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BG1182(05/26/98): Microbes and Mass Casualties: Defending America
Against Bioterrorism - HeritageThe below article came out in 1998, but I
thought it would provide some interesting reading.  Money, priorities,
paradigms, concerns of over reacting, and other over riding factors made
us vulnerable to the Sept 11 attacks and the Bio attacks that are
continuing today.  Beware that this article has political leanings.  I
wish the media would read this article and key in on this portion: "The
emergence of global, real-time media coverage increases the likelihood
that a major biological incident will induce panic.  A major biological
attack on U.S.  soil would unleash an avalanche of media attention. 
Grossly inaccurate or sensational media coverage of even a limited
bioterrorist incident, including a well-planned hoax, could induce
widespread panic and confusion.  In a world already awash with low-level
violence, bio-terrorists seeking to gain attention for their cause may
find this potential for pandemonium particularly appealing.  "

You can find the unhighlighted version of this article on <a
href="http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1182.html">http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1182.html>

Key Issue: National Security 
Microbes and Mass Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism
by James H. Anderson, Ph.D. 1 
Link to: | Executive Summary | PDF (317k)| No. 1182 May 26, 1998 

Produced by
The Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis
International Studies Center
Published by
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20002-4999
(202) 546-4400
<a href="http://www.heritage.org">http://www.heritage.org> 

Throughout human history, the threat of mass contagion has evoked primal fear. Natural 
pestilence periodically has ravaged cities, states, and even entire civilizations. 
Rapid advances in genetic engineering in the past few decades have increased the 
likelihood that disease-causing microbes could overwhelm the U.S. public health system 
and wreak horrific destruction. Today, the United States faces the nightmarish possibility 
that terrorist groups would seek to cause mass casualties by unleashing biological 
agents on U.S. soil.
Biological agents, on an equal-weight basis, are the most lethal substances known 
to mankind. According to a 1997 U.S. Department of Defense report on proliferation, 
the "most lethal biological toxins are hundreds to thousands of times more lethal 
per unit than the most lethal chemical warfare agents." 2 They can be targeted against 
people, animals, or crops using a variety of means of delivery, from aerial bombs 
and spray tanks to ballistic missile warheads. 3 
Until recently, the intelligence community generally has downplayed the capability 
of terrorists to effect mass casualties using biological agents, noting that the 
impact of an attack is difficult to predict, considering the sensitivity of microorganisms 
to meteorological conditions. Most analysts agreed with the view that terrorists 
only "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." 4 But the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, the 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo`s subway system, and the 1996 
Oklahoma City bombing shattered that conventional wisdom. These attacks indicate 
an important threshold has been breached; clearly, some terrorist groups want a lot 
of people watching and a lot of civilians dead.
Belatedly, senior defense and law enforcement officials are recognizing the growing 
danger of bioterrorism. Gordon Oehler, then director of the Nonproliferation Center 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), testified before Congress in March 1996 
that
Extremist groups worldwide are increasingly learning how to manufacture chemical 
and biological agents, and the potential for additional chemical and biological attacks 
by such groups continues to grow. 5 
In January 1998, Defense Intelligence Agency chief Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes 
testified that chemical and biological weapons have a "high probability of being 
used over the next two decades." 6 
Despite this awareness, the United States still is ill-prepared to manage the consequences 
of a major bioterrorist strike. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre admitted last 
December, "We are not currently equipped to handle a widespread terrorist attack 
that would involve biological weapons." 7 A March 1998 bioterrorist exercise involving 
government officials from more than a dozen federal agencies considered the impact 
of a deadly virus along the U.S.-Mexico border. This simulation predicted such an 
attack would cause thousands of deaths and widespread panic. The exercise also revealed 
the inability of local and state officials to cope with a major bioterrorist strike 
and highlighted a disturbing lack of interagency coordination among federal officials. 
8 
The conventional military prowess of the United States is not sufficient to offset 
the danger posed by bioterrorism. Secretary of Defense William Cohen noted in March 
1998,
Our American military superiority presents a paradox...because our potential adversaries 
know they can't win in a conventional challenge to the U.S. forces, they're more 
likely to try unconventional or asymmetrical methods, such as biological or chemical 
weapons. 9 
Clearly, the Clinton Administration and Congress must develop and articulate a comprehensive 
strategy to defend against bioterrorism that is based on an accurate assessment of 
threat, the prudent allocation of resources, and a determined respect for the rule 
of law. If properly implemented and sustained, such an approach would help deter 
terrorists and the sponsors of state terrorism who otherwise might consider biological 
attacks on U.S. citizens.
THE INCREASING THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM
Biological agents, which include disease-causing microorganisms called pathogens 
and poisonous chemicals produced by microorganisms called toxins, 10 are pound for 
pound the most lethal substances known to mankind. They can be targeted and delivered 
against innocent people, as well as their food or water supply. And the means of 
delivery ranges from sprays and bombs to ballistic missiles. 11 The young, the elderly, 
and the infirm are especially vulnerable to bioterrorism's insidious reach because 
of their weakened immune systems.

Anthrax in particular is considered an attractive agent for terrorists who seek 
to cause mass casualties. The anthrax bacillus, though not contagious, forms a durable, 
long-lasting spore that will kill its host unless antibiotics are administered immediately. 
According to official reports, the accidental release in 1979 of a small amount of 
anthrax at a Soviet biological warfare plant near Ekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk) 
killed 68 people, although some experts believe the casualty total was higher. 12 
The threat anthrax poses is staggering. A 1993 Office of Technology Assessment study 
estimates that, under ideal conditions, a single airplane delivering 100 kilograms 
(220 pounds) of anthrax spores over the District of Columbia could cause between 
1 million and 3 million fatalities. 13 
Bioterrorism on U.S. soil is not a hypothetical threat. In fact, in 1984 the Rajneeshee 
religious cult spread salmonella typhimurium in ten restaurants in Wasco County, 
Oregon. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 
food poisoning affected 751 people. The group also tried to infect the town's water 
supply. 14 The attack was part of a larger scheme to win control over a local land 
dispute. Although the Rajneeshees' attack attracted considerable media attention, 
it is only one of many bioterrorist incidents on record. As Table 2 illustrates, 
terrorist groups have used or planned to use biological agents in diverse circumstances, 
both domestically and internationally.

