[iwar] [fc:NERF-Based.Security:.Reassurance.Through.Illusion,.Rhetoric,.and.Fear-Mongering]

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Date: 2001-10-22 12:59:59
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NERF-Based Security: Reassurance Through Illusion, Rhetoric, and Fear-Mongering 

Richard Forno
22 October 2001
(c) 2001 by Author. Permission is granted to quote, reprint or redistribute
provided the text is not altered, and appropriate credit is given. The
author has no grudge with the NERF Company.

Summary: An easy-to-read look at various current issues and actions
resulting from September 11th and asking if they are really effective. 

<a href="http://www.infowarrior.org/articles/2001-09.html">http://www.infowarrior.org/articles/2001-09.html>

With all the hype surrounding the events and aftermath of September 11th
it is difficult to separate the reality and 'signal' from the hype,
sensationalism, and 'noise'.  We see increased security at buildings and
airports, and hear of threats around each corner - but how much of what
we're seeing is real, and how much is fear-mongering and/or feel-good
security measures designed more to reassure the American public than be
truly effective? Is the United States scrambling helter-skelter to
investigate, prevent, respond, or censor anything that might be remotely
connected to past or potential terrorist actions? How effective are the
proposed 'enhancements' to existing security postures, really?

This article is intended to provide reality-based answers to these
questions, and are probably not what you'll see on television or the
mainstream media.  The decision to write this came from the public
reaction to Susan Sontag's recent op-ed column in the New Yorker
Magazine.  Her comments - rooted in reality - generated a significant
public uproar that had some branding her as 'unpatriotic' - the logic
being that anyone who does not blindly accept and support everything the
United States proposes in its response to terrorism must be supportive
of terrorism.  While I am an American, and patriotic as Yankee Doodle
Dandy, I happen to agree with many of her comments, and thus this
article was born. 

If you're wondering, the title of this article symbolizes the knee-jerk
attempts to 'enhance security' in the United States by overt yet
ineffective actions in the public eye, some of which are mentioned
below.  We all played innocently with NERF's various sponge toys (balls,
frisbees, guns, spears, darts) as children since it was very difficult
to hurt someone with these realistic-looking toys.  Realistic But
Harmless - particularly on the airlines - we're becoming NERFed against
anything that might pose a danger through realistic-looking but totally
ineffective security measures.  (No offense to the NERF Company, they
make some great products, but with respects, the analogy fits well for
this article.)

Anthraxophobia Wrongly Rules News and Our Lives

Since the case of anthrax was reported in Florida, the media -
particularly the 24-hour cable news channels - focused on the story,
calling in pundit after pundit to discuss the bacteria, preventive
measures, responses, and the nation's ability to defend against a
biological attack.  Even now, days later, news 'crawlers' at the bottom
of the television screen continue to display statements and sound bites
that - while adding nothing substantive to the story - serve to elevate
the public's collective blood pressure simply because the word "anthrax"
appears on the screen.  On October 19th, the Associated Press even
reported that Northwest Airlines removed powdered artificial sweetners
from its airline food service meals to allay passenger fears! How far
will this lunacy go? Will it soon be illegal to walk down the street
eating a powdered doughnut?

This media-driven "Anthraxophobia" and contradicting government actions
sends mixed messages to the American public, and perpetuating public
fear and misperception about the issue.  While the White House presents
an "all is calm" image, the US House of Representatives adjourned for a
long weekend claiming anthrax security concerns, although the Senate -
where there were confirmed anthrax attacks - remained open for
legislative business.  Does this sound like a confused government
establishment unsure of how to proceed in today's era of terrorism? A
recent New York Times editorial by Tom Friedman notes that "We have U.S. 
troops in the field all around Afghanistan.  It can't be easy duty.  But
the House is running scared.  Just what the terrorists wanted.  The
House members should be meeting on the Capitol steps, popping Cipro if
they have to, telling America's troops and America's enemies that
nothing - N-O-T-H-I-N-G - will derail our democracy."

Anthraxophobia has even forced the Pentagon to shutter its Operation
DEAR ABBY service that sends holiday morale messages to troops deployed
overseas.  Traditionally, letters - not addressed to anyone in
particular - are sent to the central DEAR ABBY offices and then passed
on to troops.  As a result of bureaucratic Anthraxophobia, however, the
Military Postal Service Agency simply shut the service down.  Did it
ever occur to them that it might have been a better compromise to
perhaps only accept postcards instead of sealed envelopes that could
contain anthrax? We are starting to see fear influence and dictate
policy and operational decisions - not educated fear, but
assumption-based knee-jerking that's rooted in anything but facts. 

