[iwar] [fc:Power.Station.Incident.Should.Generate.Further.Security.Awarenes]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-22 22:01:58


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Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 22:01:58 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Power.Station.Incident.Should.Generate.Further.Security.Awarenes]
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[FC - an example of really poor/irresponsible reporting...]

Power Station Incident Should Generate Further Security Awareness 
By Richard Hunter, William Malik, 10/22/2001 No URL available.

Breaches such as the one that recently hit the California Independent
System Operator (ISO) are common and often result from a lack of
security awareness on the part of a well-intentioned IT security staff. 
Enterprises managing sensitive information or crucial services must take
extraordinary security measures.

Event

During a recent attack on the California ISO distribution center, a
hacker gained control of two Web servers connected directly to the
Internet without an active firewall - a situation that could have left
the door open for penetration of more-critical systems. 

[FC - how could a test system outside the firewall leave a door open to
attack the power grid?]

First Take 

Human error lies at the root of most unauthorized access incidents, and
the complexity of computer systems makes it more likely that human
errors will continue to occur.  Once they happen, a hacker will likely
sooner or later - probably sooner - discover and exploit an error if it
persists.  Fortunately, in the case of the attack on the power center,
the hacker's lack of experience probably limited the depth of the
breach. 
[FC - human error - as in design errors by Microsoft?  What a generic statement]

Very few business functions occur in our society without the control or
assistance of a computer. Any computer not secured on a network could be
breached - and any unauthorized intruder might be dangerous. If the
computer manages sensitive information critical to people's lives or
business, the intrusion threatens them as well.

Enterprises responsible for sensitive services - or that could cause
widespread harm if the information is misused, unavailable or distorted
- must take extraordinary measures to ensure that those services are not
visible on the Internet. Enterprises should put all systems behind a
secure firewall. A number of available tools can ensure that breaches do
not regularly occur. Enterprises must also scan regularly for intrusions
and malicious code and have a policy that requires regular verification
of the status of their systems, especially for something as important as
a power grid or other critical systems. At this point in the evolution
of IT security practices, allowing such important systems to remain
wide-open verges on irresponsibility. Enterprises that do not have a
security policy should develop one. Those that do have a policy should
verify that employees understand and comply with it.

[FC - again with the free advice from someone who doesn't know what he
is talking about...]

Enterprises should not treat security as an afterthought. It must become
part of the training and procedures implemented with any system from the
first. Gartner expects that negligence suits and regulatory penalties
aimed at sloppy security administrators and their companies will come
about in the United States as early as 2003.

[FC - How ridiculous.  The power industry has always has far more
stringent security than most industries - the notion that the ISO
security was an afterthought is ridiculous.  The afterthought was from
the government regulators who required thee systems to be connected to
the Internet to facilitate free trade.  As the vulnerabilities in the
telephone system are largely due to government regulations.]

Analytical Sources: Richard Hunter and William Malik, Information
Security Strategies

The content herein is often based on late-breaking events whose sources
are believed to be reliable. Gartner disclaims all warranties as to the
accuracy, completeness or adequacy of the information. Gartner shall
have no liability for errors, omissions or inadequacies in the
information contained herein or for interpretations thereof. The
conclusions, projections and recommendations represent Gartner's initial
analysis. As a result, our positions are subject to refinements or major
changes as Gartner analysts gather more information and perform further
analysis. Entire contents © 2001 Gartner, Inc. All rights reserved.
Reproduction of this publication in any form without prior written
permission is forbidden. 

GartnerGroup Corporate Headquarters, 56 Top Gallant Road, Stamford,
Connecticut 06904 USA +1-203-316-1111 Entire contents © 2001 Gartner,
Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this publication in any form
without prior written permission is forbidden. The information contained
herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable. Gartner
disclaims all warranties as to the accuracy, completeness or adequacy of
such information. Gartner shall have no liability for errors, omissions
or inadequacies in the information contained herein or for
interpretations thereof. The reader assumes sole responsibility for the
selection of these materials to achieve its intended results. The
opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notice.

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