[iwar] US Counterterrorist policy strategy

From: Vernon Stagg (vstagg@deakin.edu.au)
Date: 2001-09-17 04:23:36
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Quite a long read and back in 1994 although still has relevance today.

Vernon

(heres the pdf link for a more easier read)
 http://www.pitt.edu/~rcss/publications/viewpoints/mcrea.pdf
RIDGWAY Viewpoints 941

Page 1

Brett A. McCrea

U.S. COUNTERTERRORIST POLICY:

A PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR A

NONTRADITIONAL THREAT *

1. Introduction

Discussions of terrorism during the last 25 years have yielded highly
divergent prescriptions for counteracting what is a highly unpredictable
form of violence. Many people, such as Benjamin Netanhyu, leader of the
Israeli Likud party, contend that terrorists must be deterred through harsh
reprisals. Others, focusing on the causes rather than the manifestations of
violence, suggest more peaceful methods, such as addressing the grievances
of the terrorist organizations. Both of these arguments have validity, but
there are also weaknesses that need to be addressed if a coherent policy on
terrorism is to be enacted. Accordingly, this article analyzes two problems
in the field of counterterrorism. The first deals with gaps in the existing
literature on the subject. Much of the literature on terrorism was seen in
the context of the Cold War and identified either the Soviet Union or its
proxies as the masterminds behind international terrorism. It fell into the
trap of categorizing most, if not all, terrorist organizations as ``state
sponsored.'' Now that the Soviet Union is gone, similar attempts are made to
portray Iran as the new mastermind behind global terrorism. The problem with
such an emphasis is its disregard for terrorist organizations that do not
need state support in order to operate effectively. Moreover, the
categorization issue has significant policy implications. In the pursuit of
effective policies of counterterrorism, decision makers need to be able to
distinguish among groups, and differentiate their policies accordingly. The
second problem stems from the fact that deterrence has been the basic U.S.
counterterror policy. Yet deterrence does not inhibit the resort to
violence, particularly by those terrorist groups that do not receive state
support. With these two problems in mind, a typology of terror organizations
will be established and the weaknesses of past counterterrorist policies
will be discussed. This article also proposes a counterterror policy that
addresses the unique problems posed by terror groups without state
sponsorship. The policy prescription is based on the idea that most
terrorist organizations have a dynamic that results in a schism within the
group. Once these schisms have been identified, the U.S. can use its
political and intelligence assets to develop and perpetuate the splits in
order to isolate the radical faction from the populace. This can be
accomplished by attacking the legitimacy of the radical groups. As James
Adams has stated ``legitimacy is....the Holy Grail of terrorism.'' (Adams,
James. The Financing of Terror. (London: New English Library), 1986, p.
172. ) Hence, the strength and the weakness of terrorist groups lies in the
perceived legitimacy of their cause. The United States must therefore make
efforts to systematically destroy the legitimacy of the more radical
factions by appealing to the moderate portions of the terrorist group's
constituency. Once the most radical segments of terrorist organizations have
been isolated, counterintelligence methods can be used to create suspicion
in the ranks of the radicals in order to render them ineffective as an
operating unit and/or force the group to resort to regular purges. While
this article concentrates on Islamic terror groups, this approach can be
expanded to other groups that employ terror. For present purposes, the
definition of terrorism is the threat or the use of violence in order to
draw attention to, or otherwise promote, a group's political agenda.
Although many people may have problems with such a definition because of its
restrictiveness, there is a general acceptance that

terrorist groups have a political agenda of some sort and articulate their
demands through the use of violence. Democratic societies, such as the
United States, have ``special'' problems when trying to implement
counterterrorist policies. Open societies are extremely vulnerable to
terrorist attacks, partly because certain liberties and rights are held as
sacred. Government infringement on these rights is not passively accepted by
the general populace unless there is an immediate and overwhelming threat.
