The DTIC Review

Information Terrorism

(AD-A373756)

Bibliography of Related Documents Available from DTIC

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AD-A372229

OBJECT SERVICES AND CONSULTING INC BALTIMORE MD

Survivability in Object Service Architectures (OSA)

OCT 1999 167 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Wells, David; Ford, Steve; Langworthy, David; Bannon, Thomas; Wells, Nancy

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The military of the future will increasingly rely upon information superiority to dominate the battlespace. This report summarizes the goals and results of a project that developed an architecture and software mechanisms to make military and commercial software applications based on the popular object services architecture (e.g., OMG's CORBA) model far more survivable than is currently possible, while at the same time maintaining the flexibility and ease of construction that characterizes OSA based applications.

DESCRIPTORS: *DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING, *TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS, *NETWORK ARCHITECTURE, DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, COMPUTER PROGRAM VERIFICATION, OBJECT ORIENTED PROGRAMMING, INFORMATION WARFARE, RISK ANALYSIS.

AD-A371775

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Summary of Research 1998, Interdisciplinary Academic Groups

AUG 1999 121 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Boger, Dan; Powell, James; Panholzer, Rudolf; Eagle, James

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This report contains information of research projects in the interdisciplinary: (1) groups, command, control, and communications academic group, (2) information systems academic group, (3) information warfare academic group, (4) space systems academic group, and (5) undersea warfare academic group. A list of recent publications is also included which consists of conference presentations and publications, books, contributions to books, published journal papers, technical reports, and thesis abstracts.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *SPACE SYSTEMS, *UNDERSEA WARFARE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, COMPUTER NETWORKS, RADAR SIGNALS, RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, COMBAT SIMULATION.

AD-A371754

ELECTRONICS RESEARCH LAB SALISBURY (AUSTRALIA)

Achieving Systemic Information Operations for Australian Defence

OCT 1999 28 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Staker, R. J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This document describes a proposed program of research into theories, methodologies and techniques appropriate to achieving a systemic military information operations capability for the Australian Defence Force. The major expected outcomes of this research are decision support aids relevant to information operations, contributions to the theory of information operations and contributions to IO policy and doctrine. The doctrine would include matters relating to the design of organisations that are capable of operating effectively in an information operations environment.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *AUSTRALIA, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN), MILITARY DOCTRINE, HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, DECISION AIDS, DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS.

AD-A370937

STATE UNIV OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO CENTER OF MULTISOURCE INFORMATION FUSION

Studies and Analyses of Aided Adversarial Decision Making. Phase 2: Research on Human Trust in Automation

APR 1998 119 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Llinas, James; Bisantz, Ann; Drury, Colin; Seong, Younho; Jian, Jiun-Yin

ABSTRACT: (U) This report describes the second phase of work conducted at the Center for Multi-Source Information Fusion at the State University of New York at Buffalo. This work focused on Aided Adversarial Decision Making (AADM) in Information Warfare (IW) Environments. Previous work examined informational dependencies and vulnerabilities in AADM to offensive IW operations. In particular, human trust in automated, information warfare environments was identified as a factor which may contribute to these vulnerabilities and dependencies. Given that offensive IW operations may interfere with automated, data-fusion based decision aids, it is necessary to understand how personnel may rely on or trust these aids when appropriate (e.g., when the information provided by the aids is sound), and recognize the need to seek other information (i.e., to "distrust' the aid) when the information system has been attacked. To address these questions, this report details background research in the areas of human trust in automated systems and sociological findings on human trust, details the development of an empirically-based scale to measure trust, provides a framework for investigating issues of human trust and its effect on performance in an AADM-IW environment, and describes the requirements for a laboratory designed to conduct these investigations.

DESCRIPTORS: *DECISION MAKING, *PERFORMANCE (HUMAN), AUTOMATION, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING, DATA FUSION, DECISION AIDS, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A370865

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Intermediate Operational Commanders. A Role for Naval Destroyer Squadron Commanders

17 MAY 1999 22 PAGES PERSONAL AUTHORS: Sweeney, Michael J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Advances in Information Technology (IT) Systems and Decision Aids offer increased speed of command in warfare. What effect does it have on the authority of intermediate operational commanders such as Destroyer Squadron (Desron) commanders in the U. S. Navy? Intermediate commanders remain vital to manage the "how" to complete the operational scheme of Joint Force Commanders (JFC) despite the increased availability of shared information. Desron commanders traditional and current roles offer leadership experience to provide intuitive decision making and prepare the battlefield in maritime service applications and joint operations.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY MODERNIZATION, *DECISION AIDS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, NAVAL PERSONNEL, THESES, NAVAL VESSELS (COMBATANT), MILITARY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY.

AD-A370751

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Net-Centric Warfare: Are We Ready to be Cyber-Warriors?

17 MAY 1999 21 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Monroe, Deborah

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Joint Vision 2010, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's template for future military operations, identifies information superiority as the linchpin of the emerging operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection. While the technical challenges to realizing these concepts are acknowledged, I contend the tasks required to successfully integrate the human and cultural side of Joint Vision 2010's information superiority are as daunting as any of the still unsolved technical hurdles. Currently, the human element of technology enabled warfare is not getting the attention it needs. The military must begin to examine whether current training and doctrine are sufficient to prepare operational commanders for the chairman's vision of the future.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMBAT READINESS, *MILITARY PLANNING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, MILITARY DOCTRINE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, MANEUVERS.

AD-A370707

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Warfare in the Information Age: Adding Capability Multipliers

17 MAY 1999 25 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Cooney, David M., Jr

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) One recurring theme in military writings since the end of Desert Storm is that the American military is on the cusp of a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). Proponents of this viewpoint cite major changes in business and society brought on by the personal computer and the internet. They view these changes as part of a new information age and predict that the explosive technological growth in the speed of microprocessors and networks will lead to whole new ways to wage war, with information superiority being the key ingredient to assure victory. Critics argue that war as a rough, brutish, and frequently irrational business, and that no network will eliminate either the fog or friction of war. They see many of concepts being put forward as not respectful of the enduring principles of war. This paper presents five capability multipliers for warfare in the information age: (1) assembling and maintaining the intellectual capital to operate in the future networks; (2) developing information as a true discipline; (3) improving human computer interaction; (4) seeking greater understanding of how people process information and make decisions; and (5) furthering the cultural, organizational and operational concepts to support the technological change.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY OPERATIONS, IRAQ, KUWAIT, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, MICROPROCESSORS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, JOINT MICROCOMPUTERS, COMPUTER NETWORKS, MILITARY MODERNIZATION, INFORMATION WARFARE, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

AD-A370700

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Will Network-Centric Warfare be the Death Knell for Allied/Coalition Operations?

17 MAY 1999 25 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Geraghty, Barbara A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The U.S. Navy is undergoing a shift in its focus from platform-centric to network-centric warfare in the coming century. Enabled by the recent advances in information technology, network-centric warfare connects widely dispersed platforms into a robust network capable of massing tremendous effects. Network-centric warfare will challenge the operational commander when planning allied/coalition operations in two major areas. The first is interoperability, which includes issues of technology compatibility, intelligence sharing, classified material security policy, language, and rules of engagement. The second challenge addresses the issue of command and control, specifically as national culture and subordination of forces affect it. The operational commander must determine the ability of coalition partner forces to be part of the network and assign mission tasks accordingly. As history has shown, coalition operations require significant leadership on the part of the commander and network- centric warfare is simply another factor to add to the challenge.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, POLICIES, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, INTEROPERABILITY, SECURITY, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, COMPUTER NETWORKS, MILITARY TACTICS, BATTLE MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A370694

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Network Centric Coalitions: Pull, Pass, or Plug-In?

15 MAY 1999 25 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Carr, James

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The author traces the evolution of network centric warfare, showing its American roots. He shows that NCW is not a remote concept on the horizon, it is nascent in today's maritime operations and inevitably will be the way in which the U.S. Navy will fight future wars. Then he reveals a gaping mismatch between the emerging operational doctrine and the strategy it will be tasked to support. Since it is largely an American conception for warfare, the United States thus bears the burden to pursue interoperability with regional coalition partners if it is to fight "together when we can, alone if we must." Finally, the author presents options for addressing this strategic/operational mismatch and proposes a way ahead.

DESCRIPTORS: *WARFARE, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *INTEROPERABILITY, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, GLOBAL, UNITED STATES, OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, DOCTRINE, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A370688

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Information Warfare: Measures of Effectiveness

17 MAY 1999 23 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Wright, Beverly C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information Warfare (IW) has become central to the way nations fight wars and technological advances on the horizon will only increase the importance of IW to the operational commander. The growing significance of IW requires the development of measures for determining its effectiveness. This paper specifically explores measures of effectiveness for C2-attack. Measuring the effectiveness of C2-attack actions is critical to the operational commander because effective C2-attack allows a commander to gain the initiative, thereby establishing and maintaining a primary advantage over an adversary. Since it is important to align measures of effectiveness with mission objectives or goals, possible measures of effectiveness are developed for each of the four goals of C2-attack. Developing meaningful measures of effectiveness for C2-attack is quite a challenge due to its significant subjective content. The dilemma is how to combine objective and subjective measures so the commander has a complete picture. In many respects, objective measures can be rolled up into an overall subjective measure. Some measures, however, just don't quantify well. As a commander plans a specific action and then implements that action, it is imperative he be able to measure the effectiveness of that action, analyze the results of that measurement, and then finally use the results of that analysis to plan the next action. Mastering this process may very well be one of the greatest challenges of command.

DESCRIPTORS: *INFORMATION WARFARE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, CONTROL, MEASUREMENT, ATTACK, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT.

AD-A370329

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Army Information Centers of Gravity: Can We Protect Them

27 MAY 1999 62 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Carter, Rosemary M.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) As the Army keeps pace with the information age, it must determine how to leverage information to win its wars. According to Brigadier General Wayne M. Hall information is a tool for influencing an enemy's decision cycles. This is achieved by attacking the enemy's information centers of gravity. BG Hall defines these information centers of gravity as the physical place or mental construct in cyberspace where a confluence of intellect, decisions, collection, automation, communications and planning occurs. The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the U.S. Army has information centers of gravity, and if so, can they be protected. The monograph first determined the key components of information from the definition of information superiority. These key components were analyzed using three criteria to determine the Army's information centers of gravity. The criteria used were their influence on decision cycles, effects on strategic aims, and impact on combat power. The analysis concluded that there are two information centers of gravity Army commanders and information operations cells. The monograph used the Army's defensive IO capabilities to determine if it can protect these information centers of gravity. The conclusion is that the U.S. Army does have the capability to provide protection for these information centers of gravity. The monograph concluded with a look at additional initiatives that are ongoing to protect both information centers of gravity and the key components of information that support these centers.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMBAT READINESS, *ARMY PLANNING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY STRATEGY, DECISION MAKING.

AD-A369776

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Interoperability: A Security Services Approach to Support Transfer of Trust

SEP 1999 167 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Hansen, Anthony P.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology is at a primitive stage characterized by deployment of PKIs that are engineered to support the provision of security services within individual enterprises, and are not able to support the vendor-neutral interoperability necessary for large, heterogeneous organizations such as the United States Federal Government. Current efforts to realize interoperability focus on technical compatibility between PKIs. This thesis defines interoperability as the capacity to support trust through retention of security services across PKI domains at a defined level of assurance and examines the elements of PKI interoperability using this more comprehensive approach. The initial sections discuss the security services PKIs support, the cryptography PKIs employ, the certificate/key management functions PKIs perform, and the architectural elements PKIs require. This provides the framework necessary for discussing interoperability. Next, the two fundamental aspects of interoperability, technical and functional, are presented as well as their constituent elements and the existing barriers to interoperability. Finally, the proposed U.S. Department of Defense and Federal Government PKI architectures are analyzed and recommendations made to facilitate interoperability.

