transfer
3. Catastrophe Bonds

The insurance world, often said to be the salvation of security, has three main areas of focus.

# 1. ALE

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$$ALE = \sum_{i=1}^n I(O_i) \times F_i$$

where:

$O_1 \cdots O_n$  = Set of Harmful Outcomes

$I(O_i)$  = Impact of *Outcome<sub>i</sub>* in dollars

$F_i$  = Frequency of *Outcome<sub>i</sub>*

Annualized Loss Expectancy is just a negative expected value summation across all losses (within the fixed time period of one year).

# 1. ALE

---

- Pro:

consistent, unbiased, extracts value from experience, familiar

- Con:

useless absent actuarial tail; also:

$$1 \text{ event} \times \frac{\$10^6}{\text{event}} = 10^6 \text{ events} \times \frac{\$1}{\text{event}}$$

The advantages of ALE are roughly that for any class of events that are widely feared and widely likely, there is an existing body of measured data sufficient to provide consistent, unbiased estimates which are then the basis for financial transactions as needed. However, when the events are rare, or the substrate changes often, this is harder. In the case of digital goods, however, the losses are subject to intentional initiation and automation of technique which does rather change things, as illustrated by the last line of the above.

## 2. TRANSFER MARKET

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- Re-insurance exists to diversify risks by pooling and then trading them
- For unique risks, auction pricing based more on risk aversion of seller than risk seeking of buyer, *i.e.*, over-priced risk

An insurance company diversifies its client base but it also lays off a portion of its risk -- all with an eye to avoiding a level of retained risk that is a threat to the capital base. When the risks being laid off are numerous and subject to calculations by both buyer and seller, they are tradable commodities. When they are unique, the seller's risk aversion, expressed as a risk premium demanded by the buyer, means that sellers will generally have to accept payment for the transferred risk that is less than their own valuation of it.

### 3. CATASTROPHE BONDS

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- If no catastrophe,  
Then acts like a high yield bond
- If defined catastrophe does occur,  
Then principal diverted to beneficiaries

*Main backstop for Florida hurricane coverage*

When the market refuses to sell insurance, such as did occur after the Loma Prieta (California, 1989) earthquake, an alternative is to seek not insurers but investors who buy “catastrophe bonds.” Cat bonds pay a high rate of interest and are for fixed intervals. If, during that interval, no catastrophe occurs, the investors receive their capital back at the end of the bonded period. If the catastrophe does occur, then the capital is not returned, the bond effectively defaults, and the funds are diverted to defined beneficiaries for the mitigation of the catastrophe. Florida hurricane coverage is still available as insurance but cat bonds are the stop-loss backstop to much of the coverage.

# INSURANCE

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- Risk aggregation
  - Consistent with zero loss history
  - Undermines premium pricing
  - Inherent to intentionally unique assets
  - Exacerbates cascade failure (impact on DR)

Insurance has an extremely valuable concept: “risk aggregation.”

Risk aggregation undermines a portfolio as it makes the appearance (in time) of claims be correlated with events that may not have yet occurred. No writer of homeowners’ insurance wants closely adjacent houses lest if one burns down the other will, too. Worse still, no writer of homeowners’ insurance wants to discover that an earthquake burns down all the houses in an entire county. The problem is, without a long actuarial tail, it is not possible to disambiguate a history of zero insurable losses with an event where all individual risks are globally correlated but which has yet to occur.

The scariest digital risk is loss of an intentionally unique asset. The most uncontrollable digital risk is cascade failure.

## RISK AGGREGATION: UNIQUE ASSETS

---

- Pre-condition: Concentrated data / comms
- Ignition: Targeted attack of high power
- Counter: Defense in depth, Replication
- Requires: The resolve to spend money

For unique assets to be a risk at the national scale, you need the pre-condition of some high concentration of data, communications, or both. The ignition of that risk is a targeted attack of high power up to and including the actions of nation states. The counter to this latent risk is “defense in depth” which may include replication. Defense in depth is ultimately (at the policy level) a referendum on the willingness to spend money.

As such, there is nothing more to say at the general level and we lay this branch of the tree aside so as to focus on the other.

## IMPLICATIONS: UNIQUE ASSETS

---

- Where possible, create abstraction layer
  - Purpose: redundancy
  - Side effect: load balancing
- Run on single purpose machines
  - Share no additional risk; you can't afford it

For your unique assets, your best bet is redundancy. If the  $\text{Prob}(\text{failure})=m$ ,  $n$ -way redundancy changes that to  $\text{Prob}(\text{failure})=m^n$ , a result which assumes your redundancy does not create monocultural cascade failure possibilities. Note that the Internet's Domain Name Service (DNS) is 13-way redundant and the implementations at each of the 13 root name servers are different, radically so in general.

Also, do not inherit risks you don't need. If the  $\text{Prob}(\text{failure})=m$  for your service but other things on the current machine could cause machine failure with  $\text{Prob}=x$ , then the  $\text{Prob}(\text{success})$  for your service is  $[1-((1-m)(1-x))]$ . Taking  $m=10^{-4}$  and  $x=10^{-2}$ , a combined machine has  $\text{Prob}(\text{failure})$  of .989901 or close to the value of  $x$ , not  $m$ .

Take a Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) for example; its security must be paramount so you must run it on a single host running nothing else. However, the absence of the KDC service cascades to all other services relying upon it, so it must be replicated. To avoid creating new failure modes, you run with one master and several slaves so as to trade the diminished operation (no password changes if the master is offline) for avoiding an overall absence of Kerberos service.

## RISK AGGREGATION: CASCADE FAILURE

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
- Pre-condition: Always-on monoculture
- Ignition: Any exploitable vulnerability
- Counter: Risk diversification, not replication
- Requires: Resolve to create heterogeneity

For cascade failure to be a risk at the national scale, you need the pre-condition of an always-on monoculture. The ignition of that risk is an attack on vulnerable entity within the always on monoculture so long as it has a communication path to other like entities. The counter to this latent risk is risk diversification which absolutely does not include replication. Cascade avoidance is ultimately (at the policy level) a referendum on the resolve to treat shared risk as a real cost, per se.

We now follow this branch to see where it leads. Sean Gorman of George Mason University has an upcoming publication that suggests that the risk-cost of homogeneity kicks in at rather low densities (preliminary results indicate 43% for leaf nodes, 17% for core fabric).

# CASCADE FAILURE THRESHOLD

Gorman



This graph is the result of a simulation where a monoculture of hosts is increasingly infected with malware that prevents further communication with that host. The point is the discontinuity at 43%, and the planning implications of that (such as to avoid having more than 43% of any particular platform in the total mix of platforms within a single enterprise).

Source: Gorman SP, Kulkarni R, Schintler L & Stough R, "Is Microsoft a threat to national security? The effect of technology monocultures on critical infrastructure", George Mason University, Infrastructure Mapping Project Working Paper, 2004.

## MONOCULTURE AS CASCADE

---

$$\begin{aligned} \text{let} \quad & \text{sizeof}(\text{enterprise}) = y \\ \text{and} \quad & \text{Pr}(\text{individual\_infection}) = x \\ \text{hence} \quad & \text{Pr}(\text{no\_individual\_infection}) = 1 - x \\ & \text{Pr}(\text{no\_group\_infection}) = (1 - x)^y \\ & \text{Pr}(\text{group\_infection}) = 1 - (1 - x)^y \end{aligned}$$

we want LD50:  $x \mid y$  such that  $\text{Pr}(\text{group\_infection}) = 50\%$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{which means:} \quad & .50 = 1 - (1 - x)^y \\ (1 - x)^y & = .50 \\ (1 - x) & = \sqrt[y]{.50} \\ x & = 1 - \sqrt[y]{.50} \end{aligned}$$

This may be akin to beating a dead horse, but you are welcome to work through the math which, in turn, is the basis for the next page.

What we want to know is this: For a given enterprise size ( $y$ ) how much risk can each desktop separately have before there is a greater than even chance of a cascade failure of the enterprise as a whole.

Notation:  $\text{Pr}(A)$  is the Probability of  $A$ ; LD50 is the Dose which will prove Lethal to 50% of the experimental animals.

## CASCADE TRIGGERING

---

Internet:  $n(\text{websites}_{total}) \approx 25 \times 10^6$

For  $y = 5,000$ ,  $x \approx \frac{1}{7,200}$

$n(\text{websites}_{infected}) = x \times 25 \times 10^6 \approx 3,500$

For  $y = 100,000$ ,  $x \approx \frac{1}{144,000}$

$n(\text{websites}_{infected}) = x \times 25 \times 10^6 \approx 175$

This is a fabricated example, but it illustrates how much voltage is on the wire unless there are some resistors and capacitors to damp it out.

If we estimate the total number of websites as twenty-five million and we have the somewhat fanciful idea that every person in the enterprise visits one of them at random, then a cascading monoculture within the enterprise means that the LD50 for five thousand seats is .00014 so that if there are at least 3,400 infected web sites amongst the twenty-five million the odds favor the enterprise getting an infection. For one hundred thousand seats, if there are at least 175 infected web sites then the odds of infection are at least fifty percent.

## IMPLICATIONS: CASCADE FAILURE

---

- Perimeter-centric defensive posture
  - Anything that stops propagation: platform diversity, network segmentation
- Decision: ingress or egress filtering?
  - Attacking customers is especially bad

Avoiding cascades is about putting up roadblocks to the easy flow of hostile bits, regardless of the particulars of how those bits are sourced, organized, or targeted. This is where insurance mindsets and public health mindsets are much the same; public wants to stop propagation while insurance wants to limit propagatability.

Head of worldwide operations, NYC investment bank, said “Last year, we stopped 75,000 inbound viruses but I am prouder that we stopped 500 outbound ones.” Parsing that, this individual is saying that in decision analytic terms the “utility” of stopping an outbound virus is 150-to-1 that of stopping an inbound virus. Two orders of magnitude -- sounds about right though maybe three would be better. If that is not convincing, consider active attacks outbound and not just propagating attacks outbound.

## USE IN SECURITY

---

- Today: business continuity policies
- Tomorrow: track evolution of liability
- *AIG netAdvantage*: security & privacy liability, cyber extortion & terrorism, injury to information assets, business interruption, crisis communication

Three papers from <http://www.infosecon.net/workshop/> are relevant here.

