Return-Path: <sentto-279987-3033-1003286198-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Tue, 16 Oct 2001 19:38:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 31988 invoked by uid 510); 17 Oct 2001 02:36:19 -0000 Received: from n6.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.56) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 17 Oct 2001 02:36:19 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-3033-1003286198-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.1.224] by n6.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 17 Oct 2001 02:36:38 -0000 X-Sender: fc@big.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 17 Oct 2001 02:36:38 -0000 Received: (qmail 47879 invoked from network); 17 Oct 2001 02:36:38 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by 10.1.1.224 with QMQP; 17 Oct 2001 02:36:38 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta1 with SMTP; 17 Oct 2001 02:36:37 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id TAA26352 for iwar@onelist.com; Tue, 16 Oct 2001 19:36:37 -0700 Message-Id: <200110170236.TAA26352@big.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 19:36:37 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] [fc:Gunships.Most.Effective.Psychological.Weapons] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Gunships Most Effective Psychological Weapons 2350 GMT, 011016 Summary The United States deployed two AC-130 gunships in combat over Afghanistan for the first time since air attacks began Oct. 7. Use of the large, low-flying craft indicates the Pentagon is highly confident the Taliban's surface-to-air missile threat has been neutralized. It also suggests intelligence on fixed and mobile Afghan targets has significantly improved. Use of the highly specialized AC-130 serves to bolster a psychological warfare program aimed at splitting the Taliban while maintaining a cohesive anti-Taliban coalition. Analysis Two AC-130 gunships took part in U.S. attacks on Kandahar during the night of Oct. 15, according to sources in Afghanistan and Washington. The AC-130 is a heavily armed variant of the C-130 transport, and versions of it have been used since the Vietnam War for supporting U.S. Special Forces operations and to interdict small, mobile targets such as convoys and units of infantry. Although it may not yet be time to deploy special forces, the AC-130 is a powerful psychological weapon, and its use indicates that an evolution in U.S. strategy may be under way. The deployment of the gunship is no doubt intended to both reassure U.S. coalition allies and unnerve and fracture Afghanistan's ruling Taliban. By putting the AC-130 into action, the Pentagon is signaling it has a high level of confidence that the past week's cruise missile and bombing raids neutralized the Taliban's surface-to-air missile capabilities. It also suggests Washington has re-evaluated and downgraded the threat posed by any remaining man-portable Stinger surface-to-air missiles that were left in the Taliban's hands following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Though it carries an array of defensive countermeasures, including electronic jammers, radar-confusing chaff dispensers and infrared flares, the AC-130 is a prime target for light-air defense weapons. It is large and slow, with a cruise speed of 368 miles per hour and a much slower speed when engaging a target. For its weapons to be effective, the gunship must orbit targets at a maximum range of 12,000 feet, which is also within range of the Stinger and its Russian-made counterparts. The earlier-made AC-130H variant must circle its target along a predictable flight path to aim its sideways-firing weapons, though the trainable gatling cannon on the later AC-130U allows a more flexible flight path. The AC-130 is also a relatively rare and valuable aircraft in the U.S. arsenal, with only eight AC-130H variants and 13 AC-130Us in service. The United States would not deploy even one of these aircraft at this stage in the conflict without some certainty that it wouldn't be lost to enemy fire on the first night out. Deployment of the AC-130 also suggests U.S. intelligence regarding fixed and mobile targets in Afghanistan has improved. Until now, the United States relied on long-range strategic bombers, cruise missiles and fast-moving multi-role jet fighters for attacks on Afghanistan. These weapons are not well-suited for striking small, mobile targets like individual units of Taliban fighters, but they are appropriate to the targets U.S. intelligence could identify. They have focused on destroying airfields, ammunition dumps, surface-to-air missile emplacements, power and communications stations, barracks and camps. Afghanistan is quickly running out of such large, fixed, high-value targets, and further strategic bombing raids would only serve to make the rubble bounce. Any attacks on Taliban personnel in urban areas also run the risk of racking up high numbers of civilian casualties. The Taliban fighters are already reporting such damage, and although their claims cannot be independently verified, they could have a serious impact on U.S. coalition allies in the region. Muslim states have universally warned Washington to avoid civilian casualties or risk losing their support. During the Oct. 15 raids, the AC-130s struck a Taliban headquarters and troop complex in Kandahar, according to Agence France-Presse. If the United States is using tactical aircraft against small and mobile units in urban areas, it must have increased its intelligence gathering from refugees, satellites, aerial electronic and photographic reconnaissance, and perhaps from forces on the ground. Finally, the deployment of the AC-130 signals an evolution in the U.S. battle plan. Though it does not indicate that U.S. ground troops have been deployed in Afghanistan yet, it suggests such an action is imminent. The aircraft's value as a psychological weapon thus precedes its physical impact on the battlefield. Part of that psychological component is the expectation that expanding the range of U.S. military options will first of all unnerve and fracture the Taliban. AC-130 variants were used to support special operations from Vietnam to Bosnia, and U.S. defense sources have encouraged a great deal of speculation that AC-130s will be used to support special forces on the ground inside Afghanistan. The basic scenario being spun includes helicopters of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment ferrying special forces troops from Pakistan to targets in Afghanistan, with gunfire support from AC-130s. Pakistanis have reported the arrival of U.S. troops at Jacobabad, apparently supporting this scenario. This foreshadowing appears to have been effective at raising alarms in Afghanistan. Taliban officials and residents of Kandahar reported hearing helicopters during the Oct. 15 attacks, even though U.S. sources claimed none were used. The AC-130's deployment should also serve to reassure U.S. allies, both inside Afghanistan and throughout the region. Until now the United States has struck Afghanistan from a distance, raising questions about Washington's commitment to the battle. As the United States moves to the battlefield and more U.S. troops are put at risk, countries like Uzbekistan and groups like the Northern Alliance will be more confident that Washington will see the war through to its conclusion. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell have been making just that case on recent tours of the region. Rumsfeld Oct. 15 suggested tactical U.S. air strikes could soon begin targeting Taliban frontlines in northeastern Afghanistan. This would bridge the gap between the Northern Alliance, which has decried the U.S. failure to strike targets in support of its advances, and Islamabad, which does not want to see the Northern Alliance roll into Kabul before a coalition government is formed. The arrival of the AC-130 over the battlefield lends weight to Rumsfeld's words, as do recent air strikes against the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif. The Taliban must now prepare for the possibility of tactical U.S. air support for Northern Alliance advances in the north as well as for U.S. Special Forces operations in the south. If tactical strikes intensify rapidly in the weeks before Ramadan, the Taliban may feel pressure to abandon fixed positions and attempt to draw the United States into a war in the mountains. ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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