DESCRIPTORS: *CRYPTOGRAPHY, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TRANSFER, INTEROPERABILITY, THESES, ONLINE SYSTEMS, COMPUTER PROGRAM VERIFICATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A369372

ARMY SCIENCE BOARD WASHINGTON DC

Concepts and Technologies for the Army Beyond 2010

MAR 1999 236 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Braddock, Joseph V.; Funk, Paul E.; Gorman, Paul F.; Brady, Edward C.; Brown, William P.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) A study assessing the 2010-2025 timeframe and seeking technologies and enablers for joint, Army and other service operations with emphasis on joint missions involving land combat. Specific areas of analysis include mobility and sustainment, information dominance, platforms and weapons and investment strategies. Study analyses suggest tapping commercial successes as private sector investment is strongly supporting improvements in many areas. However, to fully tap these developments the Army must begin participating in the design of future commercial systems. This study provides 9 major recommendations including: establishing an investment council, exploiting non-Army commercial capabilities, establishing a C4ISR testbed, and using FSCS vehicles as precursors for AA2010 platforms.

DESCRIPTORS: *ARMY PLANNING, *TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING, WEAPONS, LAND WARFARE, STRATEGY, INVESTMENTS, MISSIONS, COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT, HOMING, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A368431

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors

FEB 1997 113 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Libicki, Martin C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information warfare, as any casual observer of the Pentagon can attest, remains a hot-button topic in the military community. Broader claims for it have been toned down, and few now argue that all aspects of warfare are now revealed as information warfare, but an ideology of information warfare has nevertheless wended its way into the heart of defense planning. The Air Force's cornerstones of information warfare, for example, has approached the status of doctrine. The spring 1996 establishment of the 609th Squadron (at Shaw Air Force Base) dedicated to information warfare offers further evidence of the seriousness with which that ideology is maintained. In 1996 the National Defense University (NDU) ended its two-year experiment of offering a forty-four-week program on Information Warfare and strategy after forty-eight students were graduated. In 1995-96 large portions of the defense budget were designated information operations (although only a small portion represents information warfare).

DESCRIPTORS: *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *DEFENSE PLANNING, *NATIONAL DEFENSE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, AIR FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, COMMUNITIES, AIR FORCE FACILITIES, MILITARY BUDGETS, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, DOCTRINE.

AD-A368079

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age

1999 295 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Mulvenon, James C.; Yang, Richard H.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This volume is the product of a conference, jointly sponsored by the Rand Center for Asia-Pacific Policy (CAPP) and the Taiwan-Based Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), held in San Diego, California, from 9-12 July 1998. The meeting brought together Chinese military experts to discuss a subject too long ignored: The non-hardware side of the People's Liberation Army' s (PLA's) modernization. The result is a comprehensive examination of the critical "software" side of China's military modernization, covering topics as diverse as civil-military relations, professionalism, logistics, training, doctrine, systems integration, and force structure, where as financial and logistical support for the conference was supplied by CAPS and CAPP, funding for the publication of this volume was provided by Rand's Project Air Force Strategy and Doctrine program, under the leadership of Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad. This program is in the third year of a comprehensive study of issues related to Chinese military and security affairs for the United States Air Force; the project is entitled "Chinese Defense Modernization and its Implications for the U.S. Air Force." It focuses on the fundamental question of how U.S. policy should deal with China, a rising power that could have the capability, in the not too distant future, of challenging the U.S. position in East Asia and its military, political, and economic access to that dynamic and important region.

DESCRIPTORS: *UNITED STATES, *POLICIES, *MILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN), *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *MILITARY MODERNIZATION, *CHINA, LOGISTICS SUPPORT, MILITARY PERSONNEL, WARFARE, AIR FORCE, MILITARY STRATEGY, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, TRAINING, SECURITY.

AD-A367983

AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL

China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare

JUL 1999 45 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Gauthier, Kathryn L.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In China as peer competitor? Lt Col Kathryn L. Gauthier analyzes the potential for China to emerge as a peer competitor of the United States in the coming decades. First, she examines two traditional pillars of national strength--China's status as a nuclear weapons state and as a space power. Second, she explores China's growing focus on information warfare (IW) as a means to wage asymmetric warfare against a technologically advanced adversary. Third, the author carefully examines the status of the three programs, highlights areas of concern and potential conflict with the United States, and analyzes the implications of these issues for the United States.

DESCRIPTORS: *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *CHINA, *INFORMATION WARFARE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, WARFARE, UNITED STATES, POLICIES, FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, SPACE SYSTEMS, CONFLICT, POWER, DOCTRINE.

AD-A367763

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Mesh and the Net Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon

AUG 1995 172 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Libicki, Martin C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This report contains information concerning the impact of computer technology on future military conflicts.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY MODERNIZATION, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING, COMBAT READINESS, THREAT EVALUATION, INTERNET, TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING.

AD-A367670

FYSISCH EN ELEKTRONISCH LAB TNO THE HAGUE (NETHERLANDS)

Survey of Information Warfare, Information Operations and Information Assurance

JUL 1999 92 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Luiijf, H. A. M.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Research survey on the phenomena information warfare, information operations (INFO OPS) and information assurance. History, development, definitions and developments in various countries around the globe. Appendix with list of abbreviations of terms in these fields.

DESCRIPTORS: *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY OPERATIONS, NETHERLANDS, DUTCH LANGUAGE, SECURE COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION PROCESSING.

AD-A367662

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

What is Information Warfare?

AUG 1995 110 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Libicki, Martin C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This essay examines that line of thinking and indicates several fundamental flaws while arguing the following points: Information warfare, as a separate technique of waging war, does not exist. There are, instead, several distinct forms of information warfare, each laying claim to the larger concept. Seven forms of information warfare-conflicts that involve the protection, manipulation, degradation, and denial of information-can be distinguished: (1) Command-and-control warfare (which strikes against the enemy's head and neck), (2) Intelligence-based warfare (which consists of the design, protection, and denial of systems that seek sufficient knowledge to dominate the battlespace), (3) Electronic warfare (radio-electronic or cryptographic techniques), (4) Psychological warfare (in which information is used to change the minds of friends, neutrals, and foes), (5) "Hacker" warfare (in which computer systems are attacked), (6) Economic information warfare (blocking information or channeling it to pursue economic dominance), and (7) Cyberwarfare (a grab bag of futuristic scenarios). All these forms are weakly related. The concept of information warfare has as much analytic coherence as the concept, for instance, of an information worker. The several forms range in maturity from the historic (that information technology influences but does not control) to the fantastic (which involves assumptions about societies and organizations that are not necessarily true).

DESCRIPTORS: *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *INFORMATION WARFARE, WARFARE, NATIONAL SECURITY, RISK, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, THREATS, VULNERABILITY, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS.

AD-A367661

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR
NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Defensive Information Warfare

AUG 1996 82 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Alberts, David S.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The problem of defending against information warfare is real. Our citizens and the organizations that provide them with the vital services they need can find no sanctuary from these attacks. The low cost of mounting these attacks has enlarged the field of potential adversaries and complicated efforts to collect intelligence and array our defenses. The consequences of a well-planned and coordinated attack by a relatively sophisticated foe could be serious. Even the threat of such an attack or digital blackmail is a distinct possibility. How the public will respond to the threat of IW infrastructure attacks or to actual attacks is unclear, but is a major determinant of future policy and actions. This situation is getting worse with the rapid proliferation of information technology and know-how. We are becoming increasingly dependent on automation in every aspect of our lives. As information technology becomes an essential part of the way organizations and individuals create products and provide services, the need for interconnectivity and interoperability increases. With this increased need for exchanges of information (and products), vulnerabilities increase. Finally, the increased reliance on commercial-off-the-shelf products or commercial services makes it more and more difficult for organizations and individuals to control their own security environment.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *DEFENSE PLANNING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, AUTOMATION, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, LOW COSTS, THREATS, OFF THE SHELF EQUIPMENT, COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT, CATASTROPHIC CONDITIONS, ELECTRONIC SECURITY.

AD-A367312

AIR FORCE ACADEMY COLORADO SPRINGS CO

Building Castles on Sand? Ignoring the Rip Tide of Information Operations

1 APR 1998 69 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Bass, Carla D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper will attempt to prove that a CINC for IO is now necessary to capture the plethora of ongoing IO related activities and hone them into a single, powerful, coordinated capability. Furthermore, using special operations command as a model, responsibility for IO should be assigned to an extent unified command. This additional mission should be accompanied by a designated program element to eliminate sporadic, uncoordinated, and oftentimes insufficient I0 expenditures, and to more efficiently distribute lessons learned across DoD.

DESCRIPTORS: *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *MILITARY COMMANDERS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, LESSONS LEARNED, COMBAT READINESS, THREAT EVALUATION, MILITARY MODERNIZATION.

AD-A367206

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA

Exercise Rainbow Serpent After Action Report

Jan 1999 31 Pages

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Lidy, A. Martin; Packer, Samuel H.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This document, the second in a series to be produced for the sponsor, provides an after action review of an Australian led multinational command post exercise focused on peace support operations. It identifies highlights of the exercise and provides a number of observations that respond to specific questions raised by the sponsor regarding: strengths and weakness of U.S. forces engaged in smaller-scale contingency operations; the other organizations with which U.S. forces will need to coordinate their activities when engaged in these operations; and the doctrine and structure implications of such operations.

DESCRIPTORS: *PEACETIME, *MILITARY EXERCISES, MILITARY DOCTRINE, STRUCTURES, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-M000657

JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

Information Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organizational Considerations for Assurance (Computer Diskette)

4 JUL 1996 14 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) System requirements: PC compatible; Word 6.0; Windows. The performance of essential national security-related functional activities is increasingly dependent on U.S. infrastructures and their supporting information components. In view of the dependency, and because the Department of Defense (DoD) information infrastructure is embedded in larger national and international infrastructures, DoD officials, their advisors, and others within and outside the government have recommended to the national security council staff that this may be necessary to initiate interdepartmental/interagency discussions. Topics of such a dialogue would include the dependency and vulnerability issues and the need for national policy to deal with them. The report does, however, address the breadth and complexity of the policy and strategy issues and summarizes the views of those in positions of importance to the development of policy for infrastructure protection and assurance. The environmental areas examined were: (1) Infrastructures; (2) Legal Environment; (3) Regulatory Environment; (4) Policy Environment; (5) Technology Environment; and (6) Intelligence Environment.

DESCRIPTORS: *MAGNETIC DISKS, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *NATIONAL SECURITY.

AD-A368490

JOINT ADVANCED DISTRIBUTION SIMULATION/JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION ALBUQUERQUE NM

JADS Special Report on Networking & Engineering, Appendices A, B, C, D, & E

19 AUG 1999 205 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Ashton, Charles P.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Joint Advanced Distributed Simulation (JADS) Joint Test Force (JTF) was chartered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to investigate the utility of Advanced Distributed Simulation (ADS) technology for Test and Evaluation (T&E). JADS executed three test programs; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), precision guided munitions, and electronic warfare, representing slices of the overall T&E spectrum as well as observing other activity within the T&E community to form its conclusions. Each of the three tests required that T&E facilities be linked together through a communications network to support an ADS architecture. This report outlines the network design requirements, network description, and describes the components of the JADS communications network. Also, this report addresses JADS JTF costs, concerns and constraints, and lessons learned. It is intended to provide insight into the process JADS JTF undertook in setting up distributed communications networks capable of supporting ADS testing.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, *COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, *SURVEILLANCE, *RECONNAISSANCE.

AD-A367655

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER AIRCRAFT DIV PATUXENT RIVER MD

The ACETEF HLA Interface for JADS-EW

3 AUG 1999 8 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper presents the software approach taken at ACETEF to support the JADS-EW test. It begins by describing the overall structure of the JADS-EW federation and the roles played by the federates. The HLA interface consisted of two major components, namely the RTI interface and the SWET interface, designed to work together but separately, in order to decrease the workload of a single HLA interface. Though performing different functions, their general structure is similar in that each is guided by a federate manager, which directs all activity according to the specifications of a particular federation. Another common feature between both interfaces is the utilization of the C++ class inheritance, virtual functions, and polymorphism capabilities, which greatly assist in producing highly maintainable and reusable code.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTER PROGRAMS, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INTERFACES, *JET FIGHTERS, *RADIO JAMMING, SURVIVABILITY, CODING, SYSTEMS APPROACH, WORKLOAD, REUSABLE EQUIPMENT, POLYMORPHISM.