For example, after the World Trade Center bombing, the need to collect and
collate data on the followers of Sheikh Rahman was clear. However, there are
legal as well as other issues that prevent democratic governments from
violating the privacy of this group until an act has been committed. Yet,
there is a serious need to develop proactive policies to prevent terrorist
incidents before they occur. The development of an effective policy, before
terrorism evolves to the point of threatening the style of our society, is a
difficult task. Assuming that international terrorism will not have a
significant presence in the U.S. because it has been relatively absent in
the past is extremely dangerous. Not only can such an assumption lull the
nation into a false sense of security but, if a serious incident were to
occur, decision makers run the risk of rushing to implement a rash and
ineffective policy based on popular demand for retribution or for positive
protection. Such public pressure could provoke the government to enact
policies which could exacerbate the existent situation. An alternative
scenario is that decision makers could be paralyzed into inaction. 2.
Classifications Before discussing countering terrorism, it is necessary to
distinguish the types of groups that exist. There has been a tendency in the
U.S. to categorize all terrorist groups as being ``state sponsored.''
Although this is done for the sake of simplicity, it is inappropriate. It is
also understandable. If the U.S. has a target such as a state to confront,
it is easier to hold that state responsible rather than some amorphous
organization in a sea of people. Nevertheless, labelling all groups as
``state sponsored'' is a misleading assumption on which to base a policy.
The three categories of terrorist groups used in this article are: 1)state
sponsored 2)state relevant and 3)state irrelevant. State Sponsored Terrorism
State sponsored terrorism is defined, for the purposes of this article, as
involving the use of state apparatus to aid terror groups. A prime example
would be Libya's extension of diplomatic privileges to terrorists in the
early 1980s. In cases of state sponsored terrorism, it is easier both to
discern who the culprits are and to determine how to deal with them.
Terrorist attacks in this category are more black and white than those in
the state relevant and state irrelevant categories. If the various apparati
of a state are mobilized to damage the U.S., that state will be held
responsible for the acts committed. The U.S., being able to defend itself
against such impending attacks, can and should act swiftly and decisively.
In this instance, the idea of deterrence fits in quite well. Even Iran, one
of the most radically antiU.S. states in existence, realizes the limits of
its conventional capabilities when facing the U.S. Echoing this sentiment,
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah has stated, ``the oppressed nations [of the
world] do not have the technology and destructive weapons [the] Americans
have.'' (Kramer, Martin. "The Moral Logic of the Hizballah" in Walter Reich
ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, and States
of Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1990, pp. 144145. ) Thus,
the Iranian regime would be hesitant to mobilize its state apparatus in
order to inflict harm on the United States for fear of military reprisals.
The bottom line is that states are concerned with selfpreservation; hence,
deterrence is more likely to work with states and less likely to work with
anything else. State Relevant and State Irrelevant The other two areas of
terrorism (state relevant and state irrelevant) are much more nebulous in
nature and, therefore, harder to combat. These types of terrorist groups are
independent from state control and are able to raise money for their
organizations through private donations. Consequently, these types of groups
are more difficult to combat. Their ability to raise funds to fight for
their cause means they have a more diversified pool from which to draw
money. The source of the money is difficult to trace and even more difficult
to stop. Hence, it is nearly impossible to weaken the group by trying to cut
their purse strings. Many Islamic groups are of this kind. Another asset
these groups possess is their ability to recruit members and maintain
constant contact with large portions of their constituencies in relative
safety. Most of these groups are able to maintain these connections through
mosques. In Iran, before the revolution, for example, the mosques served as
a podium for spreading radical ideas as well as providing a convenient and
safe meeting place for radicals to congregate. Hence, communication and
meeting places are already legitimately accounted for, and anyone who
attempts to disturb the functions of an Islamic mosque because
``terrorists'' could potentially meet there would risk an all out
confrontation with the entire Muslim world. Financial independence leads to
other ``benefits.'' The ability of a particular group to finance its
operations through private donations removes most obligations to act upon
the wishes of a state. For instance, had the East Germans cut the purse
strings of the Red Army Faction (RAF), the group's existence would have been
short lived. Hence, the RAF had to be responsive to East German demands. The
link between the RAF and East Germany could have been exploited by holding
the East Germans responsible for the RAF's actions. The Hizballah and the
HAMAS (HAMAS is arabic for the word "zeal" and it is an acronym for Harakat
alMuqawama alIslamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement). ) do not have