While the casual observer - perhaps those whose only source of 'news' is
from shows like 'Hard Copy' or who receive their news from a single
source - may be concerned at the potential of an anthrax attack,
realists may have a far more sinister assessment: given that confirmed
anthrax incidents and anthrax-related scares occurred in isolated areas
- Reno, Manhattan, Madison, and Palm Beach - could it be that an
adversary, be it al Qaeda, Iraq, or a domestic nut case, is simply
mailing anthrax and anthrax-like letters to either cause public
paranoia, or (more likely) is sitting back observing how the government,
media, and public react and respond to this perceived threat, in advance
of a future, more widespread attack?

Nobody seems to be interested that anthrax is a very treatable bug -
even after an infection is diagnosed - or that Cipro is not the
exclusive remedy.  Folks don't realize that it takes more than a few
spores to cause problems in people.  Worse yet, the average person -
including television's talking heads - does not understand or discuss
the concept of drug-resistant infections.  If everyone starts taking
antibiotics for any symptom of illness, over time such practices will
not only weaken the protective effect of such medicines on the human
body, but also reduce the impact of such drugs on various infectors like
anthrax, smallpox, and plague

The panic and paranoia we're currently seeing about anthrax is
insignificant compared to what we'd see if smallpox, plague, or any
other significantly more deadly substance was reported.  Several
specialists I've spoken with agree that on the ' bioweapons food chain'
anthrax is nowhere near the top of deadly weapons.  Yet by watching the
news, you'd think it was worse than anything else.  One confirmed death
from anthrax is certainly newsworthy, but does not imply terrorism or
justify a round-the-clock news cycle on thestory.  However, one person
being diagnosed with smallpox would be both newsworthy and almost
certainly terrorism, and nobody's wondering about that on the airwaves. 

Osama Most Likely Isn't Sending Encoded Messages to the Networks

Last week, National Security Advisor Condeleeza Rice contacted the major
media outlets and strongly suggested they not broadcast unedited videos
from those involved with Osama or Al Qaeda, fearing that such videos
might contain hidden messages to sleeper cells instructing them to
execute additional pre-planned attacks.  Historically, this is not a new
concept, as it was quite effective during World War II with the Special
Operations Executive (SOE) and the Office of Strategic Services (the
forerunner to today's CIA) using civilian radio broadcasts to pass coded
messages to the maquis (the French underground resistance fighters)
instructing them to carry out pre-planned strikes in advance of the
Normandy invasion in June 1944. 

Casual observers may think this is a wise precaution, even if they don't
know the success of this technique during World War II, and agree with
the White House's statement that such messages are also propaganda to
incite the rank-and-file Muslim population in the United States in
support of al Qaeda.  To a certain extent, that's probably true. 

Realists, however, seem to agree that such 'encoded messages' are
probably not a very viable method of communication for our adversaries. 
It's already known that al Qaeda knows how to communicate securely -
without encryption, by the way - to coordinate its cells and plan
attacks around the world.  Besides, even if the United States media
censors such videos, what prevents people from seeing the video from
satellite television, over the Internet, from international news
sources, via telephone, obtaining a transcript, or placing calls to
non-Internet (and old fashioned) computer bulletin board systems to
access the video or text of the statement?

Crazier still, news executives are most likely not intelligence
professionals trained to look for hidden messages or nuances in such
statements, nor do they have the background information on the situation
- much of it from classified sources in the intelligence community -- to
provide specific guidance on what to look for.  So, how effective is
this, really? That being said, if the real reason behind the White House
request to censor unedited terrorist videos is a method of quieting
propaganda directed at the United States, why not simply say so? Are
they that concerned that the American people would start believing
Osama's babbling that they must NERF its perceptions of the adversary?