In one, the authors show that the risk due to platform monoculture is mitigated by introduction of a second platform even if that second platform is itself less secure than the first, i.e., diversity alone results in reduced firm-wide risk. In the the second paper, it is argued on social capital grounds that the public policy consequence of a monoculture must be mandatory sharing of vulnerability and incident data. In the third paper, a full-tilt, academic-grade mathematical economics argument is made for differential insurance premiums for diversity as a counter to risk-correlation.

AIG, a leading insurer, has been first to market with a number of digital security offerings; <http://www.aignetadvantage.com/>

**ACCELERATED FAILURE  
TIME TESTING**

# AFT TESTING

---

- Measurement drives reproducibility
- What is the difference between a pen test and Underwriters' Labs?
- The most important calibrator is level-of-effort to subvert

Once again, the need for metrics is clear and only if we measure can we achieve reproducibility.

Note that a penetration test is just like what Underwriters' Laboratories does with, say, a toaster. The question is not whether UL can break a toaster, of course they can. The question is whether putting the handle up and down 5,000 times breaks the toaster or whether it takes 10,000 times.

The most important measure, hands down, is the level of effort to penetrate -- what does it take the penetrator to achieve his aim? This allows two important things, relative ordering of like products or like threats --and-- a way to assess whether a proposed mitigation is against something that is worth mitigating, e.g., mitigating against takeover by a national laboratory is not a reasonable strategy for a taxi-cab company.

# AFT TESTING

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
- Tests known, established modes of failure
- Doesn't exist to test if failure can happen
- Tests what it takes to cause failure
  - Ex: slam a car door until it falls off

An important point: AFT requires that you know what you are looking for. It does not discover whether a failure can happen given the particular stress but rather how much of that stress does it take to cause the (inevitable) failure.

This can be a quantitative result, like "It takes 7,500 door slams on average to fatigue the hinge post enough to sag the door beyond operational limits." This can also be a qualitative result, like "Direct contact between swords A and B showed that B sustains damage at a rate faster than A and will thus fail first in actual use."

# QUALITY V. SECURITY

---



The picture (from Doctor Dobbs' Journal) of what makes quality and security so similar but so distinct: Where there is a design requirement but no implementation there is a quality fault. Where there is an implementation but no design requirement, there is a security fault. The strategy for forcing early failure is different if what you are looking for is a design point that was not correctly implemented versus an implementation fact that was not in the original design.

# AFT TESTING

---

- Closest to QA in style
  - ... and can be built into QA procedures
- Assume failure
  - Build in rollover
  - Mandatory upgrade, anti-retention for MSFT Windows Media Player

This is the closest of all these measures to what a quality assurance engineer would recognize. You load a server until it degrades, you increase transaction rate until you saturate ("TPC"), and so forth. The idea is to assume failure and to prepare for it.

Ignoring any questions of who owns what, for some time the MSFT Windows Media Player has had features of mandatory upgrade (if an upgrade is available, the user must accept that upgrade) and anti-retention (if an upgrade is taken, the previous version must be deleted). Within the corporate environment, similar policies are often in place even if not formalized in contractual language.

See: Arbaugh W, Fithen W, & McHugh J, "Windows of Vulnerability: A Case Study Analysis," IEEE Computer, v33 n12 p52-59, December, 2000; <http://computer.org/computer/co2000/rz052abs.htm>

## EXAMPLE: LOPHTCRACK

---

- LOPHTcrack breaks passwords
  - Tells you how easy passwords are
  - Tells you who hasn't got the message
  - Tells you gross percentages
  - Permits divisional comparisons

LOPHTcrack, now known as LC5, is available from Symantec (having bought @stake having bought LOPHT Heavy Industries). It is the admitted best such commercially available tool.

## EXAMPLE: LOPHTCRACK

---

- Actual metrics (across \_\_\_\_\_)
  - Average time to break
  - Percentage breakable in X minutes
  - Quartile analysis (*see later slides*)
- Optional:
  - controlled trial of awareness program

These are examples of what you can measure, such as to compare roles (authorization levels) for the average time to break their passwords, to compare departments on the percentage of their passwords that are breakable over a lunch hour, and to look at the spread in results using quartile analysis (which we demonstrate later).

As an option, measure average time to break for two groups and then for one of those groups apply user awareness training then wait a month and then re-measure. You have a “case-control” study of the effectiveness of (back to public health) immunization against poor password choice.

## IMPLICATIONS...

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- Measure level of effort to break
  - Compare to tolerable attacks
- Use that for comparative analysis
  - Is risk correlated with job / site / shift?
- Keep at it and do longitudinal analysis
  - Is progress being made?

The reason to know level of effort to break is to compare that to what is tolerable risk.

The reason to compare across various lines in the business is to focus attention on remediation. If your internal network is flat and all your firewalls are good but one, then what is your perimeter really? Order your divisions and attend to them in that order.

Back to those original questions, "Am I better off than I was this time last year?," one sees the point of longitudinal (time trend) analysis. Public health touched on that as well with the difference that it is an observational regime around inherited risk whereas accelerated failure time testing is an intentional provocation of

# AFT LESSONS

---

- Remove low hanging fruit
- Decision support comes from comparisons
- Relative vulnerability is valuable

When an event is inevitable eventually, your best effort is to compress that time to event so that you can reduce its chance of actually happening by understanding the risk factors that would make it come sooner. This amounts to removing the (cliche alert) “low hanging fruit” opportunistic attacks rely upon.


Doing such work over and over allows comparisons either across definable sub-groupings of the firm or longitudinally across time. Either way, you get a relative vulnerability ordering and that alone is sufficient for decision support in security operations.

For more on relative vulnerability, see: Cowan C, “Relative Vulnerability: An Empirical Assurance Metric,” Workshop on Measuring Assurance in Cyberspace, June 26, 2003, Monterey, California, at <http://www.laas.fr/IFIPWG/Workshops&Meetings/44/W1/10-Cowan.pdf> and, later, <http://www.homeport.org/~adam/shmoocon/shmoocon-cowan.pdf>

# **PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT**

# PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT

Maginn & Tuttle



A classic formulation from a classic text, as first proposed in Jaquith A, "Learning from Wall Street: Risk Management for Applications," *Secure Business Quarterly*, Q2 2002; see [http://www.sbg.com/sbg/app\\_security/sbg\\_app\\_wall\\_street.pdf](http://www.sbg.com/sbg/app_security/sbg_app_wall_street.pdf)

Source: Maginn DL & Tuttle DW, *Managing Investment Portfolios, 2nd edition*, 1990, Warren Gorham & Lamont.

## PORTFOLIOS FOR SECURITY

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- Hedging-like ideas, such as
  - DHS says “Orange” ⇒ adjust knobs
  - Diversify risk
  - If future uncertain, invest for flexibility
- Hard to find “leading security indicators”

Perhaps illustrating that this is an idea whose time has come, analysts are now touting portfolio management ideas for security management. The first known reference, by the Giga Group, is at [http://www.cio.com/analyst/012502\\_giga.html](http://www.cio.com/analyst/012502_giga.html); there are others, of course.

# PORTFOLIO THEORY

---

- Risk is a commodity that can be
  - Classified
  - Measured
  - Priced
  - Traded
- Portfolios balance the risk of multiple investments

The point for financial types is to get risk into commodity status, keep it there, and make some money. Risk as understood in finance is not bad so long as it is priced correctly and hedged adroitly. The job of the portfolio manager is to balance the aggregate risk of multiple investments in the portfolio.

# PORTFOLIO RISK HANDLING


---

- Security analytics measure portfolio performance
- Drive return on security investment (ROSI) calculations
- Feed back into risk quantification

This is harder to get just right than it sounds, but also easier to get started.

# EXAMPLE OF USE

Maginn & Tuttle



Let's work an example using just the performance measurement / attainment of objectives part of this.

**...A LITTLE EXAMPLE  
USING POOLED DATA...**

Real life example from published literature over the next several slides.

Geer DE, Jaquith A, & Soo Hoo K : "Information Security -- Why the Future Belongs to the Quants," IEEE Security & Privacy, v1 n4 p24-32, July/August, 2003.

# QA LIT ON LEVEL OF EFFORT

---

## Relative cost to fix issues, by stage

Design	1
Implementation	6.5
Testing	15
Maintenance	100

*Implementing Software Inspections*, IBM Systems Sciences Institute, IBM, 1981

## Software development costs, by stage

Design	15%
Implementation	60%
Testing	25%

*Architectures for Software Systems*, course Notes, Garlan & Kazman, CS, CMU, 1998


The IBM study (by Barry Boehm) said that \$1 in design bought as much as \$100 did in field maintenance, and this was for a time when product lifecycles were more relaxed than they are now and location-independent attack was impossible. More can be found in his book, Software Engineering Economics, Prentice Hall, 1981.

The Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon arrived at the other numbers by measuring practice, not as a proscription for what to do.

# DATA ACQUISITION



@stake

## Application Penetration Testing Approach



This is the standard methodology of a well known security company to penetration testing applications. It does not matter what the approach is precisely, but it does matter that this approach was used on many, many engagements hence bias of observation can be analyzed away since all data that was collected under this methodology had the same biases.


# SECURITY DEFECTS COMMON



First finding from pooling: Security defects are common. The nine categories have sixty particular defects amongst them (genus & species). The rightmost column is how many engagements had any occurrence of each of the sixty, with the result ordered by the percentage thereof.

It also illustrates that when doing measurement you actually do have to make assumptions: If a design says “must be resistant to hostile input” and the implementation is vulnerable to hostile input, then that is treated here as an implementation fault. If, on the other hand, the design is silent on hostile input and consequently the implementation is vulnerable thereto, then that is treated here as a design fault. Oh, and a “serious design fault” is one which produced an above–median risk which, if exploited, also produced an above–median impact.


# BUT LEADERS HAVE FEWER



Second finding: There is a real difference between the top quartile and the bottom quartile.

In the first finding, it was a binary decision of whether an engagement found any of a flaw type. In this finding, we count flaws per engagement. Then, for each type, we divide the population into quartiles (four equal sized buckets). By comparing the lowest quartile to the highest, you then get a sense of spread and range for the measure at hand. In this case, it is the count of flaws per engagement by each of the nine categories (genus) of risk. As you can see, incidence and ratios of incidence vary a lot. Cryptographic algorithms have a small range of flaw density while the greatest ratio is that of Sensitive data handling. If you assume that your environment is a leader, then the above suggests you might concentrate your efforts on Input validation; if you assume that your environment is a laggard, then instead you might focus on Authentication and access control. And so forth.


