Return-Path: <sentto-279987-3333-1003880370-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Tue, 23 Oct 2001 16:41:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 10351 invoked by uid 510); 23 Oct 2001 23:38:58 -0000 Received: from n3.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.53) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 23 Oct 2001 23:38:58 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-3333-1003880370-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.56] by n3.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 23 Oct 2001 23:39:30 -0000 X-Sender: fc@red.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 23 Oct 2001 23:39:30 -0000 Received: (qmail 67904 invoked from network); 23 Oct 2001 23:39:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 23 Oct 2001 23:39:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta2 with SMTP; 23 Oct 2001 23:39:29 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id f9NNdpU28166 for iwar@onelist.com; Tue, 23 Oct 2001 16:39:51 -0700 Message-Id: <200110232339.f9NNdpU28166@red.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 16:39:51 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] [fc:Superpower.Or.Not.-.The.U.S..Got.to.Prove.It] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Superpower Or Not - The U.S. Got to Prove It Kazakhstan, October 23, 2001 [ 21:36 ] By Alexandre Lebedev, GAZETA.KZ <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=7579 ASTANA. As the world came to know of the U.S. terrorist attacks, both Western and Russian political scientists launched discussions on the tragedy's global and historical significance, stressing it's a new era of geopolitics. A fortnight after, the Central Asian people begin to realize how true could those spontaneous evaluations come to be for themselves. By choosing Osama bin Laden as their retaliation target, the U.S. have launched a process that hardly leaves a chance for the Central Asian region to stay away from these developments and to go on with a nice and quiet life of a geopolitical province (while having quite opposite political ambitions, although this is hardly a crucial factor). Now the region's countries have to decide how to act under the circumstances, certainly each nation to a certain degree. Even a traditionally neutral Turkmenistan had to step away from its principles and vouch its support of the retaliation act, still with a few clauses. Now the brain centers in the region's capitals got to come out with a behavioral model that would altogether allow to stick with the U.S. and Russian interests, not irritate the part of the Islamic world that might be dangerous to irritate, plus to always mind the Chinese interests in the area. This would be quite a challenge for Taleyran, to say nothing of the region's young diplomatic corps on the verge of their first anniversary - can they cope? The United States just has to prove to both the world, and especially to their own citizens the mercilessness and the power of the retaliation. Otherwise all the tremendous efforts to form the image of America as "the last and only superpower" would perish in vain. Operation "Desert Storm", bombing of Yugoslavia, American propaganda center (Hollywood, rather) work with Bruce Willis... Therefore, the Taliban shall indeed have a hard time, as they were proclaimed as the terrorists' aides and harborers. Thus a U.S. request for the Central Asian countries' airspace use might not be the last one of the kind. However, apart from the vengeance motives, another aspect should be viewed here - it would be perfect for the U.S. to strengthen their military presence in the area, which is another reason why the Americans are keen on discussing the use of the Central Asian countries' airspace and military bases. Employing the later in Central Asia gives the U.S. a capacity to keep a pressure on quite a few significant influence and power centers - on Islamic world, especially Iran (which is important in view of the liberal reforms attempts there), China and Russia. Even a U.S. friendly Pakistan is worth keeping an eye on, taking into account its strong Islamic anti-American opposition. It's likely the very idea of deploying American bases (especially airbases) in Central Asia, or at least of marking the U.S. presence in the region has long preoccupied the Pentagon strategists. But one could not seriously ponder the concept earlier, before the attacks, for all mentioned states and powers would instantly call it an aggression and might even rally against it. Today there is a solid excuse to launch the strategy - the retaliation to the international terrorists. Now, how could one refuse to assist in this noble act, apart from the apparent international rogues that have nothing to lose in the eyes of the international community, and above all the USA? As neither of the region's countries is similar to those, the U.S. is likely to get the reasonable assistance it's looking for. Neither Russia, nor China will have nothing to oppose to that - as everyone is blaming international terrorism. Naturally, the Russian Foreign Minister said in Washington that "each country is to take its own decision", and that Russia shall not get involved. However not to get involved does not mean to silently scrutinize - it wasn't by chance that the Russian Security Council chief was on a blitz trip to the region's capitals at the time. What