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21 September 2001 Source: http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?gao-01-1158t

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Testimony 

Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m., EDT Friday September 21, 2001

HOMELAND SECURITY 

A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts

Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

GAO-01-1158T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We at GAO, along with all Americans, were shocked and saddened by the
coordinated terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001.  The events of that day remind us that terrorism
victimizes real people‹men, women, and children‹our families, friends,
neighbors, and colleagues.  Our hearts go out to the families of the
victims of the attack and to the families of the heroic rescue crews,
those responders who were lost trying to save others.  They and many
other responders have served with distinction and valor. 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today a framework for
addressing federal efforts to provide for homeland security.  I would
like to address the issue by making three points.  First, I will discuss
the nature of the threats that face the United States today.  Second, I
will offer some thoughts on what government could do to both counter the
threats and provide for a more secure homeland.  Third, I will offer a
framework for how the government might organize a homeland security
program.  We have completed work in a variety of areas related to
homeland security, and I will reiterate some of our major
recommendations from this work. 

Summary

According to a variety of U.S.  intelligence assessments, the United
States now confronts a range of increasingly diffuse threats that puts
greater destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and
individuals and threatens our values and way of life.  These threats
range from incidents of terrorism and information attacks on critical
infrastructure to the potential use of weapons of mass destruction and
the spread of infectious diseases.  Each one of these threats could
cause massive casualties and disruption. 

Our work indicates that in efforts of this kind‹which involve many
federal agencies as well as state and local governments, the private
sector, and private citizens‹the federal government must address three
fundamental needs.  First, the government needs clearly defined and
effective leadership with a clear vision to develop and implement a
homeland security strategy in coordination with all relevant partners,
and the ability to marshal the necessary resources to get the job done. 
Second, a national homeland security strategy should be developed based
on a comprehensive assessment of national threats and risks.  Third, the
large number of organizations that will be involved in homeland security
need to have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities, and
accountability mechanisms. 

Crafting a strategy for homeland security involves reducing the risk
where possible, assessing the nation's vulnerabilities, and identifying
the critical infrastructure most in need of protection.  To be
comprehensive, the strategy should include steps to use intelligence
assets or other means to identify attackers and prevent attacks before
they occur, harden potential targets to minimize the damage from an
attack, and effectively manage the consequences of an incident.  In
addition, the strategy should focus resources on areas of greatest need
and measure performance against strategic goals.  Because the plan will
need to be executed nationally, the federal government can assign roles
to federal agencies once the strategy is developed, but also will need
to develop cooperative partnerships with state and local governments as
well as with the private and not-for-profit sectors.  Effective homeland
security also will require forming international partnerships to
identify attackers, prevent attacks, and retaliate if there are any
attacks. 

The Nature of the Threat Facing the United States

As we noted in GAO's strategic plan, the United States and other nations
face increasingly diffuse threats.  In the future, potential adversaries
are more likely to strike vulnerable civilian or military targets in
nontraditional ways to avoid direct confrontation with our military
forces on the battlefield.  The President's December 2000 national
security strategy states that porous borders, rapid technological
change, greater information flow, and the destructive power of weapons
now within the reach of small states, groups, and individuals make such
threats more viable and endanger our values, way of life, and the
personal security of our citizens. 

Hostile nations, terrorist groups, transnational criminals, and even
individuals may target American people, institutions, and infrastructure
with weapons of mass destruction and outbreaks of infectious disease. 
They may attempt to disrupt or destroy our information systems through
cyber warfare.  International criminal activities such as money
laundering, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking can undermine the
stability of social and financial institutions and the health of our
citizens.  As we witnessed in the tragic events of last week, some of
the emerging threats can produce mass casualties.  Others can lead to
mass disruption of critical infrastructure and can hold serious
implications for both our domestic and the global economy, as we saw
when the New York Stock Exchange re-opened for trading this past Monday
and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 600 points. 
Terrorist attacks also could compromise the integrity or delivery of
water or electricity to our citizens, compromise the safety of the
traveling public, and undermine the soundness of government and
commercial data systems supporting a myriad of activities. 

