[iwar] Historical posting
From: Fred Cohen
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Mon, Jan 1, 1999
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Date: Mon, Jan 1, 1999
From: Fred Cohen
Reply-To: iwar@egroups.com
Subject: [iwar] Historical posting
One of the points I am intending to make on the "instability" front
is the decreased ability of both the "adversary", and their adversaries
in turn, to ascertain the real initiator of an action.
When we thwart, or diminish the ability of a party to "secure the
controls of their own devices", they (unwittingly) gain a corresponding
degree of deniability. If their systems are seen subsequently to launch
a cyber-attack (say), how can we point a finger at them and proclaim
"look what they did", when in fact some third party may have taken
advantage of their vulnerabilities in using them as a platform? Or,
similarly, to have "made them see" an attack when none was present,
and then elicit in them a justifiable response?
These issues have existed forever, I suppose. But how does the new
cyber-intense playground amplify the problem?
___tony___
At 07:19 PM 01/11/2000 -0500, Adam H. Pendleton wrote:
>From: "Adam H. Pendleton" apendleton@v...
>
> > I believe that history shows that intentional de-stabilisation of one's
> > adversary tends to increase their willingness to take sterner measures to
> > bolster themselves, and in so doing become more unpredictable.
[snip]
>I think the premise would be better stated by saying that "the enemies
>actions, or their willingness to take drastic measures, is directly
>proportional to their perception of the consquences for taking no action,"
>which would apply in both cases.
>
>ahp