[iwar] [fc:Superpower.Or.Not.-.The.U.S..Got.to.Prove.It]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-23 16:39:51


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Superpower.Or.Not.-.The.U.S..Got.to.Prove.It]
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Superpower Or Not - The U.S. Got to Prove It

Kazakhstan, October 23, 2001 [ 21:36 ]
By Alexandre Lebedev, GAZETA.KZ &lt;http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=7579 

ASTANA.  As the world came to know of the U.S.  terrorist attacks, both
Western and Russian political scientists launched discussions on the
tragedy's global and historical significance, stressing it's a new era
of geopolitics.  A fortnight after, the Central Asian people begin to
realize how true could those spontaneous evaluations come to be for
themselves. 

By choosing Osama bin Laden as their retaliation target, the U.S.  have
launched a process that hardly leaves a chance for the Central Asian
region to stay away from these developments and to go on with a nice and
quiet life of a geopolitical province (while having quite opposite
political ambitions, although this is hardly a crucial factor).  Now the
region's countries have to decide how to act under the circumstances,
certainly each nation to a certain degree.  Even a traditionally neutral
Turkmenistan had to step away from its principles and vouch its support
of the retaliation act, still with a few clauses.  Now the brain centers
in the region's capitals got to come out with a behavioral model that
would altogether allow to stick with the U.S.  and Russian interests,
not irritate the part of the Islamic world that might be dangerous to
irritate, plus to always mind the Chinese interests in the area.  This
would be quite a challenge for Taleyran, to say nothing of the region's
young diplomatic corps on the verge of their first anniversary - can
they cope?

The United States just has to prove to both the world, and especially to
their own citizens the mercilessness and the power of the retaliation. 
Otherwise all the tremendous efforts to form the image of America as
"the last and only superpower" would perish in vain.  Operation "Desert
Storm", bombing of Yugoslavia, American propaganda center (Hollywood,
rather) work with Bruce Willis...  Therefore, the Taliban shall indeed
have a hard time, as they were proclaimed as the terrorists' aides and
harborers.  Thus a U.S.  request for the Central Asian countries'
airspace use might not be the last one of the kind. 

However, apart from the vengeance motives, another aspect should be
viewed here - it would be perfect for the U.S.  to strengthen their
military presence in the area, which is another reason why the Americans
are keen on discussing the use of the Central Asian countries' airspace
and military bases.  Employing the later in Central Asia gives the U.S. 
a capacity to keep a pressure on quite a few significant influence and
power centers - on Islamic world, especially Iran (which is important in
view of the liberal reforms attempts there), China and Russia.  Even a
U.S.  friendly Pakistan is worth keeping an eye on, taking into account
its strong Islamic anti-American opposition.  It's likely the very idea
of deploying American bases (especially airbases) in Central Asia, or at
least of marking the U.S.  presence in the region has long preoccupied
the Pentagon strategists.  But one could not seriously ponder the
concept earlier, before the attacks, for all mentioned states and powers
would instantly call it an aggression and might even rally against it. 
Today there is a solid excuse to launch the strategy - the retaliation
to the international terrorists.  Now, how could one refuse to assist in
this noble act, apart from the apparent international rogues that have
nothing to lose in the eyes of the international community, and above
all the USA? As neither of the region's countries is similar to those,
the U.S.  is likely to get the reasonable assistance it's looking for. 
Neither Russia, nor China will have nothing to oppose to that - as
everyone is blaming international terrorism.  Naturally, the Russian
Foreign Minister said in Washington that "each country is to take its
own decision", and that Russia shall not get involved.  However not to
get involved does not mean to silently scrutinize - it wasn't by chance
that the Russian Security Council chief was on a blitz trip to the
region's capitals at the time.  What were the issues discussed? Come on,
not a problem of a communication officers school establishment, as was
formally announced - the chief did not have to meet the presidents to
discuss that. 

