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ADA382535

Report of the 
Defense Science Board Task Force
on 

The Creation and Dissemination of
All Forms of Information in Support
of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
in Time of Military Conflict

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

May 2000

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a
Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the
Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the
Department of Defense.

This report is UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

[OMB Form No. 0704-0188 omitted. Provides title, author, organization,
sponsor, distribution, and classification.]

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND
LOGISTICS) 

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The
Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict

I am forwarding the final report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
The Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.

The Terms of Reference directed the Task Force to:


€ assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop
programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of the
general public; 


€ assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to
deliver such information; and


€ assess other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of
information in times of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use
of emerging mobile communication technologies.

Of particular concern is the lack of an integrated PSYOP capability with the
strategic International Public Information (IPI) initiative. While a
national capability is not the province of DoD, DoD certainly possesses
capabilities and experience which would enhance the development of the IPI
initiative. The Task Force also found that content creation and
dissemination lagged commercial capabilities. Incorporating commercial
capabilities should significantly enhance DoD PSYOP capabilities. Finally,
although PSYOP has demonstrated its usefulness over time, the incorporation
of PSYOP during time of conflict is sporadic and steps need to be taken to
strengthen its position within the JTF/CINC organizational structure.

The report offers several recommendations addressing these problems with a
major thrust being the incorporation of commercial capability in'to the
creation and dissemination of PSYOP products.

I endorse all of the Task Force's recommendations and propose you review the
Task Force Chairman's letter and report.

[Signature] 

Craig Fields
Chairman 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Final Report of,the Defense Science Board Task Force on The
Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict

Attached is the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The
Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.

The Terms of Reference charged the Task Force with reviewing PSYOP
activities within the Department of Defense (DoD). The purpose of the review
was to:


€ assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop
programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of the
general public; 


€ assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to
deliver.such information; and


€ assess other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of
information in times of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use
of emerging mobile communication technologies.

The Task Force was originally created because of concern over the
limitations exhibited in recent military operations in the Balkans, where
the Commando Solo (EC-130E) aircraft were unable to disseminate TV and radio
broadcasts. The Task Force chose to broaden its charter and address issues
associated with PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations (IO)
campaign during peace, crisis, and armed hostilities. It also evaluated
organizational issues associated with PSYOP forces within DoD and addressed
issues associated with the PSYOP community's relationship to the
Intelligence Community. of particular interest is the on-going worldwide
explosion of information creation and dissemination techLnologies and
capabilities. The Task Force spent considerable effort addressing modern
trends in information dissemination and media content creation. With those
trends as a backdrop, the Task Force then assessed the viability of the
current Commando Solo fleet and a variety of options currently being studied
by DOD. 

The Task Force found that Military PSYOP offer a unique and powerful asset
in military operationsf both in peacetime and in war. However, outdated
equipment and organizational issues often hamper the creation of PSYOP
products that meet mission needs. Given the broad array of complex missions
conducted by U.S. military forces, understanding the culture and preparation
of the "soft" battlespace is imperative to the conduct of successful
operations. A robust and flexible PSYOP capability can be an invaluable tool
in these efforts. 

With these issues in mind, the report offers several recommendations. The
Task Force believes that a major effort is required to integrate DoD PSYOP
with International Public Information initiatives to buildbrand identity and
delivery mechanisms required to ensure the message is heard during time of
conflict. Efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical level require
expert content and market analysis which is widely available in the
commercial marketplace. Additionally, DoD needs to acquire the technical
capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and
technologies in order to implement emerging techniques when warranted. More
robust connections with the Intelligence Community, specifically the Defense
Intelligence Agency are required to enhance PSYOP products for specific
countries and regions. Rank structure should be reviewed to ensure the PSYOP
commander receives adequate access to the Joint Task Force Commander/CINC
which will help enable PSYOP integration with the overall operational plan.
Finally, the Task Force recommends against crossdecking the existing Special
Mission Equipment used on the Commando Solo aircraft from the current
EC-130E to the EC-130J. Instead, we should begin the design and development
of small and easily reconfigurable information dissemination packages that
would be compatible with multiple platforms.

The Task Force would like to express its appreciation for the cooperation,
advice, and help provided by the government advisors, support staff, and the
many presenters. 