Recent revelations about Iraqi and Russian biological weapons programs, coupled 
with evidence of a Japanese cult's use of biological agents, have heightened concerns 
about bioterrorism. Specifically: 
Iraq has admitted developing a biological weapons program. Before the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War, Baghdad flight-tested a remote-controlled fighter designed to disperse 
biological weapons. 15 Iraq admitted to stockpiling a variety of biological agents, 
including anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, ricin, and gas gangrene. 16 Iraq also 
claims to have destroyed ballistic missile warheads and aerial bombs filled with 
botulinum toxin, anthrax, and aflatoxin. 17 An April 1998 assessment by a team of 
independent experts, however, deemed Iraq's reporting of its biological weapons program 
to be "incomplete and inaccurate." 18 Recent evidence also indicates Iraq dispatched 
scientists to assist Libya in developing its germ warfare program. 19 
Russia has demonstrated a continuing interest in biological weapons. Despite ratifying 
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Soviets funded a massive biological 
weapons program known as Biopreparat. At its zenith, Biopreparat reportedly employed 
25,000 people at 18 major facilities. 20 According to Ken Alibek, former first deputy 
chief of research and production for the Soviet biological weapons program, "Russian 
scientists have created genetically altered antibiotic-resistant strains of plague, 
anthrax, tularemia and glanders." 21 Some experts believe this altered form of anthrax 
could defeat the vaccine U.S. military personnel are scheduled to receive. 22 Heightening 
U.S. suspicions, the Russians steadfastly refuse to open their military biological 
facilities to inspection.
Aum Shinrikyo ("Supreme Truth") demonstrated a keen interest in bioterrorism. Shinrikyo's 
1995 chemical attack on the Tokyo subway, which killed 12 and injured 5,000, attracted 
intense media attention. Less well-publicized was the group's keen interest in bioterrorism. 
23 Shinrikyo had purchased a 48,000-acre range in Australia to test biological agents 
on livestock; it sent members to Africa to obtain samples of the lethal Ebola virus; 
and it built two major biological research centers, one in Tokyo and the other at 
the base of Mount Fuji. The group attempted at least four separate bioterrorist strikes 
before its Tokyo nerve gas attack in 1995. 24 In two of the cases, it tried (unsuccessfully) 
to disseminate biological agents in Tokyo using modified automobiles. It also had 
planned to attack New York and Washington, D.C. 25 
Nuclear, chemical, and biological agents frequently are lumped together under the 
rubric of "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD). This label often masks important differences 
among the three types of weapons. The distinguishing characteristics of biological 
agents merit special scrutiny, considering the evolving nature of terrorism, demographic 
trends, and the inherent vulnerabilities of open societies. Specific factors related 
to biological weapons increase the potential for bio-terrorism. For example: 
Biological weapons have an unmatched destructive potential. Pound for pound, biological 
agents are the world's most lethal substances. As Richard Betts, director of national 
security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, 
Nuclear arms have great killing capacity but are hard to get; chemical weapons are 
easy to get but lack such killing capacity; biological agents have both qualities. 
26 
The lethality of biological agents makes it unnecessary for terrorists to maintain 
large stockpiles. Some biological agents are self-replicating, which sets them apart 
from chemical and nuclear weapons. Increasingly sophisticated genetic engineering 
techniques also raise the haunting possibility of terrorists exploiting antibiotic 
and vaccine-resistant bacteria, as well as biological agents altered to facilitate 
aerosol dissemination. 27 
Technology for dispersing biological agents is becoming more sophisticated. Analysts 
often have downplayed the potential for bioterrorist strikes to inflict mass casualties, 
considering the difficulties associated with disseminating biological agents. Although 
aerosol dissemination presents technical challenges, they are not insuperable. In 
fact, the U.S. Army's Chemical Corps tested this technique more than 30 years ago. 
According to W. Seth Carus, a proliferation expert at the National Defense University, 

These tests demonstrated--to the extent possible with the technology then available--that 
biological agents could be disseminated as an aerosol cloud and infect a large area 
with potentially lethal infective doses. 28 
According to the Department of Defense's 1997 report on proliferation, in 1990 Iraq 
attempted to modify spray tanks capable of delivering 2,000 liters of anthrax via 
remotely piloted aircraft. 29 In Japan, the Shinrikyo cult bought a Russian helicopter 
and two remotely piloted vehicles capable of disseminating biological agents. 30 
Spurred by market pressures, technology for dispersing biological agents, such as 
that used by farmers to spray insecticide, is certain to improve. It would be a serious 
mistake to think terrorist groups would not seek to exploit such enhancements.
The lag time between infection and the appearance of symptoms generally is longer 
for biological agents than with chemical exposures. The incubation period will vary, 
depending on the biological agent. For the plague, the incubation period is two to 
three days; for anthrax, one to five days. Terrorists seeking to cover their tracks 
will find this lag time appealing; so might states seeking plausible denial or attempting 
so-called false flag operations, in which one power wrongly implicates another. Clearly, 
the gap between infection and the appearance of symptoms will complicate efforts 
to pursue bioterrorists. Law enforcement officials, in fact, took more than a year 
to ascertain that the 1984 salmonella outbreak in Oregon resulted from intentional 
contamination. 31 
Lethal biological agents can be produced easily and cheaply. The construction of 
even a crude, low-yield nuclear weapon requires considerable time, money, and expertise. 
The likelihood that even a well-financed terrorist could marshal the requisite expertise 
and resources to build such a weapon appears small. Moreover, lethal chemical agents 
are generally both more difficult and expensive to manufacture than biological agents. 