Terrorists are asymmetric and unconventional in their actions, choosing
unorthodox methods of attack.  On September 11th, four aircraft were
hijacked with the intention of destroying buildings and killing
thousands.  In early October, there were statements by Osama stating
that "storms of airplanes" would never defeat his cause.  Soon after, an
al Qaeda spokesperson warned American Muslims "not to board airplanes"
or be in skyscrapers "anytime soon." The news channel 'experts' and
government spokesmen were quick to state these were serious hints that
future airline hijackings were possible.  While that's certainly a
possibility, given the unconventional nature of terrorism, perhaps we
could interpret these messages as items intended to draw our attention
toward airports and airplanes while ships, trains, and busses (for
example) are the real targets in a follow-on attack.  Nobody wanting to
be successful in battle outlines their exact battle plan or weapons
capabilities for their adversaries.  Ask any military historian, this is
one of the oldest tactics in the book, not to mention a common one in
boxing - draw your opponent's attention to the left while aiming for the
right.  In this case, a terrorist's 'Rope-A-Dope.'

A much more effective method of communicating is through sequential
events.  Perhaps establishing a one-time-use system along the lines of
"if you hear that a car bomb exploded in Mexico City near Building Y,
begin your particular phase of our operation in 48 hours.." How will the
White House prevent this (and other such) forms of communication from
signaling further attacks? Again, censoring terrorism messages in the
mainstream media may have some impact, but it's not as foolproof as
they, or the public, are led to believe.  NERFY Security.  Sounds
important, but totally ineffective. 

Threat Inflation by The Regal Court of W. 

After September 11th, anything that could become a terrorist tool was
deemed a possible threat and became the object of close scrutiny by the
federal government.  Some of the more memorable items that came under
investigation and analysis as possible terrorist tools included
crop-dusters, hazardous material tanker trucks, airplanes,
semi-trailers, box cutters, nose-hair clippers, the Internet,
encryption, and barbecue grills.  (Well, maybe not barbecue grills, but
you get the idea.) A few of these deserve special mention:

The crop-duster 'threat' might give the uninformed observer pause, but
the realist would look at Justice claims and shake their heads in
disbelief.  Granted, crop-dusters spray chemicals from the air, but what
kind of chemicals do they spray? Insecticides and Pesticides - fancy
terms for substances that kill bugs, infections and germs in plants. 
Assuming that the adversary doesn't switch tanks or completely clean
them out, it's a good bet that the residual pesticides would negate part
if not all of the biologic agents intended to attack people via
crop-dusters.  In addition, experts note the spray orifices (the
'nozzles') used on crop-dusting aircraft are the wrong size for creating
the droplet size necessary for distributing biologic warfare agents. 
Further, several of the common biologic agents require specific
environmental conditions to live in - changes in light or temperature
can render such attacks ineffective.  Given the highly-fickle nature of
biological weapons, many educated security experts believe that chemical
weapons, not biological ones, would be the preferred weapon in an aerial
attack. 

Given the attention drawn to crop-dusters by the government and media,
an adversary wanting to distribute biowar agents could be free to wait
for the right weather conditions and simply blow them across an
interstate highway or river.  Wait for a temperate, windy day -- it
doesn't even need to be in a city or during rush hour.  Drivers would
likely think it's dust from a construction project and drive through the
dust as they often to, and not give the matter a second thought. 
Meanwhile, the particles get caught in the vehicle air system and move
with the vehicle (and its occupants) to their destination, thus
spreading the given bioweapon across a wide area.  Short of closing all
major highways, roadways, and waterways, how would this be prevented?

Recently, the White House created the Office of Homeland Security that
includes a mission to guard against the so-called, highly-sensational
concept of "cyber-terrorism" against computer networks.  While
discussing this issue is an article in itself, suffice it to say that
terrorists are by definition low-tech brutes looking to cause the
maximum amount of public fear.  Images of smoking craters and high
casualties are much more effective in generating fear than a darkened
computer screen.  Being an effective "information warrior" takes
significant technical and analytical experience and training, something
that the impoverished, uneducated, run-of-the-mill twenty-something
member of Club Osama or the al Qaeda club does not possess.  While there
always ongoing threats to critical networks, and a possibility of a
'cyber war' many security professionals - at least, the few realists in
our line of work - deem this as a potential terrorist target very low. 
Besides, there are enough inherent problems in many of today's computer
networks and systems that cause them to fail without any outside
assistance!