[Signature] 

Mr. Vincent Vitto 
Task Force Chairman

Table Of Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Executive Summary 

CHAPTER 1, Introduction

CHAPTER 2, Organizational Issues

CHAPTER 3, Reaching the Target Audience

CHAPTER 4, Future Trends in Media Creation and Dissemination

CHAPTER 5, FM and TV Broadcast from Aircraft

CHAPTER 6, Recommendations

Appendix A, Terms of Reference

Appendix B, Task Force Membership

Appendix C, Briefers

Appendix D, Congressional Language

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1.1 Serbian use of propaganda during the Kosovo Crisis

Figure 1.2 PSYOP integrated over all phases of conflict

Figure 1.3 PSYOP Tools Today

Figure 2.1 Current SOCOM PSYOP Structure

Figure 2.2 PSYOP relevance

Figure 4.1 Convergence of transmission networks

Fiaure 4.2 Projected European cable TV penetration

Figure 4.3 Conceptual schematic for DAB receiver

Figure 4.4 AsiaSat 2 TV and radio coverage in C and Ku bands

Figure 4.5 AfriStar satellite coverage and satellite radio receiver

Table 4.1 Cellular / PCS subscriber and revenue forecasts for Brazil,
1994-2004 

Figure 4.7 Emerging trends in wireless telephony (cell-phone) technology

Figure 4.8 Wireless Internet devices and metropolitan wireless Internets

Figure 4.9 The build-out of Internet bandwidth in the suburban United States

Figure 4.10 Projected worldwide market for fiber optic cables

Table 4.2 Total fiber optic cable market: revenue forecasts, 1996-2006

Table 4.3 Forecast of free Internet audio player downloads, 1995-2005

Table 4.4 Content types and distribution channels

Table 5.1 Antenna height and range to horizon

Table 5.2 Operational constraints on airborne broadcasts

Table 5.3 Effectiveness of transmissions from beyond line of sight

Table 5.4 Predicted performance of broadcast transmissions

Executive Summary

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination
of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
in Time of Mlitary Conflict was charged with reviewing PSYOP activities
within the Department of Defense (DoD). The purpose of the review was to:


€ assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop
programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of the
general public; 


€ assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to
deliver such information; and


€ assess other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of
information in times of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use
of emerging mobile communication technologies.

Military PSYOP offers a potentially unique and powerful asset in military
operations, both in peacetime and in war. However, the creation of PSYOP
products that meet mission needs is often hampered by outdated equipment and
organizational issues. Given the broad array of complex missions conducted
by U.S. military forces, understanding the culture and preparation of the
"soft" battlespace is imperative to the conduct of successful operations. A
robust and flexible PSYOP capability can be an invaluable tool in these
efforts. 

The Task Force's Terms of Reference (TOR) asked that the study examine the
issue of creatina and disseminatina information in times of military
conflict. (The full TOR is shown in Appendix A, while the Task Force
membership and the individuals, both inside and outside DoD, who met with
members of the Task Force are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C,
respectively.) The Task Force and its TOR were motivated by Congressional
language in Public Law 106-65, Section 1061 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, shown in Appendix D, which requested
that the Secretary of Defense establish a Task Force to examine (1) the use
of radio and television broadcasting as a propaganda instrument in times of
military conflict and (2) the adequacy of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed
Forces to make such uses of radio and television during conflicts such as
the one in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999.

After initial discussions and briefings, the Task Force broadened the focus
of the stuy to cover the nature of PSYOP as a whole, including
organizational issues, PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations
(IO) campaign, and the increase in media opportunities. From the outset, the
Task Force concluded that the dissemination of information via television
(TV) and radio must be viewed as part of a comprehensive PSYOP campaign
covering strategic, operational, and tactical military operations. This
report begins with a vision of future PSYOP capabilities as part of an
integrated overall information campaign and an overview of how PSYOP
activities are conducted today.

Chapter 2 then presents a discussion of the organizational issues and
challenges that current PSYOP forces face. Chapter 3 discusses the
characterization of target audiences and the need to create an effective and
believable brand identity for disseminating the message. Chapter 4 discusses
future media production and dissemination trends and how they will likely
affect the dissemination of PSYOP products worldwide. Chapter 5 examines the
use the Commando Solo aircraft to disseminate information via TV and radio
broadcasts. Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the Task Force's recommendations.

