[iwar] [fc:Crimson.SEAD]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-11-11 06:59:24
Next message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:Europe.Moving.Toward.Ban.on.Internet.Hate.Speech]"
Previous message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:Government.Brandishes.New.Powers.in.Cybersecurity]"
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Message-Id: <200111111459.fABExOP13432@red.all.net>
To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List)
Organization: I'm not allowed to say
From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com
Precedence: bulk
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2001 06:59:24 -0800 (PST)
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [iwar] [fc:Crimson.SEAD]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Crimson SEAD
Michal Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczynski
An insider's view of suppression-of-enemy-air-defense weapons and doctrine,
Soviet-style
The armed forces of the Soviet Union had very different approaches to the
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission than their Western
adversaries. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies did not treat SEAD as
independent air operations and never fielded any dedicated SEAD aircraft.
SEAD missions were flown as a support of air operations, on a tactical level
by non-specialists. They also very much relied on their SIGINT and other
reconnaissance assets, preferring pre-planned strikes on known enemy
air-defense positions, rather than the "targets of opportunity" kind of
operations typical of US operations in Vietnam and Iraq.
From the tactical point of view, the most important theater of war for the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was Western Europe. Such a war was viewed
with the Warsaw Pact on the offensive. The air phase of a European war would
last three days before the launch of a land offensive if nuclear weapons
were to be employed, or about a week when not. During the first phase of
operations about 20 percent of the Warsaw Pact air forces were to be
dedicated for reconnaissance, while the remainder would focus on strikes
against vital targets in tactical and operational areas. The latter would be
concentrated in belts according to the main directions of future ground
operations. In cases of either nuclear or conventional-only operations, the
primary air targets were the enemy's nuclear weapons delivery means - in
other words, it would always be a fight for nuclear superiority, since the
final employment of such weapons was deemed unavoidable.
Radiation, Anti-Radiation

The Kh-27 (no NATO designation) anti-radiation missile under the wing of a
Su-17M3 Fitter-D. This missile was conceived as a replacement for the heavy,
venerable Kh-28. Despite the external similarity to Kh-25MP, this is not the
same missile. (photo by Andrzej Kinski)
In the late 1950s and early '60s, Western SAM threats consisted of US Nike
Ajax and Nike Hercules and UK Thunderbird and Bloodhound systems. The SAM
systems represented a serious problem for the Soviet tactical bomber force,
which at that time mostly consisted of the Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle, the
primary tactical nuclear platform in the Soviet Air Force. The Il-28,
designed in the 1940s as a WW2-style medium bomber, had a cruising speed of
less than 500 mph and almost no low-level penetration capability, making
these sitting ducks to any air-defense system. In the '60s the Beagles were
replaced by supersonic Yakolev Yak-28 (Brewer) and Sukhoi Su-7 (Fitter-A)
aircraft, which assumed the burden of nuclear strike missions. Their
supersonic speed partially protected them against the NATO fighters, but not
against SAMs.
Rather than develop a site-specific solution to the SAM problem, Soviet
tactics at that time relied on mass nuclear weapons employment. In 1959
Soviet state authorities confirmed that the primary fire means of all forces
would be missiles, including tactical and operational ballistic missiles
used by ground forces. The Air Force was to engage any mobile targets that
survived a mass missile attack. At the same time a series of nuclear
airbursts would create widespread electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects,
disabling most of the radar-based air-defense systems. The strike aircraft
were to use corridors of nuclear strike destruction to penetrate the enemy
airspace. Therefore, SEAD was not high on the Soviet's priority list.
Despite anticipating a comfortable situation on the nuclear battlefield, the
Soviet Air Force began work on the first tactical anti-radiation missile in
January 1963. Perhaps this was merely serendipitous, as NATO was only five
years from announcing their doctrine of Flexible Response (see below) that
eschewed nuclear weapons, or perhaps the Soviet unofficial comfort level
with a nuclear battlefield was somewhat less than that of the official state
authorities. In any event, the OKB-2-155 Design Bureau (MKB "Raduga" since
1967), led by I.S. Seleznev and General Designer A.J. Berezniak, was tasked
to develop a missile, which was to be become the part of weapon complex
K-28P ("P" from Russian word "protivradiolokatsyonny": anti-radar). The
K-28P complex was to consist of the platform, a modernized version of Yak-28
tactical supersonic bomber, called Yak-28N; the Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle) missile;
and the radar-detection and target-acquisition system installed on the
Yak-28N aircraft.