such states and, therefore, deterrence loses its effectiveness. State
relevant terror groups are small organizations allowed to flourish within
the boundaries of a state that is powerless to act against them. This type
of group also possesses a desire to dominate the state in which it is
fighting. Although this definition may seem odd, countries can be powerless
to confront elements within their borders. Lebanon is a good example. There
was, and still is, a state of Lebanon, but it has been, and still is,
powerless to confront the terror organizations within its own borders. In
the past, it has been unable to take effective action because of the ongoing
civil war. Presently, Syria is the ``guarantor'' in Lebanon, and President
Assad would not risk alienating fellow Muslims by rounding up the Islamists
in Lebanon in order to weed out the violent radicals. The groups such as
HAMAS and Amal fit this category well because they both fight in states they
wish to rule once the fighting has stopped. Hence, the sense of mission for
these groups is to rule Lebanon or Palestine and rid the Arab world of
Jewish and Western influence. Another group which fits this category well is
the Islamic Jihad. This group also wants to rid Palestine of the Jews and
establish an Islamic theocracy in Palestine. State irrelevant terror is
defined as those small groups that are independent of state sponsorship and
finances and able to pursue their own agenda. These groups are the most
flexible because of their freedom from state domination in financial and
``political'' realms. These groups are similar to state relevant groups in
terms of their autonomy in participating in terror acts, the inability of
state power to constrain them, and their ability to raise private monies to
fund their operations. The difference is that the domination of individual
states is simply a means to greater ends. An example of such a group is the
Hizballah. It wants to dominate Lebanon and to reclaim Palestine from the
Jews like the HAMAS and the Amal. However, the overall mission is to have
all nations submit to Islam. 3. Dynamics It is necessary to establish this
typology of terror organizations because the latter two groups (state
relevant and irrelevant) do not have state imposed constraints. Therefore,
these groups do not behave like state sponsored groups. This difference in
behavior is critical when addressing the problems these types of groups
pose. State sponsored terrorists have constraints placed upon them, not
least because of the ability of the state to discipline dissident members
within the organization: if certain members within the group jeopardize
state missions by being ``too radical'' they will be dealt with immediately.
Such a mechanism does not exist in groups that are not state sponsored.
Groups that are political in nature, such as the PLO, would rather
disassociate themselves from radical actors than discipline the troublesome
members. This is largely because these political entities can not gain
legitimacy from states if they employ violent measures to change the
existing order. When examining the dynamics of radical organizations like
terrorist groups, it is possible to discern a recurring pattern. It seems
these organizations eventually undergo a transition in which the group
splits into factions. For simplicity's sake, the factions will be named
``radical'' and ``moderate.'' There are probably exceptions to this
statement, but, by and large, this is an established pattern. Examples range
from the Irish Republican Army splitting into the Official and Provisional
IRA to the Japanese Red Army Faction splitting from the Japanese Communist
League. Perhaps the most striking examples are in the Middle East. The
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) started as the premier organization
for the Palestinian cause. With the evolution of radicalism within the PLO,
small bands, such as Force 17, the Black September Organization, and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) emerged. However, as
time went on, radical factions began to break away from the PLO, claiming
that Yasir Arafat was concentrating too much on political settlements. For
these groups, liberation would never happen unless they used violence to
overthrow the Israelis. Such sentiment gave rise to the creation of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLPGC).
This group broke with the PFLP in 1968 claiming that it desired to use the
sword rather than the spoken word. It was violently opposed to the moderate
factions of the Palestinian movement because of Arafat's ``acceptance'' of a
political solution. However, the dynamic did not stop with the PFLPGC. A
splinter group called the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) broke from the
PFLPGC and this group split even further into proLibyan, proSyrian, and
ProPLO factions. Another off shoot of the PFLP was the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Again, this group claimed that the only
way to free Palestine was through violent action. Within this group, another
split occurred between a proArafat segment and another hardline faction
headed by Nayif Hawatmah 4 The same dynamic has occurred with another group
known as the Muslim Brotherhood Society. The Brotherhood is an Islamist
movement which wants to create a Muslim society in Palestine as was intended
by the Prophet Muhammad. Although this group was originally moderate, it
grew more radical in response to the criticism by the Islamic Jihad. These
two factions had two entirely different views on how to reclaim Palestine.