The Task Force focused on current and future technologies for the
dissemination of PSY~OP products, organizational issues, and mission needs
and requirements. However, the use of PSYOP in military operations must be
viewed as an integral part of the operation, and not as an afterthought. For
PSYOP to be most effective, efforts must be made to include PSYOP as part of
an integrated information operation over all phases of conflict, from
peacetime to hostilities.

Recommendations 

This DSB Task Force was originally created because of concern over the
limitations exhibited in recent military operations in the Balkans, where
the Commando Solo (EC130E) aircraft were unable to disseminate TV and radio
broadcasts. The Task Force chose to broaden its charter and address issues
associated with PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations (IO)
campaign during peace, crisis, and armed hostilities. It also evaluated
organizational issues associated with PSYOP forces within DoD and addressed
issues associated with the PSYOP community's relationship to the
Intelligence Community. Of particular interest is the on-going worldwide
explosion of information creation and dissemination technologies and
capabilities. The Task Force spent considerable effort addressing modem
trends in information dissemination and media content creation. With those
trends as a backdrop, the Task Force then assessed the viability of the
current Commando Solo fleet and a variety of options currently being studied
by DoD. The following recommendations were derived from all of these
considerations. 

If PSYOP is to be a useful tool in the future, it must be a nimble asset
capable of delivering the right information quickly, and in a manner that is
a technologically as sophisticated as any possible competitor within the
region. In the future, the value of PSYOP will clearly be seen as best
utilized before and after the conflict. PSYOP used before will help shape
the military context in a favorable fashion for the U.S. forces. In the best
case scenario, PSYOP actions will be coupled with other flexible deterrent'
options and actually prevent conflict. PSYOP after a conflict will shape the
way U.S. military actions are perceived by people in the region and help to
achieve the end state desired by the Theater CINC and the National Command
Authorities. In the future, bombs and missiles will still determine who
militarily wins or loses a conflict at tactical level. PSYOP, though, will
help determine how long a conflict lasts and the impact of a military strug
le on long term U.S. strategic interests.

Recommendation 1 

The Task Force recommends that DoD create a PSYOP policy planning staff,
under the coordination authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC)). This staff
should ensure the integration of operational and tactical level PSYOP with
strategic International Public Information (IPI) initiatives and provide
planning support for strategic PSYOP activities, as described in
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68.

Recommendation 2 

The Task Force recommends that rank structure and career paths within PSYOP
forces should be reassessed and more specifically:
- the senior PSYOP Advisor to the geographical CINCs should be an O-6 or
equivalent civilian and should be assigned to the CINC Special Staff, and

- the Commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting the Joint Task
Force Commander in theater (typically a three-starflag officer) should also
be an O-6. 

Recommendation 3 

The Task Force recommends that the Office of OASD(SO/LIC) and U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) strive to improve overall product quality
through increased reliance on commercial providersfor high-quality products.
Furthermore, the Task Force recommends that the PSYOP force be adequately
resourced and trained to engage a stable of commercial media content
providers who can deliver these quality products. The Task Force estimates
this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 4 

The Task Force recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency be tasked by
the Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (ASD C3I) to establish a psychological warfare intelligence
element. ASD C3I should be charged to either (a) provide resources to the
PSYOP community to implement a robust organic program of open source
acquisition, or (b) task the Intelligence Community to fulfill the needfor
on-the-shelf, worldwide basic information, including the media and cultural
background information necessary to adequately infonn PSYOP products in a
given country. The Task Force believes that this can be accomplished without
incurring an additional budgetary burden.

Recommendation 5 

The Task Force recommends that ASD C3I make National Foreign Intel
Program/Joint Military Intel Program (NFIP/JMIP) funds available to USSOCOM
for the express purpose of acquiring available data sets, particularly for
countries outside North America and Europe. The Task Force also recommends
that USSOCOM work with the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) to ensure
the integration of these data sets with the World Basic Information Library
(WBIL) and their community-wide accessibility. Moreover, the Intelligence
Community should be further tasked through ASD C3I to develop methods and
sources to obtain media use demographic information where it is not now
available but where the U.S. might plausibly have future national security
interests in which PSYOP might be employed. The Task Force estimates this
investment to be approximately $5 million per year.