Anyway, there would hardly be another chance for the U.S.  to establish
its military presence in the area.  Still it's not necessary to rush and
deploy the bases, it's much more significant to create a political
pattern of the American military presence top-level discussion, and to
infuse a concept of its strengthening into the community.  From then on
the ball will get rolling: regular international conferences, security
problems seminars, and other PR actions.  Eventually the very idea of
the U.S.  military presence in the region would seem fantastic to no
one, it might even become a feasible issue.  Under such circumstances
the region's politicians and diplomats would have to be three times
mightier that Taleyran, to cope with keeping updated on various issues,
and to try not to spoil relationships with the powerful neighbors. 

At the same time this hypothetical concept might stay idle, should the
Americans choose a wrong action plan for Afghanistan.  Kazakhstan
political scientists have come up with the four possible scenarios:
missile strikes and the U.S.  political activities to force the taliban
to surrender bin Laden; the U.S.  army invasion of Afghanistan; a
special forces limited squad operation to capture the #1 terrorist; and
a purely political pressure on the taliban to extradite the Arab
millionaire.  Let us analyze these scenarios. 

Initially, we cross the second one out.  The armed forces invasion would
most likely cause victims among both Afghanis and the U.S.  personnel. 
This won't be accepted by the Americans, Vietnam taught them to enforce
the U.S.  military supremacy at a distance, causing a maximum number of
enemy casualties, while staying with not even minimal, but microscopic
losses of their own troops.  From the military-political standpoint,
this approach has already harmed the Americans in Somalia, in the early
90s, when after loosing less than 20 paratroopers the U.S.  contingent
had been urgently withdrawn, having not completed its peaceful
assignment.  This has not gone unnoticed internationally.  Russian
military analytics even then, when Russia was at its weakest, wrote that
the U.S.  army technical and technological supremacy could be minimized
in a military conflict by means of diversions resulting in heavy
casualties of the U.S.  personnel.  The top priority is to involve the
Americans into a lengthy war with heavy losses, the American society
would not stand such a conflict, said the Russians.  This would happen
in case the U.S.  troops invade Afghanistan, and the American military
strategists do realize that.  The third scenario, a special forces
limited squad operation to capture bin Laden could be ideal, if it had
at least a small chance of a success.  Since bin Laden arrived at
Afghanistan five years ago, he certainly kept this option in mind and
was preparing for it.  Even for a super professional special forces
unit, this assignment would be extremely complex to accomplish in a
totally hostile country, with a population very well prepared for war,
to say nothing of a complicated relief.  More than that, the American
special forces did not perform super professionally in neither Vietnam,
nor when attempting to salvage American hostages in Iran in the late
70s.  Then the "Eagle Talon" operation resulted in death of a number of
troopers, it is since used as an example of an ineffectively planned and
organized operation by the professionals. 

The fourth scenario - to put a political pressure on the Taliban to make
them surrender bin Laden - the Taliban have stated they would not go for
it by demanding a clear proof of the #1 terrorist's involvement in the
attacks.  As it is clear now that it's impossible for the Americans to
come up with the absolute proof (indeed, an ideologist and mastermind of
the attacks would hardly leave any trace, unless he wants to openly
state his intentions), the Taliban demand in fact means they reject the
U.S.  ultimatum.  By doing that the Taliban keep their face in the
Islamic world, as they practically refuse to surrender bin Laden, and at
the same time they denounce those who could blame them for completely
avoiding the dialogue. 

It is likely the Americans will stick with the first scenario - missile
strikes to force the Taliban to surrender America's main enemy.  It
looks as if this option will be used, as it alone has chances of a
success.  But only in theory.  What worked in Yugoslavia might not work
in Afghanistan, where the people are not spoiled by communal and
technical conveniences, and a few power stations and bridges destruction
would be insignificant on a country's scale.  As for the missile strikes
on living quarters - it would not be a surprise for the Afghanis,
however it will definitely be used by the anti-American forces in their
counter-U.S.  propaganda.  Then if the strikes go on for a while with no
evident result, which is quite possible (indeed, bin Laden and his
harborers would hardly come out in the open to face the strikes), than a
political situation would be rather complex for the U.S.  And this is
when the political advantages America might gain in Central Asia today
might quickly prove essential. 

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