# LEADERS HAVE LESS RISK



Third finding: Leaders not only have fewer out and out flaws, it translates into less business risk.

Business risk was assessed on an ordinal scale, 1–5, with 1 as lowest risk and 5 as highest. We invented the scale, using an odd-number of categories (which is recommended) and in parallel did one for ease of exploit and one for business impact. After assignment of a score to each vulnerability on both those scales, we summed up the risks for a composite “business adjusted risk score.” While the details do matter, see the paper for them. The point is that we then compared BAR scores, again by quartiles, in the form you see above (which is called a “waterfall” graph). Now we’re getting somewhere: If we can price the cost of moving a given system from the bottom quartile to the top, we can say that the cost effectiveness of doing, say, better session management is \$XYZ for an 88% reduction in risk versus \$ABC for a 20% reduction in risk for better information gathering.


# EARLY INVESTMENT PAYS



Fourth finding: Early money is better than late money, and is so as measured by returns on security investment.

Going back to the 1981 IBM study and the 1998 CMU course notes, we combine the fees charged by the consulting firm for the risks found. Since clients hired the consulting firm at various stages, we can say whether the dollars involved in that hiring were expended at one of the three stages of product lifetime. Looking at BAR reductions but asking how the money would have changed had the work been done at a different stage of product lifetime, we finally come to a net return curve that looks like this. It is likely that 21%/15%/12% are wrong, but the shape is right -- it really does pay in classic economic terms to find your flaws early. Real data.


# RISK MIGRATION, 1/2



This is the amount of risk per assessment, separated by quartiles, and graphed over time. The news is apparently quite good with advances on all fronts.

That work continued over three years during which the four quartiles of customers all cleaned up their acts, presumably under the influence of the consulting reports they were getting. This is good news. The three years shown are simple what was covered in the referenced paper; the work continues.

## RISK MIGRATION, 2/2



This is the same graph, but normalized to the best quartile. Now you can see that although risk is declining for each quartile (the good news), the first quartile is getting better faster than the fourth quartile and thus the ratio between the best and the worst is broadening over time.

The implications of this are arguably profound -- If you are doing a good job at this (systemic) risk reduction, then the fraction of your total risk that is due to your counterparties (the unique risk) is rising. Were we talking about medicine we could doubtless agree that if we were to cure heart disease then cancer would become even more important than it now is; that is what you see here. By normalizing to the best quartile we have removed nearly all measurement artifacts that might affect our inferences; the inferences remaining are perhaps weaker but less likely to be artifacts. Divergence of risk is a solid finding.

# PORTFOLIO LESSONS

---

- Need broad market measures
- Aim of analysis is to heighten contrasts
- It is possible to price risk
- Define your risk first, then your metrics

To have a portfolio measure of any sort you need a broad measure of the market within which the portfolio lies. Whether this is direct data sharing, implicit data sharing with a common trustee third party, or is limited to divisional difference within a single enterprise, you must have an aggregate comparand.

Regardless of the comparand, the point of analysis is to heighten contrasts. This is directly consistent with looking for leverage in a set of candidate financial transactions. The examples given here -- of quartile, waterfall, non-parametric ordinal assignments to categories, etc. -- are just examples. There are many alternatives. Do some exploratory data analysis.

The bottom line is that it is possible to price risk, even if (as was shown) what you are pricing is relative risk reductions against a baseline for which there is no known calibration.

# PHYSICS

# PHYSICS OF NETS

---

- Random connectivity – like it sounds
  - Maximal resistance to targeted faults
- Scale free – looks the same at any scale, like fractals
  - Maximal resistance to random faults

A rather startling result in the physics literature has mathematically shown that a network design has to trade off vulnerability to random faults and vulnerability to targeted faults, that it is not possible to be maximally resistant to random component failure without creating the conditions in which targeted attacks cause outscale connectivity losses just as it is not possible to be maximally resistant to targeted attacks without creating the conditions in which random faults cause outscale connectivity losses.

See a short discussion at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scale-free\\_network](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scale-free_network) or Albert-Laszlo Barabasi's book, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else, Morgan Kaufmann, 2004.

# IMPLICATIONS

---

- Cannot be optimal for both random/ targeted
- Internet is scale free hence throttling is only response to traffic surges....
- Corporate networks tend not to be scale free, but this increases vulnerability to random faults

This is the impact of the insight in the physics literature on scale-free networks. The claim that the Internet is scale free is in fact true -- measurement of Internet connection patterns is what brought the original authors to the conclusion that the Internet was scale free, not the other way around (that is, the measure was not to confirm theory; rather the theory grew out of measurement).

If a network is intentionally scale-free, then targeted faults can have substantial impact. Mitigating that means having some mechanism to throttle demand, and that is the case in many commercial ISPs who will not let traffic volume rise too steeply whether inbound or outbound (relative to their peering points with other ISPs).

Corporate networks tend to be designed a bit more, not accreted by the near-random process that grow scale-free networks. As such, they may well be more resilient to targeted attacks but by the theoretic result, this means that they have a compensating rise in vulnerability to random faults, perhaps explaining the necessity for a network operations center (NOC).

## VIRAL PERSISTENCE


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- Threshold effects
  - Below threshold, die out
  - Above threshold, persist indefinitely
- Strongly affected by connectivity, spreading rate, and application of countermeasures
  - On scale-free net, connectivity dominates

None of this should be surprising, but the physicists develop these ideas with particular rigor. The reason they find their results surprising is that with the scale-free property connectivity so dominates that it becomes likely that old viruses never die, i.e., there is not really a minimum threshold of infection required to sustain a virus' presence in the Internet at large.

Source: Pastor-Satorras R & Vespignani A, "Epidemic spreading in scale-free networks", Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 3200, 2001.

# IMMUNIZATION $\Leftrightarrow$ HALF-LIFE



Posting a patch starts a race wherein the patch is reverse-engineered to produce exploits. The two data points are intended to bracket current reality. In the one case, if patching does have a one-month half-life while the reverse engineering interval is 90 days, then the susceptibility would be 12% at the moment of exploit. By contrast, if patching has a three-month half-life while the reverse engineering interval is one week, then the susceptibility would be 94% at the moment of exploit.

Time-to-exploit is shrinking while the time-to-patch is lengthening (if you factor in the growth of always-on, always-connected home machines) so the question becomes whether “mandatory” is a word we must use and, if so, what would it mean?

## IMPLICATIONS

---

- Like thermodynamics
  - Can't win, break even, or get out of game
- Perfection is clearly unobtainable
- Relative vulnerability (ordinal scale) works
- Thresholds exist

With the brusqueness of physics, the point is obviously that security will not be perfect hence relative vulnerability is likely to be the actual measure of choice. As said at the outset, a relative vulnerability focus is admitting that an ordinal scale is all we are going to get or, in brighter language, we are able to get an ordinal scale and with that there are lots of things we can do.

Physics shows us that there are thresholds, e.g., for viral persistence, for connectivity as both a value and a source of risk, and so forth. Having physics to occasionally fall back on is actually reassuring as nothing else has the same rigor, the same swagger, as physics.

# PHYSICS: THEORY V PRACTICE

---

- Does scale free actually happen?
  - Not exactly, but almost
- What does happen?
  - Design optimality for use cases but otherwise scale free

This scale free network model may or may not apply to real networks. It probably does not wherever policy tends to trump free choice of interconnection. However the lesson that optimality tradeoffs around what sort of threat you are resistant to and what are you not is worth repeating. The reference below, which hard reading, adds that you can do better in designing a network for effective bandwidth and resistance to faults but only if you design for that rather than permitting random interconnection. This remains an area of theoretic debate, but there are lessons to be learned now and no doubt lessons to be learned later.

Doyle JC, Alderson DL, Li L, Low S, Roughan M, Shalunov S, Tanaka R, and Willinger W : "The 'robust yet fragile' nature of the Internet," Proceedings National Academy of Sciences, v102 p14497-14502, <http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/102/41/14497.pdf>

## USE IN SECURITY

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- Must choose what to optimize
- Time constants and connectivity matter
- Make models you can test

As the scale-free versus designed network discussion shows, optimizing for one variable not unsurprisingly may well de-optimize another. So long as you are watching all the dials, that is no problem. So watch all the dials.

What physics has told us is mostly about the interplay between connectivity and time, which are both perhaps related to propagation of change whether that change is for the better (as in a patch management system) or for the worse (as in a geometrically propagating worm). Physics also tells us the importance of having a testable theory, a sense of the big picture yet in simple terms. That is hard to do, but it is so powerful when it obtains.

**OTHER**

## OTHER AREAS TO MINE

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- Hurricane models; property & casualty insurance *v.* building codes
- Bio-informatics applied to protocol analysis
- Sensor networks
- “Value at Risk” simulations

Perhaps in the next revision of these notes we will explore all of the above, which is, as well, not a complete list. The field is wide open to you to innovate yourself.

See <http://www.wired.com/news/infostructure/0,1377,65191,00.html> for more ideas.

# MODELLERS V MEASURERS

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## modelers

Risk equations

Loss expectancy

Linear algebra

Attack surfaces

Information flow

Economic incentives

Vendors

Why

## measurers

Empirical data

Time-series analysis

Correlation

Essential practices

Information sharing

Economic spending

Enterprises

Before and after

As you think on these topics, ask yourself if you are a modeler or a measurer. The [discuss@securitymetrics.org](mailto:discuss@securitymetrics.org) mailing list has -- with this result of how to tell.

Yes, this is only the security field's version of Isaiah Berlin's famous essay which is highly recommended; Berlin I : [The Hedgehog and the Fox](#), Simon & Schuster, 1953.

# TREND ANALYSIS

# TREND

---

OECD

A long-term movement in an ordered series, say a time series, which may be regarded, together with the oscillation and random component, as generating the observed values

<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/search.asp>



## SELECTION BIAS HERE?


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- Open question
  - NAT causes under-estimate
  - Multi-homing causes over-estimate
- Are the above fractions changing?
  - If so, there is selection bias

So, does the estimate of total Internet hosts exhibit selection bias? Of course it does: network address translation (NAT) makes a raft of hosts appear as one while multi-homed hosts, having as they do multiple addresses, can cause over-estimate. However, if either or both of these is true it is of no import so long as the fractions are relatively stable.