Recommendation 6 

The Task Force recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
work with the Department of State to fund, position, exercise, and maintain
suitable distribution channels and brand identities, insofar as these can be
reasonably anticipated for future PSYOP requirements. Policies with respect
to the use of new and emerging transnational media need to be developed or
refined. Liberal reliance on recognized professionals and the generous use
of highly qualified commercial entities are highly recommended. Buying good
content on which the messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable
expenditure. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately
$10 million per year.

Recommendation 7 

The Task Force recommends that DoD acquire the technical capability to
understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies.
Furthermore, DoD should provide the resources to acquire (rent or purchase)
emerging media content and dissemination channels from commercial
organizations. Here, DoD may be able to acquire good channels very cheaply
by means of being an "anchor tenant." The Task Force estimates this
investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 8 

The Task Force recommends that DoD maintain the current EC-130E Commando
Solo fleet with existing Special Mission Equipment (SME). The estimated cost
of $250 million to cross-deck the SME to a EC-130J platform is not justified
by the marginal increase in performance offered by this option. In addition,
future worldwide media dissemination trends will limit the effectiveness of
radio and TV broadcasts. The Task Force recommends that USSOCOM investigate
the creation of small and easily reconfigurable information-dissemination
packages that would be compatible with multiple platforms, including UAVs
and leased aircraft, for a variety of missions. The Task Force estimates the
initial investment for design and development of these packages to be $10 to
$20 million per year.

Recommendation 9 

The Task Force has recommended annual funding increases (in recommendations
1 through 8) of approximately $50 million per year. The Task Force believes
that this increase would be readily supported by reprogramming the $250
million that would be required to fund cross-decking the existing Commando
Solo SME to the EC-130J platforms.

The prompt and effective use of PSYOP in military operations can avert
crises, end wars, and save lives. DoD should prioritize Psychological
Operations appropriately, because the misuse of PSYOP can cause untold
damage to military operations. A relatively small investment over time can
reap huge rewards for the United States and its allies, both diplomatically
and militarily. 

CHAPTER 1 

Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the Study

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination
of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
in Time of Military Conflict was charged with reviewing PSYOP underway in
the Department of Defense (DoD). The purpose of the study was to:


€ assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop
programming and broadcast factual information that can reach a large segment
of the general public;


€ assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to
distribute such information; and


€ assess other issues in the creation and dissemination. of all forms of
information in time of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use
of emerging mobile communication technologies.

Military PSYOP offers a potentially unique and powerful asset in military
operations, in both peacetime and in war. However, the creation of PSYOP
products that meet mission needs is often hampered by outdated equipment and
organizational issues. Given the broad array of complex military operations
conducted since the end of the Cold War, and assumin a, these operations
will continue in the future, it is imperative to understand the culture and
preparation of the "soft" battlespace in order to conduct successful
operations. A robust and flexible PSYOP capability can be an invaluable tool
in these efforts. 

The Task Force's Terms of Reference (TOR) asked that the study examine the
creation and dissemination of information in times of military conflict.
(The full TOR is shown in Appendix A, while the Task Force membership and a
list of experts, both inside and outside DoD, who met with members of the
Task Force are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.) The
Task Force and its TOR were motivated by Congressional language in Public
Law 106-65, Section 1061 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, shown in Appendix D, which requested that the Secretary of
Defense establish a Task Force to examine (1) the use of radio and
television broadcasting as a propaganda instrument in times of military
conflict and (2) the adequacy of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces
to make use of radio and television during conflicts such as the one in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999.

From the outset, the Task Force concluded that dissemination of PSYOP
information via TV and radio must be addressed in the context of an overall
information operations campaign, in peacetime and during hostilities. It
therefore broadened its focus to include information on the nature of PSYOP
as a whole, including organizational issues, PSYOP as part of an overall
Information Operations (IO) campaign, the characterization of target
audiences, and the increase in media opportunities. Instead of focusing
merely on the dissemination of information, the Task Force began the study
with an overview of how PSYOP is conducted today and then turned to a
discussion of the organizational issues and challenges the current PSYOP
forces face. It was agreed that the effective characterization of target
audiences and the creation of an effective and believable brand identity for
disseminating a credible message and product is critical to successful
PSYOP. Also critical is a clearer understanding and better modeling of
future media trends and how they could affect the dissemination and nature
of PSYOP. Finally, the Task Force examined the issue of information
dissemination and in particular the utilization, capabilities, and future
applicability of the Commando Solo aircraft.