Creating another bureaucracy charged with accomplishing what four
previous government offices tried to do since 1995 doesn't sound
promising, and continuing to draw on the advice and counsel of CEOs (the
last people competent enough to understand the reality and dynamics of
the infrastructure security environment) through yet another
Presidential Advisory Board further demonstrates the government is once
again thinking very conventionally with its response to a very
unconventional problem.  We know what the problems are - we don't need
continued studies, research, and bureaucracy to generate jobs and more
paperwork.  We need action and authority to implement effective
countermeasures.  Unfortunately, the sad truth is that nobody in charge
wants the responsibility to rock the boat and really fix things - thus
we continue creating Boards, Councils, and generating reports.  To use a
historical analogy, our President Nero is fiddling while his
cyber-infrastructures burn!

Expanded Electronic Surveillance Doesn't Work Against Low-Tech Brutes

In the month after the events of September 11, the Justice Department
and FBI received nearly everything it sought to (but could not) get
under the Clinton Administration regarding wiretapping, electronic
monitoring, and definitions of terrorism.  As a security professional
that's worked with law enforcement investigations in the past, while I
question some of the new powers granted federal law enforcement and the
rush to get them past Congress, I'm happy that the FBI finally received
its 'roving wiretap' authority, something they've needed for a long
while, something that was a major obstacle to the timely investigation
of interstate criminal matters.  (One has to wonder if they scheduled an
after-hours champagne party in the FBI's sixth-floor SIOC to quietly
mark this historic event.)

Aside from rushing a flawed anti-terrorism bill through Congress (the
discussion of which is a separate article in itself) there were
indications that those responsible for September 11 used e-mail and
instant messages to communicate.  Immediately after the attack, there
were claims the attackers hid messages in photos on internet auction
site Ebay and used strong encryption to protect their messages, but
these have been unsubstantiated by hard, tangible evidence.  If so,
there is a slim chance that expanding wiretaps and electronic sniffing
of data (e.g., Carnivore) would have been helpful in monitoring such
communications.  Yet there were renewed calls to restrict strong
encryption, a technology policy horse that's not only left the barn, but
is already across the meadow....attempting to enact encryption
restrictions under the guise of 'anti-terrorism' is another effort in
futility given how technology works, as evidenced in the mid-1990s.  As
I've said for years, there are any number of ways to communicate -
electronic and otherwise -- that totally confounds law enforcement
interception and renders any 'expanded authority' obsolete.  Expanding
electronic surveillance won't work against such tactics, but presents
the appearance of being 'good for anti-terrorism." An example of E-NERFy
restrictions and legislation. 

The experienced co-authors of an as-yet-unpublished article "Terrorism
Today and Tomorrow" correctly note that "our new adversaries are diverse
and linked in unfamiliar ways....Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and a loose coalition of criminal actors, guerillas and
insurgents now challenge national security capabilities that were
designed to operate within a nation-state framework.  As we're now
seeing, outside that framework, our traditional structures have great
difficulties. 

America's current adversaries present a significant challenge to our
government and law enforcement organizations so enamored with
high-technology devices and tradecraft that we are grossly unprepared to
handle operations and adversaries in a low-tech environment.  As
previously mentioned, terrorists are low-tech brutes.  It's common
knowledge (to both VIP visitors at NSA and the public) that Osama
stopped using satellite phones once it was learned that NSA was
intercepting his calls.  This also begs the question regarding the
responsibility of the media and NSA tour guides in reporting these types
of facts in the first place, and how these entities balance national
security, public knowledge, and the needs of their organization's ego
about its capabilities. 

Information Resiliency and Futility of the Government's Self-Imposed Web
Clampdown

Late last week, word got out that the federal government started to
remove items from their web sites that 'could help' terrorists.  William
Beecher, spokesperson for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) said
in an AP story last week that NRC pulled the coordinates of all 103 US
nuclear power plants from the agency's web site.  "In most cases it is
common information...nothing top secret was on the Web site to begin
with," he said.  "We just don't want to provide anything that a
terrorist might find helpful." The Department of Transportation's Office
of Pipeline Safety also pulled maps of various domestic pipelines from
their web site as well, and the Environmental Protection Agency
conducted similar actions on its own site with regard to chemical plant
security. 

The casual observer may find this a prudent measure to prevent
terrorists from gaining any information that could be used to conduct
additional acts against the United States, and thus wrongfully assume
that once this information out-of-sight, it is therefore out-of-mind. 
Unfortunately, I also see this mindset in action in the IT security
industry all too frequently, and it does not work.  They are attempting
to 'nuke' information out of the public eye, but they're only succeeding
in NERFing it to another public venue. 

