Return-Path: <sentto-279987-2911-1003011702-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Sat, 13 Oct 2001 15:23:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 13628 invoked by uid 510); 13 Oct 2001 22:21:28 -0000 Received: from n32.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.82) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 13 Oct 2001 22:21:28 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-2911-1003011702-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.52] by n32.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 13 Oct 2001 22:21:42 -0000 X-Sender: fc@big.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 13 Oct 2001 22:21:42 -0000 Received: (qmail 45869 invoked from network); 13 Oct 2001 22:21:42 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by m8.onelist.org with QMQP; 13 Oct 2001 22:21:42 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta1 with SMTP; 13 Oct 2001 22:21:42 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id PAA07909 for iwar@onelist.com; Sat, 13 Oct 2001 15:21:41 -0700 Message-Id: <200110132221.PAA07909@big.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Sat, 13 Oct 2001 15:21:41 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] [fc:The.Anthrax.Alarm] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Washington Post October 12, 2001 Pg. 32 The Anthrax Alarm Much remains mysterious about the Florida anthrax case, where exposure now appears limited to three workers at a single office building in Boca Raton. Even one death from this rare and deadly pathogen is alarming; investigators have yet to offer a hypothesis as to how the spores ended up on the computer keyboard of Robert Stevens, who died last Friday, or in the noses of two other workers. But quick medical and law enforcement responses in Florida have forestalled what could have been much wider panic. Health workers flagged the case early and confirmed Mr. Stevens's diagnosis within 24 hours, allowing the building to be sealed, the second case to be found and more than 700 employees to be located and quickly given exposure tests and prophylactic drugs. Broad canvasses of Florida hospitals have turned up no new cases, sending at least a partially calming message to those suffering from jitters over strange packages or flu-like symptoms. This is far from proving American readiness for a biological attack. On the contrary, Florida benefited from pilot programs that need to be extended to the country at large. An attack with epidemic casualties would probably overwhelm emergency room and hospital bed capacity in most jurisdictions, as flunked training exercises in a half-dozen cities have shown. Defenses against bioterrorism are likely to get a huge influx of cash this year; Congress is looking at packages that could go as high as $1.65 billion. With that kind of money, debates on priorities tend to deteriorate into shopping lists boosting funding for every program with a conceivable link to public health. Florida's successes point to some key elements that need to be part of any plan to boost readiness. The experience underlines the importance of what happens in the first few hours -- detection, analysis, containment. That would be even more important if the biological attack agent were one that, unlike anthrax, could pass from person to person. The capacity for quick response needs to be spread as widely as possible through the country. Funding is not the only element here: For now, news reports and widespread edginess have created a degree of alertness that money can't buy. But doctors and nurses, who would be first to see strange ailments, do need the training to recognize them. They also need fast, secure ways to pass information on to health authorities; some jurisdictions still use regular mail for such alerts because it guarantees confidentiality. Beyond that, resources should go to boosting vaccine and antibiotic stockpiles; to ensuring there are enough labs for testing and enough trained "medical detectives" ready to go into the field; and to adding to the "surge capacity" of hospitals, which, rather than being encouraged to maintain extra beds they can't afford, should have contingency plans for converting large spaces for use on short notice. Longer-term programs for strengthening the public heath system, such as training more nurses to fill an estimated 126,000 vacancies nationwide, have a role to play, but far more emphasis should go to measures that enhance readiness now. Few states are starting at zero on this kind of planning, but until now they have had to cobble their efforts together from multiple small programs: Nebraska, for instance, computerized its health alert system with money from the tobacco settlement. A federal overview of which states and localities are up to snuff is a must; this is no time for deferring too much to state and local autonomy. As much as medical readiness, people need reminders that the actual likelihood of a successful large-scale biological attack is slim. Known failures, such as the multiple unsuccessful attempts by Japan's Aum Shinrikyo cult, suggest the technical difficulties of getting, weaponizing and distributing biological agents. Other panic-inducing possibilities, such as crop-dusters, present even greater practical barriers. A concerted effort to prevent panic may be able to dissuade people from depleting antibiotic stocks, unwisely self-medicating or otherwise undercutting the nation's best attempts at readiness. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Get your FREE VeriSign guide to security solutions for your web site: encrypting transactions, securing intranets, and more! http://us.click.yahoo.com/UnN2wB/m5_CAA/yigFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-12-31 20:59:55 PST