AD-A366257

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Prowler Integration into USAF Strategic Attack and Air Interdiction Missions

17 DEC 1998 56 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Hake, Michael F.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The importance of protecting limited aircraft assets cannot be overstated. The loss of a modern aircraft entails the probable loss of highly trained and experienced crews that took years to develop. Furthermore, if a target is missed because of defensive reactions to radar-guided weapons, the sortie is lost and the target will have to be attacked again, draining valuable resources from the war effort and risking the attack package all over again. Therefore, the jamming of early warning, ground-control intercept, and acquisition radars maximizes the success of strike packages by creating significant confusion and friction inside the command and control system of an adversary by denying critical intelligence on aircraft routes, altitudes, and timing. This friction slows an adversary's ability to respond to aerial attacks and therefore contributes directly to the preservation of experienced combat crews and aircraft. Joint publication 3-01.4 defines Electronic Warfare (EW) as "any military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy." EW is further divided into three subcategories: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protect (EP), and Electronic Warfare Support (ES). Moreover, the proliferation of radar-directed surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery threats continue to require the U.S. to maintain a robust EA capability.

DESCRIPTORS: *AIR DEFENSE, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INTERDICTION, *MISSIONS, *AIR FORCE PLANNING, MILITARY OPERATIONS, ELECTRONICS, WARFARE.

AD-A366196

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Pull, Push or Shove: Global Broadcast Service and Intelligence Support to Maritime Forces

17 DEC 1998 62 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Carter, Stuart A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Department of Defense developed the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) to increase the amount of national and theater level information provided to deployed forces, resolving some shortcomings in information dissemination identified during the Gulf War. Using direct broadcast satellite technology, GBS is expected to deliver information at rates exponentially faster than what is available now. The broadcast service makes possible the near-simultaneous transfer of critical information to multiple users. While GBS may speed the flow of information, it does nothing to improve the quality of intelligence. Given the large capacity of GBS, intelligence managers may be under unreasonable pressures to release information to fill available bandwidth. The result could be more raw information for commanders, and less finished intelligence. GBS has constraints and limitations inherent in its design. Not all users in a theater will have access to high-capacity bandwidth at the same time. Where the GBS broadcast beams are positioned will determine who gets what level of GBS bandwidth. The small antenna size of GBS receive suites allow the lowest-level tactical forces to receive intelligence support previously only available at the flag-level. To make the best use of the technology, under the proposed dissemination architecture intelligence planners must take the time actively manage the flow of information they receive. GBS offers new and unique dissemination capabilities.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *GLOBAL, *INFORMATION TRANSFER, *RADIO BROADCASTING, *SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, *INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A366192

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

The Information Operations Coordination Cell-Necessary for Division Offensive Actions

16 DEC 1998 67 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Carter, Rosemary M.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This monograph analyzes the need for a division Information Operations (IO) Coordination Cell during offensive military actions. The integrated concept team draft of FM 100-6, Information Operations: Tactics Techniques and Procedures, includes a division Information Operations Coordination Cell. The cell is responsible for integrating the components of information superiority (IS) to defeat the enemy's command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) while protecting friendly C4ISR. Their focus is the Information Operations segment that includes operational security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, electronic warfare (EW), physical destruction, computer network attack (CNA), public affairs (PA), and civil affairs (CA). The monograph restricts the topic to offensive IO, or IO that attacks the enemy commander's ability to achieve his objectives. Also, the monograph limits the type of military action to offensive.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY TACTICS, *PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, *INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A365673

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Securing the U.S. Defense Information Infrastructure: A Proposed Approach

1999 179 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Anderson, Robert H.; Feldman, Phillip M.; Gerwehr, Scott; Houghton, Brian; Mesic, Richard

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This report addresses the survivability and assured availability of essential U.S. information infrastructures, especially when they are under various forms of "information warfare" attack. To the best of our knowledge, the term "minimum essential information infrastructure" (MEII) was coined by one of the authors (Mesic) as part of the planning for a series of "Day After in Cyberspace" information warfare exercises conducted from 1995 to the present under the direction of our RAND colleague Roger Molander. The idea is that some information infrastructures are so essential that they should be given special attention, perhaps in the form of special hardening, redundancy, rapid recovery, or other protection or recovery mechanisms. This report documents the findings of the first year of a study of the MEII concept, attempting to formulate some initial answers to these questions-or, if these are not the right questions, to ask and answer better ones. This report should be of interest to persons responsible for assuring the reliability and availability of essential information systems throughout the U.S. defense establishment, the U.S. critical infrastructure, and other organizations.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *ELECTRONIC SECURITY, *INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A365127

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV WASHINGTON DC SCHOOL OF LAW

The International Legal Limitations on Information Warfare

24 MAY 1998 85 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: O'Brien, Gregory J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs are changing the face of war and how we prepare for war. Information war has no front line. Potential battlefields are anywhere networked systems allow access to oil and as pipelines, for example, electric power grids, telephone switching networks. In sum, the U.S. homeland may no longer provide a sanctuary from outside attack. A panel of Defense Department experts recently warned the nation about the prospect of an electronic Pearl Harbor, a crippling sneak attack on the nation's defense and civilian information systems in which "cyberterrorists" and other unknown assailants cripple the nation's, or the world's, computer-networked communications, financial, and national defense systems.

DESCRIPTORS: *LIMITATIONS, *INTERNATIONAL LAW, *INFORMATION WARFARE, ELECTRONICS, WARFARE, NATIONS, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, NETWORKS.

AD-A364870

ODYSSEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INC ITHACA NY

Task-Based Authorizations

APR 1999 74 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Thomas, Roshan K.; Sandhu, Ravi; Das, Souvik

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In this project we developed a new paradigm for access control and security models called task-based authorization controls (TBAC). This new authorization control paradigm is particularly suited for emerging models of computing, especially distributed computing and information processing activities with multiple points of access control and decision making. TBAC articulates security issues at the application and enterprise level. As such, it takes a task-oriented or transaction-oriented perspective rather than a perspective based upon traditional subject-object distinctions. In TBAC, access mediation involves authorizations at various points during the completion of tasks in accordance with the application logic associated with the overall governing process. In contrast, the subject-object view typically divorces access mediation from the larger context in which a subject performs an operation on an object. By taking a task-oriented view of access control and authorizations, TBAC lays the foundation for research into a new breed of "active" security models. TBAC has broad applicability to access control, ranging from fine-grained activities such as client-server interactions in a distributed system, to coarser units of distributed applications and workflows that cross departmental and organizational boundaries.

DESCRIPTORS: *DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A364072

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

The Impact of Computer Network Attacks on Infrastructure Centers of Gravity

7 APR 1999 29 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Payne, Allan D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Computer network attack is a significant asymmetric threat to the United States and its military. Motives vary, but the threat from CNA is real; U.S. infrastructure targets are vulnerable; those that directly affect the ability of the U.S. military to conduct its missions are evident innovation in CNA is unrestrained, and privacy rights of the U.S. citizenry conflict directly with U.S. Government efforts to take active measures to help defend against CNA. CNA today could be economically damaging to the computer and network dependent society that the United States has become. The challenge is to define the problem separately from every other consideration and challenge that the military faces in the information age including the broader mission areas of information operations and information warfare.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTER NETWORKS, *INFRASTRUCTURE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, UNITED STATES, STRATEGY, DAMAGE, THREATS, COMPUTERS, ATTACK, TARGETS, MISSIONS.

AD-A364003

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

The Changing Role of Information in Warfare

1998 462 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Khalilzad, Zalmay M.; White, John P.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This effort to assess how the role of information in warfare is changing seeks to understand many of the remarkable developments under way in information and communications technology, and their potential effects on warfare. Indeed, this volume reveals several important lessons that can be gleaned from the very different and distinct perspectives contained in it: Information advances will affect more than just how we fight wars. The nature and purpose of war itself may change. How wars start, how they end, their length, and the nature of the participants may change as shifts in the relative power of states and nonstate entities occur. New technologies cut both ways in terms of their effects on national security. Together, the chapters make clear that advances create new vulnerabilities; new threats create new opportunities.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTER PROGRAMS, *DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, WARFARE.

AD-A363260

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Command and Control in Joint Vision 2010: Flexible, Adaptive and Networked

5 FEB 1999 25 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Olmo, Frank J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) One of the most daunting tasks the U.S. Military will face in the 21st century is the issue of implementing effective command and control (C2) of joint and coalition military operations. As new technologies are implemented to support Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010), successful C2 must give the commander the flexibility to use faster and more accurate information technologies in order to increase battlespace knowledge and situational awareness. The dynamics of new technologies is linked to the information age and is commonly referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which is leveraged through the enabling concepts of "Information Superiority" and "Network-Centric Warfare." The challenge for the future commander is to exploit the RMA by applying a flexible C2 process to control the battlespace. Thus, as networked forces bring faster and more accurate information across all levels of war, the operational commander will exert his influence by maintaining a flexible networked architecture through a continuum based on his intent and the tempo of operations. A more focused understanding of networked C2 is the key to the evolution of new and existing joint architectures in order to keep pace with information technologies.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INFORMATION EXCHANGE.

AD-A360466

DYNETICS INC SHALIMAR FL

Linking Advanced Distributed Simulations with Flight Testing

JUL 1997 11 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Ayers, Douglas S.; Cross, Robert; Fox, Brian; Hostilo, Wayan; Pappas, Johnny

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Test and Evaluation community is relatively new to Advanced Distributed Simulation technology (ADS). Each facility participating in the JADS program has independently developed a method for testing specific aspects of various weapons systems. The MISILAB, which organizationally is part of the OWEF, but is located in a separate facility, has supported AMRAAM simulations and characterizations over the past decade. The CCF has supported real-time mission control, and monitoring functions providing pre- and post-flight analysis in the DoD community for the past 40 years. The Primes Test Facility has been involved in the ground testing of munitions systems, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)/Electromagnetic Compatibility Testing (EMC) for the past 17 years. The challenge was to develop a network architecture which would interface to the legacy systems in each test facility in a real-time distributed environment.

DESCRIPTORS: *FLIGHT TESTING, *DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, MONITORING, NETWORKS, REAL TIME, WEAPON SYSTEMS, TEST METHODS, MISSIONS, ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE, AMMUNITION, FLIGHT SIMULATORS, ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY.

AD-A359912

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Unattended Ground Sensors and Precision Engagement

DEC 1998 215 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Haider, Eric D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) are devices that automatically gather sensor data on a remote target, interpret the data and communicate information back to a receiver without interaction with a human operator. The objective of this thesis is to determine how unattended ground sensor technologies might support precision engagement. Comparative case analysis of the use of sensors in Vietnam, the Sinai and Iraq is used to develop principles that UGS must meet to support precision engagement. This study finds that precision engagement requires long endurance UGS to be delivered covertly to discriminate between targets, interrogate them for emissions, while disseminating a fused picture of the target. This study details roles and missions which UGS can fill as well as their costs, benefits and unintended consequences.

DESCRIPTORS: *DETECTORS, *HORIZON SCANNERS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, GROUND LEVEL, EMISSION, THESES, TARGETS, COSTS, ENDURANCE (GENERAL), PRECISION, OPERATORS (PERSONNEL), REMOTE AREAS.

AD-A359702

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Vision Guidance Controller for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

DEC 1998 94 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Watson, Mark T.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in modern military operations for reconnaissance and other missions continues to grow. UAV systems using remote control guidance are limited in range and subject to electronic warfare concerns. Guidance systems using only Global Positioning Service (GPS) or an Inertial Navigation System (INS) are limited to a pre-programmed route of flight. A vision guidance system that can control the UAV over an arbitrary course is not subject to these limitations. This thesis uses classical control methods to develop and test an autonomous vision controller for the Fog-R UAV (FROG). First, a computer model of the camera output for a flight that tracks a river is made to develop the controller and to test it in nonlinear simulation. Finally, the complete system is flight tested on the Fog R UAV. The design and test equipment include a highly modified Fog-R UAV from the U.S. Army, the Matrixx Product Family of software tools developed by Integrated Systems, Inc., and a ground station built at NPS from commercially available computer and communication equipment.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *UNMANNED, *GUIDANCE, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, SIMULATION, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS.