Ground crews prepare to load a Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle) on a Su-22M3 Fitter-F of
the Vietnamese Air Force. The large Kh-28 was the first Soviet
anti-radiation missile, and it was exported to selected friendly countries,
including Iraq. (Vietnamese Air Force photo)
The biggest problems centered around the design of the APR-28 passive
radar-guidance system optimized for the AN/MPQ-4 Nike Hercules radar. That
project was undertaken by the CKB-111 Design Bureau (NPO "Avtomatika" since
1967) at Omsk, under A.S. Kirtshuk, EMP General Designer. The problems were
so serious that the missile was not ready for state trials until the early
'70s.
The design work on the Yak-28N started in 1964-65. It was the sole attempt
to build a dedicated SEAD aircraft in the Soviet Union (and later Russia).
The basis for the Yak-28N was the Yak-28I tactical bomber, with the
Initsyatyva targeting radar removed and replaced by a radar-detection and
target- acquisition system for Kh-28 missiles. The aircraft was to carry two
missiles under the wings, outside the engine nacelles. The K-28P system was
flown and tested in 1971-1972, but was not accepted into service because by
that time the platform was considered obsolete as a "shooter."
At the same time, the aircraft became an EW (jamming) platform, under the
designation Yak-28PP Brewer-E. The jamming system was taken from the Tupolev
Tu-16PP Badger-H EW aircraft and divided into three parts, each carried by a
different Yak-28PP aircraft in the unit. Thus, the Yak-28PP was most
effective when three aircraft, each with a different jammer component,
operated in one formation, forming a jamming "barrier" on each side of the
corridor through which the tactical aircraft were to penetrate enemy
airspace. As it turned out, the system became an integral part of Soviet
SEAD doctrine.
No Nukes

A MiG-25BM Foxbat-F with Kh-58U (AS-11 Kilter) missiles under the wings. The
Foxbat-F is the closest thing the Russians have to a dedicated SEAD
aircraft. All 40-odd such aircraft are concentrated at the 98th
Reconnaissance Wing on the Kola Peninsula. (photo by Leszek Wróblewski)
In December 1967, NATO adopted new defense doctrine -- that of Flexible
Response. The new philosophy emphasized a conventional battlefield, as long
as the enemy refrained from using nuclear weapons. Soviet planners welcomed
the new concept, being confident of Soviet conventional weapons dominance in
the European theater. But for the Air Force, the change meant that it could
no longer rely on the EMP effect created by nuclear blasts and had to be
prepared for clearing the way through NATO air defenses using conventional
weapons.
After cancellation of K-28P program as an integrated system, the Kh-28
missile became a standard tactical aircraft weapon. The new Su-24 Fencer-A
tactical bomber carried two Kh-28 missiles under the wings and worked with
the Filin radar-detection and target-acquisition system. Almost
simultaneously, the Kh-28 missile was introduced to arm the Su-17M Fitter-C
aircraft. This tactical fighter-bomber carried a single Kh-28 missile under
the fuselage and used the Myetyel radar-detection and targeting system,
mounted in a pod carried under the right wing.
The Filin targeting system was a more general-purpose system than the Kh-28
missile itself, which was initially suitable only for Nike
Hercules/Thunderbird engagements. The Filin covered a wider range of
frequencies and was able to detect the HAWK SAM system, which was outside
the capabilities of the missile's seeker. Eventually, the Kh-28M missile
received a new seeker that was adjusted to deal with the HAWK AN/MPQ-33 and
later AN/MPQ-39 target-illumination radars, and also with the AN/MPQ-34
low-level target-acquisition radar. Filin became an integral part of the
Su-24's Puma fire-control system. The Su-17M's Myetyel targeting system was
less capable, but its replacement, the Vyuga system, could target the full
range of Western SAM radars. The Vyuga was also used on later Su-17M
variants (M3 Fitter-H and M4 Fitter-K) and the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-27
Flogger D and J.
SEAD Doctrine of the Golden Age