1.2 The Increased Relevance of PSYOP

Military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are programs of products and/or
actions that induce or reinforce the attitudes, opinions, and emotions of
selectedforeign target governments, organizations, groups, and individuals
to create a behavior that supports U.S. national policy objectives and the
theater combatant commander's intentions at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. PSYOP events are planned, coordinated, and executed before,
during, and after conflicts. PSYOP actions are a subset of Information
Operations (IO) and International Public Information (IPI) as described by
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been a part of military strategy
throughout history. In the recent past, PSYOP campaigns were utilized by
both sides in World War II, the Cold War, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. During
these large scale conflicts, the PSYOP campaigns were predominantly
effective from a United States and coalition partner perspective, except in
Vietnam, where PSYOP was more effectively used by the adversary. In more
recent conflicts PSYOP played a major role in the US successes in Grenada
and Haiti, but has been viewed as particularly successful in the recent
Balkan conflicts (Bosnia and Kosovo).

While neither the definition nor the purpose of PSYOP has significantly
changed since the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict, the available
technologies, the sociopolitical environment, and the character of
operations involving military forces have all changed dramatically.

Individuals from various backgrounds and perspectives briefed the Task Force
and spoke of the growing, importance of PSYOP to the success of any action
the U.S. Government undertakes overseas, whether diplomatic or military.
While the United Sates is years ahead of its competitors in terms of
military technology, in terms of PSYOP there are already competitors on par
with or even arguably more sophisticated than the U.S. The weakness of U.S.
military PSYOP is ironic because the United States leads the world in
commercial media technology and development. However, foreign rivals are
often more flexible, less restricted by outdated equipment and policy, and
better able to take advantage of changes in the manner in which people
communicate.

 

Figure 1. 1 Serbian use of propaganda during the Kosovo Crisis

The dense nature of the global information environment, coupled with the
importance of the "media message," was demonstrated in past military crises
in populations and cultures as diverse as Iraq, Serbia, and Somalia. The
trend to involve the U.S. military in peacekeeping operations, where the use
of violence is carefully prescribed by restrictive rules of engagement, has
furthered emphasized the need for effective information activities. In
peacekeeping operations, military PSYOP forces can expect to operate for an
extended period of time in an area where sophisticated, robust, indigenous
media competes with the U.S. military PSYOP message. In this environment,
military PSYOP will not have the ability to monopolize an area's information
outlets through destruction or jamming. In fact, PSYOP forces today must
often compete with numerous international neutral entities to gain the
attention of an intended foreign target audience.

In the Information Age there is an increasing reliance on sophisticated,
near-real time media dissemination. Information, and its denial, is power.
The state or entity most able to effectively control or manage information,
especially managing the perceptions of particular target audiences, will be
the most influential. Future adversaries will be more likely to attempt to
rely upon their ability to subvert U.S. foreign policy goals through the use
of sophisticated propaganda -- on both its own populace and on international
audiences -- than to confront the United States and its coalition partners
through traditional military means. They will try to manipulate U.S. policy
througg selected, discriminate propaganda via both legitimate news media and
non-traditional means. For military PSYOP to be effective, they must be
continuous and integrated with the other elements of IO.

1.3 A PSYOP Future Vision

If PSYOP is to be a useful tool in the future, it must be a nimble asset
capable of delivering the right information quickly, and in a manner that is
as technologically sophisticated as any possible competitor within the
region. In the future, the value of PSYOP will clearly be seen as best
utilized before and after the conflict. PSYOP used before will help shape
the military context in a favorable fashion for the U.S. forces. In the best
case scenario, PSYOP actions will be coupled with other flexible deterrent
options and actually prevent conflict. PSYOP after a conflict will shape the
way U.S. military actions are perceived by people in the region and help to
achieve the end state desired by the Theater CINC and the National Command
Authorities. In the future, bombs and missiles will still determine who
militarily wins or loses a conflict at tactical level. PSYOP, though, will
help determine how long a conflict lasts and the impact of a military
struggle on lonc, term U.S. strategic interests.

If the recommendations for military PSYOP contained in this study are
enacted, the future military PSYOP capability may well resemble the
following description which is also captured in Figure 1.2.