# TREND IS WHAT MATTERS

ISC




It is the trend that matters. Ignore the ordinate (Y axis) and look at the shape.

# TREND IS WHAT MATTERS



Without an ordinate, it is easier to look just at the shape.

# TREND IS WHAT MATTERS




Trend is what matters, especially when a model can be fit to it, as is the case here.

By the way, that is a pretty good fit:  $R^2 = .9976$  (coefficient of correlation between the observed data and the fitted curve).

# CYCLIC TRENDS, E.G., BOTS

Symantec




Sometimes trends are cyclic. Symantec views robot network (bot) recruitment as cyclic, here with a period of epidemic spread followed by a period of stabilization until some new attack method appears making possible another cycle of recruitment.

Symantec Threat Report IX, March 2006. Not open source.

# HARMONICS, E.G., PEOPLE

McAfee



**Unique Attackers per Hour with Blaster**

Trends can also be harmonic; here the attack graph for Blaster as provided by McAfee and clearly showing differences between when people are awake versus when they are asleep.

<http://www.hackerwatch.org/checkup/graph.asp>  
<http://www.hackerwatch.org/img/map/worm.png>

## TRENDS DO MATTER

---

- If the street price for meth is declining,  
Then L.E. is losing at drug control
- If price for stolen data is declining,  
Then we are losing at data security

Trends come up in everyday life all the time, such as the example above where law enforcement uses street prices for drugs as a calibrator on whether their control efforts are winning or losing.

Since the price of stolen data seems to be falling, we might as well face up to the fact that we are losing our control problem.


## USE IN SECURITY

---

- Nearly any reproducible metric that has meaning to you can be looked at as a trend
- Trend analysis is a component of decision making, particularly in the case of cost-effectiveness-based decisions

In security, trends are going to often be the best we can do and they are consistent with ordinal scale measurement. As has been said before, if decisions can be made on that basis, trend analysis is good enough and particularly so for cost-effective decision making.

# OVERLOADING TRAFFIC ANALYSIS



This shows the value of a baseline of normal operation against which to judge the worth of further inspection when something else occurs, as demonstrated here. As with public health or fighting forest fires, an outbreak of communicability has its best outcome if it is noticed early. It is a trend on top of a trend -- here size of e-mail versus frequency of e-mail, graphed as a time superimposed time series.

Source: Berinato S, "A Few Good Metrics," CSO Magazine, July 2005; see <http://www.csoonline.com/read/070105/metrics.html>

**TANSTAAFL**

"There Ain't No Such Thing As A Free Lunch" from Heinlein RA : The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress, 1966, which, incidentally, was adopted as a title by economist Milton Friedman.

## A CENTRAL IDEA

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- Cost effectiveness, yes
  - Cost of improvement trend
- Cost benefit, no
  - Cost of intangibles, per se

This is an idea we will now elaborate.

# COST-BENEFIT

---

$$CB_{\text{ratio}} = \frac{\text{Cost}_{\text{new strategy}}}{\text{Benefit}_{\text{new strategy}}}$$

$$CB_{\text{ratio}} < 1.0 \Rightarrow \text{favorable}$$

Cost-benefit ratio is, surprise, the ratio of a cost to the benefit it provides. This is valuable if it is less than 1.0, i.e., you get more benefit than your cost was for getting that benefit.

## COST-BENEFIT

---

- CB asks if you want to spend the money
- Requires pricing benefits in \$\$
  - How much is a human life worth?
  - High quality timber *v.* wilderness?
  - Cheap housing *v.* code compliance?

Cost-benefit analysis requires pricing the cost and the benefit on a common scale so that you can ask whether you would rather have the money (avoid the cost) or the benefit (incur the cost). This can be hard.

# COST-EFFECTIVENESS

---

$$CE_{\text{ratio}} = \frac{\text{Cost}_{\text{new strategy}} - \text{Cost}_{\text{current practice}}}{\text{Benefit}_{\text{new strategy}} - \text{Benefit}_{\text{current practice}}}$$

$$CE_{\text{ratio}} < 1.0 \Rightarrow \text{favorable}$$

Cost-effectiveness analysis asks how much benefit can you get for how much cost.

## COST-EFFECTIVENESS

---

- CE assumes you will spend the money
- CE asks how well you can spend it
  - \$10B: safer cars *v.* law enforcement?
  - \$1M: 100% uptime *v.* instant recovery?
  - \$100: 1 fine dinner *v.* 20 lunches?

Cost-effectiveness assumes that you will, indeed, spend the money and thus your interest is in how much you can get for your money, not whether you'd rather keep your money in the first place.

## CB V. CE IN SECURITY

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- Today's job in measuring security is to enable cost-effective decision making
- We will not answer "What is the value of security?" but rather "How much security can I get for reasonable \$\$?"

Putting a stake in the ground, it isn't whether one would rather keep the money or get the benefit (CB) but rather what good can you do for the budget dollars you have.

CE is always tractable; CB is only tractable or stable when the conversions of benefits to dollars are stable.

# CE EXAMPLE; CONSTANT \$\$

@stake



With fictitious data, this is a guess as to how you might look at a set of CE options. In this picture, one would see that the cost effectiveness of Developer Education is very good indeed, while far from good for biometrics. If your budget situation were that you spent no more than \$X, rightward parts of this option graph might disappear.

## TOTAL COST IS A MIX

---

- Anticipation costs – what you spend to avoid trouble, i.e., prevention
- Failure costs – what you spend to clean up from trouble, i.e., recovery
- Total cost is the sum of anticipation and failure costs

When talking cost, it is good to make sure that you are talking total cost. For security, these costs are of two classes, costs expended to prevent trouble (anticipation) and costs spent to clean up from trouble (failure). Total cost is the sum of both.

# MINIMAX SOLUTIONS


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- You want the maximum advantage for the minimum cost
- You want the most cost-effective strategy for the cost you can endure

The goal you seek is to maximize on variable, the benefit, and to minimize another, the cost. This is what cost-effectiveness seeks to provide. Economists would likely call this optimality and be done with it.

# BEAR V. AVOID

NCMS



Risk transfer is about trading one risk for another; that can be internal as well as external. This picture does not specify, but it illustrates the tradeoff between anticipation (prevention) costs and failures (mitigation) costs. The total cost is the sum of the two and, as the graph shows, spending nothing on anticipation maximizes failures costs just as spending too much on anticipation minimizes failure costs. The saddle point is your management target.

Source: "Costs of Information Assurance," National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, August, 2002; see <http://trust.ncms.org/pdf/CostInfoAssur-NCMS.pdf>

## SETTING MATTERS


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- Little collaboration  
⇒ low failure cost ⇒ spend little
- High collaboration  
⇒ high failure cost ⇒ spend more

One of the things that NCMS points out well is that the level of collaboration you have with your customers, suppliers, and other counterparties affects the cost of failure should you be unable to have that collaboration. If you have little collaboration, you can be offline, say, at little effect. If you have a high degree of collaboration, the effects of being offline are more profound. Were these true, you might have to adjust your spend up or down to reach optimality.

# LOWER COLLABORATION


NCMS



So at low collaboration, the total cost has its minimax point where anticipation costs are minimal because failure costs are also minimal.

# MIDDLING COLLABORATION


NCMS



At middling collaboration, the failure costs have risen so the minimax point has moved rightward.

# HIGHER COLLABORATION

NCMS



At high collaboration, more money still must be spent on anticipation if the minimax point is to be achieved.

## USE IN SECURITY

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- Can set protection levels based on impact of loss, *i.e.*, pure avoidance
- Can pick a tolerance for “offline”
  - Some business continuity policies have deductibles measured in hours
- A chance for business dialog on security

All this is obviously of direct application to nearly any security setting. If you have a loss you are willing to eat (like an insurance deductible), then you can set your protection level accordingly. You can transfer some risk and anticipate other risk while bearing yet another. More to the point, your business people will be able to have a conversation like this.

# **DECISION SUPPORT**

# RETURN ON SECURITY INVESTMENT

---

- Of course you would like to show this
- Of course it is hard
- This where Cost-Effectiveness comes to your rescue

Attempting true rigor in calculating return on security investment (ROSI) can be a time-sink but it is also a fundamentally valid question in a risk management world.

## CE EXAMPLE: ROSI

---

- Use application scanner to manufacture some risk index  $r_a$
- Apply patch, rescan to get  $r_b$
- Determine rollout cost  $c_r$
- Dollars per unit of risk reduction =  $\frac{c_r}{(r_a - r_b)}$

Let's work a simple example.


In this case, we work out a dollar value for each unit of risk reduction. So long as we consistently measure the before and the after, the relative vulnerability of the before and the after can be then used for comparison, as is done here. If you have many different options on what you might do, sample the lot of them, order the results, and just proceed from most cost-effective toward the least.

**THINKING MORE BROADLY  
ABOUT COSTS**

# WHY DO SYSTEMS FAIL?

IDC 2004

● non-security ● security ● applications ● ops errors



IDC, non-open source reference.

## SECURITY AS ~~SURPRISE~~

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If a system is insecure, then  
It will be unreliable, therefore  
Security is necessary for reliability, yet  
Security is insufficient for reliability, ergo  
Security is a subset of reliability.

*Simply, it's necessary but insufficient*

The more mature the infrastructural entity is the more security is a subset of reliability, per the logic above.

The parallel: that if a system is unregulated then it is unpredictable, therefore regulation necessary is for predictability, yet regulation is insufficient for predictability, therefore regulation is a subset of predictability suggests itself. If as correct as the relation between security and reliability, then the question for the law is how to regulate for predictability without damping out innovation or the motivation to improve. This is hardly a new topic, but the digital physics will stress security as a subset of reliability.

As Whit Diffie (Stanford) has observed, computing would become free were it not for security.

# AVAILABILITY

---

US Army

$$\text{Availability} = \frac{\text{MTBF}}{\text{MTTR} + \text{MTBF}}$$

High availability can come from

↑ Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)

↓ Mean Time To Repair (MTTR)

This section drawn from <http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/armymtm/tm5-698-3/glossary.pdf> but see also <http://www.weibull.com/SystemRelWeb/availability.htm>

## MTBF v. MTTR

---

- MTBF anticipates failure so as to avoid it
- MTTR anticipates failure so as to recover
- Neither is cost effective at the margins
- Sum of the two is the TCO of your strategy

Mean Time Between Failures is the measure of the average time between (in our case) security events.