AD-A358442

JOINT ADVANCED DISTRIBUTION SIMULATION/JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION ALBUQUERQUE NM

High Level Architecture Runtime Infrastructure Test Report

AUG 1998 52 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Wright, D. L.; Harris, Clyde J.; Black, Jerry W.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Joint Advanced Distributed Simulation Joint Test and Evaluation is an Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored joint test force chartered to determine the utility of advanced distributed simulation (ADS) technologies for Test and Evaluation (T&E). The JADS EW test will use High Level Architecture (HLA) federates to replicate all elements of an actual open air range (OAR) test environment and the selected EW system under test. To determine the utility of ADS technology for EW T&E, JADS will use and evaluate the HLA in a three phase test program. During the ADS test phases, each OAR test run will be recreated using HLA compliant federates. This report addresses performance of a key HLA component developed by the Defense Modeling and Simulation Organization (DMSO) called the Runtime Infrastructure (RTI). Use of the RTI is required to be HLA compliant. Since the RTI provides a new means for dissimilar simulators and facilities to communicate, an additional source of latency is imposed on a test architecture which must be measured, optimized, and controlled for accurate real time measurement of test events. This work was performed for the JADS EW test and is the subject of this report.

DESCRIPTORS: *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION, *COMBAT SIMULATION, ALGORITHMS, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, REAL TIME, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, COMPUTER NETWORKS.

AD-A357635

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON DC

Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

7 FEB 1996 100 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This publication concentrates on command and control warfare (C2W) and is not intended to present comprehensive doctrine for the broader concept of Information Warfare (IW). It introduces and defines IW in general terms with the objective of clarifying its overarching relationship to C2W. The scope of C2W is defined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 30, but the full dimensions of IW policy and its implementation are still emerging.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY DOCTRINE, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

AD-A357499

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON DC

Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations

20 NOV 1996 174 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This publication establishes doctrinal guidance on the provision of intelligence products, services, and support to joint operations. It provides the fundamentals of joint intelligence operations, addressing organization of joint intelligence forces, responsibilities, and command relationships. The focus will be joint intelligence support to combatant commanders revolving around the phases of the intelligence cycle: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, production; dissemination and integration and evaluation. Finally, personnel, physical, operations and communications security considerations will be addressed. Joint intelligence doctrine defines the roles and relationships of intelligence organizations at the national level, in the combatant commands, and in the subordinate joint forces. The goal is to maximize the impact of intelligence while increasing effectiveness among the organizations that support the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Intelligence plays a critical role across the range of military operations from peace to war. Intelligence enables commanders at all levels to focus their combat power and resources and to provide force protection for those resources.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *MILITARY PLANNING, MILITARY DOCTRINE, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A355904

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Operationalization of Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21): The Flight Scheduling Function in Patrol Squadron 40 as a Case Study

SEP 1998 81 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Flatau, Richard P., Jr

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In the past several years, greater exploitation of information technology to increase leverage of information has become a central focus in the military. This focus is reflected in a number of strategic vision documents. Two significant examples are "Joint Vision 2010" signed in 1996 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Achieving and using information superiority is seen as essential to future military success. This has led to the emergence of a new warfare paradigm: network-centric warfare. Towards this end, the Navy's service-wide IT improvement initiative is information technology for the 21st century (IT- 21). IT-21 establishes a standard for it capability to be achieved throughout the Navy within which Navy units can shape their IT improvements. This study explores a requirements-approach for planning improvement of it through IT-21. Specifically, it focuses on a single function of one squadron: Flight scheduling in Patrol Squadron 40. This study addresses how to establish information requirements, assess current IT performance, and formulate specifications by which to drive planning for IT improvement. It concludes by mapping IT-21 components to requirements to provide VP-40 with a plan for improving its flight scheduling process through IT-21.

DESCRIPTORS: *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *SCHEDULING, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A355203

ELECTRO-RADIATION INC TOTOWA NJ

EW Testing Lessons Learned

16 JUN 1998 14 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Berkowitz, Paul H.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Electronic Warfare (EW) testing is one of the more challenging undertakings in the Avionics community. EW tests are typically fraught with a myriad of problems due to the inherent complexity of tests involving multiple vehicles, radars, data collection, and data processing, as well as the complex nature of electronic warfare itself. Electro-Radiation Inc. (ERI) has been at the forefront of EW testing for many years, from B-52 to B-2 and from F-101 to F-22. While it is impossible to prevent all problems, it is possible to prevent the same problems from repeating. This paper applies many of the lessons ERI learned from its extensive EW testing experience, and offers recommendations of how to avoid repeating them. Electro-Radiation Inc. (ERI) has been a leader in the field of Electronic Warfare (EW) testing for many years.

DESCRIPTORS: *AVIONICS, *FLIGHT TESTING, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, DATA PROCESSING.

AD-A355202

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LAB WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

Changing Requirements for EW Threat Simulation

22 OCT 1998 10 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Eberl, Edward G.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper represents my own observations based on recent procurement and contract activity engaged in by Amherst Systems. It is not the result of a scientific survey. No requirement is intended to be associated with a specific system under test or program. These observations are based on many recent requests for proposals and contracts which Amherst Systems has been exposed to. As a leading manufacturer of EW threat simulators for all applications (RWRs, Jammers, Elint Receivers, etc.), Amherst Systems is in a unique position to be aware of many current and future requirements.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *THREATS, *THREAT EVALUATION, SCANNING, SIMULATORS, WAVEFORMS, ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION, SIGNALS, RADIOFREQUENCY, APERTURES, TRANSMITTER RECEIVERS, ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE.

AD-A354665

ARMY RESEARCH LAB ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND MD

Vulnerability Assessment of the InterNetwork Controller (INC)

SEP 1998 33 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Retter, Charles; Gwyn, Douglas

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Tactical Internet (TI) provides a reliable digital communications infrastructure for Task Force XXI at brigade level and below. The InterNetwork controller (INC) performs routing and protocol conversion of data traffic within the TI, so its vulnerabilities could have significant adverse effects on the flow and content of data communications within the TI. This report summarizes the results of a study of potential "information warfare" vulnerabilities of the INC's interfaces, configuration, protocols, procedures, and policies.

DESCRIPTORS: *VULNERABILITY, *COMPUTER NETWORKS, *DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS, *INFRASTRUCTURE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, CONVERSION, DIGITAL SYSTEMS, POLICIES, DATA TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS, TRAFFIC, BRIGADE LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, TASK FORCES, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, ADVERSE CONDITIONS, RELIABILITY (ELECTRONICS).

AD-A354205

AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

Feasibility Study on the Use of the Internet for Traffic of Unclassified Data

SEP 1998 160 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Guerra, Alexandre L.; Gustavo, Luis; Silva, F. P.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This research compares two possible networking methods for connecting all Brazilian Air Force Materiel Command units responsible for support and operation of Brazilian Air Force's weapons systems. The network includes the use of dedicated X.25 links, and the use of a virtual private network using the internet (TCP/IP) as the medium of transmission. The Brazilian Air Force Materiel Command, responsible to support operating units over a very large sparse territory, lacks an efficient media of computer communications, which makes it difficult to control the supply chain channels of materiel present in each unit, depots, and warehouses. We studied the network infrastructure necessary to solve this problem, and proposed two different scenarios. One uses the current level of technology based on dedicated X.25 environment, and the other uses the incipient virtual private networking technology and the internet as the communication medium. The results suggest that the Brazilian Air Force could be able to use the internet and VPN technology in a moderated secure environment (C2 Level), and could save more than $100,000 per month in comparison to the implementation of the same level of networking using the present X.25 model.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, *LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, *INTERNET, COST EFFECTIVENESS, DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING, SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A351744

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Construction and Measurement of an Actively Mode-Locked Sigma Laser

JUN 1998 165 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Butler, James M.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The direct digitization of microwave signals of interest would allow rapid computer processing and analysis. Current analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) are bandwidth limited and electronic warfare systems must down-convert the signal before digitization causing a loss of information. optical ADCs can directly digitize frequencies greater than 10 GHz using wideband integrated optical interferometers (folding ADCs). A critical component of the optical folding ADC is the pulsed laser used for sampling the wideband signal. The amplitude-modulated pulses become the discrete samples of the analog signal. Limiting factors in an optical ADC are the pulse width, the pulse rate, and the jitter noise of the optical pulse train. Mode-locked lasers provide pulse rates and pulse widths suitable for high bandwidth applications. In this thesis a mode-locked sigma laser was constructed using fiber-optic, electro-optic, and microwave components. The theory of mode-locking, laser construction, output measurements, and sampling applications are discussed in detail.

DESCRIPTORS: *MEASUREMENT, *CONSTRUCTION, *MODE LOCKED LASERS, DIODES, FIBER OPTICS, OPTICAL PROPERTIES, SYSTEMS, COMPUTERS, MICROWAVE EQUIPMENT, PULSED LASERS, LASERS, PHASE, PULSE RATE, OPTICAL INTERFEROMETERS, BROADBAND, AMPLITUDE MODULATION, PULSE TRAINS.

AD-A351710

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Weapons of Mass Destruction a Network-Centered Threat

18 MAY 1998 23 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Diggs, D. G.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Battlespace dominance is more than the physical control of air, land, and sea. Under the network centric concept of operations, U.S. forces must be ready to control the infosphere in order to assure military objectives can be achieved. Perhaps the most effective information warfare (IW) weapon is a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), specifically a biological or nuclear weapon. Important questions should be answered about the ability to protect American information networks from the significant information disruption characteristics of WMD. DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY STRATEGY, MILITARY DOCTRINE, THREAT EVALUATION, COMPUTER NETWORKS, NATIONAL DEFENSE, DETERRENCE.

AD-A351431

MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY ALEXANDRIA VA

66TH MORSS: Preparing for Military Operations Research in the 21st Century. Final Program and Book of Abstracts

20 MAY 1998 329 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Kee-Lafreniere, Cynthia

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This publication contains titles of presentations made at the 66th MORSS Symposium (66th MORSS), along with names, addresses, phone and fax numbers and e-mail addresses of authors, if available. In addition, abstracts of presentations, which are unclassified and approved for public release, are included. Some abstracts are missing because they had not been cleared for public release at the time of publication.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY OPERATIONS, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, AIR DEFENSE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, MILITARY PERSONNEL, LAND WARFARE, SYMPOSIA, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, COST ANALYSIS, OPERATIONAL READINESS, MANPOWER UTILIZATION, ABSTRACTS, LOGISTICS, WAR GAMES, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A351075

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

In Support of Information Dominance: Acquisitions and Organizations
15 APR 1998 46 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Kaura, Mary A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The purpose of this work is to provide a basis and a framework for today's command, control, computer, communications, and intelligence (C4I) acquisition policies that will ensure the military is positioned to support success on the 21st century battlefield. This paper establishes an approximation of future warfare and the changing nature of organizational structures by summarizing current published works. Resulting tenets for C4I operations are then developed. A summary of the technical constraints that are related to and important for the implementation of the C4I tenets are provided. Specifically considered are technology hurdles in bandwidth, computer technology, and software complexity. Finally, current and recommended acquisition policies that are applicable to the success of C4I architectures in support of 21st century warfare are discussed.

DESCRIPTORS: *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *MILITARY PROCUREMENT, *MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, POLICIES, INFORMATION TRANSFER, COMPUTERS, TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING, COMBAT INFORMATION CENTERS, ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE.

AD-A350908

FLORIDA STATE UNIV TALLAHASSEE

The Effects of Truth Bias on Artifact-User Relationships: An Investigation of Factors for Improving Deception Detection in Artifact Produced Information

7 AUG 1998 201 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Biros, David P.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) A number of studies have been accomplished examining the truth bias individuals have toward others with whom they have a close relationship or familiarity (Mccornack and Parks, 1986; Levine and Mccornack, 1992; Stiff Kim and Ramesh, 1992). However, little has been done to examine the relationship between individuals and information artifacts. Does truth bias affect an individual's ability to detection strategic information manipulation in artifact-produced information? Are there measures that can be taken to improve the deception detection capabilities of artifact users? This research examines the artifact-user relationship and proposes a research model depicting the competing nature of artifact truth bias and detection factors such as experience, arousal and training as they influence an individual's ability to detect deception in artifact-produced information. The model was empirically tested in a laboratory experiment that included the use of a survey instrument. Together, the information collecting methods are used to gain a better understanding of the factors involved in strategic information manipulation and deception detection via artifacts.