The reality is that any information published on the Internet becomes
able to be instantly copied and archived by any number of sources
aroundthe world.  Further, while the government may restrict pipeline
information and coordinates of nuclear plants, it does not take a
terrorist mastermind or uber-spy to find the same information via any
other traditional reasearch methods, including visiting local libraries,
industry associations, reading the local phone book, or (dare I say it?)
using common sense.  A fact of physics is that while you may be able to
remove information about a nuclear plant or pipeline from one site in
cyberspace, you can't easily remove its physical presence in real life
or everywhere on the Internet - you have to look at the entertainment
industry's cartel and its failed attempts to quash music file-sharing
services to see this exercise in futility.  Think about it -if someone
drives by Turkey Point Nuclear Plant in Florida, they know where it is
without having to visit a website, right? Again, only blind arrogance
assumes that removing information from a few websites will impact a
terrorist's plans.  As mentioned earlier, it's an ineffective and
high-tech approach to an effective and low-tech adversary. 

I've said repeatedly that terrorists are by definition low-tech brutes. 
They don't use Joint Directed Air Munitions (JDAM), Joint Stand Off
Weapons (JSOW), or Tomahawk cruise missiles reliant on Global
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates to locate their targets.  Being
low-tech means that such adversaries have much simpler methods of
determining the locations of their targets, and an easier time
conducting such attacks.  It's a good bet that the hijackers didn't need
the GPS coordinates of the World Trade Center towers in New York on
September 11th, and didn't step all over themselves coordinating radio
frequencies, codewords, go/abort signals, and network adapters.  They
Keep It Simple. 

Despite the government's clampdown on pipeline and power plant
information on its federally-owned websites, a few minutes at my local
library and online resulted in information that can be found here. 
You'll see several examples of information that could be considered
'helpful' to a terrorist in planning attacks.  Yet this information is
also quite useful for the law-abiding citizens, visitors, and businesses
of the United States.  Some of this information was removed from
government websites recently, but most of it is freely available in a
variety of formats to the public. 

Thus, the realist knows that the government's much-publicized
restriction of its various web sites does little to impact or prevent an
adversary from obtaining useful targeting information from a variety of
sources - both electronic and traditional - and is the government's
inside-the-box response to a non-issue.  As we see in the IT security
community, information is a dual-use item, and the mere fact that a
given set of facts (or knowledge) can be used for evil does
notnecessarily follow that it will be used for evil.  The
point-and-click convienience may be gone, but the information exists in
a multitude of other formats. 

Airport Security as The Screen Door on The Submarine (NERF Security @
Its Finest)

Since September 11th, we've seen airport and airline security measures
reviewed and increased...at least as far as the public is concerned. 
Seeing camouflaged and armed National Guardsmen patrolling our airports
presents the appearance of increased airport security.  Prohibiting
everything from nail clippers to tweezers, Swiss Army Knives, box
cutters, and sewing needles results in increased pre-board search times
at airports, and the public's perception that security is being
strengthened on our airplanes.  For a firsthand account of the current
airport security fallacies - including bags not being matched to
passengers and arriving at a destination before their owners - I
encourage you to read this missive from a respected intelligence
professional who's also a close friend.  While some security procedures,
such as reinforcing cockpit doors and developing 'auto-land'
capabilities for aircraft will truly increase aircraft safety, some of
the other measures - particularly at the airports - are just downright
goofy. 

Recently, an officer friend in the National Guard called and asked if I
noticed anything odd about his fellow Guardsmen posted at the airports I
frequent.  I said that nothing looked strange, but that I'd look again
when on travel later in the week.  Sure enough, a closer, casual
observation revealed that many of the Guardsmen at airports are either
unarmed or apparently instructed to hold their hands strategically over
their holsters (perhaps containing an unloaded or non-existent weapon)
to give the public impression they are indeed armed.  To the average
person, this presents the warm-and-fuzzy illusion of security, but
that's just about what it is - only an illusion. 

