[iwar] China/United States - Why Fiji May Matter (fwd)
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Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2000 20:08:00 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: [iwar] China/United States - Why Fiji May Matter (fwd)
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From: http://www.stratfor.com
Island Strategy: Why Fiji May Matter
Summary
Last month, a political crisis erupted in Fiji. Last week, another
exploded in the Solomon Islands. So far, the world has largely
shrugged. After all, these are isolated islands in a region that
has become a bit of a strategic backwater. But taken together with
the steady crumbling of Indonesia, instability on these islands can
allow an outside power to gain a strategic advantage. Why? To keep
the U.S. Navy out of Asia.
Analysis
Last month, a political crisis erupted in Fiji: an attempted coup,
followed by the seizure of political hostages and a confrontation
that continues. Last week, a political crisis exploded in the
Solomon Islands. Both cases involve complex internal political,
economic and ethnic issues that, in general, are of great interest
to the citizenry but not of particular interest to the outside
world.
It is therefore startling to step back and realize that with these
two crises, a virtually unbroken belt of instability now stretches
from the Straits of Malacca in western Indonesia to the south
central Pacific. It is easy to dismiss this as an interesting
coincidence. And it may well be that purely local forces exploded
simultaneously. Nevertheless, the strategic implications of events
may be very real, if not at all intended by the actors involved.
So far, the world has largely ignored the events in the Pacific. No
calls for international intervention have gone up. The government
in Australia, which has sought a larger role in the region, has in
effect shrugged. Alone each of these events means little. But taken
as a whole, they could threaten commercial shipping - and naval
traffic. If, in the course of a few years, hostile forces emerge in
control of these islands and portions of Indonesia, the world will
find every reason to care.
At one level, there is both a common element and a common force
driving events from Indonesia to Fiji. All of these societies are
complex mixtures of traditional political arrangements coexisting
poorly with approximations of modern states. But the tension
between tradition and modernization has not been dealt with
satisfactorily in any of these societies. As a result, long-
standing ethnic tension has mixed with divergent economic interests
to produce the ingredients of instability.
________________________________________________________________
Would you like to see full text and graphics?
http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/061200.ASP
___________________________________________________________________
This region has, as of late, been a bit of a strategic backwater.
But it was not always. During the U.S.-Japanese competition for
preeminence in the Pacific from the 1920s until 1945, these islands
made up the centerpiece of a great strategic struggle. American
power projection into the Western Pacific toward China, Japan,
Australia and the Philippines depended on the ability of the U.S.
Navy to navigate past these islands. Japanese airfields denied the
U.S. fleet passage during World War II. Brutal fighting from
Guadalcanal to Tinian revolved around the use of these islands as
unsinkable, if immobile aircraft carriers.
Defeating the Guadalcanal prevented them from moving east through
Polynesia. And so the line of supply stretching from Pearl Harbor
to Australia was never cut by Japanese air power. The United States
could project power to Australia, blocking any plan to invade
Australia, and allowing American forces to begin rolling back the
Japanese in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea.
More than a half-century later, the U.S. Navy still enjoys
unchallenged access to and through all of these routes, the most
important of which are the sea-lanes through the Indonesian
archipelago. Through here pass the U.S. carrier battlegroups on
their way to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Choking these
off would cripple Washington's modern-day ability to project power.
This is not as unthinkable as it might seem. Every day, Indonesia
crumbles literally one island at a time.
But what power would be in a position to benefit from this
situation? There is but one: China. The government in Beijing is
clearly intent on becoming the dominant East Asian power; it has an
interest in keeping U.S. forces at bay and it has the means to take
advantage. So long as American fleets lurk just over the horizon,
China will fail in its ability to redraw a new regional order.
Consider the problem from the Chinese viewpoint. The presence of
U.S. naval power near - and sometimes just off - the mainland coast
makes it difficult for Beijing to control coastal political
interests that are naturally inclined to be more oriented toward
the outside world than inland China. Today, coastal entrepreneurs
have the navy of their foreign financial partners reassuringly over
the horizon. The government is acutely aware that the U.S. 7th
Fleet affects both the regional balance of power and the domestic
psychological fabric. The fact that Beijing cannot solve its Taiwan
dilemma is testimony to this fact.
_______________________________________________________________
For more on China, see:
http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/china/default.htm
__________________________________________________________________
For now and the foreseeable future, Beijing has few conventional
military levers at its disposal. A blue-water navy capable of
challenging the U.S. Navy could be generations away; it certainly
won't put to sea in the lifetime of China's current leadership.
There is no powerful navy in the world with which the Chinese can
ally.
But if the current situation in the Pacific continues to
deteriorate, it could allow Beijing to reach for an unconventional
lever. The goal is not the destruction of the U.S. 7th Fleet; the
goal is merely to make access, transit and the concentration of
forces thorny. All China would need to do is take advantage of this
emerging belt of instability, increase the risk of passage through
the central and southern parts of the Pacific Ocean and divert U.S.
ships. Instead of, say, showing up unchallenged off of an Asian
coast, American forces would have to first figure out how to get
there.