DESCRIPTORS: *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *DECEPTION, *INFORMATION WARFARE, DATA MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION TRANSFER, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VULNERABILITY, THESES, HEURISTIC METHODS, MAN COMPUTER INTERFACE, ERROR DETECTION CODES.

AD-A350433

INFORMATION ASSURANCE TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS CENTER MCLEAN VA

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center. Information Assurance Tools Report. Vulnerability Analysis

1998 46 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This report provides an index of vulnerability analysis tool descriptions contained in the IATAC information assurance tools database. This report summarizes pertinent information, providing users with a brief description of available tools and contact information. It does not endorse or evaluate the effectiveness of each tool. As a living document, this report will be updated periodically as additional information is entered into the information assurance tools database.

DESCRIPTORS: *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *VULNERABILITY, DATA BASES, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, DATA MANAGEMENT, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A348564

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
Joint Vision 2010: Information Superiority and its Effect on the Command and Control Process

13 FEB 1998 20 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Ellis, Jeffrey A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) With the implementation of Joint Vision 2010, information superiority will impact every aspect of operational art, but none will be so great as the impact on operational command and control. Through information superiority, the operational commander theoretically gains a clearer picture of the battlespace, thus mitigating the fog of war. This study examines some of the potential command and control issues facing the operational commander as he attempts to conduct major operations and campaigns. Given the diverse threat, it is doubtful that U.S. forces can gain and maintain information superiority over our enemies. The need for information superiority will hamper our ability to operate in a combined environment. Information superiority may lead to operational command and control that is too rigid and too centralized to maintain friendly freedom of action. Operational commanders may become transfixed by increasing levels of information focusing on data instead of the application of forces in space and time. In the end, information superiority will provide a clearer picture of the battlespace but it will not mitigate the fog of war.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *DECISION MAKING, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *BATTLE MANAGEMENT, *INFORMATION WARFARE, THREATS, MILITARY COMMANDERS.

AD-A348473

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

The Double Edged Sword: Information Superiority or Information Vulnerability of Joint Vision 2010

13 FEB 1997 30 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Tenner, Nancy L.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Joint Vision 2010 emphasizes the criticality of achieving information superiority in future military operations. With the global explosion of information age technology, the United States seeks a strategic and operational advantage through information while simultaneously denying an enemy any advantage. With no peer competitor to challenge the United States, adversarial nations may attempt to leverage the low cost, compared to high advantage, that information warfare has to offer. As the United States becomes increasingly reliant on the rapid flow of information, will the underlying infrastructure and deterrence effort provide sufficient security to ward off potentially devastating information warfare attacks? Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a methodology to identify hazard severity and probability from which to draw reasonable measures to reduce risk. (ORM) techniques can be adopted to assess information warfare (defense) hazards and assist in developing controls to minimize risks. Recommendations highlight the importance of educating personnel in information warfare, incorporating information warfare (defense) in war games, studying information infrastructure issues and applying ORM principles to reduce vulnerabilities.

DESCRIPTORS: *THREAT EVALUATION, *INFORMATION WARFARE, *RISK ANALYSIS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

AD-A345705

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Cyber-Terrorism: Modem Mayhem

14 APR 1998 40 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: White, Kenneth C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) America can no longer rely on broad oceans and a strong military to protect its homefront. The arrival of the information age has created a new menace cyber terrorism. This threat recognizes no boundaries, requires minimal resources to mount an attack, and leaves no human footprint at ground zero. This study addresses technology, identification procedures, and legal ambiguity as major issues, for countering cyber terrorism as an emerging challenge to U.S. national security. As America's reliance on computer technology increases, so does its vulnerability to cyber attacks.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *ELECTRONIC SECURITY, *TERRORISM, DATA MANAGEMENT, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VULNERABILITY, THREAT EVALUATION, COUNTERTERRORISM, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A345602

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

The Department of Defense and the Age of Information Operations

13 MAY 1998 33 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Evans, Alan T.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper explains the challenges and vulnerabilities the nation and especially the military will face in the next century as our dependence on information systems and associated infrastructure continues to grow. It will highlight the results of the President's commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and discuss the steps necessary to protect the information systems upon which we have come to so heavily depend. It will highlight that without a comprehensive national policy in protecting information infrastructures poses a great risk to its military, commercial users and ultimately the nation.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *MILITARY RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, DATA MANAGEMENT, VULNERABILITY, PROTECTION, TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING, INFRASTRUCTURE, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A345540

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Managing Risk to the National Information Infrastructure

8 APR 1998 39 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Thomas, James H.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Now, more than ever, the survival of our information based society depends on the integrity of our National Information Infrastructure (NII). Our information systems are vulnerable to a wide spectrum of threat ranging from a dissatisfied employee to a coordinated transnational attack to gain strategic advantage. Interconnected military, government and civilian information systems throughout our critical infrastructures, with limited self-protection features, are susceptible and attractive targets. The NII suffers attack almost constantly and we must do better at dealing with the consequences of such attacks. The ends, ways and means of managing the consequences of malevolent intrusion into the NII are within the capabilities of the nation to implement. Our success at dealing with these assaults, thus preventing an adversary from gaining strategic advantage jeopardizing our way of life will hinge on taking action to resolve the technological, legal, and sociological impediments to information infrastructure protection.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VULNERABILITY, PROTECTION, INTRUSION, INFRASTRUCTURE.

AD-A342718

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Information Warfare Force XXI Situational Awareness

6 MAR 1998 44 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Thomas, Laurence E., Jr

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The 80's saw the introduction of stovepipe digital architectures in the primary combat arms branches (Aviation, Armor, Artillery, and Infantry) weapon systems. Some of these systems were not interoperable due to their unique software protocols. Aviation and artillery platforms were interoperable since they utilized the same protocol. In the 90's, General Sullivan expounded on his force XXI vision to digitally link all the combat arms horizontally and vertically to increase situational awareness. The materiel and combat developments communities produced an internet type system for the combat arms to provide situational awareness. An applique system was installed on some of the platforms so the weapons systems could digitally communicate within the internet. The applique system proposed to solve the stovepipe architectures will not work. Each combat arms system (AH-64D, MLA2 Abrams, M3 Bradley, Paladin/Crusader) has limited space, weight, and power constraints which prevent the integration of the applique system.

DESCRIPTORS: *WEAPON SYSTEMS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, MILITARY OPERATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS, AWARENESS.

AD-A342284

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

General Hey've Captured our Hard Drive

2 NOV 1997 35 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Nault, Mark

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), an overview document describing the strategic vision of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), was released in early 1997 and revealed a new joint armed forces battlespace concept called Full Spectrum Dominance. Information Operations (IO), which includes both Information Warfare (IW) and Command and Control (C2) doctrine, is the backbone of this emerging JV 2010 full spectrum dominance concept. Are there any significant strategic level IO concerns, for our military leaders who practice the strategic art in today's and tomorrow's joint armed forces, which ultimately delay or degrade the capabilities detailed in the new JV 2010? This author believes that the answer to this thesis question is a resounding YES! This Strategic Research Project (SRP) briefly reviews several basic, but recently updated, IO definitions, and describes the role that IO plays in the cyber missions depicted in the new JV 2010 and other related documents, such as the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the CJCS's National Military Strategy (NMS), as well as individual service concept documents.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *DRIVES (ELECTRONICS), *INFORMATION WARFARE, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, THESES, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, MILITARY COMMANDERS, MILITARY TACTICS, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.

AD-A341533

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

A High Resolution Satellite Communication Model

SEP 1997 133 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Murphy, Brandee L.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information warfare is a cornerstone of Joint Vision 2010 which addresses the future strategic environment for the United States. An integral component of information warfare is the continuing development of joint space doctrine. The Joint Warfare System (JWARS) is a large scale, systemic simulation being developed by the Joint Warfare Systems Office to aid in the evaluation of future joint doctrine and force structure. The purpose of this thesis is to develop and demonstrate simulation of Satellite Communications (SIMSATCOM), a high resolution, stochastic simulation of satellite communications for evaluating the effectiveness of message transmission and receipt by specified senders and receivers. SIMSATCOM is designed to operate as a stand alone simulation, but may be adopted as a high resolution module for a large scale simulation such as JWARS. The thesis describes SIMSATCOM in detail and provides analyses of simulation runs for different jamming levels and channel capacities.

DESCRIPTORS: *SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, *MESSAGE PROCESSING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC, MILITARY DOCTRINE, THESES, HIGH RESOLUTION, ANTIJAMMING, COMMUNICATION SATELLITES, MILITARY SATELLITES, MULTICHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS.

AD-A340846

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON DC NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIV

Electronic Warfare: Test Results Do Not Support Buying More Common Sensor Systems

MAR 1998 11 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) We have completed our follow-up review of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Common Sensor (IEWCS) program, which is to provide the Army and the Marine Corps with improved signals intelligence capability. In 1995, we suggested the Army's fiscal year 1996 IEWCS procurement request be reduced because operational testing to prove the system worked properly was not scheduled until fiscal year 1997. In 1996, we reported the Army had prematurely committed to low-rate production the prior year and recommended that additional IEWCS production planned for fiscal year 1997 be canceled. In response, the Department of Defense (DoD) reduced the number of systems to be procured, but permitted the Army to proceed. To assist the Congress in its oversight of DoD's management of systems acquisitions, we conducted this follow-up review to determine whether results of testing conducted since our previous review support continued IEWCS production.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *SIGNALS, TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MARINE CORPS, DETECTORS, ACQUISITION, PRODUCTION, OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, ARMY PROCUREMENT.

AD-A340087

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Information: A Selected Bibliography

FEB 1998 41 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information: A selected bibliography was compiled to support one of the special themes of the U.S. Army War College's curriculum. Focusing primarily on information warfare and operations, it also includes citations for other contemporary information issues such as information technology, information management, and the information highway. All references are dated 1995 to the present. Items listed in this bibliography are available in the U.S. Army War College Library collection. For your convenience, we have added our call numbers at the end of each entry. Please keep in mind that call numbers may vary from library to library.

DESCRIPTORS: *BIBLIOGRAPHIES, *ARMY, *INFORMATION WARFARE, WARFARE, DATA MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, EDUCATION, COMPUTERS, UNIVERSITIES, LIBRARIES, INTERNET, INFORMATION SCIENCES.

AD-A337392

ARMY COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS COMMAND FORT MONMOUTH NJ

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence & Electronic Warfare and Sensors and Information Management (C4IEWS&IM), Project Book, Fiscal Year 1998

1998 345 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This document displays a cross section of the Army Team's systems and equipment which are currently in development, production, or in the field. This publication reflects a coordinated effort between CECOM, PEO Command, Control and Communications Systems (PEO C3S), PEO Intelligence and Electronic Warfare & Sensors (PEO IEW&S), and PEO Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAM IS). The C4IEWS&IM military community shares the critical mission of equipping, sustaining, and modernizing technologically superior and integrated C4IEWS&IM systems. This mission supports the nation's warfighters in the accomplishment of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics through information superiority.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *DATA MANAGEMENT, DETECTORS, PRODUCTION, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, SIZES (DIMENSIONS), ARMY PERSONNEL, COMPUTERS, TEAMS (PERSONNEL), MISSIONS, CROSS SECTIONS, PROTECTION.

AD-A337178

SOUTHWEST RESEARCH INST SAN ANTONIO TX

Information Warfare Modeling I

OCT 1997 46 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Collier, Mark

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This report documents the results of survey task in which the contractor was asked to identify current Information Warfare (IW) modeling development within the Department of Defense (DoD) and recommend an approach for IW modeling. It involved working with Rome Laboratory to identify their primary interest area in IW modeling, surveying DoD for ongoing unclassified IW modeling efforts, and defining an IW modeling architecture which Rome Laboratory could use in the future to guide research and development.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS.