Mean Time To Repair is the measure of the average time to recover from (in our case) a security event.

Making MTBF infinite is infinitely expensive. Making MTTR zero likewise. Neither is the whole answer separately but together you have a risk management decision that permits actual, sane discussion of the Total Cost of Ownership for the security technology and processes that you do deploy.

# CE & AVAILABILITY


US Army

$$A = 1 = \begin{cases} \frac{MTBF}{0+MTBF} & \text{when MTTR} = 0 \\ \frac{\infty}{MTTR+\infty} & \text{when MTBF} = \infty \end{cases}$$

In other words, which is more CE to approach, zero recovery time or infinite uptime?

In some circumstances, your availability improvements are most cost effective when approached through suppressing failures. In others, they may come from shortening repair time. For a space mission, no failures clearly wins. For Google, throwing out a misbehaving board-level Linux blade is the answer.

# RELATIONSHIPS



Note, in case it was not obvious, that “MTBF” is not the same as half-life. This is a side issue, but the exponential curve above says that if MTBF is 1 unit of time that 50% of the component it covers will have died by 0.69 units of time.

“Availability & Reliability Theory,” APC, at <https://ilcsupport.desy.de/cdsagenda/askArchive.php?base=agenda&categ=a0533&id=a0533s1t12/moreinfo>

# REDUNDANCY

---

- If risks are uncorrelated,  
Then redundancy raises Availability
- If risks are correlated and propagable,  
Then redundancy lowers Availability

An important point: If the risk of failure is uncorrelated across multiple instances then redundancy will raise availability (more units will have to fail to break availability). If, however, the risk of failure is correlated and transmissible, then adding units decreases availability.

# 2004 TURING LECTURE

---

Adi Shamir

- Absolutely secure systems do not exist
- To halve your vulnerability, you have to double your expenditure
- Cryptography is typically bypassed, not penetrated

Adi Shamir, the “S” of “RSA,” received the Turing Award in 2004. His acceptance lecture included three points, as above.

[http://www.acm.org/awards/turing\\_lectures\\_project/turing/S/s-pp/shamir\\_1files\\_files/TextOnly/index.html](http://www.acm.org/awards/turing_lectures_project/turing/S/s-pp/shamir_1files_files/TextOnly/index.html)

# LIABILITY

# LIABILITY AS RISK

---

Hand 1947

- Given
  - $P$  = the probability of loss
  - $L$  = the amount of said loss
  - $B$  = the cost of adequate precautions
- Then
  - Liability whenever  $B < PL$

Judge Learned Hand says simply that if it is more cost effective to anticipate and thus prevent a failure than it is to bear the risk, then there is liability for not having done so. This is a precedential case for all of U.S. liability case law.

UNITED STATES et al. v. CARROLL TOWING CO., Inc., et al.; Nos. 96, 97, Dockets 20371, 20372; SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS; 159 F.2d 169; January 9, 1947.

## EX: IDENTITY FRAUD

FTC 2003

$$P = 4.6\%$$

$$L = \frac{3 \times 10^8 \text{ hr} \times \$5.15 / \text{hr} + \$5 \times 10^9}{10^7 \text{ victims}} = \$655 / \text{v}$$

$$P * L = \$30.11 = B_{\text{cutoff}}$$

Is \$30.11 / yr / consumer enough to cure?

Applying Hand's calculus to data from the Federal Trade Commission on identity theft, 4.6% of the population has suffered an identity fraud. In the process, they spent three hundred million hours repairing the troubles caused (priced here at the Federal minimum wage) and they also spent five billion dollars out of pocket. The ten million people involved thus had a \$655 loss per incident. Since the probability (P) of a loss, 4.6%, times the loss (L) of \$655 imposes a burden (B) of \$30.11, the question then is whether it is possible to protect an individual against identity fraud for \$30.11 per annum. If it is, then liability is found. If not, not.

Identity Theft Survey Report, Federal Trade Commission, September, 2003, as found at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf>

## CONTRACT AS PROTECTION

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“[B]y using this product you agree that it’s all your fault, that it’s only broken to the extent that it ships ‘as is’ and therefore if you think it’s broken you accepted that this was the case when you bought it, and anyway you agreed it wasn’t and you didn’t buy it anyway, because it’s still ours...”

This is the wonderfully curmudgeonly UK digital publication “The Register” synopsis of the plain English meaning of most software licenses. Liability can, as ever, be removed by contract as this one tries illustratively doing. See <http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/33082.html>

# SOFTWARE METRICS

# PRICING SOFTWARE

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- COncstructive COst MOdel (COCOMO)
  - Organic - small teams work to less than rigid requirements
  - Semi-detached - mixed teams meet requirements of varying rigidity
  - Embedded - tight hardware, software, and operational constraints

One of several methodologies for producing reliable software at attractive costs, the COncstructive COst MOdel (COCOMO) provides differing advice for three tiers of development teams and requirements, as stated here. Material taken from <http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/COCOMO.html>

## COCOMO EQUATION 1/2

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$$E = \text{person-months} = a(KLOC)^b$$

$$D = \text{chronological months} = c(E)^d$$

$$P = \text{people required} = E/D$$

$KLOC$  = thousand lines of code

Defining three outcome variables, E, D, and P, and noting that software cost is going to be dependent on sheer volume measured in thousands of lines of code.

## COCOMO EQUATION 2/2

---

where  $a$ ,  $b$ ,  $c$  and  $d$  are:

Software project	$a$	$b$	$c$	$d$
Organic	2.4	1.05	2.5	0.38
Semi-detached	3.0	1.12	2.5	0.35
Embedded	3.6	1.20	2.5	0.32

Coefficients derived from practice under a NASA contract to TRW. See original reference to pursue this.

## COCOMO PUNCHLINE

<i>KLOC</i>		1	1,000	100,000
organic	<i>E</i>	2	3,390	426,787
	<i>D</i>	7	55	345
	<i>P</i>	0.3	62	1,238
semi-detached	<i>E</i>	3	6,873	1,194,322
	<i>D</i>	4	55	335
	<i>P</i>	0.8	125	3,566
embedded	<i>E</i>	4	14,332	3,600,000
	<i>D</i>	4	53	313
	<i>P</i>	1.0	268	11,491

A punchline: as projects grown in size they also grow in complexity and requirements, i.e., the path tends to be diagonal as seen here. The chart contrasts 1,000 lines of code with 1,000,000 and then 100,000,000. In the upper left box, we find 500 LOC / person month of effort. In the lower right box, we are down to 27 LOC / person month of effort. This is a complexity tax imposed by a requirement for constant quality.

As this talk is not about software construction, we will move forward, but there is a lot of work to be done on stealing from the quality assurance literature for the benefit of software security.

# FIELD ESTIMATION

## CAPTURE/RE-CAPTURE

---

- $N = \#(\text{population})$
- $n_1 = \#(1^{\text{st}} \text{ capture; mark \& release})$
- $n_2 = \#(2^{\text{nd}} \text{ capture})$
- $m_2 = \#(2^{\text{nd}} \text{ capture found to be marked})$
- “Lincoln Index:”  $\frac{m_2}{n_2} = \frac{n_1}{N} \implies N = \frac{n_1 n_2}{m_2}$

Sometimes, you want to estimate how many frogs there are in a pond. For that you capture some frogs, band them, release them, wait a while, and capture some more frogs. The ratio of frogs captured in the second pass that do or do not have a band tells you what you want to know -- the total number of frogs in the pond, as we shall see. The assumption, and of course there is one, is that your chancing of catching each individual frog is the same.

## USE IN SECURITY

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- Select all e-mails in one hour, say
- Record senders of Bad Mail ( $n_1$ )
- Repeat in one week ( $n_2$  and  $m_2$ )
- Estimate number of violators ( $N$ )

*e.g.*, {41,62,6}  $\Rightarrow$   $\exists$ 424 Bad Mail senders

In security, we might well use this. We would catch all the e-mail outbound in a one hour capture. We'd band (remember) whomever sent bad e-mail by whatever definition we wished to use. At a later time, we'd do this a second time. People who re-appeared from the first time we'd treat as banded. We could now estimate the number of people who are sending bad e-mail.

In the example, forty-one in pass one plus sixty-two in pass two, of which six are repeats, and now we have an estimate of the population of senders of bad e-mail.

## (FOR THE RECORD)

---

- Better to calculate  $N = \frac{(n_1 + 1)(n_2 + 1)}{m_2 + 1} - 1$
- So our example is really  
 $\{41,62,6\} \Rightarrow \exists 377$  Bad Mail senders
- Has seen real use in analyzing repeated design reviews by independent teams

Without going into it, the better statistical measure is as seen here which leads to a different though similar estimate of the number of senders of bad e-mail. For further discussion, see several texts. For security purposes, and remembering the Dr. Dobbs illustration, you might especially want to read Vander Wiel SA & Votta LG : Assessing Software Designs Using Capture-Recapture Methods, IEEE Trans on Software Eng, v19 n11 p1045-1054.


## CAPTURING FOR REMOVAL

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- First removal =  $r_1$ , second removal =  $r_2$
- If  $\frac{r_1}{N_0} = \frac{r_2}{N_0 - r_1}$ , then  $N_0 = \frac{r_1^2}{r_1 - r_2}$

Sometimes you don't band the frogs and throw them back -- sometimes you want to get the frogs out of the pond. You can still estimate size of the beginning population by, you guessed it, making an assumption: that on any round of catching you catch the same percentage of frogs.

# CAPTURING FOR REMOVAL



So, with only two numbers, 29 captures on the first round and 18 captures on the second round, we can say that we began with 76 frogs in this pond and that the population will decline further to 20 thence 14 thence 9 thence 6 thence... under repeated removal of 29/76=38% of the frogs at each round.

## USE IN SECURITY

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- University screening inbound laptops for malware before Reg Day
- Egress filtering with feedback to senders of Bad Bits (“Don’t let me catch you again”)

In security, we might say that within a university the returning students and their laptops are the pond and the ones that have malware are the frogs to be removed. Or we might do a capture/re-capture experiment to tell people sending bad e-mail that they should not do it again.