Many biological agents suitable for terrorist strikes can be cultivated easily. For 
example, the Patriot's Council, the Minnesota-based militia group that schemed in 
1992 to assassinate a deputy U.S. marshal and a sheriff, reportedly manufactured 
enough ricin toxin from a book recipe to kill 125 people. Detailed techniques for 
extracting ricin from castor beans are available in numerous publications. The cost 
of procuring lethal biological agents is also relatively low. Kathleen Bailey, a 
former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, estimated 
a significant biological arsenal could be cultivated in a 15-foot square room with 
$10,000 worth of equipment. 32 
Several states maintain offensive biological weapons programs. As many as ten countries 
possess offensive biological weapons programs, including the People's Republic of 
China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria (see Table 3). 33 The existence 
of these programs greatly increases the danger of bioterrorism. States seeking to 
sponsor bio-terrorist acts always have the option of sharing their expertise with 
extremist groups. For their part, terrorists groups interested in bio-terrorism may 
attempt to lure disgruntled scientists to support their causes. 

Biological agents are easier to produce clandestinely than are either chemical or 
nuclear weapons. Biological research can be used for peaceful or malevolent purposes. 
The equipment required for the production of biological agents for either purpose 
is generally the same, which raises the so-called dual-use problem. As former director 
of central intelligence John Deutch emphasized,
[A]ny modern pharmaceutical facility can produce biological warfare agents as easily 
as vaccines or antibiotics. 34 
The dual-use problem also makes it easy for countries to conceal their biological 
weapons programs. For example, recent reports suggest U.S. intelligence "underestimated 
the amount of botulinum Iraq made by at least a thousand-fold and the amount of anthrax 
Iraq had made by at least a factor of eight." 35 Even small terrorist groups could 
develop lethal biological agents, or genetically altered agents, clandestinely. As 
Richard Preston, a noted authority on bioterrorism, observes,
Genetic-engineering work can be done in a small building by a few Ph.D. researchers, 
using tabletop machines that are available anywhere in the world at no great cost. 
36 
Global transportation links facilitate the potential for biological terrorist strikes 
to inflict mass casualties. In 1918 and 1919, a globe-girdling strain of influenza 
killed 22 million people, including 500,000 Americans. The advent of rapid transportation 
links has made the world even more vulnerable to the rapid spread of contagious diseases. 
Thanks to the reach and rapidity of modern jet travel, a person carrying the Ebola 
virus, for example, could infect hundreds or thousands of people across several continents 
in a matter of hours. To be sure, the contagion potential of biological agents would 
not appeal to terrorists intent on narrowly focused attacks. But for a nihilistic 
or apocalyptic group aiming to cause mass casualties, this potential would be very 
attractive.
Urbanization provides terrorists with a wide array of lucrative targets. In densely 
populated areas, even a partially successful biological attack would have a devastating 
impact. The potential to generate mass panic is greatest in city environments. Third 
World cities are particularly vulnerable to bioterrorism, considering their high 
population densities, inadequate sewage systems, and dearth of modern medical facilities. 
This vulnerability has important implications for the U.S. military, which must plan 
for a variety of contingency missions in Third World cities.
The diaspora of Russian scientists has increased the danger that rogue states or 
terrorist groups will accrue the biological expertise needed to mount catastrophic 
terrorist attacks. The dissolution of the Soviet Union focused considerable attention 
on the dissemination of nuclear weapons expertise; this led Congress to pass the 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act in 1991. Even though it has received 
comparably less attention, the dispersion of biological weapons know-how also presents 
grave risks. Commenting on his former colleagues, the former first deputy chief of 
research and production for the Soviet biological weapons program, Ken Alibek, stated,
They are everywhere today. Most are in Russia. But some are overseas, abroad. And 
we have lost control of them. 37 
According to media reports, some of these scientists work in North Korea, while 
others assist Iranian and Pakistani WMD programs via modem. 38 
The emergence of global, real-time media coverage increases the likelihood that 
a major biological incident will induce panic. A major biological attack on U.S. 
soil would unleash an avalanche of media attention. Grossly inaccurate or sensational 
media coverage of even a limited bioterrorist incident, including a well-planned 
hoax, could induce widespread panic and confusion. In a world already awash with 
low-level violence, bio-terrorists seeking to gain attention for their cause may 
find this potential for pandemonium particularly appealing. 
The convergence of these trends portends that the threat of bioterrorism is increasing 
significantly. The development of sophisticated law enforcement techniques, which 
include electronic surveillance, may offset some of the risk within the United States. 
But the use of such techniques is necessarily bound by constitutional safeguards 
to preserve civil liberties and personal freedoms. An increasing number of law enforcement 
officials have become fatalistic about the potential for a terrorist attack involving 
WMD within the United States. Commenting on this nightmarish potential, Robert Blitzer, 
director of the terrorism section of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, asserted 
last November that
The consensus of people in the law enforcement and intelligence communities is that 
it's not a matter of if it's going to happen, it's when. 39 
THE STATE OF U.S. PREPAREDNESS AGAINST BIOTERRORISM
Part of the reason the U.S. intelligence community has been slow to recognize the 
growing potential for bioterrorism on U.S. soil is because it tends to assume that 
potential adversaries may constrain their actions by the moral norms that ordinarily 
bind civilized states. Although civilized states consider the offensive use of biological 
weapons morally abhorrent, this does not mean that all potential U.S. adversaries 
do. Indeed, the fact that Americans find the mere thought of bioterrorism revolting 
may make such attacks especially appealing. The growth of groups espousing apocalyptic 
creeds increases the probability that WMD will be used against Americans at home 
and abroad. 40 
In July 1995, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 
39 on terrorism; parts of it have been declassified. The document asserts that
the United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities 
to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or 
chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists. 41 
This long-overdue document helped reaffirm and clarify the general lines of responsibility 
for responding to a terrorist incident involving WMD.