A basic and fundamental role of the government under our Constitution is
to protect America from both foreign and domestic threats.  The
government must be able to prevent and deter threats to our homeland as
well as detect impending danger before attacks or incidents occur. 
However, it may not be possible to prevent, deter, and detect every
threat, so steps should be taken to harden potential targets.  We also
must be ready to manage the crises and consequences of an event, to
treat casualties, reconstitute damaged infrastructure, and move the
nation forward.  Finally, the government must be prepared to retaliate
against the responsible parties in the event of an attack. 

What Government Could Do to Address Homeland Security

Now I would like to turn to what the government could do to make our
homeland more secure.  First, I will discuss the need for clearly
defined and effective leadership with a clear vision of what needs to be
accomplished.  Second, I will address the need for a coordinated
national strategy and comprehensive threat assessment. 

A Focal Point Is a Critical Component of Homeland Security Strategy

Yesterday, we issued a report that discusses challenges confronting
policymakers in the war on terrorism and offered a series of
recommendations.  One of these recommendations is that the government
needs more clearly defined and effective leadership to develop a
strategy for combating terrorism, to oversee development of a new
national threat and risk assessment, and to coordinate implementation
among federal agencies.  Similar leadership also is needed to address
the broader issue of homeland security.  Specifically, a national focal
point will be critical to articulate a vision for ensuring the security
of the American homeland and to develop and implement a strategy to
realize that vision.  The entity that functions as the focal point
should be dedicated to this function.  In addition, the person who heads
this entity should be dedicated full-time to this effort and
consideration should be given to a term appointment in order to enhance
continuity. 

In testimony on March 27, 2001, we stated that overall leadership and
management efforts to combat terrorism are fragmented because there is
no single focal point managing and overseeing the many functions
conducted by more than 40 different federal departments and agencies.1
Also, our past work in combating terrorism has shown that the multitude
of federal programs requires focus and attention to minimize redundancy
of effort and eliminate confusion within the federal government and at
the state and local level.  Homeland security will rely on the concerted
efforts of scores of agencies, which may exceed the number in the fight
against terrorism.  Consequently, the need for overall leadership is
even more critical. 

____________________

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and
National Strategy (GAO-01-556T, March 27, 2001). 

At present, we do not have a national strategy specifically for ensuring
homeland security.  Thus, the strategy must establish the parameters of
homeland security and contain explicit goals and objectives.  It will
need to be developed in partnership with Congress, the executive branch,
state and local governments, and the private sector (which owns much of
the critical infrastructure that can be targeted).  Without such a
strategy, efforts may be fragmented and cause confusion, duplication of
effort, and ineffective alignment of resources with strategic goals. 
Consequently, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the various
levels of government and the private sector will be a critical function
for the entity that is given oversight responsibility for homeland
security efforts. 

The Country Needs a Comprehensive National Security Threat and Risk
Assessment

The United States does not have a national threat and risk assessment to
help guide federal programs for homeland security.  A threat and risk
assessment is a decision-making tool that helps to define the threats,
to evaluate the associated risk, and to link requirements to program
investments.  In our March 2001 testimony on combating terrorism, we
stated that an important first step in developing a strategy for
combating terrorism is to conduct a national threat and risk assessment
to define and prioritize requirements.  Combating terrorism is a major
component of homeland security, but it is not the only one.  It is
essential that a national threat and risk assessment be undertaken that
will address the full range of threats to the homeland. 

