[iwar] [fc:Why.air.power.may.be.more.humane.than.sanctions]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-25 09:36:46


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Why.air.power.may.be.more.humane.than.sanctions]
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A Matter of Precision 

(This article was originally published in the March/April 2001 issue of
Foreign Policy.)

Why air power may be more humane than sanctions

By Phillip S.  Meilinger

During the last century, air attacks on civilian noncombatants, whether
intentional or accidental, have produced some of war's most shocking
images.  Yet public revulsion over the toll that air war can take on
civilians belies an emerging truth: Not only have air strikes accounted
for a tiny proportion of civilian wartime deaths, but recent
technological advances in weaponry and intelligence have significantly
reduced casualties among both attackers and attacked.  Indeed, in
comparison with the devastating impact on civilians of coercive
mechanisms such as sanctions, modern air warfare stands out as an
increasingly efficient, effective, and humane tool of foreign policy. 


Although well over 100 million people died in wars during the 20th
century (the vast majority of whom were noncombatants), relatively few
were victims of bombing attacks.  According to one estimate, 62 million
perished from 1900 to 1970 as a result of genocide or war-induced
starvation; 24 million were killed by small arms; 17 million by
artillery and naval gunfire; and 2 million due to air attack. 

Over the last decade, the growing sophistication of air warfare has
dramatically diminished the likelihood of noncombatant deaths.  Consider
the results of NATO's air campaign over Kosovo: While Human Rights Watch
estimates that there were 90 instances during Operation Allied Force
when attacking NATO aircraft caused civilian casualties and collateral
damage, that number is low considering the number of strikes flown
(14,000) and munitions dropped (28,000).  In one case, aircrews were
given the wrong target-the Chinese embassy.  In another, a guidance
system failed and the bomb landed in a residential area.  On another
occasion, an aircraft attacked a bridge just as a passenger train
unexpectedly passed over it.  And in a tragic misidentification, NATO
pilots killed several dozen refugees in an attack on a column of
vehicles.  While any loss of civilian life is deplorable, the relatively
few noncombatants killed by bombing attacks-Human Rights Watch estimates
500-is nonetheless remarkable for such an intense air campaign. 

A number of revolutionary technologies have helped make this
self-imposed restraint possible.  Guided by cameras, lasers, or
satellites, today's air-launched precision guided munitions (PGMs) use
adjustable fins to home in on their targets.  Perfect accuracy is not
guaranteed-failure of the guidance system or aircraft equipment and
errors by aircrews mean that accidents still happen-but current PGMs
have an accuracy that is usually measured in feet.  The speed, reach,
and power of current information technology, in turn, enable rapid
targeting and deployment.  Over Kosovo, for example, a U-2 aircraft took
video images of a suspected target and sent them by satellite to the
United States.  These images were fused with three-dimensional terrain
data and satellite imagery to produce precise geographical coordinates,
which were then relayed to orbiting command-and-control aircraft that
directed airborne fighter-bombers to the target.  The entire process
took place in minutes. 

The almost total reliance of NATO on air power during the Kosovo
campaign drew widespread criticism.  Some observers argued that NATO's
refusal to commit ground troops and its decision to protect its pilots
by flying bombing sorties at altitudes above 15,000 feet undermined the
morality of the alliance's actions.  (Presumably, these critics would
have rested easier if more of the nearly 700 surface-to-air missiles and
tens of thousands of antiaircraft shells fired by Milosevic's forces had
found targets.) But in the vast majority of cases, the decision to fly
at a higher altitude did not endanger civilians by adversely affecting
bomb accuracy.  In fact, precision bombs are most accurate when dropped
from an altitude of 15,000 to 23,000 feet, a height that enables the
weapon to correct itself in-flight. 

While few civilized humans would argue against the drive to limit the
suffering of noncombatants, the call for greater discrimination,
accuracy, and restraint in air attacks rings false when set beside the
death and destruction caused by more traditional forms of coercion. 
Never mind the carnage of recent sieges, such as those of Sarajevo and
Grozny, or the potential toll on civilians had there been a ground war
in Kosovo.  Consider the recent impact of seemingly nonviolent weapons
such as sanctions and embargoes.  In Haiti, the sanctions imposed by the
Organization of American States (in 1991) and the United Nations (in
1993) not only failed to persuade coup leaders to surrender power but
caused considerable civilian deaths.  One 1993 study by the Harvard
Center for Population and Development Studies found that the sanctions
killed 1,000 children per month-a particularly disturbing number when
contrasted with the handful of deaths, military and civilian, resulting
from the armed intervention the United States was so reluctant to
launch. 

Some argue that this kind of suffering is the responsibility of rogue
regimes that refuse to give up.  But history demonstrates that those
under embargo generally accept casualties as the price necessary to
achieve their objectives.  A wealth of empirical data shows that
blockades, embargoes, sanctions, and sieges almost always have a
percolating effect: They start killing at the bottom levels of society
and work their way up.  It is not the dictators and their cronies who go
to bed without their supper.  Most recently, U.N.  studies of the impact
of sanctions against Iraq suggest that a half million infants died
between 1991 and 1998 as a result of the continuing U.N.  embargo.  When
this staggering number is juxtaposed with the total of 2,300 civilians
that Iraq claims were killed during the six-week air campaign in 1991, a
glaring disconnect emerges between public endorsement of "humane"
coercion and public demands for greater discrimination in air warfare. 

If a military operation had caused such enormous death and suffering, it
would have immediately and irrevocably lost the moral high ground. 
Instead, the U.S.  public standard for military action now seems to
resemble the ethic that prevailed on old TV Westerns: The good guy-the
one in the white hat-never killed the bad guy.  He shot the gun out of
his hand and arrested him.  Modern air power may not solve every
military problem, but thanks to the innovations of the last decade, it
is the weapon in the U.S.  arsenal that comes closest to fulfilling that
goal. 

Phillip S.  Meilinger is a former U.S.  military pilot and deputy
director of the AEROSPACENTER at Science Applications International
Corporation. 


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