# **MORE TREND ANALYSIS**

# REMOTELY EXPLOITABLE VULNS


NIST

Component	2005	2004	2003	2002
OS	19	140	163	213
Net Stack	1	6	6	18
Non-Server App	229	393	384	267
Server App	88	345	440	771
Hardware	0	20	27	54
Protocol	12	28	22	2
Crypto	0	4	5	0
Other	0	10	16	27

This is data right from the National Institute for Standards and Technologies. I don't like it; it doesn't tell you anything; the column order is reverse chronological and the raw counts offer no insight. But let's start with it, as seen at <http://icat.nist.gov/icat.cfm?function=statistics>

# OVERALL: PROGRESS

OS    Stack    N-S App    Server App  
Hdw    Protocol    Crypto    Other



Let's see if there is progress being made by making a stacked area graph and running time in the forward direction. It does indeed look like progress.

## NON-UNIFORM $\Delta N(\text{VULNS})$

	CAGR	
Hardware	-73.5%	} -36%
Other	-66.7%	
Net Stack	-61.8%	
OS	-55.3%	
Server App	-51.5%	
Non-Server App	-5.0%	
Protocol	81.7%	
Crypto	-na-	

But the progress is hardly uniform. The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) varies from -73.5% to +81.7%, which is quite a range, and has an overall CAGR of -36%.


## MARKET SHARE

---

Component	2005	2004	2003	2002
OS	5%	15%	15%	16%
Net Stack	0%	1%	1%	1%
Non-Server App	66%	42%	36%	20%
Server App	25%	36%	41%	57%
Hardware	0%	2%	3%	4%
Protocol	3%	3%	2%	0%
Crypto	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other	0%	1%	2%	2%

It might be more instructive to look at market share rather than pure count. In the format of the original, it looks like this (which is still pretty useless).

# Δ MARKET SHARE



But as market share we can now see something worth seeing, that the green Server Application category was once dominant but is in fast decline, its place taken by the brown Non-Server Application category.

## THIS TELLS YOU...

---

- ...to work on non-server applications
- Market share tells the story
  - NS-apps 20% → 66%, CAGR = 49%
  - Other 80% → 34%, CAGR = -25%

Now we have a metric on which to base a decision; we need to work on these Non-Server Applications as they have a CAGR of 49% in market share terms while everything else has a CAGR of -25% in market share terms.

## 2006 FORECAST


linear regression

OS	0	
Net Stack	0	
Server App	0	
Hardware	0	
Other	0	
Crypto	2	0.6%
Protocol	25	7.8%
Non-Server App	292	91.5%

If we take the numbers as given and just do a linear regression so that there is a 2006 (plus one year) prediction, we'd expect the year 2006 values to be down to three (from eight) classes with Non-Server Applications now at 91.5%, thus reinforcing the idea that we need to attend to that line item above all others.

# FORECASTING

- OS
- Stack
- N-S App
- Server App
- Hdw
- Protocol
- Crypto
- Other



Graphing, in the same style, with the forecast in place gets the point across to almost anyone.

# FORECASTING IS GOOD

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- Can help with  
    “What if we hadn’t done anything?”
- Don’t overdo it; stay skeptical

And, in fact, forecasting with an intervention versus non-intervention dichotomy is often a very good decision tool indeed. You can overdo it, of course, but a healthy skepticism is an adequate protection here.

Scepticism is the chastity of the intellect; it is shameful to give it up too soon, or to the first comer.

-- George Santayana

## BACK TO THE FUTURE

---

Q: How to assess 0day protection?

A: Put tool on XP / unpatched, throw all the malware since 2002 at it, treat its future as a simulation of your future

*You have the real future for some things; start there and look at those time series.*

Sometimes the time series you really want is a deep projection into the future. That is hard to do. As an example of trying, the present author wanted to assess a 0day protection strategy. Of course, one cannot ask for samples of future 0day attacks, so an unpatched Windows XP system, vintage 2002, was taken and the protection installed on it. As 2002 is four years back, all the worms and viruses that have appeared in four years can be said to be a sample of what the future held for XP in 2002 and thus throwing all of those attacks at the unpatched XP system was, in fact, a simulation of repeated 0day attacks and, in turn, an adequate test of whether the installed tool had protective value against 0day malware. As a testing strategy, it worked and worked well.

**FROM NUMBERS  
TO INFERENCE**

# “LAWS OF VULNERABILITIES”

---

Qualys

- Multi-year field observation type study
- Some selection bias
- Meta-analysis = “measure of measures”

In a multi-year field observation study where company's exteriors were scanned for vulnerabilities and the results pooled for descriptive purpose, Gerhard Eschelbeck of Qualys came to publish his “Laws of Vulnerabilities” as found at <http://www.qualys.com/research/rnd/vulnlaws/>

Yes, there is selection bias in that the company's scanned invited the scanning, thus proving that they have an interest in security that is probably in excess of the average interest. Nevertheless, this combining of multiple analyses into one is itself an analysis, a meta-analysis, and it is a measure or measures of some real value.

# HALF-LIFE

---

Qualys

The length of time it takes users to patch half of their systems

Eschelbeck noted that patching behavior is like radioactive half-life; each succeeding fixed interval of time has the same fall-off in the number of patched systems.

# HALF-LIFE, CONT.

Qualys

$t_{1/2}$	2004	2005	
external	21	19	-10%
internal	62	48	-23%
	3.0	2.5	

Over one year of observation, here 2004 through 2005, the half-life constant for internal systems changed from 62 days to 48 days, a reduction in patch latency of 23%, a better figure than the 10% reduction seen in external machines. On the other hand, external machines were three times quicker in 2004 in getting patches and still a respectable 2.5 times as fast in 2005.

# PREVALENCE

---

Qualys

50% of the most prevalent and critical vulnerabilities are replaced by new vulnerabilities on an annual basis

In turn, Eschelbeck makes some observations, the first of which is that half of the problems to really worry about are new each year.

# PERSISTENCE

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Qualys

4% of critical vulnerabilities remain persistent and their lifespan is unlimited

and that one in twenty-five of all vulnerabilities is effectively immortal,

# FOCUS

---

Qualys

90% of vulnerability exposure is caused  
by 10% of critical vulnerabilities

and that there is a 90/10 rule for magnitude of danger and count of vehicles for carrying that danger

# WINDOW OF EXPOSURE

---

Qualys

The time-to-exploit cycle is shrinking faster than the remediation cycle;

80% of exploits are available within the first half-life period of critical vulnerabilities

As we all have guessed, the interval between warning and attack shrinks. Eschelbeck's data is that in that first half-life decline from 100% unpatched to 50% patched, 80% of all exploits become available. This means that in patching one has the quick and the dead.

# EXPLOITATION

---

Qualys

Automated attacks create 85% of their damage within the first 15 days from the outbreak and have an unlimited life time

Automation is, of course, what in many ways separates digital security from physical security more than any other. This tends to front-load the damage to the earliest parts of the period of susceptibility, and in Eschelbeck's data that is 85% of damage in days 1-15.

## SOMETHING TO THINK ON

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
A plane lands in England full of bullet holes. The repair mechanics suggest armoring the plane where the holes are. The pilot notes that the planes which come back do not have the kind of bullet holes that need armoring.

An apocryphal story, but a good one. It reminds us that what we can observe has already been through some filter. In this case, the returning planes were still flyable so the bullet holes they carried were, ipso facto, not the ones to fear most.

# **YET MORE TREND ANALYSIS**




# RATE OF CHANGE FOR REPORTED INCIDENTS



The calendar is per IDC, and added to the incidents per CERT, we can now look at the rate of change of incident reports to CERT demarcated by the dates of product release by Microsoft (MSFT has a 94% market share so we can safely ignore all other vendors here).

Win 3.1	Win NT	Win 95	NT 4.0	Win 98	NT 5.0	Win 2K	Win XP
1990	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002

## RATE OF RATE CHANGE FOR REPORTED INCIDENTS



Now we look at the rate of rate of change, i.e., the second derivative. In this case we now see when the problem began: Windows 95 and its introduction of a TCP/IP network stack. This suddenly glued an operating system that had been designed for a single authoritative user on a truly local network to the entire world including a lot of Bad Guys. The rest is history. The realization that the Internet was important caused Gates & Co. to expose their unprotected user base to everyone else. All else follows.

## USE IN SECURITY

---

- Don't just look at trends
- Look at rate of change of rate of change
  - What is correlated with changes in the rate of change?
  - If  $X \propto Y$  and  $Y = f(t)$ , then pull out the impact on  $X$  of changes due only to  $t$

In security, trends are almost always good enough for decision making but sometimes you want trends of trends, as the previous pictures attempted to illustrate. When doing this, you will generally be looking for correlated events that correspond to sharp rate changes. In other words, when  $X$  is proportional to  $Y$  and  $Y$  is a function of time, then try to find what part of the change of  $X$  is due to time in and of itself.

# **ECONOMICS**

## THE QUESTION IS NOW

---

“The next ten years will be a referendum on whether we consume the entire productivity growth of the US economy for increased security spend.” [ *paraphrase summary* ]

Chief US Economist, Morgan Stanley  
Op-Ed, NY Times, 23 October 2001

“The Terror Economy,” Richard Berner, NY Times, 23 October 01, Page A23, Column 1

ABSTRACT – Op-Ed article by Morgan Stanley economist Richard Berner warns that war against terrorism will impose long-term economic costs in form of higher insurance and security costs, maintenance of larger inventories and new Internet security measures; explains that spending more on defense will erase decade-long 'peace dividend' and crowd out other investments that helped transform budget deficits into surpluses.

Full article available from author; no longer available online. The point is real for us: We cannot be the opponent of wealth creation by withdrawing all the productivity growth our economy provides and using it for our non-productive purposes.

# SECURITY SPEND AS A CALIBRATOR, 1/2

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Meta

- Corp budget for security:  
3% for manufacturing...8% for banks
- IT headcount for security:  
5% of total
- IT budget for security:  
12% hardware    20% software  
15% services    53% staff

The Meta Group, Diamond report #2856, recommendations on how much of IT budget should be allocated to security spend. Regardless of whether you believe these numbers, once published they are the numbers you have to prove your numbers are better than if you want your numbers to now be the de facto standard.