AD-A336966

AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING

A Modeling and Simulation Approach to Characterize Network Layer Internet Survivability

DEC 1997 194 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: King, Leif S.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Air Force Core Competency of Information Superiority will be achieved in an age of decreasing AF manpower and corporate expertise. Increased AF reliance on COTS solutions, coupled with nearly ubiquitous points of entry to communication networks, create unique challenges in maintaining the Information Superiority edge. The protection of the internet is part of this equation. The internet supports the daily business traffic of the Air Force. Personnel, finance, and supply data flow through its routers. Controlling an adversary's access to our Information Systems, either the data, or the hardware and software that control the data and transform it into information, is a key operation of Defensive Information Warfare which is the primary focus in maintaining Information Superiority. This research will attempt to answer the viability of implementing measures designed to ensure the survivability of the internet communications infrastructure against denial of service attacks. It will provide planners the information to make decisions based on the cost and benefit tradeoffs associated with such measures.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTER GATEWAYS, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *INTERNET, *INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A336852

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON DC

Joint Technical Architecture - Army; Version 5.0

11 SEP 1997 182 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) One of the underlying tenets of information age warfare is that shared situation awareness, coupled with the ability to conduct continuous operations, will allow information age armies to observe, decide, and act faster, more correctly and more precisely than their enemies. This presupposes that information is reliable, timely, available, usable, and shared. The underlying information infrastructure must, therefore, facilitate rather than inhibit the flow of information between sustaining base agencies and strategic tactical force elements and provide the flexibility to accommodate different missions and organizational structures. A Technical Architecture (TA) is a set of building codes. By itself it builds nothing. However, used in conjunction with the other enterprise architectures the operational and systems architectures the adoption and enforcement of the TA fosters interoperability between systems, as well dramatically reducing cost, development time, and fielding time for improved systems.

DESCRIPTORS: *INTEROPERABILITY, *COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, DATA MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, STANDARDS, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS, SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT.

AD-A336481

NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION ARLINGTON VA

Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium and Exhibition, "National Security Strategy in Transition" the Critical Role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future

19 FEB 1998 674 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Major topics of this symposium include: (1) A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (2) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (3) Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future, (4) The Nature of Future Military Operations, (5) Transforming SOF for the 2020 Environment, (6) PSYOP and Information Operations-Integration and Interface, (7) SOF Aviation, (8) Civil Affairs Challenges of Post-Conflict Transitions in Failed Societies, (9) C4I: War in the Information Age for SOF, (10) Weapons Systems Modernization: The Future Demands Better, and (11) Waging Peace: SOF's Role in Peace Operations.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY STRATEGY, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *MILITARY PLANNING, *SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, SYMPOSIA, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WAR GAMES, MILITARY MODERNIZATION, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, NATIONAL DEFENSE, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, PEACEKEEPING, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A334778

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON DC

Operational Requirements Document for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Tactical Control System (TCS) Version 3.0

1996 10 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The requirement relates to the Office for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Mission Areas 212 (Indirect Fire Support), 217 (Land Warfare Surveillance and Reconnaissance), 223 (Close Air Support and Interdiction), 227 (Air Warfare Surveillance and Reconnaissance), 232 (Amphibious, Strike, and Antisurface Warfare), 237 (Naval Warfare Surveillance and Reconnaissance), 322 (Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) for Tactical Land Warfare), 345 (Tactical Communications), 370 (Electronic Combat) and 373 (Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Target Acquisition). The Tactical Control System (TCS) is the software, software-related hardware and the extra ground support hardware (antennae, cabling, etc.) necessary for the control of the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV), and Medium Altitude Endurance (MAE) UAV, and Future Tactical UAVS. The TCS will also provide connectivity to identified Command, Control, Communications, Computers , and Intelligence (C4I) systems. TCS will have the objective capability of receiving High Altitude Endurance (MAE) UAV payload information. Although developed as a total package, the TCS will have the capability to be configured and down-scaled to meet the user's deployability or operator limitations.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, *REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES, *TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, LAND WARFARE, CONTROL SYSTEMS, ACQUISITION, CLOSE SUPPORT, COMBAT SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION, MILITARY VEHICLES, INTERDICTION, AIRBORNE, AERIAL WARFARE.

AD-A333391

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

In Athena's Camp; Preparing for a Conflict in the Information Age

1997 516 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Arquilla, John; Ronfeldt, David

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) We have been posing our ideas about conflict in the information age for some years now, beginning in 1991 with our original ruminations about cyberwar, then about netwar, and lately about 'information strategy.' With each step, we have kept returning to a favorite set of themes; organization is as crucial as technology in understanding the information revolution; this revolution is giving rise to network forms of organization; and the rise of networks will continue to accrue power to nonstate actors, more than to states, until states adapt by learning to remold their hierarchies into hybrids that incorporate network design elements. Meanwhile, we have kept our eyes on emerging trends in conflict from the end of the Persian Gulf War, through recent developments in places like Chechnya and Chiapas to further our understanding that the context and conduct of conflict is changing from one end of the spectrum to the other. New modes of war, terrorism, crime, and even radical activism are all these emerging from similar information age dynamics? If so, what is the best preparation for responding to such modes? When the subject is warfare, for example, it is common wisdom that militaries tend to prepare for the last war, and there is much historical evidence to support this notion.

DESCRIPTORS: *THREAT EVALUATION, *MILITARY PLANNING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY HISTORY, MILITARY STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY, COMPUTER NETWORKS, MILITARY TACTICS, ELECTRONIC SECURITY, TERRORISM.

AD-A333373

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Modeling Organizational Configuration and Decision Processes for Information Warfare Analysis

MAR 1997 142 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Black, Bruce J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) For an organization to survive it must be able to adapt to its environment. A military organization operates in an environment that is constantly changing. The ability to model organizational configurations and organizational decision processes can assist the commander in adapting to the environment and understanding how a military organization is susceptible to Information Warfare (IW) attacks. First a commander must understand the concepts of Information Warfare, Command and Control and the concept of organizational decision processes and how these permit an organization to adapt to its environment. Then the commander must determine what level of detail is necessary to model the organizational decision processes for its environment. Next the commander must analyze his model for configuration and decision processes. Using such commercially available software as Organizational Consultant and VDT the commander can identify any organizational misfits to the environment and the IW attack susceptibilities of the organizational decision processes. In the end, this approach demonstrates that it is feasible to model organizational configuration and organizational decision processes in an information warfare environment.

DESCRIPTORS: *DECISION MAKING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, CONFIGURATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

AD-A333216

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

An Information Security Education Initiative for Engineering and Computer Science
1 DEC 1997 31 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Chin, Shiu Kai; Irvine, Cynthia E.; Frincke, Deborah

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper puts forward a case for an educational initiative in information security at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Its focus is on the need for such education, the desired educational outcomes, and how the outcomes may be assessed. A basic thesis of this paper is that the goals, methods, and evaluation techniques of information and computer security are consistent with and supportive of the stated goals of engineering education and the growing movement for outcomes based assessment in higher education.

DESCRIPTORS: *JOB TRAINING, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *COURSES (EDUCATION), SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, DATA MANAGEMENT, SKILLS, CRYPTOGRAPHY, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, COMPUTER NETWORKS, TRAINING MANAGEMENT, CONDITIONING (LEARNING), INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A332446

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON DC

Information Warfare: New Roles for Information Systems in Military Operations

3 DEC 1997 20 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Crawford, George A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In the past decade we have witnessed phenomenal growth in the capabilities of information management systems. National security implications of these capabilities are only now beginning to be understood by national leadership. Information Warfare (IW) is one of the new concepts receiving a great deal of attention inside the Washington DC beltway; in some circles IW is even touted as the cornerstone of future U.S. military doctrine. There is no doubt IW is a concept the modern military officer should be familiar with, for advancements in computer technology have significant potential to dramatically change the face of military command and control. Information warfare theory has tremendous political, technical, operational and legal implications for the military. This article seeks to define IW for the layman and discuss its potential applications. It will also attempt to identify potential military uses of existing information systems technology and address some of the issues facing those who will be responsible for implementing this new doctrine.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY PERSONNEL, NATIONAL SECURITY, LEADERSHIP, DATA MANAGEMENT, MILITARY DOCTRINE, COMPUTERS, INFORMATION THEORY, OFFICER PERSONNEL.

AD-A331946

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL

Information Warfare: Planning the Campaign

APR 1996 78 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Okello, Fredrick; Ayers, Richard; Bullock, Patrice; Erhili, Brahim; Harding, Bruce

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information warfare is a nebulous concept, but widely cited as a keystone in any future campaign. Even though information warfare has been used for centuries, current doctrine, policies, and guidance provide little help for the warrior to understand first, what information warfare is, and secondly, how to do it. "Information Warfare: Planning the Campaign" provides a logical approach for the information warrior to employ in planning for this aspect of warfare. This paper addresses the: (1) Current state of information warfare policy and doctrine, (2) Modeling of a system to identify its critical nodes and links, (3) Modeling of a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) to serve as an example, (4) Examples of current and potential offensive and defensive information warfare tools used in information encounters, and finally, and (5) A step-by-step approach to information warfare campaign planning. Analysis of information and its flow is a daunting undertaking in all but the most simple of organizations. To remedy this, one can view the organization as a system and employ a model which will help illustrate information flows.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, *INFORMATION WARFARE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, WARFARE, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INFORMATION TRANSFER, MILITARY DOCTRINE, COMPUTER AIDED MANUFACTURING, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

AD-A331679

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEPT OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH

Stochastic and Deterministic Models of Targeting, with Dynamic and Error-Prone BDA

SEP 1997 41 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Baver, Donald P.; Jacobs, Patricia A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Deep precision strike is a generic military operation that depends importantly on C4/ISR system contributions. Information from the latter is realistically subject to chance influences: targets are found and correctly identified generally at rates proportional to their numbers, locations, and activities, and to the coverage of shooter-serving sensors; the events of detection are realistically random, as are the delays, results, outcomes, and follow-up of the targeting shooters. In this paper a simplified version of the above complicated process is analyzed mathematically, here as a multi-stage queuing process with imperfect service. The probabilistic outcomes can be used to anticipate the results of higher-resolution simulations; these often are far more time consuming both to set up and run. Aspects of the above queuing situations can also be deduced via a deterministic 'fluid' queuing approximation that gives an adequate and convenient representation of aspects of the state variables and various measures of effectiveness in the stochastic queuing model. Relying on that agreement, we have elsewhere generalized the stochastic queuing model setup to fluid models that incorporate omitted realities, such as losses from target-list tracking, and the inevitable time dependencies, non-stationarities, and adaptive behaviors that typically occur in actual military operations or vignettes.

DESCRIPTORS: *MATHEMATICAL MODELS, *QUEUEING THEORY, *BATTLE MANAGEMENT, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, STOCHASTIC PROCESSES, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

AD-A331354

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Information Operations - A New Tool for Peacekeeping

22 MAY 1997 92 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Phillips, Gary E.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This monograph discusses the application of information operations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of peace missions ranging from peacekeeping to peace imposition. Using a variety of models and an examination of the components of information operations this monograph demonstrates the applicability of these operations to peace missions. Examples from recent history provide a backdrop for evaluating previous applications and investigating other potential uses of information operations to support peace missions. Based on the validation of applicability the possible increase in effectiveness and efficiency are postulated and potential resource savings evaluated. The monograph first examines the status of international relations as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of information technology. The impact of these two earthshaking events have forever changed the face the world.

DESCRIPTORS: *PEACEKEEPING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), MILITARY HISTORY, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

AD-A329719

AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

Information Warfare: Few Challenges for Public International Law

26 SEP 1997 56 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Meader, Gerald H.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information Warfare is of rising concern a threshold question is, "why address this issue at all?" It deserves a look because our increasing dependence on information and information technologies makes us ever more vulnerable to this attractive, elegant weapon. Dependence on the National Information Infrastructure according to a recent report by a Defense Science Board Task Force, the information infrastructure of the United States is increasingly vulnerable. Indeed, because the U.S. is so very dependent on information technology, it is one of the most vulnerable nations to IW attack. This vulnerability extends to infrastructures related to military C4I, oil and gas control, water supply, government operations, mass media, civil emergency services, transportation control, finances (national and global), and production, inventory and process controls. They are vulnerable because all of these systems use increasingly complex, interconnected network control systems. These infrastructures are also interdependent such that an attack on one could have a cascade effect on others.