Let's not forget that a pen, house key, a piece of plastic, string,
shoelace, belt, credit cards, and any number of other innocuous everyday
items or trinkets can be made into a weapon, yet can be carried onboard
aircraft, even after the latest security changes.  More fundamentally,
anyone with two fists, feet, and teeth - regardless of any martial arts
training - can endanger passengers or flight crews.  Even something as
innocuous as an airplane fire extinguisher - a handheld device readily
available to all passengers in an emergency -could be misused as a blunt
trauma weapon onboard an aircraft.  Are we going to prevent anyone from
using such items under anything but 'approved' circumstances? Who
determines what those circumstances are?

It is important to realize that the items used as weapons to commandeer
four aircraft on September 11 were not prohibited by existing federal
airport security guidelines.  Anything that can be controlled by a
person - tools, pens, trinkets, guns, knives, and information - can be
turned into a weapon with the proper modification and intent. 
Incidentially, a six hundred page Danielle Steele hardback novel could
be used as a weapon.  And what about blunt force trauma caused by impact
from a metallic laptop or strangulation from a power cord or a Walkman's
headphones? As if airline food wasn't bad enough of a concern for us. 

Are we destined to live in a hardened world of safety scissors and
plastic sporks, boarding airplanes in hospital scrubs after being
strip-searched and separated from our carry-on bags? Will our flights
become extended periods of people sitting at a cramped 'attention' in
their airborne sardine cans, staring at the seatbacks in front of them,
prohibited from standing, eating, reading, listening to music, or using
anything sharper than a witty remark to their seatmates? If this becomes
reality - and were' on that course already - you can bet I'll start
driving home for the holidays. 

The reality is that these are feel-good, scrunchy, NERFy steps to
encourage the public to fly again by presenting the appearance of
increased security.  Yet, there have been numerous cases of pilots,
flight attendants, and passengers 'testing' these new security
requirements and successfully moving newly-prohibited objects past
security checkpoints since September 11.  That fact alone should
indicate the nature and state of these vaunted 'increased' security
measures, and question its true effectiveness. 

Terrorists Don't Keep Bankers' Hours (But Those Guarding Our Buildings
Do)

There are currently new provisions prohibiting semi-trailers from
driving on the two major DC roads that flank the Capitol grounds.  The
casual observer will interpret this as increased security to prevent
against future terrorist attacks. 

Realists, however, will note that the events of September 11th
demonstrate one of any number of ways to attack a facility that bypasses
street closings, and something that's been quietly discussed in security
circles for years.  While street closings may reduce the size of
vehicles that can pass through it, nothing precludes an explosives-laden
SUV or Volkswagen Bug from wreaking havoc in the area at an opportune
moment. 

More strikingly, working close to the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia,
the week after the attacks saw increased police vehicles and military
policeman checking credentials of those driving into garages of military
buildings here.  Three weeks after the attacks, there was no sign of
military police checking vehicles as they entered garages...it was as if
the threat to those buildings had magically disappeared.  However, after
the October 11th FBI advisory warning that additional attacks were
possible, military police were back checking vehicles and patrolling the
sidewalks in front of their buildings during the business day.  However,
driving by at 7:45 one evening, I did not see any police or guards
checking vehicles, and was able to drive into the same garage that was
protected by military policeman three hours earlier! I've also been in
DoD facilities that prohibit entry from any door but the front door
during work hours, where staff identification is checked - but after
5:00pm, since there are fewer security guards to check badges, monitor
cameras, and make rounds, authorized staff are free to use their access
cards and enter the building from any external door.  This is Feel-Good,
Look-Good security in action, plain and simple. 

Based on these observations, one assumes that those in charge of
homeland security believe that we're facing an adversary working on a
9-5 40-hour workweek schedule.  Something tells me that an
unconventional adversary doesn't keep bankers hours or regular
schedules. 

Contrary to Patriotic Rhetoric, America Is Reaping What It Sowed (We
just don't want to know or admit it)

Any discussion of Islam would take several pages alone, but suffice it
to say that those that understand Islam know it is a religion rooted in
charity and peace.  Those Americans that equate Islam to terrorism,
Hezzbola, bin-Laden, and al Qaeda are ignorant of the reality of Islam,
and wrongfully interpret these extremists as representatives of the
Islamic and Arab communities, as evidenced in the increased anti-Arab,
anti-Islamic criminal incidents in recent weeks.  Nothing could be
further from the truth -- Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance;
the nut-cases in al Qaeda do not speak for the world Islamic community,
just as a Christian blowing up an abortion clinic does not speak for all
Christians around the world.  In the same vein, American evangelists
Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson used religious overtones to explain and
justify the September 11 attacks, but these two men don't represent
mainstream Christianity as a whole.  As Americans, we have always prided
ourselves as a tolerant mixing pot of world cultures and ideologies, and
we should continue being tolerant of our fellow Islamic and Arab
citizens and neighbors.  Being Islamic or Arab does not indicate a
proclivity for terrorism.  Thus endeth my soapbox sermon. 