The U.S. Department of Justice, as delegated to the FBI, has the lead for crisis 
management of domestic terrorist incidents in the United States. It also manages 
the Domestic Emergency Support Team, an interagency group activated in 1995 to provide 
expert advice to domestic agencies during crisis incidents involving WMD. The U.S. 
Department of State has the lead role in managing terrorist incidents abroad as well 
as the Foreign Emergency Support Team.
Under the rubric of "consequence management," PDD 39 also outlines the responsibilities 
of the federal government for responding to the aftermath of a terrorist attack involving 
WMD. These include
measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, 
and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected 
by the consequences of terrorism. 42 
Should an attack occur on U.S. soil, the onus of consequence management would fall 
on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA is responsible for ensuring 
that the
Federal Response Plan is adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorism directed 
against large populations in the United States, including terrorism involving weapons 
of mass destruction. 43 
The Federal Response Plan is a generic template designed to coordinate the delivery 
of federal assistance--personnel, technical expertise, and equipment--in the event 
of natural disaster or federal emergency. 44 
Although the general lines of responsibility appear reasonably clear, the Clinton 
Administration's plan to cope with the threat of bioterrorism still suffers from 
several weaknesses. The reactive nature of the Administration's approach has helped 
spawn an "alphabet soup" of counter-terrorism programs (see partial listing in Table 
4). The sheer number of actors involved has created immense coordination problems 
in the unwieldy counterterrorism architecture, which includes more than 40 different 
federal agencies, bureaus, and offices, according to September 1997 study by the 
U.S. General Accounting Office. 45 In theory, the U.S. National Security Council 
is supposed to coordinate disparate elements of the counterterrorism effort by managing 
various working groups. The reality is very different. A government bioterrorist 
simulation conducted in March 1998 revealed serious interagency coordination problems. 
46 According to former CIA director James Woolsey, who recently served as the co-chair 
of a classified study on terrorism and WMD, "The system is not well organized at 
all." 47 

The Clinton Administration's plan for reducing the danger of bioterrorism also suffers 
from a misplaced faith in arms control. The Administration has backed an ill-conceived 
attempt to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) with a legally 
binding protocol. The parties to the original agreement, which entered into force 
in 1975, agreed "never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise 
acquire or retain" biological weapons. 48 Fifteen years after the BWC was signed, 
Congress passed domestic implementing legislation, the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 1989. This law made the prohibitions of the BWC binding on U.S. citizens. 
49 Unfortunately, the BWC still lacks a verification regime or enforcement mechanism. 
  In fact, this agreement suffers many of the same flaws as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, which Congress ratified in 1997. 50 In varying degrees, such countries 
as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Russia have maintained active biological offensive 
weapons programs despite being full parties to the BWC accord. In fact, the Soviet 
Union set up its massive Biopreparat biological weapons program one year after signing 
the BWC.
The protocol being promoted by the Clinton Administration would not remedy the substantive 
weaknesses of the BWC; it also would fail to reduce the threat of bioterrorism. The 
protocol, which would require a burdensome and expensive inspection regime, raises 
serious constitutional and national security questions about opening U.S. facilities 
to foreign inspectors. More fundamentally, it would not address the fungible nature 
of biological research that makes potential weapons programs inherently unverifiable. 
The Iraq case has demonstrated how difficult it is to unmask a country's biological 
weapons capability. An April 1998 assessment by a team of independent experts deemed 
Iraqi's reporting of its biological weapons program "incomplete and inaccurate." 
51 Iraq's apparent ability to conceal elements of its biological weapons capability, 
even after Operation Desert Storm and years of intrusive inspections sanctioned by 
the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, suggest the futility of the BWC protocol 
backed by the Administration.
The Clinton Administration also has failed to develop a public education program 
to explain the dangers posed by bioterrorism and government efforts to reduce this 
peril. This shortcoming is alarming, especially because the specter of bio-terrorism 
has attracted considerable attention. It has become a frequent topic of newspaper 
stories and magazine articles, many of which express serious doubts about the government's 
ability to deter bioterrorist attacks, let alone manage the horrific consequences. 
The absence of a modulated public education campaign increases the likelihood of 
mass panic in the aftermath of such a strike.
The Department of Defense's Role
in Domestic Preparedness
The Pentagon's interest in the threat of biological warfare and bioterrorism has 
received sporadic attention. Part of the reason for the intermittent attention is 
psychological. "The biological warfare threat can appear so formidable and frightening 
that it can engender a posture of inaction," as noted by an October 1997 Defense 
Science Board study. 52 The military's planning has improved somewhat since the post-Gulf 
war discovery of Iraq's extensive biological weapons program. Secretary of Defense 
Cohen has pledged to increase funding for battlefield protection against chemical 
and biological weapons. Recently, the Department of Defense decided to inoculate 
its entire active and reserve force against anthrax.
The military's ability to assist state and local officials in coping with bioterrorism 
on U.S. soil has lagged. As Colonel David Franz, deputy commander of the U.S. Army 
Medical Research and Materiel Command, testified recently before Congress,
We have, generally, fewer tools and less information to protect citizens from terrorism 
than we have had to protect a defined military force from the classical biological 
warfare agents. 53 
To help remedy these shortcomings, Congress passed the 1996 Defense Against Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Act sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA), Richard Lugar (R-IN), 
and Pete Domenici (R-NM). This act directed the Department of Defense, in conjunction 
with other federal agencies, to manage a training and equipment program in 120 cities 
over a five-year period. 54 The law was designed to nurture, at the local level, 
the expertise to cope with the consequences of major terrorist strikes involving 
WMD. As of April 1998, the program had reached roughly 25 percent of the designated 
cities. The program has experienced "growing pains," particularly with respect to 
allocation and funding of equipment. 55 
In addition to managing the cities' training program, the Department of Defense 
relies on several highly trained units to respond to terrorist incidents involving 
WMD. These units include, for example, the U.S. Army's Technical Escort Unit and 
the Marine Corps' Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force. 56 Both are designed 
to provide specialized support in the event of a biological or chemical incident.