As noted Palestinian scholar Ziad Abu Amr has stated: Where the Islamic
groups differ is on the centrality of the Palestine issue and the proper
timing for liberating the country. For the Muslim Brotherhood, the first
priority is the Islamic transformation of society, which it sees as a
prerequisite to the liberation of Palestine. According to the Brotherhood,
armed struggle (jihad) cannot be undertaken until the society is reformed,
until secular ideas are abandoned and Islam is adopted. The Islamic Jihad,
on the other hand, considers Palestine its central issue, and advocates
armed struggle as its strategy for political action without waiting for the
Islamization of society. The Islamic Jihad was all the more critical of the
Brotherhood's failure to engage in armed struggle in that jihad is one of
the five pillars of Islamic doctrine. (United States Department of State,
Patterns of Global Terrorism, (U.S. Government Publication), April 1993, pp.
32, 4547. 5 AbuAmr, Ziad, "HAMAS: A Historical and Political Background,"
Journal of Palestinian Studies (Summer 1993), p. 9. ) The Brotherhood
allowed coexistence with secular Arab states. These differences, in
combination with the eruption of the intifada, led to the Brotherhood
sanctioning the use of violence in order to free Palestine from Israeli
occupation. This led to the creation of what is known today as the HAMAS.
The HAMAS' willingness to use terror in order to ``liberate'' Palestine is
undoubted and has managed to overshadow the ``moderate'' Muslim Brotherhood.
Finally, we will examine the Hizballah. This seems to be the group that many
in the U.S. fear because of the ``Iranian connection.'' 6 This group was
initially very radical and, although there has really been no visible split
within the group itself, there are indicators in the state of Iran which
suggest that a schism has occurred. After all Iran is, first and foremost, a
religious community of Shi'ite Muslims and the Hizballah is a terrorist
groups that is dominated by Shi'ites. Disorganization within the Iranian
state is reflective of its religious community. Moreover, the revolution in
Iran has lost considerable steam, largely because the Mullahs have been
unable to deliver many of the promises they had made to the people. During
Iran's eightyear war with Iraq, the enormous amounts of money spent on
military procurements, and its inability to rebuild all of its oil fields
devastated the economy, and the shattered economy has left many in Iran
feeling disillusioned about the ability of their religiously run government.
This, in conjunction with a leadership crisis, has broken the
``Khomeiniite'' hold on Iran. Another movement away from the radicals was
the ascendance of Hashemi Rafsanjani to the Presidency of Iran and the
redefinition of the role of the Velayat eFaqih. (For more on these subjects
read: Sarabi, Farzin, "The PostKhomeini Era in Iran: The Elections of the
Fourth Islamic Majlis," Middle East Journal, vol. 48 no. 1 (1994). 8 See:
"Iran Broke CIA Spy Ring, U.S. Says," New York Times 8 August 1989. ) These
are signs that the moderates in Iran are reemerging. A sign of Rafsanjani's
moderation was his lack of action after a major CIA ring was broken up in
Iran in April 1989. 8 Rafsanjani did not come out and attack the U.S. as was
expected. One could hardly imagine 6 This "connection" has led many to
believe that the Hizballah takes it marching orders form Tehran. This is
simply another attempt to simplistically name groups "state sponsored." The
Hizballah was never a tool of Iran, it was a tool of Khomeini. He used the
group in order to internationalize his revolution. To assure that no one
would moderate this group and hence, compromise his revolution, he kept it
separate from the ruling establishment. what would have happened had
Khomeini been in power. A subsequent example of its moderation was the
assistance in the freeing of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. In short, Iran's
religious community is fractionalized at best and without solid leadership.
The internal situation in Iran may have a significant impact on terrorist
groups such as the Hizballah. 4. U.S. Policy The ``get tough'' stance on
terrorism was started in the United States after the massacre at Lod Airport
in Israel and the killing of the Israeli olympic athletes in Munich in 1972.
