Return-Path: <sentto-279987-3776-1004935557-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Sun, 04 Nov 2001 20:47:08 -0800 (PST) Received: (qmail 2931 invoked by uid 510); 5 Nov 2001 04:45:03 -0000 Received: from n11.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.61) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 5 Nov 2001 04:45:03 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-3776-1004935557-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [10.1.1.220] by n11.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 05 Nov 2001 04:45:57 -0000 X-Sender: fc@red.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 5 Nov 2001 04:45:57 -0000 Received: (qmail 17945 invoked from network); 5 Nov 2001 04:45:57 -0000 Received: from unknown (216.115.97.172) by m2.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 5 Nov 2001 04:45:57 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta2.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 5 Nov 2001 04:45:56 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id fA54kSf02664 for iwar@onelist.com; Sun, 4 Nov 2001 20:46:28 -0800 Message-Id: <200111050446.fA54kSf02664@red.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2001 20:46:28 -0800 (PST) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] [fc:Computer.Nets.Escape.Attacks] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Computer Nets Escape Attacks By William B. Scott, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11/2/2001 <a href="http://www.aviationnow.com">http://www.aviationnow.com> U.S. Space Command's ''cyberwarriors'' remain on high alert for potential terrorist attacks against Defense Dept. computer networks, but, so far, there's been no increase in activity. Whether they have launched offensive computer operations against identified terrorist groups is unknown. Probes by hackers of all stripes have fallen off since the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Even after the air campaign in Afghanistan began on Oct. 7, assaults on Defense networks remained inconsequential. ''We turned our sensors up to ultrasensitive because we weren't sure what to expect after [the attacks],'' said Army Lt. Gen. Edward G. Anderson, 3rd, deputy commander-in-chief of U.S. Space Command (USSC). ''We're still waiting to see if something's going to happen, but we haven't seen it yet. It's a pleasant surprise . . . [but] we don't expect this condition to continue.'' ANALYSTS DETERMINED that one possible reason for the decreased number of probes is ''no one wanted to be linked to the Sept. 11 events, so they kind of shut down,'' he said. The command believes it is well positioned to fulfill its mission of computer network operations (CNO) for the entire Defense Dept. CNO combined USSC's dual responsibilities of computer network defense and computer network attack (CND/CNA). To provide support for U.S. warfighting commanders-in-chief, ''we felt we had to consolidate the two -- a single commander, coordinating organization, oversight and support function,'' Anderson explained. ''And, if we're going to employ computer network attack tools, we damn sure better have our defenses in line.'' The Bush Administration has shown ''a great awareness of both our vulnerability and the increased capabilities of threats'' to the nation's computer networks, he observed. White House officials also understand the Pentagon's dependence on computer networks is both a strength and a vulnerability. Military forces around the world rely on satellite and terrestrial links to rapidly distribute digital data. Everything from the collection of intelligence to moving supplies depends on U.S. forces achieving and maintaining ''information superiority'' during a conflict. Any disruption of that data flow could be disastrous. As a result, USSC believes ''it would be very reasonable for a threat force to conclude they need to go after those information'' channels, Anderson said. ''I'm sure they'd be developing [the means] to diminish, degrade or destroy our capabilities.'' He emphasized that information superiority is highly dependent on ''space control,'' an issue of perennial importance to the joint space command. However, the U.S. is sorely lacking in this department. ''As we look at tomorrow, one of the major shortcomings we see is space control,'' the general said. ''In order to provide information superiority in times of crisis or conflict, we believe we have to have space control.'' Today, the U.S. can claim space superiority, but not space control, he noted. Space systems -- both ground and orbital -- are considered relatively safe from potential terrorist attacks, given the adversaries' capabilities. That confidence does not extend to the information side, however. ''I see 'cyberspace' in a different context. In CNO, we are engaged in warfighting today. We have folks [working] 24-7, protecting and defending the defense information infrastructure,'' Anderson said. ''To be honest, CNO is what keeps me awake at night. We have a huge dependence on cyber systems, but we're in an area here that we largely don't know what we don't know.'' Still, his greatest concern is reserved for attacks by nation states, not terrorists or hackers. When the Code Red ''worm'' struck the nation last summer, there was little impact on Defense networks, thanks to procedures put in place by a USSC Joint Task Force (JTF) for CNO. Since its activation in April, the JTF has proven its mettle during several CNO events, Anderson said. While the ''trend lines of [network attacks] have gone up very, very steeply in the past two years,'' USSC has learned a great deal about how to detect, then defend against those probes. Officials at USSC become tight-lipped when questioned about CNA, but it is clear significant advances have been made there, too. ''WHAT WE'RE LEARNING is that, while cyberspace could be a significant vulnerability -- if we don't take proper measures -- it also could be a very effective [attack] tool,'' Anderson said. ''We're learning more and more'' as the JTF and USSC gain experience. A significant improvement in recent years has been the ability to predict the outcome of a computer network attack launched by the U.S. Although there is still a dearth of simulation and modeling tools available to predict the consequences of offensive computer-network actions, Anderson said his cyberwarriors are extremely ''sensitive to collateral damage and fratricide'' in the cyber world. He declined to expand on the point, citing security issues. Based on discussions with military officials, Los Alamos National Laboratory computer scientists and experienced computer security consultants, it is highly likely that the U.S. has the means to manipulate satellite and terrestrial communications data streams. If Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization has been reduced to reliance on space-based voice and data channels, as the Pentagon has indicated, it may be acting on ''polluted'' information -- thanks to sophisticated computer network attacks. Anderson hinted at such capabilities when he acknowledged that the U.S. can affect space-based resources ''on the ground.'' ''I think, at some point, we'll talk about 'information control,' and that's critical to information superiority,'' he said. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> FREE COLLEGE MONEY CLICK HERE to search 600,000 scholarships! http://us.click.yahoo.com/Pv4pGD/4m7CAA/ySSFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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