In March 1998, the Department of Defense announced plans to give the National Guard 
a greater domestic role in responding to terrorist strikes involving WMD. The Pentagon's 
fiscal year 1999 budget request includes money to field ten 22-member Rapid Assessment 
and Initial Detection (RAID) teams to respond to chemical or biological attacks. 
Secretary Cohen asserted,
This new initiative will be the cornerstone of our strategy for preparing America's 
defense against the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. 57 
Although the creation of RAID teams is important, they should not be considered 
the "cornerstone" of U.S. policy. Instead, the cornerstone should be the training 
and equipping of the "first responders," the local police and fire officials who 
will arrive at the scene hours, perhaps even days, before federal or state assets 
can be deployed in force. The first few hours are critical in responding to chemical 
and biological attacks; the time represents a narrow window in which local officials 
can manage the casualties from the attack and reduce the risk of mass panic.
The Role of the Centers for Disease Control
In addition to the Department of Defense, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
has a vital role in the consequence management of biological attacks. Unfortunately, 
the U.S. public health system lacks the resources to handle such a contingency. Indeed, 
the system has problems even with the resurgence of infectious diseases, such as 
tuberculosis. A recent White House-backed interagency working group on infectious 
diseases finds that at least "29 previously unknown diseases have appeared since 
1973 and 20 well-known ones have reemerged, often in new drug-resistant or deadlier 
forms." 58 
These findings raise serious questions about the ability of the U.S. public health 
system to cope with major biological terrorist attacks. Dr. Donald Henderson, dean 
emeritus of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, argues that the
United States is ill-prepared to confront a terrorist attack using biological weapons, 
and health officials need more money to prepare against such attacks. 59 
In 1972, for example, the United States ceased giving routine smallpox vaccinations. 
Dr. Henderson, who led the global effort to eradicate smallpox, believes the United 
States should increase its store of smallpox vaccine by 20 million doses. 60 
Other public health system issues germane to bioterrorism require urgent attention 
beyond the vaccine deficiencies. As late as 1995, U.S. laws and regulations provided 
few barriers to prevent an individual from legally procuring biological agents. The 
1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act made it a crime to threaten the 
use of biological weapons and established tighter regulations concerning the transfer 
of biological agents. As Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) emphasized in recent hearings before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, although the CDC published the regulations required 
by the act, it "failed to provide the funds needed to implement and enforce safeguards 
designed to prevent the diversion of lethal agents into the hands of terrorists." 
Senator Kyl added,
For all practical purposes, we today appear to be in the same position as we were 
in 1995 with regard to the lack of controls over transfers of dangerous biological 
agents within the United States. 61 
The overall structure of the public health system is incapable of managing the consequences 
of a major bioterrorist strike. Frank Young, former director of the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness in the Public Health Service of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, argues that the U.S.
emergency system overall is geared to respond to small numbers of people injured 
primarily due to trauma, including transportation accidents, medical emergencies 
such as heart attacks, and localized cases of violence. The responses to these types 
of emergencies are not as relevant to injury caused by chemical and biological attack." 
62 
Thus far, the Clinton Administration has failed to address these structural shortcomings.
REDUCING AMERICA'S VULNERABILITY TO BIOTERRORISM
Senior Clinton Administration officials now concede an increased likelihood of a 
terrorist strike involving WMD occurring on U.S. soil. Yet it has not formulated 
a realistic response to this potentially catastrophic danger. Addressing the threat 
posed by WMD in general, and bioterrorism in particular, requires two guiding principles.
First, congressional oversight is necessary to ensure an effective counterstrategy 
based upon defense-in-depth. Federal agencies would require, at the very least, several 
hours to respond to an incident involving biological weapons. As result, the initial 
onus of managing the consequences of a major attack would fall on the first responders. 
Depending on the severity of the incident, state and federal expertise and resources 
could be applied, as appropriate. A defense-in-depth approach to domestic preparedness 
would help prevent the development of a "Maginot Line" mentality. 63 
The vulnerability of the United States to biological attack is linked with a broader 
strategic vulnerability. As a matter of national policy, the Clinton Administration 
has decided to keep the United States defenseless against ballistic missile attack. 
Yet long-range missiles can carry nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to U.S. 
territory. In fact, former Soviet scientists have revealed that Moscow had a program 
to put biological weapons on missiles. 64 In preparing the U.S. defense to cope with 
the consequences of bioterrorism on U.S. soil, Congress should not lose sight of 
the threat posed by long-range missiles.
Second, congressional oversight is necessary to ensure close coordination among 
federal, state, and local officials. No single agency would be capable of countering 
the threat of bioterrorism; public health, law enforcement, and intelligence and 
military agencies would have important roles to play. For this reason, Congress should 
review the panoply of counterterrorism programs constantly to ensure they do not 
work at cross-purposes with one another. Congressional oversight is necessary to 
meld disparate parts of the strategy together, minimize bureaucratic turf battles, 
prevent duplication of effort, and identify potential security gaps. Specifically, 

To clarify responsibilities for counter-terrorism efforts and strengthen response 
capabilities, Congress should: 
Pressure the Clinton Administration to streamline the lines of responsibility for 
preempting, deterring, and responding to bioterrorism. The threat of bioterrorism 
has national security, law enforcement, and public health implications. The absence 
of top-down leadership has created overlaps and gaps in the overall counterterrorism 
architecture. For example, the FBI wants to build a multimillion-dollar biolab, even 
though the U.S. Army and CDC already have more than a dozen such facilities. 65 Congressional 
oversight can help reduce potential waste and duplication.
Increase emphasis on training and equipping "first responders" according to the 
specific needs of individual locales. No matter how well-trained or quickly mobilized 
they are, federal response teams never will match the responsiveness of local officials. 
Congressional efforts to train and equip first responders therefore must remain a 
top priority. This assistance must be tailored specifically to address local circumstances. 