DESCRIPTORS: *INTERNATIONAL LAW, *INFORMATION WARFARE, TERRORISTS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, NATIONS, UNITED STATES, CONTROL SYSTEMS, VULNERABILITY, SENSITIVITY, COMMUNICATION AND RADIO SYSTEMS, COMPUTER NETWORKS, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, MASS MEDIA, FEDERAL LAW, INFRASTRUCTURE.

AD-A329699

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Organizational Innovation and Redesign in the Information Age: The Drug War, Netwar, and Other Lower-End Conflict

AUG 1997 218 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Berger, Alexander

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The end of the Cold War and the rise of the Information Age have fostered an uncertain security environment which the United States is struggling to master. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the factors that lead complex organizations to initiate large-scale structural change in the face of environmental uncertainty, and more specifically to determine how the rise of the Information Age may change the organizational requirements of the U.S. national security structure. This thesis creates a unique framework for analysis, blending principles of organization and innovation theory with the theory of information-based 'netwar.' This study analyzes the organizational structures adopted by several transnational drug cartels, and compares them to that of U.S. counternarcotics forces. Next, this thesis reviews a series of recent occurrences pertaining to national security to test whether there are manifestations of netwar threats emerging, and whether new and old organizational actors are learning to adapt their structures to gain an advantage over the United States. Finally, this thesis is both predictive and prescriptive with regard to the issues of organizational redesign. It argues that structural changes are necessary for the United States to ensure the national security in an Information Age. Then it makes recommendations that would help the U.S. security structure redesign itself to become more agile in the face of Information Age threats.

DESCRIPTORS: *ORGANIZATIONS, *DRUG INTERDICTION, *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, REQUIREMENTS, UNITED STATES, NATIONAL SECURITY, INFORMATION TRANSFER, SECURITY, THESES, NARCOTICS, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A329064

ARMY SPACE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE COMMAND HUNTSVILLE AL

BM/C3 Information Technology Distributed Processing and Information Warfare

1997 15 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Hayes, J. L.; Merritt, Ira W.; Hayes, James C.; Mcfee, John K.; Sauer, Jon

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (USASSDC) Advanced Technology Directorate (ATD) currently manages several research programs that have the potential to significantly advance the current state of the art in information technology for future battle Management/Command, Control, and Communication (BM/C3) Systems. These programs address some of the challenges associated with full spectrum dominance in information warfare by providing new and innovative technologies for advanced distributed processing. The definition of information technology as it applies to BM/C3 is provided, as well as our vision for the future of distributed processing and its role in future BM/C3 systems. We propose that the realization of more effective BM/C3 systems utilizing megacomputer architectures to support the human in control will require continuing technological advances in high speed communications, architectural structures, automated decision support, modeling and simulation (M&S), and parallel processing algorithms.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING, *BATTLE MANAGEMENT, *INFORMATION WARFARE, ALGORITHMS, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, PARALLEL PROCESSING, PHOTONICS, THREAT EVALUATION, ARMY PLANNING, DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS.

AD-A328226

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

U.S. C4I and Logistics Vulnerabilities to Offensive Information Warfare

13 JUN 1997 31 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Mckethan, Colton

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The information revolution fostered by the microchip has made it possible for military commanders to receive information in unequaled quantity and quality. U.S. commanders have a broad range of opportunities resulting from digitized technologies that enhance of military equipment performance and the application of force. These information advances represent force enablers providing synergistic advantage to operational command and control (C2), intelligence, and logistic functions. However, there is a down side, in that the computers and microchips have vulnerabilities that must be addressed to retain operational force advantage. Information warfare is central to the way the nation plans to fight in the future, and information systems now connect U.S. military forces on a worldwide basis. Despite the enhancements that connectivity brings, with integration of global communications, state and non-state actors are provided new ways to access and undermine the C2, intelligence, and logistics function via computer and communication networks. This new area of vulnerability extends from the strategic, through the operational, down the tactical levels of warfare.

DESCRIPTORS: *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, VULNERABILITY, CHIPS (ELECTRONICS), INTEGRATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, COMPUTER APPLICATIONS, DEFENSE PLANNING, DECEPTION, INTRUSION, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INFRASTRUCTURE.

AD-A327513

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Off the Trodden Path: Thinking Through the Military Exploration of the Information Domain

21 FEB 1997 87 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: O'Connell, Ed

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Trends in today's security environment point to a changed information domain on the horizon--a cyberspace of increased density, interconnectivity and collaboration, where links and nodes have disappeared. As military planners, we are stuck somewhere between institutional skepticism reserved for new tricks, and the awe and wonder with which the rest of our society views this new frontier. Yet, insights provided by recent strategic information warfare exercises suggest the military is beginning to approach cyberspace from a new perspective--as a place like any other. These trends and early insights will have profound implications for how we project force into this changed cyberspace of tomorrow.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *COMPUTER NETWORKS, *MILITARY PLANNING, *INFORMATION WARFARE, DATA BASES, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, MAN COMPUTER INTERFACE.

AD-A327427

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Information Operations: A Layman's Perspective

1 APR 1997 34 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Bishop, Roy V.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The subject of Information Operations (IO), formerly called Information Warfare, is having a profound impact on the Department of Defense and the Armed Services because of the proliferation of information technologies throughout the Armed Services. Most literature on the subject will tell you that IO is the center piece for a larger revolution in military affairs. Whether these technological innovations represent a revolution or not, is of little importance in the grand scheme of things. But taking maximum advantage of their potential is. Utilization of these technologies is not without considerable risk. This paper examines where we got started with incorporating high technology into intelligence, weapons, and command, control, communications and computer systems, assess where we are and where we are going, discuss the associated vulnerabilities and what we are doing to protect against them.

DESCRIPTORS: *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, WEAPONS, RISK, COMPUTERS.

AD-A327112

NAVAL RESEARCH LAB WASHINGTON DC VACUUM ELECTRONICS BRANCH

Christine: A Multifrequency Parametric Simulation Code for Traveling Wave Tube Amplifiers

5 MAY 1997 39 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Antonsen, Thomas M., Jr.; Levush, Baruch

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) A model and computer code are presented that simulate the operation of traveling wave tube amplifiers (TWTs). The model is based on the well known parametric theory in which the relevant properties of the interaction circuit are the phase velocity and coupling impedance of the waves supported by the slow wave structure. The model includes a multifrequency description of both the fields of the structure and the space charge fields. This allows for the study of harmonic and intermodulation distortion. The beam is treated as an ensemble of disks with an effective axial velocity spread. Several options are available for specifying the parameters of the interaction circuit: using a sheath helix description, importing data from another model, or using data from experimental measurement. The advantages of the code are that it can relatively quickly simulate situations in which the amplifier is driven by multiple input frequencies, it is readily portable to different platforms, and it facilitates tube design by enabling users to vary parameters relatively easily.

DESCRIPTORS: *TRAVELING WAVE TUBES, *INTERMODULATION, FREQUENCY, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS, COMPUTER PROGRAMMING, DISKS, ELECTRICAL IMPEDANCE, SPACE CHARGE, SLOW WAVE CIRCUITS, AMPLIFIERS, COUPLING CIRCUITS, PHASE VELOCITY.

AD-A327000

ARMY COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS COMMAND FORT MONMOUTH NJ

Advance Planning Briefing for Industry: Information Dominance for the Full Spectrum Force

29 MAY 1997 510 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Army C4IEW is pleased to present these proceedings of the 1997 Advance Planning Briefing for Industry (APBI) entitled 'Information Dominance for the Full Spectrum Force.' The objective of this publication is to provide industry with a comprehensive overview of our research and development programs, sustainment efforts and corresponding contract opportunities available to industry within the next five years. Technology is the critical component to attaining full-spectrum operations. The Department of Defense must team with private industry at every opportunity in order to ensure advanced technologies for our forces in the 21st Century.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *ARMY PLANNING, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SYMPOSIA, ARMY RESEARCH, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH MANAGEMENT.

AD-A326646

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

The Role of the Intelligence Community in Preparing to Win the Information War

10 APR 1997 25 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Mccollum, William W.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Increasing reliance on information-based technology is not unique to the United States, but growing awareness of the vulnerabilities created by this reliance has focused attention on protecting our information and information systems, while the potential value of offensive information operations, particularly in peacetime, has been less fully explored. This paper examines the relationship between defensive and offensive information warfare, looks at the status of governing policies and doctrine, discusses the vital role of intelligence in winning the defensive and offensive information war, and makes recommendations regarding organizing the intelligence community to support the successful prosecution of the offensive information war.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *VULNERABILITY, *INFORMATION THEORY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, WARFARE, UNITED STATES, POLICIES, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, PEACETIME, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AWARENESS.

AD-A326536

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Information Warfare - Who is Responsible? Coordinating the Protection of Our National Information Infrastructure

3 MAR 1997 42 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Thompson, Michael J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The government of the United States relies on the information superhighway, officially known as the National Information Infrastructure (NII), to pass critical information. Banking, transportation, communication, medicine, electrical power, and manufacturing are also dependent upon the NII to pass the information required for them to operate. The U.S. Military depends on the NII for the movement of personnel and equipment, voice and data communications and research and development. The nation's power is provided through the national power grid which is connected to the NII. The NII is vulnerable to intrusion, disruption and exploitation by hackers, hostile entities, or anyone with a modest amount of automation equipment. Leadership at the national level is required to coordinate government and private sector actions to ensure the security and reliability of the NII.

DESCRIPTORS: *MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *COMPUTER NETWORKS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INFORMATION TRANSFER, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VULNERABILITY, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS.

AD-A326368

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Defensive Information Warfare in Today's Joint Operations: What's the Real Threat?

APR 1997 47 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Ashman, Bruce W.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information Warfare (IW) is an emerging concept that affects the use of automated systems and reflects the growing realization that information technology can be used to gain an advantage over other users. Since the Gulf War, the incidents of information systems attacks have increased, especially in the civilian environment. Attacks against military systems have gone as far as penetrating sensitive, previously secure systems. As this threat against information or computer-based systems becomes more blatant, it raises the question of how vulnerable to attack are our automated military systems. Emerging technologies promise greater speed, accuracy and reliability for military operations while simultaneously producing greater lethality and situation awareness. However, as the Armed Forces depend more and more on these systems to perform routine and specialized operations, the risk of penetration, disruption, or even compromise becomes apparent. While information warfare has great potential as a valid offensive tool, this paper explores the threat to unified and joint military operations from a defensive information warfare perspective.

DESCRIPTORS: *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, DATA BASES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE.

AD-A325529

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Critical Factors in Cyberspace

7 FEB 1997 23 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Van Cleave, John

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Since WWII, warfare and conflict involving the United States, has taken on an antiseptic dimension. Conflicts have been resolved in far away places, separated by distance and a powerful military force able to project power and take the fight to the enemy. In doing so the U.S. has remained relatively immune to attacks on its own social, economic, political, and military infrastructures. But as the U.S. forges ahead into the information age, the global connectivity inherent in this transformation also brings about new vulnerabilities. The vast advantages of space the fabled high ground including the civil and military capabilities it brings to the U.S will soon be overshadowed by what could be termed the common ground, cyberspace. In cyberspace highly computerized and networked social, economic, political, and military infrastructures become intertwined, increasing their vulnerability to attack. This paper will explore some current and future challenges that must be considered carefully as we develop the new common ground in cyberspace and the impact that cyber weapons will have in reshaping operational and strategic planning. It will also identify critical factors traditional in U.S. infrastructures that are increasingly vulnerable to attack through cyberspace due to these new linkages.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *MILITARY PLANNING, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, LOGISTICS SUPPORT, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, VULNERABILITY, COMPUTER PROGRAM VERIFICATION, INTERNET.

AD-A325003

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Information Warfare and its Impact on National Security

13 JUN 1997 20 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Devries, Anita D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) For years, the United States national security posture has relied heavily on secured sea lines of communication, friendly borders, unmatched human and material resources, unlimited mobilization capability, and nuclear hegemony. This paper defines information warfare; examines its offensive and defensive components; explores potential threats, information warfare legalities and nature; and concludes that we face a tremendous challenge at the strategic level to keep our current status of being a world power to be reckoned with.