A Kh-58U photographed below Su-24M in front line unit of the Soviet Air
Force. Development of the Kh-58U was inspired by the British/French Martel
anti-radiation missile. (photo by Piotr Butowski)
Most NATO air-defense-type targets were presumed to have been previously
located and air strikes against them were to be of a pre-planned, mass
character. Tactical (frontal, according to Soviet terminology) air forces
were to operate up to 300-400 km deep into enemy territory. The operational
zone between 400 and 800 km belonged to operational air forces, equipped
with Tu-22K (Blinder-B) and later with Su-24M (Fencer-D) and Tu-22M
(Backfire). Both frontal and operational aviation were to use the same
corridors, navigating to preset orientation points, where subsequent routes
proceeded to individual targets. The corridors were to be about 40-50 km
wide, allowing two or three independent strike groups to proceed through
them at low level in tandem, separated by about 10 km and by about two
minutes (for squadrons from the same wings) or five minutes (for formations
from different wings) along the routes. Careful planning was required to
secure ingress and return time slots.
Usually a Soviet army group (front) attacking across a front 100-150 km wide
selected two such corridors for its assigned aviation assets. Simply, the
first formations penetrating the enemy airspace were tasked to engage and
suppress the SAM positions, located by SIGINT conducted over friendly
airspace. In earlier years, SIGINT was gathered by standoff Il-14E Crate and
Il-28E aircraft, eventually replaced by Mil Mi-8 Hip SIGINT helicopters of
various versions. In later years, MiG-25R Foxbat-B and Su-24MR Fencer-E
aircraft were available for more aggressive reconnaissance duty. The concept
was for frontal aviation to destroy all medium- and most long-range SAM
positions within the corridor. Nike Hercules sites were considered harmless
along the routes, since their minimum engagement altitude was about
1,000-1,500 m. However, around target areas where aircraft were to climb for
dive attacks, Nike Hercules battalions were also to be destroyed.

A Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler) missile on display during open day at the 7th
Bomber Reconnaissance Wing in Poland. This was a modular missile with
several seeker/warhead options, including the anti-radiation version, shown
here. (photo by Jerzy Gruszczynski)
There was no special unit or aircraft type dedicated for SEAD missions.
Every task group (usually of squadron strength) detached 2-4 aircraft armed
with anti-radiation missiles and fragmentation/incendiary bombs for
suppression of SAM positions along the corridors and around the target area.
The SAM targets within the corridors were allocated to wings as a support
task. For example, a wing tasked to engage an enemy army headquarters would
detach flights from the reserve squadron to suppress SAM positions within
the corridor a few minutes before the main strike force. Receiving such an
order, the wing commander could also detach a pair of aircraft (optional)
from every squadron to suppress the target air defenses and the SAM
positions known to be deployed in depth around vital targets, such as
airbases, second echelon areas, reserve force concentrations, high-level
headquarters, industrial areas, etc. Usually most of the targets were
outside predefined corridors, since these were drawn to avoid enemy air
defenses to the maximum extent.
The largest concentrations of NATO air defenses were expected along the
ground engagement line, where HAWK systems, backed up by deeper NATO
echelons, formed a continuous chain of engagement zones. The HAWK and Nike
Hercules positions forming the front belt were to be located using standoff
SIGINT platforms. The first task was to break the chain within the
corridors, usually ending at orientation points just outside of them.
Just before the strike groups passed the ground engagement line, Soviet and
Warsaw Pact artillery was to engage short-range air-defense positions, such
as the Gepard, Roland, Rapier, and Vulcan batteries deployed along the front
echelon of NATO ground forces. There were no anti-radiation missiles
available to target these systems (although some were developed later, see
below), so aircraft were to avoid them, unless they protected the designated
target, in which case they might be attacked with bombs or other
air-to-ground ordnance.