Clearly, the requirements for New York City are not the same as for Wichita, Kansas. 
A "cookie-cutter" approach will not serve the interests of local or federal officials. 
And jurisdictional issues will prevent the federal government from mandating cooperation. 
Federal and state officials will be successful to the extent they sustain working 
partnerships with local officials. In this vein, Congress needs to develop a follow-on 
program to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program to train and equip officials in 120 cities.
To pressure Russia to curb its biological weapons program, Congress should: 
Insist that Russia open all its biological facilities to international inspectors. 
In 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev officially "canceled" the Soviet Union's biological 
weapons program. In 1992, however, President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged Russia still 
was conducting biological warfare research. The United States should insist firmly 
on greater transparency, as called for by the September 1992 Joint Statement on Biological 
Weapons issued by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. Specifically, the 
United States should insist that Russia open to inspection its military biological 
facilities at Kirov, Sergeev Posad, Strizhi, and Ekaterinburg.
Require the federal intelligence community to publicize lists of former Soviet biological 
warfare specialists who share their expertise with rogue states. This requirement 
would make it easier to track and monitor scientists willing to sell their deadly 
know-how to terrorist organizations. Drawing attention to these individuals could 
help dissuade others from following in their tracks; it also would focus international 
scrutiny on states that maintain biological weapons programs.
Review and scrutinize funding for projects at the International Science and Technology 
Center based in Russia and Ukraine and explore the practicality of funding more projects 
to focus biological weapons expertise on peaceful purposes. The United States provides 
financial support for the International Science and Technology Center, an intergovernmental 
organization that gives weapons experts from the former Soviet Union an opportunity 
to redirect their talents toward peaceful activities. Thus far, this center has focused 
largely on nuclear expertise. The United States should consider funding more projects 
related to biological expertise as a means of channeling such know-how for legitimate 
purposes.
Fund programs designed to enlist the expertise of former Soviet scientists in bilateral 
U.S.-Russian research projects of mutual concern. The International Science and Technology 
Center is not the only venue to attract Russian biological warfare expertise. During 
the Cold War, Soviet scientists reportedly discovered a fungus capable of destroying 
opium poppies without affecting any other crops. A three-year program under the auspices 
of the Vienna-based U.N. Drug Control Program is testing the validity of this claim. 
66 The United States should not wait for the U.N. to finish its study. Congress should 
initiate a focused bilateral program, enlisting the expertise of former Soviet biological 
warfare specialists, aimed at studying such mutual concerns as naturally occurring 
diseases.
To strengthen the U.S. public healthsystem's level of preparedness, Congress should: 

Mandate national requirements for stockpiling the medical supplies that would be 
necessary in the event a major bioterrorist strike occurred. The CDC should develop 
contingency plans in the event that it became necessary to vaccinate a large portion 
of the civilian population against anthrax or other lethal agents. Doxycycline, one 
of the antibiotic treatments of anthrax, could be stockpiled at secure storage facilities 
at relatively low cost. Similar plans are possible regarding the country's supply 
of smallpox vaccine. The current stock of smallpox vaccine would protect only 6 million 
or 7 million people. Alarmingly, there is no extant capacity to manufacture a new 
vaccine. 67 Yet, at relatively modest cost, the stockpile of smallpox vaccine could 
be expanded to cover a much broader range of possible contingencies. Congress therefore 
should welcome President Clinton's recently announced decision to order the stock-piling 
of vaccines and provide adequate funding for this program.
Request the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to review its quarantine 
procedures. If a major bioterrorist incident occurred, it could become necessary 
to quarantine thousands of people to prevent the spread of disease. Plans could be 
developed and tested using computer simulation and modeling. As with other contingency 
plans for managing the consequences of the use of WMD, close coordination with FEMA 
and other federal agencies is imperative.
Explore the practicality of deploying sensors capable of providing early warning 
of biological attacks in major U.S. cities. In summer 1998, the Department of Defense 
will deploy a system of biological agent detectors (the "portal shield") at select 
U.S. military bases in South Korea and the Middle East. 68 U.S. citizens living in 
major metropolitan areas should be afforded a comparable measure of warning. Congress 
should fund a pilot program to develop and test sensors expressly for the purpose 
of providing advance warning to major metropolitan areas in the United States.
To improve intelligence gathering and early warning systems, Congress should: 
Provide increased funding for human intelligence to penetrate and disrupt
terrorist organizations. The United States needs to improve its intelligence collection 
efforts against terrorist groups that have the capability of launching biological 
attacks. PDD 39 directs 
the Intelligence Community to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international terrorism 
through an aggressive program of foreign intelligence collection, analyst, counter-intelligence 
and covert action in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O. [Executive 
Order] 12333. 69 
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration's assertive language has not been matched 
with sufficient resources. Congress therefore should increase funding to strengthen 
human intelligence programs designed to penetrate and disrupt extremist groups with 
the capability to commit bioterrorism.
Require the intelligence community to exploit "open source" intelligence. The intelligence 
community has long held an institutional bias against "open source" intelligence, 
such as that in newspapers, Internet sites, books, magazines, and foreign radio broadcasts. 
This bias is unfortunate, for open-source intelligence can be a valuable resource. 
For example, private civil rights groups, such as the Anti-
Defamation League and Klanwatch, maintain extensive files on extremist militia groups. 
A researcher working outside the government accurately predicted the Tokyo subway 
attack. 70 In 1996 testimony before Congress, CIA and FBI officials admitted they 
were unaware that Shinrikyo had been developing chemical and biological weapons. 
This oversight occurred even though the cult had 50,000 members worldwide and $1.5 
billion in assets.  Congress should fund CIA and FBI programs designed to exploit 
the potential of open source intelligence to monitor extremist groups interested 
in WMD.