# SECURITY SPEND AS A CALIBRATOR, 2/2

Gartner

- Corp budget for security:  
3-6%, visibility and size as drivers
- Security software  
small companies greater budget %age
- Security %age spending by sector:  
health > government > education > ...

A similar set of de facto numbers, this time from The Gartner Group, Research #G00126733, recommendations on how much of IT budget should be allocated to security spend.


## SECURITY'S FOCUS CHANGING

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- Long-term trend is towards
  - greater data-richness
  - greater data-mobility
- If true, then implications for planning
- Why is it true?

The long-term prospect for computing is that it changes over time based on predictable pressures; see following slides. The short form is that data takes command. If so, this is where our metrics need to go.

# LAB-DRIVEN OPTIMALITY



Black line is “Moore’s Law” whereby \$/MHz drops by half every 18 months. Its unnamed siblings are, in red, the price of storage (12 month) and, in green, bandwidth (9 month). Taken over a decade, while CPU will rise by two orders of magnitude, the constant dollar buyer will have 10 times as much data per computer cycle available but that data will be movable to another CPU in only 1/10th the time. This has profound implications for what is the general characteristic of the then optimal computing plant.

And, even if there are wiggles here and there, the general point that there is a drift over time in the optimal computer design stands.

## DATA: VOLUME ITSELF

---

- Surface web  $\approx$  175 TB
- Deep web  $\approx$  400x surface web = 70 PB  
If printed, approx 850 B trees  
(1 GB  $\approx$  1 pickup truck of paper)
- Telephone calls  $\approx$  97% of information flows
  - Implications of VoIP

The volume of data as estimated by Lyman & Varian in their annual survey on “how much information?”, specifically that the apparent World Wide Web is 175 terabytes whereas the total spinning data volume is estimated at four hundred times as large, meaning 70 petabytes. Were the “deep web” printed it would consume 850 billion trees. As a rule of thumb, 1 gigabyte of information would, if similarly printed, fill a pickup truck.

If, as Lyman & Varian suggest, 97% of information flows are in telephone form, then a wholesale trend to “Voice over Internet Protocol” will have profound implications to the amount of data exposed to threat and the nature of that threat.

See <http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info/>

## DATA: VOLUME GROWTH

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- Corporate IT spending on storage:  
4% in 1999 v. 17% in 2003 (Forrester) for  
net capacity of +150% / year (Gartner)  
while bits/\$ up 16x in same interval  
(vide supra)
- Retained volume doubling at ~30  
months

The volume of data is substantial, getting more so, and will likely dominate security's rational focus from this point forward.

Forrester and Gartner numbers from research documents (subscription).

## DATA: VALUE

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Some day, on the corporate balance sheet, there will be an entry which reads, 'Information'; for in most cases the information is more valuable than the hardware which processes it.

Grace Murray Hopper, USN, 1987

Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper, USN (Ret), Washington, D.C., 1987.

Question for the reader: Is that point now? Has it already occurred? Where do information assets appear on the balance sheet and/or how are they treated when describing shareholder value?

## **DATA: VALUE**

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The information about the packages we ship is more valuable than the packages themselves.

Fred Smith, Federal Express, ca 1990

Fred Smith, founder of Federal Express.

## DATA VALUE, OPTION 1/4

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- Replacement value
  - How much would it cost to build a brand as good as the one you have?
  - What is the time to recycle after a continuity break?
  - Management cost of new passwords for 5,000 users

You ask a management team “How much is your brand worth?” and you get blank stares or wild guesses. Try it a different way, ask “How much would it cost you, knowing what you know today, to build a brand from scratch as good as the one you have now?” This will get an answer that is probably a lower bound for replacement value. If such a value is sufficient basis to make whatever managerial decision around security that is on the table, then that is good enough for the time being.

Similarly, if your business has a “non-interruptibility” requirement, such as continuous monitoring of weather conditions for a period of time before a power plant can be sited, then the re-formulated form of “How much is your information worth?” would be more like “How much incremental cost would you incur if your continuity of measurement were broken and you had to start over?”

A different sense of the value of good passwords or good password protection would be to not ask “How much are your passwords worth?” but rather “If today you had to get all 50,000 people in your firm to pick a new password within 36 hours how much incremental cost would you incur?”

## DATA VALUE, OPTION 2/4

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- Black economy market price
  - AOL screen names: 0.1¢/name
  - Bot-net host rental for spam: \$1 / wk
  - Deadbeat details: \$10 / name
  - Financial screenshot: \$500
  - Game skin 90 days out: \$50,000

A different way to look at the value of information is to ask what the black market pays, if indeed that is a question that can be answered in a way that is sufficiently close to where you are to be valuable via analogy. For example, a thief was paid \$100,000 for 92MM AOL screen names.

Computers that are taken over silently are occasionally rented to others, e.g., as spam relays. The rental fee approximates \$1/week by some estimates. That tells you at the very least that the supply of machines taken over is great as such a price is obviously slight. That would mean that your data on your machine is, by analogy, very easy to get at by others. If you don't know how easy it is, then you would conservatively assume that breaking into your machine is worth a dollar on the open market.

More directly, a major west coast bank reports that its tellers are routinely offered \$500 per screenshot of customer identifying data for customers with over \$50,000 of assets. So a clerk making \$10/hour can give herself an after-tax raise of \$26,000/year for the price of one sheet of paper per week. Not every clerk is immune to this temptation.

The other prices are based on publicly reported events.

## DATA VALUE, OPTION 3/4

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- Future economic value
  - From eureka to FDA filing costs circa \$700M, 80% is information
  - Derivative pricing algorithm alone carried on books as \$300M
  - Patent losses: CDMA in India & China at \$750M/annum

In a pharmaceutical company, the critical period begins with the “Eureka!” moment and closes with the FDA formal filing. In this interval, the pharmaceutical can expect to spend \$700,000,000 at the end of which 80% of the value is the information in the can. This is a hard to get figure and was obtained in conversations variously.

A single bank in NYC that is known for its derivative trading carries its apparatus for pricing same as a \$300,000,000 asset.

The inability of Qualcomm to effectively patent its CDMA technology in China and India represents an information loss to them of \$750,000,000 per year based on current usage rates of the CDMA technology.

# DATA VALUE, OPTION 4/4

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Lindstrom

- Lower bound value
  - At least as much as the total IT budget including depreciation & amortization

A painful observation by Pete Lindstrom, Spire Security.

## DATA MUST BE THE FOCUS

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- Rising value
- Rising volume
- Rising mobility

*Security economics makes data the focus*

An obvious conclusion: the economics of security and what it is for point us towards data as a focus rather than infrastructure, as has been the case heretofore. Our metrics actually do have to follow.

## DATA VALUE, ALTERNATE

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- “Hey, just add it up!”

Info Asset Val  $\geq$  Salary(IT)

+ Capital Expense

+ Salary(Other)

+ Revenue(IT)

+ Intellectual Property

- If inequality sufficient for decision,  
then all well and good

Of course, you can value data a different way -- the budgetary way. If this gets a decision, all well and good. See value #4 (Lindstrom) for what this is a variation on.

# VALUE OF NETWORKS

---

$\propto n$  for broadcast (Sarnoff)

$\propto n^2$  for networks (Metcalfe)

$\propto 2^n$  for networks with groups (Reed)

Side issue, but networks have value. You have probably heard of the second. The first is for a broadcast network like radio, which says that the number of listeners is the proportionality constant for the value of the network itself (Sarnoff). The second is for communications networks like the Internet, and it says that the number of potential conversations is the proportionality constant (Metcalfe). The third is more sociologic; it says that sub-groups and not individuals are what make networks valuable and thus the number of possible groups is the proportionality constant (Reed).

# NO ABSOLUTE SECURITY

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- Security absolute only w.r.t. opponent
- Opponents mutate
- Hence cannot stay absolutely secure even if once achieved

Ian Grigg, in a paper on security economics, reminds us that “secure” has a sub-text of “secure against opponent X” but since opponents change often it is thus proved that you cannot stay absolutely secure even if you might achieve it for an instant; see <http://iang.org/papers/pareto-secure.html>

# 2004 TURING LECTURE


---

Adi Shamir

- Absolutely secure systems do not exist
- To halve your vulnerability, you have to double your expenditure
- Cryptography is typically bypassed, not penetrated

Repeating Adi Shamir, with emphasis.

$$\text{VULN}/2 \Rightarrow \text{COST} * 2$$



This is what Shamir's statement looks like and it in its own way illustrates how a defense in depth strategy is a better strategy; diminishing returns along one axis can be abandoned for robust returns along another axis.

# PARETO EFFICIENCY

---

- *Pareto improvement:*
  - someone is better off, and
  - no one is worse off
- *Pareto efficient:*
  - no improvements left

As Grigg points out, the economics literature has a concept of a Pareto improvement (rate) and Pareto efficient (state) that may as well be applied to security.

# PARETO SECURE

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Grigg

- Proposed change increases security in some area, and
- Does not decrease security in any area
- Another form of CE analysis

*Example: AES versus DES*

In particular, a Pareto secure state is one where there are no changes that can be made which are unqualifiedly good; see again Grigg I : Pareto-Secure, r1.6, Systemics, 2005, <http://iang.org/papers/pareto-secure.html>

# NVD WORKLOAD INDEX

NIST

$$W = n(\text{high}) + \frac{n(\text{medium})}{5} + \frac{n(\text{low})}{20}$$

Calibrates effort by vuln severity

Thirty-day moving average is  
published; May 24 = 6.80, July 20 = 7.55

The National Vulnerability Database as seen at <http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?workloadindex> has a different metric more of interest to operational people than any other but in this case it is a work-load predictor based on the current vulnerability rankings. As you can see, it has a ratio scale for work (1-0.2-0.05) and what they publish is a thirty-day moving average. This can be adapted to other uses or, more likely used as a calibrator to some metric you are yourself using, which is why it is here.

# FAULT TREES

Soo Hoo



Impractical (combinatoric cost)

$$n(\text{scenarios}) = 3 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 = 192$$

In case you have been tempted to try this, don't bother with fault trees; they suffer from combinatoric explosion in terms of the numbers of scenarios that have to be considered if full exhaustion of the problem space is your goal; just in this picture it is 192 such scenarios. For more discussion (and on much broader scale and more relevant scope) see Soo Hoo KJ: "How Much Is Enough? A Risk-Management Approach to Computer Security," CISAC Working Paper, August 2000; as found at <http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/11900/>

# COMPLEXITY

# COMPLEXITY

---

“There are two ways of constructing a software design. One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies and the other is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies.”