Su-22M4 of the Polish Air Force with four Kh-25MPs. Normally, an aircraft
would carry two such missiles, in addition to the Vyuga targeting pod. There
is no Vyuga pod on the aircraft shown here because the picture was taken at
a public display. (photo by Waclaw Cholys)
While the strike groups were to proceed at very low level to their targets
(below 100 m), the SAM suppression groups (flights or pairs) preceding them
were to climb before the outside boundary of the target SAM position's
engagement zone, to about 500-4,000 m at 40-50 km in case of HAWK or to
2,000-6,000 m at about 120 km in case of Nike Hercules. As soon as the SAM
system's firecontrol radar illuminated the attacking group, the
anti-radiation missile was to be launched against it.
Note that in Soviet and Warsaw Pact practice, the initial stage of a SEAD
engagement was a standoff activity. The Kh-28 had a range of 110 km. Compare
this with the US Shrike, which initially had a range of 16 km. Soviet SEAD
was a methodical process where strikes were planned according to data
collected through SIGINT. The more footloose and opportunistic SEAD
techniques of the US "Wild Weasels" (even the name says it!), where
free-roving hunters baited SAM sites at point-blank range, had no place in
the Soviet system. It is interesting to note that the US conduct of its SEAD
campaigns in Yugoslavia and Iraq of late seem progressively more methodical
(dare we say, Soviet?) in the use of stand-off weapons against known
targets. Contrary to the US armed forces, the Soviet Union and then Russia
never had a real opportunity to test its SEAD concepts and weapons, except
for the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, where the former's employment
of Soviet-made Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler) was carefully observed, although
operations were nothing like what was expected of a general war in Europe.
In the case of a hit or when the radar was turned off, aircraft were to
approach the SAM site at low level and attack it with bombs. The entire
action was to be supported by Mi-8 jamming helicopters operating in friendly
airspace. Effective jamming range was in excess of 100 km. When the
continuous chain of NATO SAM engagement zones was broken even temporarily
(expected within hours), the corridor could be used for deeper penetration
of enemy airspace. Since that time the waves of strike groups were to be
additionally covered from the corridors sides by teams of Yak-28PP aircraft,
operating in barrier combat air patrol (BARCAP), on the corridor sides. The
strike groups were to be also protected by fighters, sweeping the strike
groups' operations areas.
The Last Gasp of the Cold War

A Kh-31P (AS-17 Krypton) on display during the Moscow Aerospace Show at
Zhukovsky airbase in 1993. The long-range, supersonic Kh-31 is seen as the
"swan song" of Soviet SEAD. (photo by Jerzy Gruszczynski)
The Soviet SEAD concept did not change much in the 1980s, although emphasis
was once again put on nuclear weapons employment. In the late 1970s and
early '80s, NATO fielded new SAM systems, the most dangerous of which were
considered to be the Improved HAWK and Patriot. The Soviets answered with
new types of weapons and equipment, but these were built around the same
concept outlined above. The biggest change was the equipping of all tactical
aircraft with self-protection EW systems, such as the widely deployed
SPS-141, -142, and -143 Siren pod family; the SPS-161 and -162 Geran on the
Su-24M; the SPS-151 and -152 Lyutik on the MiG-25RB; the SPS-171 Sorbcja on
Su-27 fighters; and the SPS-201 Geran on the MiG-29.
The other important element of SEAD tactics was the introduction in late
'80s of a new tactical ballistic missile: the 9M714U Totshka-U (SS-21
Scarab) with an anti-radiation seeker warhead that had a 70-km range. Every
Soviet division had its own battalion of standard Toshka rockets, and every
launcher was able to fire the Totshka-U version. In the '80s new
anti-radiation missiles were introduced. The first was the Kh-25MP, soon
followed by the Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter). Towards the end of the decade,
improved versions of both types were introduced, including the Kh-58U with a
range of 250 km and an improved seeker with late lock-on capability.
Initially, the primary carrier of the Kh-58U was the MiG-25BM Foxbat-F
aircraft. The MiG-25BM was not a dedicated SEAD aircraft but was widely
deployed in this role. The development of the aircraft started in 1976 as a
fast nuclear strike bomber. From 1982-1985 about 40 were produced, while an
additional 20 were re-built from early MiG-25RB reconnaissance versions, and
provided with the Jaguar target-acquisition system. Some of these aircraft
were based in Poland, with the 164th Reconnaissance Wing in Krzywa, from
1983 until 1992. The Kh-58U was also adopted for use with the Vyuga system,
allowing it to be carried on Su-17M4 aircraft. The Su-17M4 -- and its
Su-22M4 export version -- could carry two missiles under the fuselage.