Develop the equivalent of Megan's Law for individuals convicted of violating state 
and federal laws regarding the possession of biological agents. Megan's Law was developed 
to alert local communities of the presence of convicted child molesters. Because 
national security concerns sometimes outweigh an individual's right to privacy, the 
same principle should be applied to individuals who violate laws and traffic in biological 
agents. Such a law would require local law enforcement officials to be notified of 
the presence of persons convicted of such federal and state related crimes.
To address public education issues related to the threat of bioterrorism, Congress 
should: 
Pressure the Clinton Administration to develop a sustained campaign to educate the 
public on bioterrorism. At a press conference in November 1997, Secretary Cohen held 
aloft a five-pound bag of sugar to dramatize how little anthrax would be needed to 
inflict mass casualties in a city like Washington, D.C. Media stunts may serve to 
dramatize national security threats, but they should not be confused with a sustained 
campaign to heighten awareness about the danger of bioterrorism. Such a campaign 
would explain, in a sustained and carefully modulated fashion, U.S. counterterrorism 
policy as well as the nature of the bioterrorist threat. This could be achieved through 
a variety of different mediums, including public service announcements on television 
and radio. The overall approach should be coordinated at the National Security Council 
level. Although some analysts might find this approach alarmist, a carefully modulated 
educational campaign could serve, in fact, as an important confidence-building measure 
and reduce the possibility of mass panic. 71 
Require the Clinton Administration to assess the potential impact of saturation 
media coverage following a major bioterrorist strike. A bioterrorist strike at home 
or abroad would generate sensational media coverage. Even hoaxes can attract considerable 
media attention, as demonstrated in 1997 when the headquarters of B'nai B'rith, a 
national Jewish organization, received a petri dish labeled anthrax. U.S. policymakers 
need to think through the media implications of a major bioterrorist strike. Congress 
should mandate an independent assessment by a team of government, media, and disaster 
relief experts to explore the potential impact of media saturation after a terrorist 
attack involving WMD.
CONCLUSION
The development of a clearly articulated, comprehensive strategy to defend against 
bioterrorism must be based on an accurate threat assessment, prudent allocation of 
resources, and respect for the rule of law. If properly implemented and sustained, 
this approach could help deter terrorists and sponsors of state terrorism who otherwise 
would consider biological attacks. Conversely, the perception that the United States 
is poorly prepared to cope with bioterrorism is likely to encourage groups to exploit 
this strategic vulnerability. Unfortunately, this latter perception currently prevails.
The potential for nuclear terrorism has gained much attention already, and deservedly 
so. To help offset the danger of nuclear terrorism, the U.S. Department of Energy 
created its Nuclear Emergency Search Teams in 1974. The government must pay greater 
attention to the horrific potential of bioterrorism. As it stands today, the United 
States is unprepared to handle a concerted attack involving biological agents. Even 
a single biological terrorist strike in a densely populated urban area could cause 
catastrophic damage and widespread panic.
Clearly, the threat of bioterrorism is not the only national security danger the 
United States faces. But this threat is linked with other strategic vulnerabilities. 
As a matter of national policy, the Clinton Administration has kept the United States 
defenseless against long-range missiles. These missiles can be tipped with nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons. In fact, former Soviet scientists have revealed 
that Moscow had a program to put biological weapons on missiles. 72 The United States 
requires a defense-in-depth against the threat of biological strikes, whether it 
stems from terrorists operating on U.S. soil or in hostile states armed with long-rang 
missiles.
Counterterrorism programs invariably attract intense media interest and legislative 
activity in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks. A sustained, comprehensive 
effort is necessary to address the threat posed by bioterrorism. By moving to address 
extant vulnerabilities without compromising constitutional freedoms, Congress and 
the Clinton Administration have the opportunity to prevent bioterrorism from occurring 
on U.S. soil. The United States should reject the grim insinuation that a catastrophic 
terrorist strike involving weapons of mass destruction somehow is an inevitable rite-of-passage 
into the 21st century.
--James H. Anderson, Ph.D., is Defense and National Security Analyst at The Heritage 
Foundation.

Endnotes
1. The author would like to thank Michael Baxter, a Heritage Foundation intern in 
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center, for his research 
assistance with this paper.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, 
p. 82.
3. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Risks (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 50.
4. Brian Jenkins, The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977), 
p. 8.
5. Jonathan Tucker, "Policy Approaches to Chemical and Biological Terrorism," in 
Brad Roberts, ed., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons (Alexandria, VA: 
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997), p. 98.
6. Quoted in Walter Pincus, "CIA Chief Calls Hostile States' Weapons Buildup Threat 
to National Security," The Washington Post, January 29, 1998, p. A7.
7. Bradley Graham, "U.S. Gearing Up Against Germ War Threat," The Washington Post, 
February 14, 1997, pp. A1, A16.
8. Judith Miller and William Broad, "Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ War 
Threat," The New York Times, April 26, 1998, pp. 1, 10.
9. William Cohen, speech, National Press Club, March 17, 1998.
10. Toxins are considered biological agents under the terms of the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.
11. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Risks, p. 50.
12. Transcript, "Diane Sawyer Reports," Prime Time Live, ABC News, at http://www.abcnews.com/onairdev/primetimelive/transcripts/pt10225.html, 
  February 25, 1998. 
13. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Risks, p. 54.
14. W. Seth Carus, testimony before Joint Hearing of the Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, 
105th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 4, 1998, p. 9.
15. Richard Preston "The Bioweaponeers," The New Yorker, March 9, 1998, p. 60.
16. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Poison, Germ Weapons Would Not Be Direct Targets," The Washington 
Post, February 22, 1998, p. A28.
17. Ibid.
18. Barbara Crossette, "Experts Dispute Iraq's Claim It Ended Germ War Effort," 
The New York Times, April 10, 1998, p. A10.
19. Michael Evan, "Iraqi Scientists Helping Libyan Germ Warfare," The Times (London), 
January 6, 1998.
20. David Hoffman, "Russia Challenged to Disclose Status of Biological Weapons," 
The Washington Post, February 26, 1998, p. A17.