Truth be told, the Taliban have a reason to hate America - as is often
the case when America gets involved in foreign nations' conflicts, we
tend to pull out once our goals are reached, leaving those we supported
to fend for themselves.  When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in
February 1989, the Untied States also withdrew its support of the
anti-Soviet mujhadeen, since American interests in the country were
reached once the Soviet war machine and communism departed.  Post-Soviet
Afghanistan became one of deep poverty, civil war, estranged elections,
and famine....yet because the Soviets were gone, the United States had
little interest in helping rebuild the battered nation.  It is this type
of foreign policy that generates anti-American sentiment and support for
al Qaeda.  It may also be justifying our current humanitarian relief
mission in Afghanistan as a way for the United States to relieve its
guilt at 'abandoning' the Afghans in 1989.  If we do not learn from our
history, we're potentially doomed to not only repeat it, but become
endangered by it, as we are today. 

Club Osama, on the other hand, is filled with individuals possessing
limited education and exposure to (and perhaps are jealous of) the
international standards of conduct and society.  Nearly all of what they
know comes from cave-borne propaganda and religious brainwashing. 
Simply put, their goal is to return the Arab world to the strict
medieval Islamic culture of the 15th Century, using the world's oil
interests in Saudi Arabia and the presence of Israel as a cassus belli
for an Islamic holy war with the intentions of freeing Saudi Arabia's
religious lands from so-called "Western invaders" and restoring the
Palestinean State where Israel currently sits.  Club Osama's radical,
tyrannical view uses a very warped interpretation of the Koran to strive
toward an isolationist Islamic world where religion is the absolute law,
women serve as disposable walking wombs (incidentally, female US
soldiers in Saudi Arabia really angers Osama) and anything non-Islamic
is inherently evil and must be destroyed. 

The concept of a holy war (a jihad) in the Club Osama Brochure does not
refer to the quest by Muslim individuals to lead a wholesome life
according to their religion, but to use any means necessary to defend
the Islamic culture against the declared Evil De Jour.  Unfortunately,
the word 'jihad' has been in frequent use in the Western press over the
past decade or two, explained directly or subtlety, to mean an Islamic
'holy war.' (As a matter of fact, the term 'holy war' was coined in
Europe during the Crusades, referring to the many wars waged against
Muslims by European invaders in the Middle Ages.) Jihad is not a
declaration of war against other religions and certainly not against
Christians and Jews as some media and political circles want it to be
perceived.  Islam does not fight other religions.  Christians and Jews
are considered as fellow inheritors of The Abrahamic traditions by
Muslims (historically called "People of The Book") that worship the same
God. 

The Koran makes reference to war as a last resort, very much like the
Just War Ethic of the Catholic Church or international laws.  Reading
similar to the United Nations Charter, the Koran states that adveraries
should "..make peace between them (the two fighting groups), but if one
of the two persists in aggression against the other, fight the
aggressors until they revert to God's commandment." (49:9) Military
action is therefore a subgroup of the Jihad and not its totality, and
represents the ultimate scenario when diplomacy and communications break
down between international parties. 

We have to acknowledge that nearly all major religions - Islam,
Christianity, and Judiasim, among others - had their lapses in honestly
following the valued ideals of their religions or philosophies.  Over
the course of human history, religion has been responsible for more
man-made deaths than any man-made device.  This is no reflection on
religion, but it shows how desperately humanity is in need of better
education, more enduring concern for human dignity, rights and freedom,
tolerance, and vigilant pursuit of justice, even at the price of curbing
political, economic, ideological, and individual greed. 