The media brought terrorism to the forefront of world attention, and the
U.S. was compelled to formulate policy on this unpredictable form of
violence. This ``get tough'' attitude was both a blessing and a curse. The
benefit was that the United States realized that terror organizations were
capable units, willing and able to take their fight to the international
stage. This realization forced President Nixon to gather all the agencies
that would play a role in the fight against terrorism and form a committee
that would handle future terror incidents. (The committee was called the
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. It was comprised of the Secretary of
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, Assistant to the President for Domestic
Affairs, the Director of the F.B.I., and whoever else the President might
deem necessary.) This action, at the very least, set parameters for the
jurisdictions of these agencies. It also gave U.S. government agencies a
mandate to prevent terrorism from affecting the United States. However, the
formation of this committee occurred more for show than substance. This lack
of motivation was reflected in the performance of the group when it became
operational. The committee continued to meet for about five years and
achieved very little. A staff report issued by the Sub committee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights noted ``[i]n the five years of existence the
Committee accomplished little towards fulfilling its mandate.'' 10 The lack
of accomplishment seems to indicate that since the United States had not
suffered a direct blow from a terrorist organization, it lacked sufficient
motivation to contemplate fully the reality of terrorism. After the
Nixon/Ford administration left office the Committee was essentially dead.
However, there was continued debate in the Carter administration on how to
formulate counterterror policy. Deterrence was brought to the forefront of
the discussion. The antiterrorist program under the Carter administration
broke down into the following categories: 11 1. Prevention. International
initiatives and diplomacy to discourage state support of terrorism and to
build a broad consensus that terrorist acts are inadmissible under
international law irrespective of the cause in which they are used. 2.
Deterrence. Protection and security efforts of the public and private
sectors to discourage terrorist acts---essentially target hardening. 3.
Reaction. Antiterrorism operations in response to specific major acts of
terrorism. 4. Prediction. Intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in
continuous support of the other three program components. The Carter
administration's definition of deterrence was essentially based on passive
techniques like target hardening. Carter's intention with this policy was to
make it harder for terrorists to get to their desired targets, rather than
crippling the organization before it could reach the U.S. Although many
criticize Carter for not taking a more active stance with terrorists, he 10
For more on this, see U.S. Congress, House, Federal Capabilities in Crises
Management and Terrorism. Staff Report, Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, 95th Congress, 2nd session, December 1978, p. 6. 11
Executive Committee on Terrorism, The United States Government Antiterrorist
Program (Washington: National Security Council, June 1979), p. 2. at least
was able to formulate a policy. That was more than Nixon's Cabinet Committee
had accomplished. The administration's idea of deterrence reveals much about
Carter's thoughts on what terrorists would most likely target, and is very
narrow in focus. The assumption seems to be that only state and private
facilities will be targeted. For example, it is plausible to build the White
House and virtually all U.S. Embassies into veritable fortresses, but this
technique is completely useless when it comes to protecting the most
vulnerable portion of the state: its civilian population. Hence, this
passive approach to deterrence has limited effectiveness. Site hardening may
be used in conjunction with other policies, but, as a definitive objective,
it has many holes. As Reagan and Bush ascended to power in the 1980s, they
maintained the idea of getting tougher with terrorists. Although the
definition of deterrence changed, there were still shortcomings in their
version of deterrence. National Security Decision Directive 138 symbolized
the change in definition. Defense Department official Noel Koch reported
that it was ``a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from a reactive mode
to recognition that proactive steps are needed.'' ("Preemptive
AntiTerrorist raids Allowed." Washington Post, April 16, 1984, p. 19. 13
Motley, James B. "Target America: The Undeclared War" in Neil Livingstone
and Terrell Arnold edt. Winning the War against Terrorism. (Lexington, D.C.
Heath and Company, 1986), p. 67.) Although much of NSDD 138 is still
classified, there is one idea that is pervasive throughout the document. All
countries have a right to defend themselves and states that use or support
terrorism cannot be allowed to do so without consequences. 13 The following
quote by Admiral James D. Watkins encapsulated the Reagan Administration's
thinking about terrorism: Our goal is to deter aggressors from taking
terrorist actions against us. We should work to make terrorist acts so
counterproductive and costly, that potential perpetrators will think twice
before carrying out, or threatening to carry out, terrorist acts. In that
context, even preemptive and retaliatory acts carried out for their
deterrent effect may, under carefully controlled circumstances, be moral. 14
This quote symbolized the change from passive deterrence of the Carter
Administration to the active deterrence emphasized by Reagan.