One of the first Kh-31P missiles produced for the Russian Su-24M Fencer-D,
which is the sole platform for this capable anti-radiation missile. (photo
by Wojtek Matusiak)
The MiG-25BM became its primary carrier, since the aircraft was able to
operate up to 21,000 m (68,900 ft.), above the Improved Hawk engagement
zone. MiG-25BM pilots would use typical American tactics, flying in "search
and destroy" groups and operating independently from the other aircraft. The
other method of MiG-25BM attack was to use nuclear bombs to attack the SAM
concentration areas from maximum speed and altitude. The accuracy of such
bombing was not high, but it was not necessary in this case. Presently all
the remaining MiG-25BM aircraft (about 40) are concentrated at the 98th
Reconnaissance Wing in Montshegorsk in the Kola region, together with some
Su-24MR. If Russia ever fields a dedicated SEAD force, this will probably be
its cradle.
Nuclear war is no longer an option, and Russia has adopted a much more
defensive posture. This has dramatically reduced requirements for SEAD,
which have always been seen as an extension of mass offensive operations.
The financial resources Russia allocates to SEAD are shrinking, and we
probably will have to wait a long time for any new anti-radiation missiles
to be made in Russia. Among the greatest achievement of late was fielding
the Kh-31P (AS-17 Krypton) missiles, though in small numbers. For the near
future, modernization rather then new design is more likely. For example,
the overhaul factory in Borisoglebsk conducts Kh-58 modernization to Kh-58U
standard. Some Kh-25MP were also modernized to Kh-25MPU standard, with the
seeker optimized for Roland and Crotale systems. This missile entered
service in 1991 in limited numbers, to deal with short-range air defenses.
It is a common enough sight at international arms shows, indicating that the
future of Russian SEAD weapons might be found in the export marketplace.
Maj Michal Fiszer , Polish Air Force (ret.), was born in 1962 and graduated
from the Polish Air Force Academy in 1985. He served eight years with the
8th Fighter-Bomber Wing as a pilot, flight leader, deputy squadron
commander, and chief air-reconnaissance officer. In 1994, Michal joined the
Polish Air Force Intelligence Division as a senior analysis officer. In 1997
he moved to the Wojskowe Sluzby Informacyjne (WSI), the national
intelligence service of Poland, as a senior analysis officer, and also
served as chief of the NATO section at the Military Attaché Liaison Office.
He has served with NATO and UN missions to the Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and
Kuwait. Retiring in 2000, Michal presently works as an editor in the Polish
Air Force magazine, Przeglad Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej, and is a
regular contributor to JED.
Maj Jerzy Gruszczynski , Polish Air Force, was born in 1961 and graduated
from the Polish Air Force Academy in 1985. He flew for a year with the 45th
Fighter Bomber Wing, and then served six years as a pilot, flight leader,
and chief aerial reconnaissance officer in a squadron of 7th
Bomber-Reconnaissance Wing. He was injured ejecting from a crippled Su-20MK
(Fitter D) in 1991 but went on to become chief of staff of the 7th FBW.
Jerzy subsequently joined the National Defense Academy as a teacher of air
tactics, and presently continues his research on air tactics development. He
is a regular contributor to JED.
Major Soviet / Russian Anti-Radar Missiles
Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle)

The first Soviet tactical anti-radiation missile, the Kh-28 was a supersonic
winged missile with cylindrical fuselage and pointed nose, small delta wings
with no control surfaces, and classic tail, with vertical and horizontal
all-moving surfaces. Beneath the rear fuselage, a small stabilization fin
was installed. The missile is powered by the R-253-300 liquid-fuel rocket
motor designed at OKB-300 Design Bureau (designer of the MiG-21's R-11F
engine). Initially the missile was intended to have a solid rocket motor,
but this was considered unable to meet the long-range requirement of the
missile - exceeding 100 km - to deal with Nike Hercules. The APR-28 seeker
system was optimized for AN/MPQ-4 Nike Hercules radar and could also engage
British Thunderbird sites. The missile entered production in 1973, and its
series production was continued for a decade.
According to established Soviet SEAD doctrine, all tactical aircraft were to
be armed with anti-radiation missiles. But at 715 kg, the Kh-28 was heavy
and cumbersome, thus limiting its employment. Each Su-17M could carry just
one missile, which limited its effectiveness, while the MiG-27 Flogger-D
(attack version of the MiG-23 fighter) could not carry it at all: the
missile was too big to be attached under the fuselage and too heavy to be
carried under the wings.
A later version, the Kh-28M missile, received new seekers that were able to
deal with HAWK AN/MPQ-33 and, later, the AN/MPQ-39 target-illumination
radar, and also with AN/MPQ-34 low-level target-acquisition radar. The older
warhead, suitable for Nike Hercules/Thunderbird engagements, could be
swapped out for the new warhead. In early 1980s, Kh-28 missiles were
produced mainly for export and delivered to some Arab countries - among them
Iraq - and to Vietnam. The export version was called Kh-28E. In Iraq the
missile was locally named Nisan-28 and used on Su-22s.
Kh-27