Unfortunately, as we saw during the 1930s in the Great Depression and
post World War I Germany, people that are impoverished, with little
direction in life, and not much to live for tend to elect and follow
leaders promising radical change for their society.  This, coupled with
religious laws, customs, and occasional brainwashing, presents a
significant adversary with no reservations about dying (and ascending to
heaven) for conducting actions that their religious beliefs or national
loyalties - however warped - deem a just cause (Incidentally, Adolph
Hitler's campaign slogan in the 1930s was 'give me four years and you
won't recognize Germany.' A historical demonstration of the Law of
Unintended Consequences.)

What Osama's Real Problem Is (Rick's Patriotic Comedy)

Has anyone else noticed the Freudian picture presented whenever
America's adversaries (Osama, Omar, and al Qaeda representatives) appear
in the media? Has anyone seen these individuals without a Kalishnikov
rifle slung over their shoulder, hanging on the wall behind them, next
to them on a cushion, or being casually stroked in their lap while they
deliver their messages to the world? While the casual outsider would
probably interpret this as an attempt to convey fear in the image on
television - I suggest this demonstrates a high degree of personal
insecurity, possibly hinting at deeper personal issues, perhaps physical
limitations or the absence of a significant, meaningful adolescent
experience.  Maybe that's what this is really about, these warped men
trying to enhance their manhood in a part of the world that doesn't
carry Viagra.  After all, everyone has personal problems. 

Conclusions

The co-authors of "Terrorism Today and Tomorrow" noted that "the world
of today and tomorrow is one dominated by a conflict between those �who
have� and those �who have not�.  Those with a conflicting cultural or
religious ideology are likely to challenge our superiority according to
their rules, not our rules.  Their modus operandi blurs and will
continue to blur the distinctions between crime and war, criminal and
civil, combatant and non-combatant.  Their actions will seek to exploit
the seams of the modern state�s internal and external security
structures.  These emerging challengers will embrace unconventional
means not amenable to conventional responses. 

If we begin to live in constant fear, we allow the adversary to win. 
The United States is not the first industrial nation to experience
terrorism at home - Israel has lived with assorted Arab-sponsored
terrorism since it became a state in 1948, and the United Kingdom has
been victimized by Irish terrorism for longer than that.  We, too, will
survive this�.and we will, provided we keep things in perspective, do
our own research, and draw our own conclusions on what the real threats
and security measures are, instead of taking what is presented by the
government and media as undeniable gospel. 

The wisdom I hope you've gleaned from this article is that contrary to
what is presented on the media and enacted as law or new procedures,
little is really effective at preventing or adversely impacting future
terrorist activities.  This is a different kind of war - not only is it
a military one, but a psychological one for us at home.  We're not as
secure or as prepared as the government would lead us to believe, and
there is no clear defense against the impact of terrorism except to keep
an open mind and continue our normal lives the best we can. 

The President is waging a self-declared "war on terrorism" against a
"new enemy" that modern America is not prepared to face.  This article
has shown, however, that much of the defensive posturing in this new war
-- especially at home -- is conventional, traditional, and predictable -
and thus rather ineffective against an unconventional adversary and
philosophy.  We would be wise to recall the warning of Edward Luttwak in
his 1997 text Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace: "War, in common with
sport, has the characteristic that what worked well yesterday may not
work well tomorrow, precisely because it worked yesterday."

Welcome to tomorrow. 


- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Resources: 

A military intelligence professional's firsthand report on the state of
airport security 

A demonstration of what can be gleaned online despite the government's
removal of information from its websites. Anyone with the right resources,
time, and effort could use libraries, phone books, and traditional research
methods to obtain this type of targeting information.

"Terrorism Today and Tomorrow" - Currently unpublished article (draft copy)
co-authored by Col. G.I. Wilson, USMCR, Sgt. John P. Sullivan, Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, and Lt.Col. Hal Kempfer, USMCR.

Thomas Friedman's Op-Ed: "A Tweezer Defense Shield?" appearing in the 19
October 2001 New York Times Foreign Affairs Section. (We've all had a Eureka
moment in recent days when we realized the new world we're living in
post-Sept. 11. For me it came at National Airport the other day when, while
checking in for the Delta Shuttle to New York, my small overnight bag was
searched and the security agent found my tweezers. "I'm sorry," she said.
"You have to check this...")

(c) 2001 by Author. Permission is granted to quote, reprint or redistribute
provided the text is not altered, and appropriate credit is given. The
author has no grudge with the NERF Company.

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