Results from hearings and other studies also underscore the importance
of a national threat and risk assessment.  For example, in a July 2001
letter to the vice president from several senators, the senators stated
that federal programs to combat domestic terrorism are being initiated
and expanded without the benefit of a sound national threat and risk
assessment process.2 In a May 2001 Center for Strategic and
International Studies' report on homeland defense, the authors stated
that an annual threat assessment would provide federal planners with the
basis for assessing the emerging risk of attacks and developing an
integrated analysis structure for planning.3

____________________

2 Report to the Vice-President: Findings Pursuant to the Senate Hearings
on US Federal Government Capabilities to Combat Domestic Terrorism (July
13, 2001). 

3 Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: A
Comprehensive Strategy (Report of the CSIS Homeland Defense Project, May
2001). 

We recognize that a national-level threat and risk assessment will not
be a panacea for all the problems in providing homeland security. 
However, we believe that such a national threat and risk assessment
could provide a framework for action and facilitate multidisciplinary
and multi-organizational participation in planning, developing, and
implementing programs to enhance the security of our homeland.  Given
the tragic events of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, a comprehensive
national-level threat and risk assessment that addresses all threats has
become an urgent imperative. 

How the Country Should Develop the National Strategy

Now, I would like to discuss some elements that may need to be included
in the development of the national strategy and a means to assign roles
to federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. 

Three essential elements provide a basis for developing a national
strategy: a risk assessment, vulnerability analysis, and infrastructure
criticality analysis.  This approach, developed by the Department of
Defense for its antiterrorism program, could be an instructive model in
developing a homeland security strategy.  First, our nation must
thoroughly assess the threats posed by nations, groups, or individuals
and, to the extent possible, eliminate or reduce the threat.  Second, we
have to identify the vulnerabilities and weaknesses that exist in our
infrastructure, operations, planning, and exercises and then identify
steps to mitigate those risks.  Third, we must assure our ability to
respond to and mitigate the consequences of an attack.  Given time and
resource limitations, we must identify the most critical aspects of our
infrastructure and operations that require the most immediate attention. 

Our strategy, to be comprehensive in nature, should include steps
designed to

reduce our vulnerability to threats, for example, by hardening targets
to minimize the damage from an attack;

use intelligence assets to identify threats;

stop attacks before they occur; and

manage the consequences of an incident. 

In addition, the strategy should incorporate mechanisms to assess
resource utilization and program performance as well as provide for
training, exercises, and equipment to respond to tragic events such as
those that occurred last week.  Because we may not be able to eliminate
all vulnerabilities within our borders, prevent all threat activity, or
be completely prepared to respond to all incidents, our strategy should
focus finite national resources on areas of greatest need. 

Once a strategy is developed, all levels of government and the private
sector will need to understand and prepare for their defined roles under
the strategy.  While the federal government can assign roles to federal
agencies under the strategy, it will need to reach consensus with the
other levels of government and with the private sector on their roles. 

In the 1990s, the world was concerned about the potential for computer
failures at the start of the new millennium, an issue that came to be
known as Y2K.  The Y2K task force approach may offer a model for
developing the public-private partnerships necessary under a
comprehensive homeland security strategy.  A massive mobilization with
federal government leadership was undertaken in connection with Y2K
which included partnerships with the private sector and international
governments and effective communication to implement any needed
corrections.  The value of federal leadership, oversight, and
partnerships was repeatedly cited as a key to success in addressing Y2K
issues at a Lessons Learned summit held last year.  Developing a
homeland security plan may require a similar level of leadership,
oversight, and partnerships with nearly every segment of American
society‹including individual U.S.  citizens‹as well as with the
international community.  In addition, as in the case of our Y2K
efforts, Congress needs to take an active, ongoing, and crosscutting
approach to oversight in connection with the design and implementation
of the homeland security strategy. 

Prior GAO Work Related to Homeland Security

We at GAO have completed several congressionally requested efforts on
numerous topics related to homeland security.  I would like to briefly
summarize some of the work that we have done in the areas of combating
terrorism, aviation security, transnational crime, protection of
critical infrastructure, and public health. 