Operation El Dorado Canyon was a perfect example of the Reagan
Administration's counter terror policy. Although it can be argued this
operation was successful in deterring state sponsored terrorism, such
strikes will not deter all terrorists, especially those that do not depend
on states for their livelihood. In fact, similar strikes run a better chance
of making more enemies than deterring the ones that already exist. Martha
Crenshaw states: Terrorism may also be intended to provoke a counteraction
from the government, to increase publicity for the terrorists' cause, and to
demonstrate that criticism of the regime is well founded. Terrorists mean to
force the state to show its true repressive face, thereby driving the people
into the arms of the challengers. 15 The U.S must avoid overt shows of
repressive force because that force can be used to legitimize the criticisms
of the terrorist groups. Therefore, a new approach must be taken in order to
combat terrorist organizations that are not state sponsored. Many do not see
the lethal potential in these groups because of their relatively limited
financial and military support. However, these are the groups that are most
dangerous to the U.S. and its allies. It is precisely their diminutive
stature which makes them such a threat. Groups such as the HAMAS and the
Hizballah feel, since they have no state of their own, they have very little
to lose and much to gain by employing terror tactics. 14 Admiral James D.
Watkins, "Countering Terrorism: A New Challenge to our National Conscience,
"Sea Power, November, 1984, p. 37. 15 Crenshaw, Martha, "Causes of
Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., International Terrorism:
Characteristics, Causes, Controls (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990), p.
118. 5. Problems with U.S. Policy In the United States, policies that
surround the issue of terrorism have traditionally been more rhetorical than
substantial. An even more significant shortcoming has been the assumption
that terrorism can be deterred. This is a pervasive thought in combatting
terrorism but, in reality, is flawed. Under some circumstances, efforts at
punitive deterrence has been counterproductive. For example, after the
bombing of the Marine barracks and the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, the U.S.S.
New Jersey lobbed shells into the AlShouf mountains hoping to deter future
actions of the fledgling Hizballah. This action, however, legitimized the
Hizballah's version of U.S. intervention in the region, and neither impeded
nor deterred the group from committing future acts. Another prime example
was the attempted assassination of Hizballah ``leader'' Muhammad Fadlallah.
While this operation failed, it also managed further to convince the
Shi'ites in the region that the U.S. was out to destroy the Muslim world and
its leaders. Neither Reagan's nor Carter's version of deterrence should be
pursued as a primary objective when considering counterterror policies.
Many in the Arab world still consider the United States the ``Great Satan''
and, therefore, the greatest evil on earth. Devout Islamists are not
concerned with their own lives or resources. Their mission is simple: to
have all submit to Islam and those who will not submit must be eradicated.
Threats of violence against these groups are useless. In the Islamists'
mindset, it is the highest duty for a Muslim to fight and, if need be, to
die for his faith. For an outsider to threaten death accomplishes nothing
but assists them in their martyrdom. Deterrence assumes that the adversary
is concerned about selfpreservation. If members of groups such as the
Hizballah are willing to accept death, deterrence is not an option.
Consequently, a new approach to this problem is essential. Policy
Prescription This policy prescription relies heavily on the intelligence
community and is based on the ``schism'' dynamic discussed above. The first
stage involves collecting and collating information about various terrorist
organizations. The second stage of this policy consists of making contact
with the moderate faction of the organization's constituency. The third
phase deals with gaining access to the moderate faction's intelligence
network, and establishing a closer relationship with the moderate elements.
Although terrorism will continue from the radical group even after most of
its backing has been stripped away, in the final phase, the use of
counterintelligence (CI) can be used to disarm the rump of the radical
faction. When these groups split into radical and moderate factions, the
U.S. must have hard evidence as to why the schism occurred and what type of
support the factions have. Intelligence services must ascertain, with the
highest degree of accuracy possible, who are leading the factions, what
support they have, and who are their major enemies (both within the group
and outside it). The primary target of such ``surveillance'' would be
mosques that were known to have radical followers and preachers. Detailed
information on moderate groups is necessary for the next stage of the
policy. In the second stage, after the moderates and the radicals have been
identified, it is necessary to initiate contact with the moderate faction.
Such contact can be achieved by either overt or covert methods, depending on
the situation. For example, an overt approach with the PLO served U.S.
interests by enhancing Arafat's position and the factions that support him.