21. Ken Alibek, "Russia's Deadly Expertise," The New York Times, March 28, 1998, 
p. A23.
22. William Broad, "Gene-Engineered Anthrax: Is It a Weapon?" The New York Times, 
February 14, 1998, p. A4.
23. For a comprehensive treatment of Shinrikyo, see David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, 
The Cult at the End of the World (New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 1996).
24. Carus, p. 10.
25. David Kaplan, "Terrorism's Next Wave," U.S. News and World Report, November 
17, 1997, p. 30.
26. Richard Betts, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 
1 (January/February 1998), p. 32.
27. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, 
pp. 82-83.
28. Carus, p. 3; see also Preston, "The Bioweaponeers," p. 60.
29. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 33. 
30. Ibid., p. 50.
31. Carus, p. 3.
32. Leonard Cole, "The Specter of Biological Weapons," Scientific American, December 
1996, p. 61.
33. Louis Salome, "Saddam the Threat, Not Arms," The Washington Times, February 
23, 1998, p. A12.
34. John Deutch, "Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence," Statement for the Record, February 22, 1996, p. 16.
35. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive For a Biological Arsenal," The Washington Post, 
November 21, 1997, p. 1.
36. Preston, "The Bioweaponeers," p. 62.
37. Tim Weimer, "Soviet Defector Warns of Biological Weapons," The New York Times, 
February 24, 1998, p. A8.
38. James K. Campbell, Commander, U.S. Navy, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats 
to America," written testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, 
Terrorism, and Government Information and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
April 22, 1998, p. 9. 
39. Kaplan, "Terrorism's Next Wave," p. 28. (Emphasis in the original.)
40. Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 
1996), pp. 32-33.
41. White House, Presidential Decision Directive 39, June 21, 1995, available at 
<a href="http://www.fas.org/irg/offdocs/pdd39.htm">http://www.fas.org/irg/offdocs/pdd39.htm>. 

42. Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Appendix A, Terrorism Incident Annex to 
the Federal Response Plan," Federal Response Plan, FEMA 229, Chg. 11, April 1995, 
p. 70. 
43. White House, Presidential Decision Directive 39.
44. FEMA groups federal resources into 12 emergency support functions: transportation; 
communications; public works and engineering; fire fighting; information and planning; 
mass care; resource support; health and medical services; urban search and rescue; 
hazardous materials; food; and energy. See Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Rapid 
Disaster Response: Executive Overview," Federal Response Plan, FEMA 229, Chg. 11, 
April 1995.
45. "Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy 
and Strategy," NSIAD-97-254, September 26, 1997.
46. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ 
War Threat," The New York Times, April 26, 1998, p. 1.
47. Quoted in David Kaplan, "Everyone Gets into the Terrorism Game," U.S. News and 
World Report, November 1997, p. 32.
48. Article 1, Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, 
26 UST 583, TIAS 8062 (entered into force for the United States on May 26, 1975).
49. The act states: "Whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, 
acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for 
use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any terms of years, or 
both." Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, Public Law 101-298.
50. For an assessment of the weaknesses of the Chemical Weapons Convention, see 
Baker Spring, "The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Bad Deal for America," Heritage 
Foundation Committee Brief No. 25, April 15, 1996.
51. Crossette, "Experts Dispute Iraq's Claim."
52. Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force, DOD Responses to Transnational 
Threats, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Technology), p. 48.
53. David Franz, Colonel, U.S. Army, testimony before Joint Committee on Judiciary 
and Intelligence, U.S. Senate, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 4, 1998, p. 2.
54. In addition to the Department of Defense, other federal agencies involved in 
the Domestic Preparedness program include the Department of Energy, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, FEMA, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Public Health Service.
55. Zachary Selden, "Confronting the Threat of Biological Weapons," Defense Working 
Group Backgrounder, Progressive Policy Institute, March 1998, p. 5.
56. Graham, "U.S. Gearing Up Against Germ War Threat."
57. "Military Adding 10 `Chem-Bio' Response Teams," The Washington Post, March 18, 
1998, p. A3.
58. Laurie Garrett, "The Return of Infectious Disease," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, 
No. 1 (January/February 1996), p. 73.
59. Lawrence K. Altman, "Smallpox Vaccine Urged to Fight Terrorist Attacks," The 
New York Times, March 11, 1998, p. A21.
60. Ibid.
61. Senator Jon Kyl, statement submitted to Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, 
Terrorism, and Government Information," U.S. Senate, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 
4, 1998. Emphasis in the original.
62. Frank Young, "The Essential Tasks of Emergency Preparedness," in Roberts, Terrorism 
With Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 115.
63. The Maginot Line was a defensive fortification built on the eastern border of 
France before World War II to deter an invasion by Nazi Germany. Named after France's 
then minister of war, it proved unsuccessful.
64. Preston, "The Bioweaponeers," pp. 56, 65.
65. David Kaplan, "Everyone Gets into the Terrorism Game," p. 32.
66. Peter Ford, "At Heroin's Source, Hope Rises for a Way to Cut Opium Crops," The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 1998, p. 6.
67. Anita Manning, "U.S. `Not Ready' for Biological Threats," USA Today, March 11, 
1998, p. 3A.
68. John Donnelly, "Bases in Korea and Mideast to Get Bio-Warning Networks," Defense 
Week, January 26, 1998, p. 1. For a summary of biological and chemical detectors 
being developed and fielded, see U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat 
and Response, pp. 66-69.
69. White House, Presidential Decision Directive 39. 
70. Kyle B. Olson, "The Matsumoto Incident: Sarin Poisoning in a Japanese Residential 
Community," Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, February 1995.
71. For further ideas aimed at reducing the possibilities for mass panic, see Michael 
Eisenstadt, "Enhancing Public Preparedness for Chemical and Biological Terrorism," 
Policywatch No. 308, April 3, 1998.
72. Preston, "The Bioweaponeers," pp. 56, 65.
 
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