 

Figure 1.2 PSYOP integrated over all phases confiict


€ 
Strategic PSYOP: A permanent PSYOP staff organization under the direction of
ASD SO/LIC, will work closely with U.S. Department of State Public Diplomacy
staff members. Their primary purpose, in accordance with Presidential
Decision Directive 68, will be to assist the Department of State in
developing strategic International Public information plans and programs.
Additionally, this strategic PSYOP policy and planning staff will also be
able to de-conflict and synchronize the Theater CINC's PSYOP scheme with the
strategic International Public Information plan. The link between the
strategic PSYOP policy/planning staff and the theaters will occur through
the Joint PSYOP Headquarters. For the first time, this headquarters will
bring all the military PSYOP assets under one organization. Commanded by a
flag officer, the Joint PSYOP Headquarters will maintain open contracts with
civilian advertising and marketing firms for assistance in PSYOP product
development and links with members of academia studying the potential impact
of information on the attitudes and behaviors of foreign target audiences.


€ Operational PSYOP: In this future PSYOP structure, wartime operational
PSYOP will diminish in significance. Much of what is termed today as
"operational PSYOP" will occur during future conflict at the strategic or
tactical level. However, in the future, operational PSYOP will still be an
important contributor during peacetime. In the future, the PSYOP perspective
will always reach the Theater CINC because of the existence of a senior
PSYOP Advisor (PSYAD). The PSYAD position, a member of the CINC's Special
Staff, in close consultation with the Political Advisor, will provide the
CINC with a unique viewpoint on the motivations of the people within a
specific area of operation. The PSYAD also will advise the CINC on how best
to deploy the PSYOP forces organic to his theater. This will be organic
PSYOP because PSYOP forces will no longer be exclusively located in CONUS
but permanently assigned to their particular theater of operations. This
forward deployment will eliminate the long delay caused today by the current
requirement for the CINC's staff to request any and all PSYOP forces and for
the Joint Staff to issue deployment orders. By having permanent in theater
PSYOP forces, CINC's, in coordination with the various U.S. Embassy Country
Teams, will be able to execute a more robust peacetime PSYOP program and
have far more confidence and control of their PSYOP assets. Through
coordination by way of the Joint PSYOP Headquarters, the Theater CINC's
PSYOP staff will provide input into strategic PSYOP plans and programs and
insure their efforts are synchronized fully with the International Public
Information efforts. During periods of crisis and war, the Theater PSYOP
forces will use a variety of platforms, both manned and unmanned to
disseminate information. Some of these assets will be based in space and
owned by commercial interests, and some others will be owned by
other-than-DOD agencies within the U.S. government.


€ Tactical PSYOP: Future tactical PSYOP teams will more resemble electronic
news gatherers as opposed to loudspeaker teams. PSYOP soldiers will no
longer carry loudspeakers in high threat environments. Instead, PSYOP
messages will be routed through a wireless network to unmanned speakers.
Loudspeakers will be mounted on the outside Of more survivable a ored
vehicles like tanks and will be dropped in the enemy's rear areas. The
primary purpose of tactical PSYOP teams will be to gather video footage and
send it for further editing to various PSYOP production centers.


€ Communications links will be robust and real time. Footage gathered by
these soldiers will be sent directly back to the Joint PSYOP Headquarters
and incorporated into the Department of State's Worldnet Television
transmissions. In peacetime, local media contracts will be typically
consummated in order to disseminate PSYOP materials.

1.4 PSYOP Today 

Used properly, PSYOP can help, in the words of the Chinese philosopher Sun
Tzu, "subdue the enemy's army without battle." Especially in an era when any
loss of life is politically sensitive, the ability of PSYOP to be a 'combat
reducer' and save the lives of U.S. troops and citizens, as well as opposing
force personnel, is exceedingly important. PSYOPforces offer U.S.
policyrnakers and warfighters a more discreet and often more politically
palatable tool than conventional military activities, which are primarily
designed to bring the adversary to heel through death and destruction.

