[iwar] Historical posting
From: Fred Cohen
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Mon, Jan 1, 1999
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Date: Mon, Jan 1, 1999
From: Fred Cohen
Reply-To: iwar@egroups.com
Subject: [iwar] Historical posting
> I believe that history shows that intentional de-stabilisation of one's
> adversary tends to increase their willingness to take sterner measures to
> bolster themselves, and in so doing become more unpredictable. I think I
> recall a story regarding Hitler's willingness to nuke the Soviets (and
> others) in the event he could not beat them on the ground (and possibly
> regardless of whether he could or not). Had our Allies not gotten wind of
> Telemark, we might have found out for certain.
While the premise, "de-stabilisation of one's adversary tends to increase
their willingness to take sterner measures to bolster themselves" may be
true, I don't think that Hitler's willingness to use nuclear weapons is a
proper example of that statement. The United States used two nuclear
weapons for a similiar reason (that the ground war in Japan would either be
futile or so costly as to be a Punic victory), but I don't think that anyone
would argue that the United States used nuclear weapons as a means to
bolster themselves in the eyes of the Japanese, or the world for that
matter.
I think the premise would be better stated by saying that "the enemies
actions, or their willingness to take drastic measures, is directly
proportional to their perception of the consquences for taking no action,"
which would apply in both cases.
ahp