Combating Terrorism

Given concerns about the preparedness of the federal government and
state and local emergency responders to cope with a large-scale
terrorist attack involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, we
have reviewed the plans, policies, and programs for combating domestic
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.  Our report, Combating
Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations,4 was issued
yesterday and updates our extensive evaluations in recent years of
federal programs to combat domestic terrorism and protect critical
infrastructure. 

____________________

4 Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations
(GAO-01-822, Sept.  20, 2001). 

Progress has been made since we first began looking at these issues in
1995.  Interagency coordination has improved, and interagency and
intergovernmental command and control now is regularly included in
exercises.  Agencies also have completed operational guidance and
related plans.  Federal assistance to state and local governments to
prepare for terrorist incidents has resulted in training for thousands
of first responders, many of whom went into action at the World Trade
Center and at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 

However, some key elements remain incomplete.  As a result, we
recommended that the President designate a single focal point with
responsibility and authority for all critical functions necessary to
provide overall leadership and coordination of federal programs to
combat terrorism.  The focal point should oversee a national-level
threat assessment on likely weapons of mass destruction that might be
used by terrorists and lead the development of a national strategy to
combat terrorism and oversee its implementation.  Furthermore, we
recommended that the Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology complete a strategy to coordinate research and development to
improve federal capabilities and avoid duplication. 

Aviation Security

Now let me turn to aviation security.  Since 1996, we have presented
numerous reports and testimonies and reported on numerous weaknesses
that we found in the commercial aviation security system.  For example,
we reported that airport passenger screeners do not perform well in
detecting dangerous objects, and Federal Aviation Administration tests
showed that as testing gets more realistic‹that is, as tests more
closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a
checkpoint‹screener performance declines significantly.  In addition, we
were able to penetrate airport security ourselves by having our
investigators create fake credentials from the Internet and declare
themselves law enforcement officers.  They were then permitted to bypass
security screening and go directly to waiting passenger aircraft.  In
1996, we outlined a number of steps that required immediate action,
including identifying vulnerabilities in the system; developing a
short-term approach to correct significant security weaknesses; and
developing a long-term, comprehensive national strategy that combines
new technology, procedures, and better training for security personnel. 

Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

Federal critical infrastructure-protection initiatives have focused on
preventing mass disruption that can occur when information systems are
compromised because of computer-based attacks.  Such attacks are of
growing concern due to the nation's increasing reliance on
interconnected computer systems that can be accessed remotely and
anonymously from virtually anywhere in the world.  In accordance with
Presidential Decision Directive 63, issued in 1998, and other
information-security requirements outlined in laws and federal guidance,
an array of efforts has been undertaken to address these risks. 
However, progress has been slow.  For example, federal agencies have
taken initial steps to develop critical infrastructure plans, but
independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant
information security weaknesses that place virtually all major federal
agencies' operations at high risk of tampering and disruption.  In
addition, while federal outreach efforts have raised awareness and
prompted information sharing among government and private sector
entities, substantive analysis of infrastructure components to identify
interdependencies and related vulnerabilities has been limited.  An
underlying deficiency impeding progress is the lack of a national plan
that fully defines the roles and responsibilities of key participants
and establishes interim objectives.  Accordingly, we have recommended
that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ensure
that the government's critical infrastructure strategy clearly define
specific roles and responsibilities, develop interim objectives and
milestones for achieving adequate protection, and define performance
measures for accountability.  The administration currently is reviewing
and considering adjustments to the government's critical
infrastructure-protection strategy that may address this deficiency. 