were the issues discussed? Come on, not a problem of a communication officers school establishment, as was formally announced - the chief did not have to meet the presidents to discuss that. Anyway, there would hardly be another chance for the U.S. to establish its military presence in the area. Still it's not necessary to rush and deploy the bases, it's much more significant to create a political pattern of the American military presence top-level discussion, and to infuse a concept of its strengthening into the community. From then on the ball will get rolling: regular international conferences, security problems seminars, and other PR actions. Eventually the very idea of the U.S. military presence in the region would seem fantastic to no one, it might even become a feasible issue. Under such circumstances the region's politicians and diplomats would have to be three times mightier that Taleyran, to cope with keeping updated on various issues, and to try not to spoil relationships with the powerful neighbors. At the same time this hypothetical concept might stay idle, should the Americans choose a wrong action plan for Afghanistan. Kazakhstan political scientists have come up with the four possible scenarios: missile strikes and the U.S. political activities to force the taliban to surrender bin Laden; the U.S. army invasion of Afghanistan; a special forces limited squad operation to capture the #1 terrorist; and a purely political pressure on the taliban to extradite the Arab millionaire. Let us analyze these scenarios. Initially, we cross the second one out. The armed forces invasion would most likely cause victims among both Afghanis and the U.S. personnel. This won't be accepted by the Americans, Vietnam taught them to enforce the U.S. military supremacy at a distance, causing a maximum number of enemy casualties, while staying with not even minimal, but microscopic losses of their own troops. From the military-political standpoint, this approach has already harmed the Americans in Somalia, in the early 90s, when after loosing less than 20 paratroopers the U.S. contingent had been urgently withdrawn, having not completed its peaceful assignment. This has not gone unnoticed internationally. Russian military analytics even then, when Russia was at its weakest, wrote that the U.S. army technical and technological supremacy could be minimized in a military conflict by means of diversions resulting in heavy casualties of the U.S. personnel. The top priority is to involve the Americans into a lengthy war with heavy losses, the American society would not stand such a conflict, said the Russians. This would happen in case the U.S. troops invade Afghanistan, and the American military strategists do realize that. The third scenario, a special forces limited squad operation to capture bin Laden could be ideal, if it had at least a small chance of a success. Since bin Laden arrived at Afghanistan five years ago, he certainly kept this option in mind and was preparing for it. Even for a super professional special forces unit, this assignment would be extremely complex to accomplish in a totally hostile country, with a population very well prepared for war, to say nothing of a complicated relief. More than that, the American special forces did not perform super professionally in neither Vietnam, nor when attempting to salvage American hostages in Iran in the late 70s. Then the "Eagle Talon" operation resulted in death of a number of troopers, it is since used as an example of an ineffectively planned and organized operation by the professionals. The fourth scenario - to put a political pressure on the Taliban to make them surrender bin Laden - the Taliban have stated they would not go for it by demanding a clear proof of the #1 terrorist's involvement in the attacks. As it is clear now that it's impossible for the Americans to come up with the absolute proof (indeed, an ideologist and mastermind of the attacks would hardly leave any trace, unless he wants to openly state his intentions), the Taliban demand in fact means they reject the U.S. ultimatum. By doing that the Taliban keep their face in the Islamic world, as they practically refuse to surrender bin Laden, and at the same time they denounce those who could blame them for completely avoiding the dialogue. It is likely the Americans will stick with the first scenario - missile strikes to force the Taliban to surrender America's main enemy. It looks as if this option will be used, as it alone has chances of a success. But only in theory. What worked in Yugoslavia might not work in Afghanistan, where the people are not spoiled by communal and technical conveniences, and a few power stations and bridges destruction would be insignificant on a country's scale. As for the missile strikes on living quarters - it would not be a surprise for the Afghanis, however it will definitely be used by the anti-American forces in their counter-U.S. propaganda. Then if the strikes go on for a while with no evident result, which is quite possible (indeed, bin Laden and his harborers would hardly come out in the open to face the strikes), than a political situation would be rather complex for the U.S. And this is when the political advantages America might gain in Central Asia today might quickly prove essential. ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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