[iwar] [fc:More.intel.autopsy:.From.Bobby.Inman,.no.less]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-09 17:20:42
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From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
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Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2001 17:20:42 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: [iwar] [fc:More.intel.autopsy:.From.Bobby.Inman,.no.less]
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Subject: [LEANALYST] More intel autopsy: From Bobby Inman, no less

I think Inman is the cat's meow.
dh


<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/09/opinion/09INMA.html?todaysheadlines">http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/09/opinion/09INMA.html?todaysheadlines>
October 9, 2001

Spying for a Long, Hot War

By BOBBY R. INMAN

AUSTIN, Tex.  -- The total surprise achieved by the perpetrators of the
acts of war on Sept.  11 has forced a reappraisal of the entire American
approach to combating terrorism.  The top priority remains domestic. 
Legislation is now being considered to enhance the law-enforcement tools
for detecting, pursuing and blocking terrorists here.  The much harder
and longer-term challenge will be building our intelligence
capabilities.  Now that war has begun, meeting this challenge has become
still more urgent. 

To understand what needs to be done, one must first look at how we got
where we are: grossly unprepared to keep the country critically informed
about the world around us. 

In the late 1950's, before satellite photography became available, at
least 75 percent of the raw information came from people gathering
intelligence around the world.  At least two thirds of that came from
foreign service officers engaged in overt activities: reading the local
papers, listening to the local radio, speaking with local officials and
generally moving about with open eyes and ears.  The rest of our "human
intelligence" came from covert information-gathering by clandestine case
officers, that is, from spies. 

In the early 1960's, as a vogue for systems analysis and cost-benefit
tradeoffs swept through government, it was decided that nonofficial
cover ‹ in most cases, posing as businessmen ‹ for clandestine officers
was too expensive.  Instead, more agents were placed in American
embassies and consulates, posing as political, economic, cultural,
commercial, legal and military officers or attachés as cover for spying. 

From 1967 to 1981, American ambassadors were told to reduce the size of
the official presence in the countries where they served.  Out went many
of the overt foreign-service observers and with them many of the covers
being used for clandestine officers. 

By 1974, the reduction in personnel had been so large that the Central
Intelligence Agency's deputy director for operations, Bill Nelson,
concluded that the headquarters staff in Virginia should be reduced as
well, because it had become too large for the size of the remaining
field force.  He proposed reducing headquarters staff by about 900
people. 

William Colby, the director of central intelligence, set Mr.  Nelson's
proposal aside while grappling with Congressional investigations of the
C.I.A.'s work.  Mr.  Colby's successor as director, George H.  W.  Bush,
chose not to address problems of staff size. 

In 1977 a new director, Stansfield Turner, was asked by the Office of
Management and Budget to reduce intelligence spending.  He took the
Nelson study off the shelf and gave it to the operations leadership. 
Unfortunately, the operations people used the opportunity to reduce
field personnel ‹ in particular, case officers and station chiefs who
were viewed by some in headquarters as competitors ‹ as well as the
headquarters staff.  Much experienced spying talent was lost. 

In 1981, Ronald Reagan authorized a vigorous rebuilding of human
intelligence capabilities.  C.I.A.  growth was limited, however, by the
small training base.  The time was already past when you could simply
hire capable agents; you now had to train them, often from scratch. 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig also encountered resistance in his
department to using defense-budget funds for rebuilding the foreign
service overseas, which would at least have improved our overt
intelligence gathering.  The intervening years have provided only
limited improvements in either overt or clandestine human intelligence
collection. 

America needs the best clandestine intelligence gathering it can find. 
It should be a relatively small force focused on the hard targets that
cannot be dealt with through overt information collection.  As matters
stand, field agents from the C.I.A., military intelligence and other
agencies are burdened and distracted by the work once done by foreign
service officers ‹ reading the papers, meeting with local officials. 
They haven't the time for clandestine work, which is the only work that
will crack terrorist networks. 

At the same time, our ability to gather information by overt means also
remains inadequate.  This will be especially problematic as the
government works with its partners in the war on terrorism.  Most of the
critical information about what drives current and potential allies is
accessible by overt observers with language skills and deep knowledge of
the countries involved.  Several retired career ambassadors have
expressed skepticism that the existing foreign service is adequate to
the task.  I believe we must at least start there.  The pool of talent
needs to be substantially increased, right now, with a significant
program of scholarships for language and area studies linked to a
commitment of some years of public service. 

It will probably be at least 10 years before we can return to the level
of competence we had in the 1950's.  In the meantime, our relationships
with other countries, including many not dedicated to our democratic
principles, will be vital to filling human intelligence gaps. 
Dependence on foreign intelligence services is clearly not ideal, and
the sooner we can reduce that dependence the better. 

Bobby R.  Inman served in high intelligence positions under three
presidents and is a professor of national policy at the University of
Texas at Austin.

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