[iwar] [fc:Harvesting.passwords.from.DSL.routers]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-19 07:32:35


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Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 07:32:35 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Harvesting.passwords.from.DSL.routers]
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Harvesting passwords from DSL routers 
By Kevin Poulsen, The Register, 10/19/2001
<a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/22353.html">http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/22353.html>

Hackers have developed a trick for pilfering DSL account names and
passwords right from subscriber's routers, a technique that provides
hackers with untraceable Internet access, and potentially exposes
subscriber email to interception. 
The method targets Cayman Systems' popular 3220-H DSL router, a
combination modem, router and hub that allows DSL subscribers to share
their Internet connections among multiple computers. The 3220-H is sold
retail, and is distributed by Cayman's channel partners-- notably SBC
Communications, which provides the devices to thousands of "Enhanced
DSL" subscribers through subsidiaries Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell
and Ameritech. 
Like other DSL routers, the Cayman 3220-H allows users to easily
configure their settings through a Web browser interface. But the router
makes that interface accessible, not just from the user's local area
network, but also from the 'WAN port' that connects to the Internet. 
The device is protected from unauthorized reprogramming by an
administrative password set by the owner. But unless the subscriber also
sets a separate 'user password', the router's configuration settings can
be viewed, though not changed, through the browser interface. There, the
'PPPoE' password used to log onto the DSL service is masked as a series
of asterisks, but it is plainly visible in the HTML source code of the
page. 
Hackers can use the purloined password to download the subscriber's
email from SBC servers, or view and edit portions of their account
information. 
But sources say the vulnerability has found its greatest utility in the
computer underground as a wellspring of free, anonymous Internet access.
Because the same password works on SBC's dial-ups, without interfering
with the subscriber's DSL use, the purloined passwords help hackers
cover their tracks by borrowing other people's ISP accounts, according
to 20-year-old Internet hacker Adrian Lamo. 
"Most of the people that I know of use them as disposal dial-up
accounts," says Lamo, who discovered the hole over a year ago. "Looking
at something in page source is not a tremendous technological effort." 
Privacy Problems  An SBC spokesperson acknowledged the password theft
vulnerability, and said it drove the company to begin disabling all
Internet access to the router's configuration settings as part of its
standard installation routine. 
"Cayman and other companies have a factory setting where the WAN port is
disabled," says spokesperson Fletcher Cook. "Our technicians are trained
to disable this themselves." 
But subscribers who received their routers over a year ago, before SBC
enacted the more secure policy, may remain vulnerable, Cook admits.
Newer subscribers are at risk only if they explicitly enable
administrative access to the router's WAN port. He adds that the company
educates users about security issues through its Web sites. 
Lamo says his scanning has turned up thousands of vulnerable routers in
homes and small offices throughout Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Houston, Saint Louis, San Diego, and other cities. 
The problem has privacy implications for DSL subscribers. The same
password that provides Internet access, is also used to control access
to subscriber email. 
The passwords can also be used to access some account information over
SBC's public customer service Web sites; a cyber snoop could learn a
given subscriber's name and phone number, or change their billing
address. In some circumstances, the sites also reveal one digit of the
subscriber's confidential three-digit telephone account "customer code,"
Lamo notes. 
A spokesman for California-based Netopia, Inc., which acquired Cayman
Systems last week, said the company is considering releasing a patch for
the password revelation hole. In the meantime, customers should disable
access from the WAN port, or set a separate 'user password,' on top of
the administrative password, to block access to the configuration
screens. 
"[Cayman has] been concerned about network security for some time," says
Evan Solley, Netopia's vice president of product marketing. "But there
has been back pressure from the channels about solutions, because it
makes things more difficult for deployment." 
The issue is not the first for the Cayman router. In March of last year,
security experts revealed that the 3220-H's administrative password was
left blank by default, potentially allowing attackers to reconfigure or
reprogram the devices remotely. In response, SBC technicians began
setting that password manually upon installation. 
© 2001 SecurityFocus.com, all rights reserved.

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