[iwar] [fc:Afghanistan.Crash.Reveals.U.S..Intel.Operation]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-01 22:27:45


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Afghanistan.Crash.Reveals.U.S..Intel.Operation]
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Aviation Week &amp; Space Technology
October 1, 2001
Afghanistan Crash Reveals U.S. Intel Operation
By David A. Fulghum, Washington

Don't expect massive bombing attacks on Afghanistan, say U.S. 
officials.  Much of the movement to the region is a show of force.  The
current plan is for a few air strikes by small packages of aircraft,
given the low state of Afghan air defenses.  Targets are expected to be
the poppy fields that have helped fund Taliban operations.  "The number
of militarily significant targets you can count on your fingers and
toes," a senior Air Force official said.  U.S.  aircraft based in the
Central Asian republics will be support, combat search-and-rescue,
airlift and reconnaissance aircraft, but not bombing and strike
aircraft, he said.  The skill that will be honed during operations in
Afghanistan is that of hitting a moving target.  Keys to this process
will be long-term surveillance and then quick reaction once a "fleeting
target" like a car or group of people starts moving.  They have to be
identified, tracked and struck within minutes "before they can hide
again," the official said.  A fundamental change from combat in the past
would be in allowing such decisions to be made at the scene.  The Air
Force has the fast-response capability, which involves specialized data
links, tight surveillance and instantaneous command and control tied to
"trigger pullers on the ground and in the air," he said.  "The challenge
is to be in the right place at the right time with the right
information.  We can't do it if we have to go through the National
Security Agency and inside the Beltway so some [bureaucrat] can have his
say first."

The first U.S.  aircraft has already been lost in the newly declared war
against terrorists. 

It was a General Atomics-built unmanned aerial vehicle operated by the
Central Intelligence Agency and, given its operational range of
400-500-mi., flown from a base in one of the Central Asian republics. 
Seven years ago, the CIA flew UAVs from Albania to monitor Serbian
participation in the Bosnia conflict ( AW&amp;ST Jan.  31, 1994, p. 
20). 

The agency's General Atomics-built I-Gnats have been fitted with a new,
miniaturized synthetic aperture radar, called Lynx, that in its
spotlight mode can register details as small as 4 in.  (including tire
tracks in sand or footprints in mud) at a range of 16 mi.  That means
darkness, rain and clouds no longer offer safety of movement for
guerrillas.  The radar system can detect moving targets and very small
changes in a scene between one pass and the next.  It also can be
upgraded for 3D imaging or aerial combat identification of targets
tagged by special forces. 

THE INITIAL, intelligence-gathering stage of this campaign will be
conducted largely by manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.  They
must supply crucial data for planning future operations.  Against them
will be pitted a wide range of low-altitude, antiaircraft machine guns,
cannon and missiles.  The UAV went down near Tashkurghan Pass in
Samangan province in northern Afghanistan near the border with
Uzbekistan.  It was apparently tracking the fighting between Northern
Alliance and Taliban militia troops.  The Northern Alliance appears to
be trying to retake Mazar-e-Sharif (just south of the intersection of
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan) which has a large Shiite
population that was decimated by the Taliban after the town's capture. 
It also has a large military airfield that would increase the Northern
Alliance's ability to shuttle supplies from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
whose governments have turned a blind eye to the clandestine
anti-Taliban operations. 

Taliban officials say the UAV was shot down.  U.S.  officials say it was
more likely an equipment failure, given the difficulties in shooting
down an object that you can't see or hear using short-range weapons. 
Even shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles can only reach up to about
14,000 ft.  at best. 

The Gnat-class of aircraft can't fly as high (above 20,000 ft.) or orbit
the battlefield as long as the larger, Air Force-operated Predator, but
it is still hard to see or hear and seldom comes within the range of
small arms.  U.S.  officials suspect failure of the engine, a servo that
manipulates the control surfaces or some other piece of on-board
equipment. 

The CIA has had considerable experience operating its small fleet of
manned and unmanned aircraft from unusual places to watch military and
terrorist activities, such as the Japanese Embassy takeover in Lima,
Peru.  The Gnat UAVs can extend their range--limited by line-of-sight
communications--by using another Gnat or a manned aircraft as a relay, a
method used when operating over Yugoslavia from Albania.  Manned
reconnaissance and relay aircraft used by the CIA include the Schweizer
single-engine RG-8A and two-engine RU-38A Twin Condor. 

Both the very long-range, high-altitude Global Hawk and the Air Force's
medium-altitude, 8-12-hr.  endurance Predator are expected to be flying
in support of operations in Afghanistan soon. 

DEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN slowed by a bureaucratic fight.  Pentagon officials
split over whether to deploy the aircraft immediately or wait until
communications upgrades are completed to make its communications and
command-and-control links interoperable with the other services.  The
Air Force says that any diversion will slow the deployment, which
requires the full attention of Predator program officials.  Even without
Pentagon interference, UAV specialists says it takes about 30 days to be
operational.  How much would the primitive Afghanistan air defenses
threaten U.S.  reconnaissance and, later, strike or troop insertion
aircraft that would need to penetrate into the country's interior? Not
much, U.S.  officials believe, against aircraft operating at medium and
high altitudes.  Some surveys of military force say the Taliban had
access to the SA-2 and SA-3, but such aging systems need maintenance and
professional crews and have not been assessed as a significant threat. 
The introduction of modern high- or medium-altitude surface-to-air
missiles seems unlikely.  The Northern Alliance recently struck Kabul
airport with rocket-firing helicopters and escaped unscathed. 

Russian-made antiaircraft guns range from the 12.7-mm.  (roughly
0.50-caliber) NSV heavy machine gun through the 14.5-mm.  ZPU in single,
double or four-barrel mountings to the ZU-23 23-mm.  cannon in single
and double towed carriages. 

China North Industries Corp.  has been exporting its versions of the ZPU
and a new Type 85 that is 58% lighter, making them easier to transport
by infantry in rough terrain.  Iran and Egypt also make and export
versions of the weapon. 

SHOULDER-FIRED antiaircraft missiles that track the infrared signature
of aircraft are probably the major threat in Afghanistan.  There are a
few U.S.-supplied Stingers (intelligence estimates are around 100) still
in Afghan hands, but few think they are still effective.  More
available, and probably more reliable at this late date, are the
Russian-designed SA-7 through SA-18 family.  The missiles are also built
by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, China, Pakistan and others.  They are variously
know as the Strela 2 (SA-7 Grail) and Strela 3 (SA-14 Gremlin), the
latter effective against approaching targets.  More advanced variants
are the Igla (SA-18 Grouse), which is designed to ignore decoys, and
Ingla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet), the single most effective Iraqi antiaircraft
weapon used in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf war. 

China builds and sells a shoulder-fired weapon called the HN-5/5A/5B and
a similar, derivative missile built by Pakistan as the Anza (Lance) Mk. 
1/2.  Both combine Stinger and Igla technology.  There also is an
improved version of the Chinese missile called the QW-1 Vanguard that is
now on the market.  Egypt sells the Falcon Eye, an improved SA-7b.  All
three are in service in Afghanistan.  Russian Igla and U.S.  Stinger
technology fed China's QW-1 development, which in turn was transferred
into Pakistan's Lance program.  ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILES also are available
on black markets.  Within the last few years, U.S intelligence officials
quoted the following availability and prices:

*The French-built Mistral can be bought for $60,000-100,000.  It has a
maximum effective altitude of roughly 14,000 ft.  It can be fired at an
approaching aircraft or from the side. 

*The U.S.-built Stinger is available for $50,000-80,000.  It also can
reach 14,000 ft.  Although the batteries needed to aim and fire the
weapons are now thought to be useless, replacing them is not considered
impossible.  Stingers also were sold to Pakistan, Angola's Unita units,
Chad and Nicaragua's Contras. 

*The British Blowpipe, thought to be in roughly the same price range,
was sold to Afghanistan but it was designed as a low-altitude system
with a maximum effective altitude of about 8,000 ft. 

*The SA-7/14s are on the market for $35,000.  Maximum altitude ranges up
to 12,000 ft., and they are thought to have no flare-rejection
capability.  The more advanced SA-16/18s cost $60,000-80,000 and have
improved sensing.  The SA-18 has improved target discrimination and an
altitude of at least 14,000 ft.  A logic unit in the missile moves the
aimpoint, at the last moment, from the tailpipe to the cockpit and
center fuselage area. 

In an ominous turn of events, triggered by the success of U.S.  aircraft
in striking radars and radar-guided missiles, foreign manufacturers are
modifying their heavy SAM systems with electro-optical and infrared
sensors to avoid detection.  While infrared missiles have been the most
effective antiaircraft weapons over the last decade, there are
improvements being made to defenses against them.  They now involve more
than the traditional dispersal of flares. 

Sweden, for example, has developed a covert flare that because of its
low temperature is not visible to the unaided eye.  It operates at the
same temperature as the dispensing aircraft so that imaging seeker heads
on missiles have difficulty telling the plume from the aircraft. 
Moreover, several countries are using lasers to fool laser-guided
weapons and jam IR seekers.  In some cases, it can be powerful enough to
overload sensors and damage detectors or frost optics on the incoming
missile. 

IN THE U.S., Lockheed Martin and the Air Force Research Laboratoryhave
tested the laser infrared countermeasure flyout experiment (Life).  It
uses a multiband laser to identify an approaching weapon by the sensor
it carries.  It assesses characteristics of the missile and then returns
a complex synchronized jam code.  This response causes the missile to
make a high-g turn away from the target aircraft in order to chase a
cluster of false targets.  If it can drive the missile in one direction,
the total time to jam could be as little as 3-4 sec., a necessity when
aircraft are at low altitude ( AW&amp;ST May 21, p.  43). 


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