It was viewed as the U.S. actually listening to the voice of the Palestinian
nation, and was followed by tangible efforts to resolve Palestinian
problems. Efforts ranged from increased financial aid to moderating future
negotiations for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This access and
subsequent successes should, in turn, make Arafat a viable alternative for
voicing grievances. In essence, these actions gave the moderates the
political initiative. However, such an approach would not work with a state
like Iran. If the U.S. were to make overt governmental overtures to Tehran,
Rafsanjani would be forced to refuse. If he accepted U.S. advances, he would
unnecessarily run the risk of being seen as collaborating with the ``Great
Satan,'' which could cost him his political future as well as unite the
hardliners against the U.S. This would, in turn, give the initiative to the
radicals and probably trigger renewed attacks by fundamentalist terror
groups. Therefore, covert diplomacy should be the tool here. Approaches
should be made to Rafsanjani and other moderates, covertly suggesting that
the U.S. wishes to ``bury the hatchet'' and pursue a more peaceful policy
towards Tehran. In order to convince the moderates in Tehran that these
peaceful overtures are legitimate, the U.S. would have to make concessions
to Rafsanjani without alerting either the U.S. public or the radicals in
Tehran. This could be accomplished by using nonstate actors. For example,
Washington could quietly encourage American oil companies to aid the Iranian
government to rebuild the oil rigs damaged in the IranIraq war. Unfreezing
Iranian assets that have been held since 1979 would be another signal that
the U.S. was serious about rapprochement. If the U.S. discontinues its
confrontation with Tehran, it would remove much of the steam that drives the
engine of the radicals. This would, in turn, enable the moderates in the
country to regain the political initiative. The third stage in the
development of this counter terror policy is contingent upon the success of
attaining positive dialogue with the moderate factions. The attempt to
achieve a running dialogue with the moderate factions is crucial to the
success of this policy plan and can reasonably be expected to be effective
so long as the moderate faction wants to remain a viable political force.
Constituencies want tangible results that their problems are being solved.
In the absence of such results, radical solutions can appear attractive.
Therefore, if moderate leaders can produce tangible results for their
constituency, it enhances their legitimacy while simultaneously reducing the
legitimacy of radical solutions. The United States can aid in this process
through monetary or trade incentives. Once the dialogue with the moderate
faction is established, the U.S. must strive to gain access to the
intelligence assets of the moderates. This access can be achieved by
granting further monetary and/or political concessions. The extensive human
intelligence (humint) network that is already in place would be an
invaluable asset to the U.S. because of the time needed and extreme
difficulty in building such a network of its own. Arafat and his
Lieutenants, for example, already have a network capable of reporting on
groups in the area that have hostile intentions towards the U.S.
Subsequently, penetration into the radical groups would be much easier.
Arafat personnel would be much more able to penetrate those radical
organizations than U.S. personnel because those radical groups will be
competing with Arafat factions for members. One or many men or women loyal
to Arafat could pose as dissidents and infiltrate the organization and feed
intelligence on radical organizations. Once the U.S. gained access to this
network, the nature of the relationship would essentially turn into a quid
pro quo. The U.S. would then support the Arafat camp by supplementing U.S.
humint with Arafat's own intelligence sources and/or increasing foreign aid
in return for the latest intelligence on the radicals. Arafat could be
Washington's biggest ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism. Many of
the terror organizations claim to act on behalf of the Palestinian cause.
