[iwar] [fc:OSAMA.BIN.LADEN.WAS.ONCE.PRAISED]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-09-19 19:24:29


Return-Path: <sentto-279987-2099-1000952656-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com>
Delivered-To: fc@all.net
Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Wed, 19 Sep 2001 19:25:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 26427 invoked by uid 510); 20 Sep 2001 02:24:54 -0000
Received: from n21.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.71) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 20 Sep 2001 02:24:54 -0000
X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-2099-1000952656-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com
Received: from [10.1.1.221] by ci.egroups.com with NNFMP; 20 Sep 2001 02:24:31 -0000
X-Sender: fc@big.all.net
X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com
Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2_2); 20 Sep 2001 02:24:15 -0000
Received: (qmail 20314 invoked from network); 20 Sep 2001 02:24:15 -0000
Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by 10.1.1.221 with QMQP; 20 Sep 2001 02:24:15 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta2 with SMTP; 20 Sep 2001 02:24:30 -0000
Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id TAA10707 for iwar@onelist.com; Wed, 19 Sep 2001 19:24:29 -0700
Message-Id: <200109200224.TAA10707@big.all.net>
To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List)
Organization: I'm not allowed to say
X-Mailer: don't even ask
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1]
From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com
Precedence: bulk
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 19:24:29 -0700 (PDT)
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [iwar] [fc:OSAMA.BIN.LADEN.WAS.ONCE.PRAISED]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

OSAMA BIN LADEN WAS ONCE PRAISED

By MORT ROSENBLUM

    PARIS, (AP)      *****
 - Osama bin Laden, now America's public enemy No.  1, was the type of
Soviet-hating freedom fighter that U.S.  officials applauded when the
world looked a little different. 

Though not singled out specifically for Washington's praise, Western and
Middle Eastern sources say, bin Laden received U.S.  support to fight
Soviet troops in Afghanistan as he was shaping his al-Qaida terrorist
network. 

``I warned the CIA about getting involved with this sort of Muslim
extremist,'' said Pierre Lacoste, the admiral who headed French
intelligence at the time.  ``This business of 'the enemy of my enemy is
my friend' can be very dangerous.''

During the 1980s, the United States supported several ragtag rebel
groups eager to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  Americans
provided funds and arms, including Stinger surface-to-air missiles. 

``Bin Laden was just emerging as a leader, but he was already an Islamic
idealist, clearly with no love for the West,'' Lacoste said in an
interview, one of several with veterans of that period who sketch a
similar picture. 

Although bin Laden insists he never took any CIA funds directly, he was
heavily funded by Saudi interests and received American logistical and
political support, Lacoste said. 

U.S.  officials at the time say aid was given first under President
Carter and then under President Reagan.  Reagan once praised the Afghans
and Arab guerrillas who helped them as ``freedom fighters.''

Herman Cohen, who in the 1980s was deputy assistant secretary of state
for intelligence and then on the National Security Council, said aid was
channeled through Pakistan and given to groups selected by Pakistanis. 

``We didn't understand at that point what was happening,'' Cohen said. 
``I don't think any analyst back then thought these were bad guys in
Afghanistan.  We were thinking about the Cold War and the Reagan
Doctrine.''

Some of the Pakistanis involved were themselves Islamic fundamentalists,
he added.  Cohen is now a private consultant in African affairs. 

Ed Girardet, a writer and humanitarian aid specialist who has covered
Afghanistan since 1980, first met bin Laden a decade ago when the
wealthy Saudi set up camps where combat-hardened Afghans trained Arab
fighters. 

``He was always after some purist Islamic state which exists nowhere in
the world,'' Girardet said.  ``He had a deep hatred of anything from the
West.  Unlike the Afghans, his radical Arab followers wouldn't even
shake your hand.''

Bin Laden made ample use of the American equipment lavished on rebel
groups during the Soviet resistance, he said.  When Moscow retreated in
1989, CIA operatives departed, leaving splintered factions to fight for
supremacy. 

``The United States really blew it,'' Girardet said.  ``They dropped
Afghanistan like a hot potato.''

Bin Laden was lionized when he returned to Saudi Arabia but soon ran
afoul of the kingdom's ruling family.  He moved to Sudan, building up
his organization, and then to Afghanistan when the Taliban Islamic
militia took power in 1996. 

Robert Korengold, a retired senior U.S.  information officer, laughs
bitterly as he looks back at what he calls hard realities of foreign
entanglements. 

``It happens all the time,'' he said.  ``People who are your allies at
one time turn out not to be when things change.  Unfortunately, that's
the way of the world.''

At the Afghan Embassy in Paris, which is in the hands of the
anti-Taliban northern alliance, Ambassador Masstan Mehrabodin insists
history would have turned out better if Americans had instead helped the
more moderate Afghans. 

Because of Pakistan's opposition, he said, Americans gave almost no help
to Ahmed Shah Massood, the northern alliance's military leader, who held
out for years against the Taliban from a mountain redoubt in northern
Afghanistan. 

Massood was mortally injured by suicide bombers only days before
terrorists struck in the United States.  Mehrabodin blames bin Laden,
saying he wanted to eliminate the logical candidate when Western allies
seek a new leader. 

France's Lacoste agrees that Massood's more secular politics might have
prevented the rise of extremists. 

``We thought Massood should have had a bigger role, and I felt a certain
regret when the Americans passed him over,'' he said.  ``He might have
provided a moderating influence.''

He said that although some CIA officials shared his misgivings at the
time, they were bound by orders.  ``Intelligence people don't make
policy,'' he said. 

Lacoste, now a professor of international strategic affairs, said the
United States went wrong by allying itself too closely to Pakistan. 

``Pakistan is playing a double - maybe a triple - game,'' he said,
``They are allied with the United States, but they also recognize the
Taliban, and they are close to China.'' What Pakistan wants, he
concluded, is a weak Afghanistan. 

AP-NY-09-19-01 1325EDT

------------------
http://all.net/ 

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 



This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-09-29 21:08:45 PDT