However, to be a "combat reducer," PSYOP must be robust and integrated into
each element of power. Unfortunately, the current PSYOP structure reflects
an outdated Cold War policy, with U.S. PSYOP forces primarily oriented
toward supporting tactical forces on the ground, using loudspeaker
operations and face-to-face communications. Nevertheless, given the
increased velocity of information at every level, and the need to react more
quickly to local situations, U.S. military commanders have increasingly
relied upon PSYOP forces at all levels as their conduit for information to
foreign populations. These commanders depend upon their PSYOP officers and
non-commissioned officers to communicate information and expectations,
irrespective of local or international competition, in a manner that
challenges the PSYOP organizational structure.

1.4.1 Strategic PSYOP

In the past, there were clear distinctions between the three levels of
PSYOP: strategic, operational, and tactical. In the post-Cold War world,
however, these distinctions have blurred to the extent that they may no
longer exist. The world's almost instantaneous access to news and
information makes it nearly impossible to localize any information campaigm.
A leaflet handed out in Bosnia is just as likely to be shown by a reporter
on the nightly news in the United States or Europe as it is to be read in
Sarajevo.

 

Figure 1.3 PSYOP Tools Today

Strategic PSYOP, in accordance with PDD 68, is defined as having global
implications and is planned, initiated, and executed at the national level.
Military PSYOP support strategic PSYOP through planning, and if tasked,
through the dissemination of assets. Military'PSYOP should also ensure that
the geographic CINC's peacetime engagement activities are harmonized with
the national strategic PSYOP plan. Despite recent attempts to ensure better
coordination, PSYOP plans at the strategic level suffer from a lack of
synchronization. Currently, there is not a systemic manner in which military
PSYOP organizations gain insight into the strategic perception-management
effort - nor is there a practiced method to de-conflict a supported CINC's
theater information activities with the national information effort. While
strategic PSYOP actions are most effective during peacetime, military PSYOP
doctrine and organizational structure are principally configured to respond
during a conflict. This over-emphasis on wartime operations is viewed by the
Task Force as a deficiency of today's PSYOP force.

1.4.2 Operational PSYOP

During periods of conflict, military PSYOP capabilities and doctrine are
more developed and effective. During warfighting, PSYOP elements are
flexible and can provide support with a small team or with a robust Joint
PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF), potentially consisting of thousands of
individuals. Given enough time during a crisis, PSYOP forces can provide a
surge capability from bases in the United States to the theater CINC
headquarters, supplementing existing PSYOP planning capabilities and/or
establishing PSYOP headquarters for multiple Joint Task Forces. Operational
PSYOP actions impact throughout the entire military theater of operations
and typically consist of widespread television and radio broadcasts, and
newspaper, magazine, and leaflet dissemination. To be effective, PSYOP
planners on the supported CINC's staff must oversee and coordinate PSYOP
prior to the deployment of large forces from the United States. PSYOP
planning staff billets forward in the theaters are however typically thinly
and inconsistently manned.

Operational-level military PSYOP forces today are asked to compete against
sophisticated local and international media organizations, which are often
better funded and more technically sophisticated. Unlike their rivals, U.S.
PSYOP forces today cannot readily disseminate materials over the Internet or
via commercial broadcast satellites. In addition, the PSYOP force is largely
composed of a rather small pool of U.S. Army personnel, who are at best
media amateurs. These forces must attempt to compete against often better
trained foreigners, who are less encumbered by policies and organizational
structures. Ideally, PSYOP research regarding foreign audiences should be
modem and sophisticated, and should utilize a wide range of national
intelligence capabilities and leverage the latest in commercial marketing
and polling techniques. In reality, however, U.S. PSYOP forces have
difficulty making intelligence collection requirements known and accessing
intelligence. In addition, PSYOP personnel are often untrained in civilian
marketing, polling, and media production skills.

Moreover, the PSYOP capability to disseminate via television and radio
broadcasts in denied areas is extremely deficient. The current capability
for radio and television dissemination is limited to the use of Commando
Solo aircraft, which have the capability to broadcast AM and FM radio and
VBF and UBF TV signals from an altitude of 18,000 feet. The Special Mission
Equipment (SME) carried on the EC-130E aircraft features technology that is
decades old and vulnerable to an adversary's countermeasures. The current
PSYOP operational concept features the deployment of a small element of
PSYOP forces forward in the supported CINC's theater of operations. These
deployed forces would be primarily supported by PSYOP plans, programs, and
products develoned at the PSYOP headquarters in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
This so-called "Reachback" concept is dependent upon an enormous amount of
bandwidth through secure communications links. In practice, "Reachback" has
often been very difficult to institute and support.