The problem is partly political and partly technological. The
Chinese have worked hard on the technical problem. Knowing that
they are weak in both surface weaponry and air power, and aware
that U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities could probably
rapidly diminish China's submarine force, China has concentrated on
the use of missiles. In particular, the Chinese have concentrated
on developing a generation of land-based anti-ship missiles,
including cruise missiles. Already, these missiles have made
American planners pause and consider that Beijing can at least
partly enforce a blockade of Taiwan.
Now, imagine that these missiles are transferred to irregular
forces operating on a string of unstable islands in Indonesia and
the western and central Pacific Ocean. The United States is
suddenly facing an equation very similar to the one it wrestled
with in 1942. If the Chinese - or any other power - emulate the
Japanese strategy with modern missiles, the American navy would
find its way much riskier than ever before.
Since the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is already at work
on the technical problem, Beijing would have to grapple with the
political problem. Even in a crisis, placing Chinese forces on
these islands is a difficult task. All of these nations are heavily
exposed economically and politically to the United States,
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Penetration is not easy, but at
the same time Pacific Islanders have been extraordinarily
neglected, in many cases by these same countries. Particularly
north of the equator, the level of development is so primitive that
it is hard to find a government to influence. South of the equator,
in Polynesia and some of Melanesia, the problems are so complex and
idiosyncratic that it is difficult to get a handle on them.
This, of course, is the precise atmosphere in which a relatively
low-cost campaign of destabilization and influence-buying could
achieve a great deal. Given the fact that no one really is
watching, the situation that is now unfolding can present a
tremendous strategic opportunity for China. It does not take a lot
of resources to buy influence in these places. And it doesn't take
a great deal of acumen to trigger crises in societies that are
tinderboxes anyway. Certainly, no matter who triggers the crisis,
it does not take much to exploit it.
Is there any evidence that China is behind any of the crises? Very
little, although over the past year some straws have blown in the
wind:
1.) Rumors have circulated that conflict in Guadalcanal was related
to a struggle between pro-Chinese and pro-Taiwanese factions.
Taiwanese foreign ministry spokesman Chen Ming-cheng responded to
questions saying, "The turmoil should not be used as an excuse to
influence ROC (Taiwan)-Solomon Islands relations." It is
interesting that the spokesman didn't just reject the question out
of hand.
2.) Nauru, an island nation just northeast of the Solomon Islands
has applied for membership into the United Nations. Its application
had been deferred due to Chinese opposition. China objected on the
grounds that Nauru has recognized Taiwan. Taiwanese Foreign
Minister Jason Hu has called the Chinese policy "naked hegemony"
and said that the Chinese stance was intolerable.
3.) China endorsed the application of Kiribati for U.N. membership.
The Chinese maintain a satellite and missile tracking facility on
Kiribati, which is located on the equator, east of Nauru.
Interestingly, Kiribati's government has given final approval to
Japan's national Space Development Agency to build a spaceport on
remote Kiritimati, or Chistmas Island. On the equator and at 180
degrees longitude, Kiribati occupies an extremely strategic
position for missile launches and communications satellite
management. Boeing has plans to launch communicates into
geostationary orbit from oil drilling platforms towed to the
region.
4.) Vanuatu's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and
Business Development visited China last summer. The invitation was
extended by Chinese Vice Prime Minister Qian Qichen. Vanuatu is
sandwiched between Fiji and the Solomons.
The point here is that the governments in Beijing and Taiwan are -
unlike much of the rest of the world - acutely aware of the
importance of this region. The Chinese are not acting aggressively
to expand their influence, but they are acting. Too aggressive a
course would undoubtedly trigger a U.S. response. Quiet bridge
building is the key. And the Chinese are quietly building bridges.
For about 50 years, no one has had any interest in increasing their
influence in this region. This may not continue to be the case for
much longer. China's need to counter American power - combined with
Beijing's limited naval capability - makes a Pacific Island
strategy as natural to them as it was to the Japanese decades ago.
There is, however, ample time for the United States, Australia and
New Zealand, acting in concert, to developing a blocking strategy
that is both effective and cheap. The governments in Australia and
New Zealand, however, are relatively impervious to strategic
thinking these days, tending to look at events piecemeal instead of
eyeing long-term threats. And right now U.S. strategy is on
autopilot.
A potentially important chapter is opening in the Pacific. It will
be interesting to see if Beijing takes advantage of it and whether
anyone will care enough about this ignored region to devise a
counter-strategy.
_______________________________________________________________
For more on Asia, see:
http://www.stratfor.com/asia/default.htm?section=2
_______________________________________________________________
(c) 2000 WNI, Inc.
--
Fred Cohen at Sandia National Laboratories at tel:925-294-2087 fax:925-294-1225
Fred Cohen & Associates: http://all.net - fc@all.net - tel/fax:925-454-0171
Fred Cohen - Practitioner in Residence - The University of New Haven
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