[iwar] [fc:Bio-Chem.Hype.Spreads.Like.a.New.Form.of.Infectious.Disease]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-06 21:41:51


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Bio-Chem.Hype.Spreads.Like.a.New.Form.of.Infectious.Disease]
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[FC - noteworthy that even the belief in these attacks would induce many
to have symptoms...]

--------------------
Bio-Chem Hype Spreads Like a New Form of Infectious Disease 
--------------------

By JIM WALSH
Jim Walsh is a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs at Harvard University

October 5 2001
LA Times

There's something in the air, and it is spreading.  You can't walk down
a street or go to work without being exposed.  Worse yet, it's reaching
your kids.  It's not a chemical or biological agent.  It's fear. 

It is, however, a fear all out of proportion to reality.  It is fear
based on hype, and sadly, some of the hype is driven by parochial
interest.  Thursday's report of an isolated case of anthrax will only
make things worst. 

First, consider the facts.  Chemical weapons have been with us since
World War I.  Biological weapons have an even longer history, stretching
back centuries to the Peloponnesian War and, more famously, to early
America when Indian tribes were supplied with blankets infected with
smallpox.  Despite this long history, biological and chemical weapons
have rarely been used, and then only by countries.  No country, however,
would attack the U.S.  with such weapons for fear of nuclear
retaliation.  There has not been a single death due to a bio-attack by
terrorists.  Casualties from a terrorist chemical attack are almost as
rare.  Only once has a terrorist group used chemical weapons to deadly
effect--the 1995 attack by the Aum Supreme Truth, a Japanese cult.  Even
in that case, the attack was more failure than success; 12 people were
killed in a crowded Tokyo subway.  Had they used a traditional high
explosive, the death toll would have been far greater.  Many warned that
Aum's attack would set off a wave of chemical attacks.  That didn't
happen. 

Politicians and the media would have us believing the worst.  Atty. 
Gen.  John Ashcroft, who threw the city of Boston into a panic Sept.  21
when he warned of a possible attack, continues to use inflammatory
rhetoric about chemical-biological terrorism.  His aides admit that
there is no new intelligence to substantiate such claims.  His warnings
seem to coincide with testimony aimed at getting passage of sweeping new
anti-terrorism laws. 

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is a little more cautious.  He claims
that terrorists will eventually acquire such weapons from countries. 
What he fails to mention is that no country has ever provided a weapon
of mass destruction to a terrorist group.  They do not give them to
groups over which they have limited control and which might use the
weapons against them later. 

The media treatment of bio-chem terrorism has been predictable and
regrettable.  This is particularly true of television, which cannot
resist showing images of gas masks and exploding canisters.  The typical
story begins with dire warnings about the consequences of a perfectly
executed chemical or biological attack.  This is followed by interviews
with public health officials who solemnly declare that the U.S.  is
unprepared for such an attack.  Only at the very end is the viewer told
that the risk of such an attack is exceedingly small.  By then the
damage is done. 

If bio-chem threats are being hyped, why aren't there more voices of
caution? There are two reasons.  First, there is no cost to being a
Cassandra.  If the dire predictions do not come true, the analyst simply
can say that we have been lucky.  By contrast, the person who suggests
that the threats are overblown is taking a career-threatening risk.  One
attack--even if it fails, even if it employs a household cleaner rather
than sarin or anthrax--would be viewed as having proved the skeptic
wrong. 

There is a second, less obvious reason.  There is an unwritten rule
among the small fraternity of people who study weapons of mass
destruction.  When colleagues engage in hype, many of us will turn a
deaf ear rather than publicly contradict them.  We tell ourselves that
hyping the threat is the only way to get the attention of the U.S. 
public and therefore a necessary evil. 

Sept.  11 changed all that.  Today, bio-chem hype has real consequences. 
It is needlessly scaring our children.  It is being used to justify a
variety of questionable public policy proposals, and worse, it may
actually encourage terrorists to consider these weapons. 

Yes, we should reduce the danger of a biological or chemical attack.  We
can improve the public health infrastructure and, in particular, the
worldwide monitoring of infectious disease.  We can work on vaccines and
techniques to prevent advances in the lab from becoming new weapons. 
Finally, the Bush administration should reverse course and support the
chemical weapons and the biological weapons treaties, which aim to
reduce the risks of biological and chemical warfare. 

The infectious disease gripping the U.S.  is fear.  Left untreated, this
disease may have disastrous consequences--for public policy, for the
economy and for our daily lives and the lives of our children. 

For information about reprinting this article, go to <a
href="http://www.lats.com/rights/register.htm">http://www.lats.com/rights/register.htm>

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