DESCRIPTORS: *WARFARE, *NATIONAL SECURITY, ELECTRONICS, GLOBAL, STRATEGY, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, IMPACT, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, THREATS, MOBILIZATION, COMPUTERS, VULNERABILITY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY TACTICS, INFRASTRUCTURE.

AD-A324333

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Heavy Division Organic Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Added Value or Added Baggage

13 DEC 1996 69 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Taylor, Robert J., Jr

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This monograph discusses heavy division organic SIGINT and its limited ability to aid the commander in the division's fight. Modern weapon system employment demands that intelligence and SIGINT provide precision intelligence at extended ranges. Furthermore, tactical SIGINT system mobility and survivability requires carriers that are as mobile and survivable as the combat systems they support. This monograph examines the range, accuracy of collection, and the mobility and survivability of tactical SIGINT systems. The monograph first determines that the changing nature of the modern battlefield and doctrine require tactical SIGINT assets to adequately range targets, determine precisely their location, move with combat formations yet remain survivable. The monograph uses these three requirements through each section as a guide in determining the value of SIGINT. Next, it evaluates tactical SIGINT through two case studies. The first is Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the second is at the National Training Center. Both case studies evaluate currently available tactical SIGINT systems.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *TACTICAL WARFARE, *TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE, *ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY OPERATIONS, MOBILITY, IRAQ, KUWAIT, SURVIVABILITY, BATTLEFIELDS, WEAPON SYSTEMS.

AD-A316760

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Defensive Information Warfare

AUG 1996 82 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Alberts, David S.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The problem of defending against information warfare is real. Our citizens and the organizations that provide them with the vital services they need can find no sanctuary from these attacks. The low cost of mounting these attacks has enlarged the field of potential adversaries and complicated efforts to collect intelligence and array our defenses. The consequences of a well-planned and coordinated attack by a relatively sophisticated foe could be serious. Even the threat of such an attack or digital blackmail is a distinct possibility. How the public will respond to the threat of IW infrastructure attacks or to actual attacks is unclear, but is a major determinant of future policy and actions. This situation is getting worse with the rapid proliferation of information technology and know-how. We are becoming increasingly dependent on automation in every aspect of our lives. As information technology becomes an essential part of the way organizations and individuals create products and provide services, the need for interconnectivity and interoperability increases. With this increased need for exchanges of information (and products), vulnerabilities increase. Finally, the increased reliance on commercial-off-the-shelf products or commercial services makes it more and more difficult for organizations and individuals to control their own security environment.

DESCRIPTORS: *WARFARE, *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, *THREAT EVALUATION, *DEFENSE PLANNING, *INFORMATION SCIENCES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

AD-A314073

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

The Advent of Netwar

1996 127 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Arquilla, John; Ronfeldt, David

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This briefing elucidates a concept-'netwar'-that we mentioned in an earlier article on 'cyberwar.' Whereas the latter term refers primarily to information-based military operations designed to disrupt an adversary, netwar relates to lower-intensity conflict at the societal end of the spectrum. In our view, netwar is likely to be the more prevalent and challenging form of conflict in the emerging information age and merits careful and sustained study. In terms of conduct, netwar refers to conflicts in which a combatant is organized along networked lines or employs networks for operational control and other communications. The organizational forms that netwar actors adopt may resemble 'stars' that have some centralized elements, or 'chains' that are linear, but the major design will tend to be 'all-channel' networks in which each principal node of an organization can communicate and interact with every other node. Further, netwar actors may develop hybrid structures that incorporate elements of some or all of the above designs in varied ways. Strong netwar actors will have not only organizational, but also doctrinal, technological, and social layers that emphasize network designs. Netwar actors may make heavy use of cyberspace, but that is not their defining characteristic-they subsist and operate in areas beyond it.

DESCRIPTORS: *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *COMPUTER NETWORKS, CONTROL, CHAINS, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, HYBRID SYSTEMS, CENTRALIZED, EVOLUTION (DEVELOPMENT).

AD-A313366

DECISION SCIENCE CONSORTIUM INC FALLS CHURCH VA

Decision Support for Battlefield Planning

MAR 1996 37 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Lehner, Paul E.; Tolcott, Marvin A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) As part of a research program investigating decision support capabilities for battlefield planning, an examination was made of developmental systems in each of five principal elements of Army C2I: maneuver control, fire support, air defense, intelligence and electronic warfare, and combat support services. The systems described generally fall into two categories (with some overlap): (1) decision support systems that attempt to capture automatic specific decision processes, usually employing advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence; and (2) decision aids that attempt to enhance human cognition in command decision making, usually based on psychological research findings. These efforts appear to be mainly driven by technology, rather than being based on systematic study of operational requirements and there is little evidence of their operational use. Another type of support, not reviewed, takes the form of application programs that process data already available in management information systems; these are being built into C2I systems by the systems developers, and are therefore likely to find operational use. Increased emphasis on studying command decision making requirements is recommended.

DESCRIPTORS: *BATTLEFIELDS, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *ARMY PLANNING, *DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AIR DEFENSE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, MANEUVERABILITY, AUTOMATION, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS, DECISION MAKING.

AD-A312146

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Interoperability: The Cornerstone of Information Warfare

12 APR 1996 27 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Barac, Gregory G.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Information warfare has won the joint acceptance within DoD and may become the biggest threat faced by our nation. The great achievement of interoperability between information-based systems (e.g., computers) also introduced inherent risks and vulnerabilities, which is the cornerstone of information warfare. Information warfare includes the ability to exploit and dominate information made assessable through computers and communications. Should there be concern about these vulnerabilities? Absolutely. Modern societies depend upon these information-based systems to live and work. This paper introduces the recentness of information warfare and highlights some current issues, like who is leading the effort. The success of the information society to make their systems interoperate with other systems greatly increased the potentiality of information warfare. A review of the evolution of system interoperability highlights this phenomenon. As a result of being directly influenced by the industrial-age society, leaders over the age of forty may be too challenged to adequately grasp the issues of information warfare and may lead ineffectively.

DESCRIPTORS: *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *INTEROPERABILITY, *SECURE COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, EVOLUTION (GENERAL), ACCEPTABILITY.

AD-A311887

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Information Warfare: Implications for Forging the Tools

JUN 1996 160 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Thrasher, Roger D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) One part of the modern Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is the possibility of a new form of warfare-often called information warfare. Development of information warfare depends on technological advances, systems development and adaptation of operational approaches and organizational structures. This thesis assesses the implications of information warfare for the technology and systems development areas, with the underlying motivation of ensuring the military is postured to win the information warfare RMA through effective research, development and acquisition. This assessment takes place primarily through a 'Delphi' process designed to generate discussion between selected information warfare experts about the impacts of information warfare. This thesis concludes that information warfare is largely dependent on commercial information technology. This dependence means the military should rely on the commercial sector for most technological advances and products-with government research funds focused on military-unique research areas. Use of commercial items, coupled with DoD standard architectures, may enable a decentralization of information warfare acquisition to the user level.

DESCRIPTORS: *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *MILITARY APPLICATIONS, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, COMMERCE, DETECTORS, COMPUTER PROGRAMMING, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, DATA ACQUISITION, COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT.

AD-A311885

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Reexamining the Principle of Surprise in 21st Century Warfare

16 JUN 1996 22 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Baker, Virginia E.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: The U.S. military has undergone profound changes over the past decades, however the basic principles of warfighting, developed in the late 1900's, remain essentially unchanged. Nevertheless, as we continually revise doctrine and the way we fight wars, particularly in the approaching 21st Century, it is important to review the principles of war in the context of the current military environment. Probably the most affected by the technological and institutional changes in the military is the principle of surprise. Surprise, a vital force multiplier in any military operation, can achieve quick, decisive victory in battle. Therefore its employment will continue to be effective in 21st Century warfare; however commanders must consider the impact of changes in technology and intelligence on achieving surprise; and how secrecy, another vital component of surprise, will be more difficult to maintain in the future. The technological advantages of the United States is diminishing due to technology exchanges, commercial availability of military systems, and gray market activities. Good intelligence analysis is becoming more difficult to achieve in a complex real-time, multidiscipline collection environment. Massive infusions of information increase the fog and friction of war and commanders must quickly and accurately assess intelligence and take risks accordingly.

DESCRIPTORS: *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, *MILITARY APPLICATIONS, *MILITARY MODERNIZATION, *MILITARY PLANNING, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY OPERATIONS, WARFARE, NATIONAL SECURITY, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, MILITARY DOCTRINE.

AD-A310529

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

Analysis of Protection of Electronic Information in the Gulf War

MAY 1996 22 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Taiying, Lin

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In the Gulf War in early 1991, the most lethal and most expensive weapons were not the guided missiles, fighter craft, tanks, or warships, but the electronic information system deployed by the multinational troops in the Gulf area led by the United States. This information system was large-scale, advanced in technology, strict in organization, and high in operational efficiency, providing the overall, precise, timely, and continuous information about Iraqi troops to the multinational troops in its various command structure levels. Thus, the demand for prescribing combat plans and command execution was ensured, to have key functions in winning the war. The Gulf War was a concentrated manifestation of the modern informationized battleground. In the view of the U.S. forces, the Gulf War signaled the conclusion of a combat era and marked the coming of the C3I era. Therefore, analysis on the electronic information protection system in this war is very important and significant to cope with combat in the future high-tech conditions.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *PROTECTION, *ELECTRONIC SECURITY, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), MILITARY HISTORY, IRAQ, FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN), COMBAT SUPPORT, ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE, TRANSLATIONS, DEFENSE PLANNING, CHINA, FOREIGN LANGUAGES.

AD-A309782

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Information Warfare: The Organizational Dimension

FEB 1996 27 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Minehart, Robert F., Jr

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Since the December 1992 publication of the Department of Defense (DoD) classified directive on Information Warfare (IW) considerable effort has been expended examining this issue. Despite this attention, a clear vision for the implementation of IW within DoD and the U.S. Government as a whole has yet to emerge. Three pillars are essential to achieving a viable IW strategy and supporting architecture: policy doctrine, organization training and requirements/technology. Much has been written, discussed, and even debated on the need for overarching national policy in this area, as well as the multitude of capabilities and vulnerabilities stemming from our increased reliance on advanced technology. A similar focus on the organizational component of IW has not occurred. The study specifically addresses the role of organizations as a key component of IW. Both the progress achieved to date within DoD and the significant challenges remaining to be overcome at the interagency level are examined. Specific recommendations are provided on how better to organize the IW effort.

DESCRIPTORS: *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, POLICIES, ORGANIZATIONS, SIZES (DIMENSIONS), TRAINING, MILITARY DOCTRINE, VISION, ARCHITECTURE.

AD-A309400

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Artificial Intelligence Applications to Information Warfare

22 MAR 1996 35 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Kirk, David C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In the coming years, a critical element of combat will likely be waged in the information infrastructure. Current strategic concepts do not compensate for the vulnerability of our ever-increasing information-based society. In this research project, artificial intelligence technology (specifically, intelligent agents) was explored. Intelligent agents were found to have characteristics that could help execute an information war. Although there still is work to be done, intelligent agents may someday manage the information flow, be the core technology in network firewalls, and contribute to overall network security through continuous red team vulnerability assessments.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *DATA MANAGEMENT, *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY STRATEGY, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, VULNERABILITY, COMPUTER NETWORKS, INFRASTRUCTURE.

AD-A307334

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

The Challenge of Netwar for the Operational Commander

6 MAR 1996 30 PAGES

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Poole, James A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The threat of intrusions to U.S. domestic and military infrastructure and information systems is very real and may affect our national security now and in the future. Information has become a new center of gravity that must be protected. Netwar is one tool of information warfare that the operational commander can use in defensive and offensive operations to gain information dominance. Netwar targets military or civilian non-weapons computer networks to gain a military advantage while it protects one's own systems from attack. With an overview of netwar concepts, this paper explores the benefits of netwar for the commander, the defensive and offensive decisions that must be made, and some prescriptions for the future that will enable the commander to fight and win conflicts effectively in the twenty-first century.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *COMPUTER NETWORKS, WARFARE, DECISION MAKING, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, TOOLS, ATTACK, PROBLEM SOLVING, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, DOMESTIC, MILITARY COMMANDERS, INTRUSION, INFRASTRUCTURE.

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