Because the weight of the Kh-28 missile limited its use, the Soviets soon
set about designing successors. In 1972, two projects were launched almost
simultaneously: the Kh-27 for the MiG-27 and the Kh-24 for the Su-24 (thus
the numbers). Only the Kh-27 was fielded, and Kh-24 development was
redesignated Kh-58 (see below). The Kh-27 was based on the earlier Kh-23
(AS-7 Kerry) radio-command-guided missile developed for the MiG-23. It was
developed by OKB Zvezda, while the solid-state rocket motor was developed by
OKB-81. The missile had a cylindrical fuselage, forward "X" type
stabilization surfaces at the missile's front guidance-system housing, and
larger "X" type wings with control surfaces at the missile's rear. The
engine nozzles were positioned between the wings.
The new seeker was developed with a highly sensitive receiver with five
antennas in the PRGS-1-type guidance version and with six antennas in the
PRGS-2 version. The missile could be used either against Nike Hercules or
against HAWK, but not at the same time (it depended on the type of seeker
installed). It was much lighter than the Kh-28, with a weight of 310 kg.
Since the direction to the target radar was defined based on phase
difference between the antennas, it was much more accurate than the Kh-28,
which had single revolving conical antenna. After launch it climbed at about
a 20-degree angle, defining the distance to the target by measuring the
vertical angle and missile altitude. If an aircraft preparing to launch the
missile flew over 5 km with the target locked on, the Vyuga system was able
to measure the distance to the target based on depression angle and
altitude. When at low altitude, the pilot had to make a "snake" type
maneuver to measure the bearing angles while flying at the angle to the
target. Precise information about bearing and distance to the target allowed
the missile to hit the target area, even when the radar was turned off. The
missile range was limited to 60 km when launched from 15,000 m and 40 km
from 5,000 m.
The missile passed trials in 1975-76 and was introduced into service in
1977. Its production was limited, since it was soon replaced by the newer
Kh-25MP missile. The Kh-27 was used on MiG-27K, MiG-27M and MiG-27D (all
called Flogger-J) aircraft, and on Su-17M3 Fitter-H aircraft. All the
aircraft carried up to two such missiles and the Vyuga pod for target
designation. In the early '80s the Kh-27s were replaced by Kh-25MPs.
Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)

A new missile family, called the Kh-25M, was designed according to a modular
concept with interchangeable guidance systems in the nose and tail modules
attached to a common missile core. Thus, both the aforementioned Kh-27 and
Kh-24 missiles were redesigned to this modular concept. They formed the core
of the Kh-25M family, and at the beginning three types of guidance systems
were produced: Kh-25ML (laser guided), Kh-25MP (anti-radiation), and Kh-25MR
(radio command guided). The guidance system could be changed at the
firing-unit level (thus, Warsaw Pact technicians could confuse NATO code
users, since the guidance module replacement turned AS-10 Karen into AS-12
Kegler or vice-versa!).
The whole family entered service in 1981, and many aircraft could carry
them. The primary types were, Su-17M3 Fitter H and Su-17M4 Fitter-K, and
their export versions: Su-22M3 and Su-22M4. Also MiG-27M, MiG-27K and
MiG-27D Flogger J aircraft could carry them, two missiles per aircraft.
Since the Kh-25MP had only slightly modernized guidance systems
(interchangeable PRGS-1VP and PRGS-2VP), it could engage the same radars as
the Kh-27: AN/MPQ-4A or -4B for Nike Hercules; AN/MPQ-33, -39, or -34 for
HAWK systems; or AN/MPQ-46 and AN/MPQ-48 for Improved HAWK systems. It also
worked in conjunction with the Vyuga target detection and designation
system. The pod is attached under the right wing pylon, regardless of
aircraft type. At the same time SPS-141, -142, or -143 systems could be
attached under the left wing pylon, providing the carrier with self-defense
measures during the penetration of a missile-engagement zone. The missiles
were always attached under the fuselage, on an APU-68 launcher, typical for
the whole Kh-25M family and some other missiles.
The Kh-25MP was widely exported, though not with all types of seekers. Only
those aimed at defeating the basic HAWK system were provided to the foreign
customers. Poland received 75 Kh-25MP missiles together with Su-22M4
aircraft and some Vyuga pods. Also Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic
Republic received the missiles. The Kh-25MP is still in use in the Russian
Air Force, although in limited numbers, since the MiG-27 and Su-17M4
aircraft platforms are in service only in Asia-based units. Some of the
missiles remained in Ukraine and Belarus, but both countries have withdrawn
the Mig-27 and Su-24 from service.
Kh-58 (AS-11 Kitler)

