[iwar] [fc:Warning-&-Indicators---Cyber-Conflict]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-09-12 15:44:38


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From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
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Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2001 15:44:38 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Warning-&-Indicators---Cyber-Conflict]
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The below points deal with the emerging cyber conflict tied to the 11
Sept.  2001 terrorist attacks.  At this point it is emerging only.  I'm
keeping my fingers crossed that this does not escalate further (the
physical component is more than enough to keep track of), but in case it
does, here is what to look for and some points for consideration. 

If you see any traffic you believe is related to this, I'm very interested.
...

What to Look For/How a Cyber Conflict Develops
1. Event Occurs
2. Email traffic among concerned individuals picks-up.
3. Discussion boards and chat rooms light up.
4. Purpose-built lists and online communities formed to discuss the event.
5. Intelligence collection and targeting.
6. Organized groups formed to carry out attacks.
7. Known tools deployed or slightly modified.
8. Public and private attack tracks begin.
9. Purpose-built attack tools released.
10. Dedicated perception management campaign launched.
11. More sophisticated attacks that required preparation time launched.
12. Additional groups and supporters from around the world rally to the cause.
13. Behind the scenes infrastructure targets and other indirectly 
connected organizations hit.
14. Continued evolution of attack tools and tactics.


Points for Consideration

 The potential cyber conflict has the ability to escalate without the
support of nation-state actors. 

 Never before have nations had to deal with patriotic populations that
have the ability to launch potentially damaging strikes against another
country on their own initiative.  This new development raises a
significant number of issues that will continue to complicate
international relations for the near future.  What if a targeted country
refuses to believe it's a 17-year-old kid and considers an attack an act
of state-sponsored Information Warfare? How do you stop patriotic
activists in your own country from launching attacks against a foreign
country to right a perceived wrong? How does a country under cyber siege
from another's citizens, not the government, respond? In the past, the
fact that not everyone had an ICBM sitting in their living room or a B-2
bomber parked in their driveway prevented individual citizens from
launching their own attacks.  These same barriers don't exist in the
cyber realm. 

 A certain portion of the attackers will believe passionately in their
cause while others will be involved just because it seems like a cool
thing to do. 

 Due to the context of these types of conflicts, some hackers and others
that consider themselves to be "ethical" find justification for crossing
lines they normally wouldn't, consequently enhancing the talent pool
available to both sides.  An individual might be unwilling to crack a
system for criminal profit but avenging the death of a fellow countryman
or launching a counterstrike falls into a different sphere. 

 During periods like this, NOT ALL activity originating from either
party and targeting the other necessarily has anything to do with the
current tensions. 

 The level of sophistication of the participants on both sides is likely
to run the gauntlet from extremely skilled to knowing how to do no more
than surf to a web page and click on a few buttons. 

 Participants will range from organized groups to lone actors. 

 Attackers with other motives (criminal profit, etc.) may try to launch
attacks designed to be lost in the background noise generated by current
tensions or direct suspicions to another party. 

 We are going to continue to see more of this type of cyber-based
protest/action/conflict in the future when tensions in the physical
realm rise. 


Developments So Far

 Shortly after 11 Sept.  terrorist attacks "US supporters" began posting
messages on bulletin boards calling for attacks and posting target
intelligence.  The targets so far are Arab networks and sites specific
to Muslim extremist groups. 


Lessons Learned from the Israeli-Palestinian Cyber Conflict

 There are two classes of targets.  Targets of opportunity can include
anything from non-profit organizations and mom-and-pop shops to
multinational corporations and government agencies.  If systems are
vulnerable and picked up in a scan, problems can be expected.  The
second class of targets are made up of those that are specifically
targeted either because they are high-profile, the attackers perception
of what they represent, or services they provide to another
organization. 

 Targets range from web sites, DNS servers, chat rooms, bulletin boards,
FTP sites, ISP infrastructure, closed databases, e-commerce servers and
a wide range of others. 

 While web page defacements and some other actions are public by their
very nature, this does not mean that strikes are restricted to these
types of attacks only.  During the Israeli-Palestinian Cyber Conflict,
groups would launch very public denial of service campaigns and
defacements while behind the scenes working with skilled crackers to
gain root access to targeted systems.  It is important to understand the
public actions and how they relate to your operations and then raise
your vigilance to deal with the lone actor or silent group that is
likely to attempt the more sophisticated attack. 

- 

______________________
IntelCenter
Voice (703) 370-2962
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Email - <a href="mailto:information@intelcenter.com?Subject=Re:%20[LEANALYST]%20Warning%20&amp;%20Indicators%20-%20Cyber%20Conflict%2526In-Reply-To=%2526lt;p0510039ab7c555fec6e4@[199.174.154.114]">information@intelcenter.com</a>
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