International Crime Control

On September 20, 2001, we publicly released a report on international
crime control and reported that individual federal entities have
developed strategies to address a variety of international crime issues,
and for some crimes, integrated mechanisms exist to coordinate efforts
across agencies.  However, we found that without an up-to-date and
integrated strategy and sustained top-level leadership to implement and
monitor the strategy, the risk is high; scarce resources will be wasted;
overall effectiveness will be limited or not known; and accountability
will not be ensured.  We recommended that the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs take appropriate action to ensure
sustained executive-level coordination and assessment of multiagency
federal efforts in connection with international crime.  Some of the
individual actions we recommended were to update the existing
governmentwide international crime threat assessment, to update or
develop a new International Crime Control Strategy to include
prioritized goals as well as implementing objectives, and to designate
responsibility for executing the strategy and resolving any
jurisdictional issues. 

Public Health

The spread of infectious diseases is a growing concern.  Whether a
disease outbreak is intentional or naturally occurring, the public
health response to determine its causes and contain its spread is the
same.  Because a bioterrorist event could look like a natural outbreak,
bioterrorism preparedness rests in large part on public health
preparedness.  In our review last year of the West Nile virus outbreak
in New York, we found problems related to communication and coordination
among and between federal, state, and local authorities.  Although this
outbreak was relatively small in terms of the number of human cases, it
taxed the resources of one of the nation's largest local health
departments.  In 1999, we reported that surveillance for important
emerging infectious diseases is not comprehensive in all states, leaving
gaps in the nation's surveillance network.  Laboratory capacity could be
inadequate in any large outbreak, with insufficient trained personnel to
perform laboratory tests and insufficient computer systems to rapidly
share information.  Earlier this year, we reported that federal agencies
have made progress in improving their management of the stockpiles of
pharmaceutical and medical supplies that would be needed in a
bioterrorist event, but that some problems still remained.  There are
also widespread concerns that hospital emergency departments generally
are not prepared in an organized fashion to treat victims of biological
terrorism and that hospital emergency capacity is already strained, with
emergency rooms in major metropolitan areas routinely filled and unable
to accept patients in need of urgent care.  To improve the nation's
public health surveillance of infectious diseases and help ensure
adequate public protection, we recommended that the Director of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lead an effort to help
federal, state, and local public health officials achieve consensus on
the core capacities needed at each level of government.  We advised that
consensus be reached on such matters as the number and qualifications of
laboratory and epidemiological staff as well as laboratory and
information technology. 

Conclusion

Based on the tragic events of last week and our observations over the
past several years, there are several key questions that need to be
asked in addressing homeland security:

1.  What are our vision and our national objectives to make the homeland
more secure?

2.  What essential elements should constitute the government's strategy
for securing the homeland?

3.  How should the executive branch and the Congress be organized to
address these issues?

4.  How should we assess the effectiveness of any homeland security
strategy implementation to address the spectrum of threats?

Homeland security issues are now at the top of the national agenda, as a
result of last week's tragic events.  As a result, it is clear that the
administration has taken and is taking a variety of actions to identify
responsible parties for last week's attacks, manage the related
consequences and mitigate future risks.  Obviously, we have not been
able to assess the nature and extent of this effort in the wake of last
week's events.  We expect that we will be asked to do so in due course. 

Finally, Mr.  Chairman, as you might expect, we have been inundated with
requests to brief congressional committees and members on our present
and pending work and to undertake new work.  We are working with the
congressional leadership to be sure we have focused our limited
resources on the most important issues.  We look forward to working with
you and others to focus our work and to identify options for how best to
proceed while holding responsible parties accountable for desired
outcomes.  This concludes my prepared statement. 

I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

(350124)

Source: http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?gao-01-1158ta

GAO United States General Accounting Office
Testimony 
Before Senate Governmental Affairs
For Release on Delivery 9:30 a.m., EDT Friday September 21, 2001
HOMELAND SECURITY 
Appendixes to A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts
Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States
GAO-01-1158T 

Related GAO Products

Combating Terrorism
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations
(GAO-01-822, Sept. 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management (GAO-01-909, Sept. 19, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President's Council on
Domestic Preparedness (GAO-01-555T, May 9, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response
(GAO-01-660T, Apr. 24, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further
Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy (GAO-01 -556T, Mar. 27, 2001 ).