C.A.R. Hoare

This sums up the question of complexity. The parallels to current market leading suppliers, competing as they are on feature richness, is obvious and daunting. We mention complexity here as it will come again and again through the course of the day.

## CODE COMPLEXITY

---

- Lots (lots) of measurements of code complexity out there
- If security faults  $\subset$  quality faults,  
And quality faults  $\propto$  complexity,  
Then security  $\propto$  {1-complexity}

If you assume that security faults are a subset of quality faults and are thus scattered and inadvertent, and if you accept the quality control literature that suggests complexity is the biggest contributor to quality faults, then we need to look at code complexity if we are to understand security faults in that code. See RELATED CASE STUDIES section in <http://hissa.ncsl.nist.gov/HHRFdata/Artifacts/ITLdoc/235/appendix.htm#418907> in particular.

# CYCLOMATIC COMPLEXITY

---

- Structured testing
  - Effort  $\propto$  complexity it is itself assessing
- Pioneered by McCabe
- Uses control flow structure of software to create testing criteria

The most widely deployed measure of code complexity is McCabe's "cyclomatic" figure where the idea is to graph the control flow of a body of software and then to create testing criteria that are informed by that structure. Obviously, as that structure becomes more complex the task of testing against it becomes more daunting. In the limit, complexity above a threshold prevents testing from being efficacious thus leaving quality faults undiscovered (and thence delivered to the field).

## CYCLOMATIC COMPLEXITY

---


- McCabe often integrated to build env.
  - $v(G) = e - n + 2$ , where  $e$  and  $n$  are the number of edges and nodes in the control flow graph
- Outside scope, except
  - Trouble when  $v(G) \geq 10$

McCabe calculations are today often integrated into build environments, i.e., they are often available at zero marginal cost to developers and analysts. The definition of the score is graph-theory at work: the number of edges minus the number of nodes plus two. How to derive this is out of scope here, but as you can see more edges than nodes means more paths through the code and a rising McCabe score. Though opinions vary, a score greater than ten is thought troubling and over fifteen perhaps fatal.

```
-----
Annotated Source Listing
-----
Program : Euclid                                01/15/96
File    : euclid.c
Language: instc
Module  Module
Letter Name          v(G) ev(G) iv(G) Start Num of
-----
A euclid              3   1   1       2       19

2      A0              euclid(int m, int n)
3      A1              /* Assuming m and n both greater than 0,
4      A2              * return their greatest common divisor.
5      A3              * Enforce m >= n for efficiency.
6      A4              */
7      A5              int r;
8      A6              if (n > m) {
9      A7              r = m;
10     A8              m = n;
11     A9              n = r;
12     A10             }
13     A11             r = m % n; /* m modulo n */
14     A12             while (r != 0) {
15     A13             m = n;
16     A14             n = r;
17     A15             r = m % n; /* m modulo n */
18     A16             }
19     A17             return n;
20     A18             }
```

For the programmers in the audience, a simple set of three illustrations. Here, some simple source.




$$e = 15$$

$$n = 14$$

$$v(G) = 3 \leq 10$$

...some simple source with a McCabe score of 3, which is much less than 10.



A less than simple picture now with a score of 28 which is rather higher than 10 and quite likely untestable.

## A WARNING

---

- Limits on sizes of modules? No
- Limits on complexity thereof? Yes
- Aftermarket tools to assess complexity of binaries are appearing.

*Note that most patches increase  $v(G)$*

So what should the security metrics person do? Limit sizes of modules? No. Limit complexity of modules? Yes. Note that there are aftermarket tools now appearing for this even if all you have is a binary and not source. Once this is possible, the default good practice shifts to “Why aren’t you looking at this?” and that shift-point is more or less now.

Note that as most patches involve at least one extra node and two extra edges that most patches increase complexity scores. What a surprise.

## USE IN SECURITY

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- Hotspotting – look at your outliers
- Trending – recent check-ins different?
- Verify assumptions – c.f. code coverage

How might we use McCabe or other complexity metrics? As stolen directly from [http://www.enterpriseintegrationpatterns.com/ramblings/41\\_metrics.html](http://www.enterpriseintegrationpatterns.com/ramblings/41_metrics.html) the answer is to do one or more of (1) looking at your outliers, (2) looking at recent versus historical trends, and/or (3) verify that you are or are not getting testing that actually can be said to have enough coverage to predict field experience before field deployment. The higher your requirement for reliability the higher the need for this strategy.

## NAIVE EXAMPLE

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- Naive in that...
  - it uses the only data we have, code volume, and
  - estimates complexity as square of code volume (a venerable metric)

A naive example might be as follows, noting that this is unproven (even if once you've seen it you would tend, as does the present author, to suggest that the burden of proof has shifted to those who say that the following isn't so).

# CODE VOLUME (94% SHARE)



Windows 94% market share per IDC

Code volume as observed:

Win 3.1	Win NT	Win 95	NT 4.0	Win 98	NT 5.0	Win 2K	Win XP
3	4	15	17	18	20	35	40
1990	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002



# COMPLEXITY SPECULATION

---

- Factual:

X.509r1      20 lines of ASN.1

X.509r3      600 lines of ASN.1

SET          3000 lines of ASN.1

A different speculation. X.509 is the ISO standard for public key infrastructure (PKI) certificate structure. The above is factual.

# COMPLEXITY SPECULATION

---

- Conjectural:

If insecurity is proportional to complexity,

And complexity is proportional to square of code volume,

Then normalized to X.509.3 we have...

We might have an hypothesis that security is, as we said earlier, proportional to complexity and, again as we said before, that complexity is proportional to the square of code volume. In that case, and normalizing to X.509c3, we'd have...

## COMPLEXITY SPECULATION

---

- Then normalized to X.509.3 we have...

X.509r1    .001 units of complexity

X.509r3        1 unit of complexity

SET            25 units of complexity

...normalizing to X.509c3, we'd have X.509r3 at the normalization point of 1 unit of complexity with X.509r1 at three orders of magnitude below and SET at one and a half orders of magnitude above. That's a fair dynamic range, to say the least.

[ Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) was a 1996 standard jointly by Mastercard and VISA; see <http://www.echeck.org/overview/comparison/set.html> ]

## COMPLEXITY SPECULATION

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- Back to factual:

X.509r1    insufficient expressiveness  
            thus not much in use

X.509r3    widely used, but too  
            expressive for assured interop

SET        couldn't be cost-effectively  
            implemented thus failed

X.509r1 was too small, SET too large, and therefore by exhaustion X.509r3 must be just right (apologies to Goldilocks). The present author thinks that this is a textbook case of cost in complexity terms putting an upper bound on what could be cost effectively implemented, not that PKI with client-side certificates has exactly taken over Internet-based commerce.

## USE IN SECURITY

---

- Complexity hard to get a handle on
- ...But if you can, do so
- Certainly distinguish between failures in operation (often due to complexity) and failures from attackers
- Correlate, say, McCabe with app scans

In security, if you can get a handle on it, is absolutely vital in any program of security metrics. At the very least, see if you can find predictive correlations such as McCabe scores and application scanning against the built products those code bases deliver. This requires further discussion than can be done here, sadly.

## SUMMARIZING

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- The field is a mess, but progress can be made in any direction
- State of the art is the inequality and the ordinal scale, but those suffice for much decision making
- Consistency beats clever, and trend accuracy beats point precision

Summarizing is virtually impossible, but simply put at our present state of knowledge, ordinal information is both good enough and almost all we can do. Clever we have not got time for and the clever will be busy shooting themselves in their own feet in any case. Progress can be made if you are not afraid to try.

# So

---

- Instrument your firm / unit
- Derive metrics from instrument output
- Map metrics to values
- Make decisions

More or less stolen from Betsy Nichols, CTO of ClearPoint Metrics.

## WHEN PICKING METRICS...

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- Metric name
- Metric description
- Metric purpose / objective
- Required data sources
- Required logic, algorithms, or formulae
- Frequency of measurement
- Units of measure
- Benchmark or goal
- Visualization
- Publication schedule

Current consensus on the [discuss@securitymetrics.org](mailto:discuss@securitymetrics.org) list of how to define a lasting metric.

## CONVERGENCE, NOT SO

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- Physical - law enforcement model, reactive, force wins, arrest “Sammy the Bull” Gravano
- Digital - intelligence model, proactive, surveillance wins, let Sammy keep talking with John Gotti while you listen

Don't get sidetracked, if you can organizationally help it, by trying to “converge” the physical security folks with the digital security folks. There are some places this might make sense, such as when the badge reader says that the guy logged in in New York just came through the door in Pittsburgh, but not otherwise.

Geer D : “Convergence,” IEEE Security & Privacy, v4 n3 p88, May/June, 2006.

# I'VE DREAMED A DREAM


---

- A balanced scorecard for security
  - Financial
  - Internal business processes
  - Learning and growth
  - Customer

What does the present author actually want? A balanced scorecard built with security in mind. And what is a balanced scorecard?

# BALANCED SCORECARD

Kaplan & Norton



A balanced scorecard is a now-standard part of business planning albeit not for security. It comes from Kaplan RS & Norton DP : "The Balanced Scorecard: Measures That Drive Performance," Harvard Business Review, January-February 1992, and, with a picture from <http://www.balancedscorecard.org/> looks like the above. By this time next quarter, we'll have made real progress on this and you might want to check back.

## GOOD ENOUGH SECURITY

---

1. Good enough is good enough
2. Good enough always beats perfect
3. The really hard part is determining what is good enough

*This is why we are here today.*

A parting thought... we are here because we need to know how to deal with #3. That's all.

Sandhu R: "Good-Enough Security: Toward a Pragmatic Business-Driven Discipline," IEEE Internet Computing, January/February 2003, v5 n3 p66; as found at <http://www.list.gmu.edu/journals/ic/03-sandhu-good.pdf>

There is never enough time.....

.....Thank you for yours

It has been entirely my pleasure. Contact is welcome but reply is not instant. Slides are yours to use though I would appreciate acknowledgement if it is possible to do so.

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