Hence, most of these groups need the support of the Palestinians to maintain
their struggle. If the U.S. could gain access into the Arab world through
Arafat and then eventually establish its own intelligence network, the
rewards would be considerable. Once solid intelligence is received on a
consistent basis, dealing with terror groups becomes easier. The fourth
stage is based on the fact that increased legitimacy of the moderate faction
will not stop the radical faction from using violence. It is unlikely
terrorism will be eradicated. Most terror groups are formed because the
viable avenues of political, social, and economic change are perceived to be
blocked. A small group of ``militants'' are empowered to champion the cause
of justice. This ``empowerment'' can elevate certain individuals to a higher
plane (socially, politically, etc.) as well as give them tremendous
political authority within their community and/or nation. To assume that one
would be completely willing to forgo such power is not realistic. Thus, it
is not foolish to speculate that these leaders would try to ``prolong'' the
movement in order to gain more concessions from the government and maintain
their heightened status. A quote from Jerrold M. Post encapsulates this
thought well. He states, ``Terrorists whose only significance comes from
being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would
be to lose their very reason for being. `` (Post, Jerrold W. "Terrorist
PsychoLogic" in Walter Reich ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies,
Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 1990, p. 38.) This is a strong barrier to overcome and thus, it is
virtually impossible to completely remove this form of violence from the
international arena. It is not the purpose of this paper to eliminate
terrorism. Rather, it is to reduce and control the damage terrorist groups
can exact on the U.S. Given that some members of an organization feel that
participation in terrorist actions will elevate them to a noble plane, it is
logical that terrorism will occur even if all of a constituency backs the
actions of the moderates in a society. When this happens,
counterintelligence (CI) assets, in particular, should be brought to bear in
order to fight these groups. A terrorist organization's most powerful asset
is secrecy. If it cannot maintain its covert status, state officials would
seek out and destroy the unit after one act was committed. Not surprisingly,
these groups are extremely suspicious (if not paranoid) when attempting to
maintain their secrecy. This asset is a two way street, however, and can be
manipulated through the use of counterintelligence, as has been noted by
Angelo Codevilla and Roy Godson: Effective deception can be viewed as a kind
of mental judo---a set of techniques for handling an opponent by lending
just a little extra strength to his own tendencies. Hence the most
fundamental operational requirement for deception is knowledge of the
target's prejudice---What does he want to believe? What is he disposed to
accept? And who in the target's camp is disposed to accept what. (Godson,
Roy et. al. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s Vol. 7. (Lexington:
Lexington Books), 1986, p. 102. ) Terrorist groups actively seek out
informers in their ranks. Therefore, counterintelligence should create the
illusion that one of the members (preferably one of high rank in the
organization) is an informant. If this operation targets more than one
person within the group, it will cause suspicion and, perhaps, create a
witch hunt. Since these groups are small to begin with, as suspicion grows
within the ranks it could effectively paralyze the unit. This paralysis will
result, at least, in a temporary cessation of activity by the group. At
best, it could cause a complete breakup. Conclusion The intelligence option
is one that can result in very tangible benefits while minimizing risks to
U.S. interests and personnel. Everyone pays lip service to the fact that
intelligence is the ``front line'' of defense against terrorist groups.
However, when debate is raised about countering such activity, the
discussion bypasses intelligence options in favor of legal, diplomatic, and
military solutions. Yet, the use of the CIA and its intelligence
capabilities may be the most effective tool against terror organizations. As
such, intelligence agencies should be the primary instrument in fighting the
war against terrorism. However, if intelligence assets are still not
adequate to neutralize the danger of terrorist groups, other actions should
be considered. When this occurs, the U.S. must be willing and able to ``up
the ante'' if need be. Military options provoke many ethical as well as
practical objections. Many do not view the military option as a viable
solution because of the possibility of hurting civilians as well as placing
U.S. military personnel in harm's way. (By "military option" it is meant
sending U.S. Special Forces groups into hostile territory and neutralizing
camps or individuals.) Another problem which should be taken very seriously
is the fact that the U.S. has not been effective at military operations
which require a person or group to be neutralized (e.g. Aidid in Somalia,
Noriega in Panama, and Qadaffi in Libya). These operations may be feasible,
but they are also highly prone to failure. Even though this option appears
weak, however, it is still a necessary possibility. If groups realize that
the U.S. will not resort to force, this perception may send the wrong
message to terror groups and allow them to feel they can act with impunity.
In conclusion, the fight against terrorist organizations with no state
support is difficult for the U.S. because Washington has not dealt with such
actors in the past. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. will have to deal
more often with terrorist groups in the future. If the U.S. fails to
understand that these groups do not behave like states, the chances for
ineffective policy increase exponentially. The problem with formulating
comprehensive policy is that it takes time. Meanwhile, policy makers may be
tempted to use the military as a ``quick fix'' to the terrorist problem. The
danger in succumbing to this temptation is twofold. First, the U.S. has not
been entirely successful in such low intensity missions, and the probability
of failure remains high. Second, such actions may anger, not deter, the
terror groups and undermine, rather than enhance, the efforts to have the
moderates as part of an attempt to divide and rule. Skillful diplomacy and
effective intelligence and counterintelligence are likely to be more
effective than the use of force.



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