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, Mar. 20, 2001 )

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000) .

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources
(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-00-181, July 19, 2000).

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be
More Integrated and Focused (GAO/NSIAD-00-97, May 26, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected
Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, May 4, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Apr. 7, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs
(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly
Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, Oct. 20, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises
(GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR, June 25, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs
(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and
Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist
Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health
Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism
(GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related
Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program
Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas
(GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management Structure of
Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives
and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997).

Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13
Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and
Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Aviation Security 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed About Access Security
Improvements (GAO-01-1069R, Aug. 31, 2001).

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
Carriage of Weapons Regulations (RCED-00-181, Sept. 29, 2000) .

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners'
Performance (GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).

Aviation Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (T-OSI-00-10,
May 25, 2000). 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security
System (T-RCED/AIMD-00-142 Apr. 6, 2000).

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener
Performance Problems. (T-RCED-00-125 Mar. 16, 2000).

Aviation Security: FAA's Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for
Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies (RCED-99-53, Feb. 25,
1999). 

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-term Attention Is Needed
(T-RCED-98-190, May 14, 1998).

Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
(RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the Recommendations
of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (T-RCED-97-90,
Mar. 5, 1997) . 

Aviation Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities
(T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, Sept. 19, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251,
Sept. 11, 1996) 

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met
Expectations (RCED-94-142, May 19, 1994).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Information Security: Serious and
Widespread Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies (GAO/AIMD-00-295, Sept. 6,
2000). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities (GAO-01-769T, May 22, 2001).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
National Capabilities (GAO-01-232, Apr. 25, 2001).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive
Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination (GAO/T-AIMD-00-268, July
26, 2000). 

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials (GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139, July 11, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber Security
Information Act of 2000 (GAO/T-AIMD-00-229, June 22, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: "I LOVE YOU" Computer Virus Highlights
Need for Improved Alert and Coordination Capabilities (GAO/T-AIMD-00-181,
May 18, 2000). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information Systems
Protection (GAO/AIMD-00-90R, February 11, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for
Information Systems Protection (GAO/T-AIMD-00-72, Feb. 1, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to
Assure Security of Federal Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-00-7, Oct. 6,1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Status of Computer Security at the
Department of Veterans Affairs (GAO/AIMD-00-5, Oct. 4, 1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year
2000 Experiences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, Oct. 1, 1999).

Information Security: The Proposed Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1999
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-302, Sept. 30, 1999).

Information Security: NRC's Computer Intrusion Detection Capabilities
(GAO/AIMD-99-273R, Aug. 27, 1999).

Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).

Public Health 

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness
(GAO/HEHS-00-180, Sept. 11, 2000).

Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate
Contamination (GAO/RCED-00-3, Oct. 27, 1999).

Emerging Infectious Diseases: Consensus on Needed Laboratory Capacity Could
Strengthen Surveillance (GAO/HEHS-99-26, Feb. 5, 1999).

International Crime Control

International Crime Controls: Sustained Executive Level Coordination of
Federal Response Needed (GAO-01-629, Sept. 20, 2001).

Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address
Growing Problem (GGD-00-103, May 1, 2000).

Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens
Continue to Need Improvement (T-GGD-99-47, Feb. 25, 1999).

Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need
Improvement (GGD-99-3, October 16, 1998).

Immigration and Naturalization

Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges (GAO/T-GGD-99-148, July 29, 1999).

Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation
(GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19, 1999).

Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More
Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997).

Naturalization of Aliens: INS Internal Controls (GAO/T-GGD-97-98, May 1,
1997). 

Naturalization of Aliens: INS Internal Controls (GAO/T-GGD-97-57, Apr. 30,
1997). 

Naturalization of Aliens: Assessment of the Extent to Which Aliens Were
Improperly Naturalized (GAO/T-GGD-97-51, Mar. 5, 1997).

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