This missile was based on the British/French Martel anti-radiation missile,
although the Soviet missile is larger and heavier. It has large "X" type
wings around the middle of and smaller "X" type control surfaces at the rear
of its trapezoid shape. The missile received a new seeker to engage
surveillance pulse-radar systems, such as the AN/TPS-43 and AN/TPS-44 used
for ground-controlled fighter intercept, and especially adjusted for the
AN/MPQ-53 radar of the Patriot system.
The Kh-58 was designed to be carried by the Su-24M Fencer-D and using the
L-086A "Fantasmagoria A" or L-086B "Fantasmagoria B" target acquisition/
designation system mounted in a pod on the centerline pylon. The Su-24M can
carry two such missiles under wing pylons. The missile is dropped before
ignition from its AKU-58 launcher, also used with Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
missiles. When the missile is 2-4 m below the aircraft, its rocket motor is
ignited. The Kh-58 entered service in 1982, and all the standard Su-24M
Fencer-Ds could carry it. Due to its long range (36 km from low level, 120
km from 10,000 m, and 160 km when fired at 15,000 m), the Kh-58 allowed
stand-off engagements of such systems as Improved HAWK or even Patriot. It
also made a climb after launch to attack the target from a steep dive,
overcoming the "dead" zone of AN/MPQ-53 radar.
Shortly after the original Kh-58 became operational, its Kh-58U variant
entered service. The Kh-58U was adapted to operate with other
target-designation systems, but its primary difference was that its maximum
range was increased from 160 to 250 km. The missile also has an improved
seeker, allowing lock-on after launch mode. Initially the primary carrier of
the Kh-58U was the MiG-25BM Foxbat-F aircraft. The export version of the
Kh-58 is designated Kh-58E. It is more or less a downgraded Kh-58U, with the
range of a Kh-58 and an improved Kh-58U seeker, but without the
lock-on-after-launch mode.
Presently the Kh-58 and Kh-58U remain the primary Russian anti- radiation
missiles, deployed with Su-24M and MiG-25BM aircraft. They were also
exported to the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and are probably still in use with
Czech and Slovak Su-22M4 Fitter-Ks.
Kh-31P (AS-17 Krypton)

In the early 1980s, after the American HARM entered service, Soviet military
analysts recognized missile speed as an important feature for engaging radar
systems effectively. Cutting the time from launch to impact left less time
for a SAM position to react, or even to turn off its radar. Fast missiles
are also more difficult to shoot down by the defending SAM, which Patriot
could do to older-generation anti-radiation missiles. Thus, OKB Zvezda
started to design two versions of a long-range, high-speed missile at once:
the Kh-31A (anti-ship) and the Kh-31P (anti-radiation), the "swan song" of
Soviet SEAD. The missile has a booster rocket motor and four solid-fuel
ramjets attached around cylindrical body, giving the missile excellent
speed, exceeding Mach 3.6. At 600 kg, the missile is lighter than the Kh-58.
It has the same warhead seeker bands, but its excellent target-location
system allows it to hit the target with a circular error of probability of
5-7 m and 20-30 m when the radar is shut down while missile is in
mid-flight. Its maximum range is 110 km, slightly lower than the Kh-58 but
much higher than the HARM.
The Kh-31P passed state trials in 1988-1990 and entered service with Su-24M
aircraft in 1991. It uses the same "Fantasmagoria" targeting system as the
Kh-58. Although it was integrated with several MiG-29, Su-25, Su-34, Su-35,
and Yak-141 variants, none of these entered service. The Su-24M remains the
sole platform for the missile, carrying up to four in AKU-58 launchers.
Rather low number of these missiles were produced due to financial
restrictions, and probably just one unit of Su-24M aircraft has the missile
in hand. In the mid-'90s an improved version, the Kh-31PD, was developed and
tested. Its range was increased to 150 km, while the other parameters
remained unchanged. The Kh-31PD never entered regular service.

------------------
http://all.net/ 

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Next message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:Europe.Moving.Toward.Ban.on.Internet.Hate.Speech]"
Previous message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:Government.Brandishes.New.Powers.in.Cybersecurity]"
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-12-31 20:59:59 PST