1.4.3 Tactical PSYOP

Militant tactical PSYOP are actions taken in a local area with focused
impact. Loudspeaker operations, handbills, local radio broadcasts, and
television programming are typical tactical PSYOP actions. Today's PSYOP
capability at the tactical level isquite well developed. Recently, PSYOP
forces supporting local military commanders were augmented with a capability
to produce a limited range of PSYOP products.

In fact, one could make the argument that the current PSYOP structure is too
heavily focused toward tactical PSYOP. This structure makes it difficult to
support the theater CINCs, especially in an age when the power of electronic
media has, in many areas of the world, overwhelmed the print alternative.
Within the current PSYOP organizational structure, the PSYOP regional
battalions, primarily responsible for operational-level PSYOP, are the most
heavily deployed PSYOP forces and struggle to meet the manpower requirements
for the numerous contingency missions. With enough PSYOP tactical forces to
support seven Army corps equivalents (one PSYOP tactical battalion is
allocated to a corps equivalent), the imbalance between regional and
tactical PSYOP forces in the current force structure is obvious.

A major concern regarding tactical PSYOP forces is the survivability of
these units during mid- and high-intensity conflicts. With the lethality of
the weaponry on the modern battlefield, the lifespan of the three-person
PSYOP tactical team in a lightly armed HMMWV, equipped with a loudspeaker
with a range of a mere thousand meters, would probably be measured in terms
of hours, if not minutes. Should PSYOP loudspeaker operations be needed at
the front lines in such difficult threat environments, they will need to be
accomplished remotely via a more heavily armored manned vehicle or an
unmanned vehicle (either aerial or ground). The capability to conduct remote
loudspeaker operations is currently not present in the PSYOP force.

CHAPTER 2 

Organizational Issues

The expectation that the air campaign [against Serbian forces] would last
only a short time also was a detriment to the NATO psychological operations
effort [in the 1999 Kosovo campaign], since those assets were not included
in the initial plans. It took two weeks to start delivering products and
some 30 days to develop a campaign plan. Serbia started its psychological
operations campaign days earlier and won the early initiative.

Timothy L Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority, "
Parameters, Spring 2000, pp. 13-29.

Although USCINCCENT's approval for the theater PSYOP plan was received in
late September, execution authority was not granted until December. The
interagency approval process, mandated by DoD Directive 3321.1 [Overt
Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and
Contingencies Short of Declared War], was glacial. Had the Saudis not
requested U.S. support to encourage Iraqi desertion and defection,
culminating in the formation of a combined U.S., Saudi, Egyptian, Kuwaiti
and British PSYOP effort and the King's approval to execute, it is doubtful
that PSYOP would have been allowed to play an active role in the [Gulf] war
at all. 

Jefffey B. Jones and Jack N. Summe, "Psychological Operations in Desert
Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom, " A USA Landpower Essay Series, No.
97-2, August 1997. 

The above quotes suggest that, in a crisis, DoD cannot conduct psychological
operations any faster than the U.S. Government can produce its International
Public Information (IPI), Public Diplomacy (PD), and coordinated PSYOP
campaign plans. 

2.1 Strategic Relationships of Military PSYOP With Non-DoD Agencies

Organizational debates are hardly new to U.S. PSYOP. Indeed, differences
over the institutionalization and organization of propaganda in U.S.
national security have been a central theme in the evolution of PSYOP
throughout the 20th century. Since World War I, the organization of PSYOP
has been hotly debated and U.S. military PSYOP capabilities have waxed
during wartime and waned during peace.

Since the early 1980s, military PSYOP have become well institutionalized
within DoD. The 1983 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77
("Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security"); the 1984
National Security Decision 130 ("U.S. International Information Policy"),
which instructed DoD to rebuild military PSYOP capabilities; and the 1985
DoD PSYOP Master Plan reversed the post-Vietnam atrophy of military PSYOP
capabilities. 

This institutionalization of military PSYOP forces, however, did little to
eliminate the differing opinions over the organization of PSYOP,
particularly regarding national-level interagency coordination of PSYOP
campaigns. Since the early 1980s, every NSDD and Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) dealing with IPI, PD, or PSYOP (for example, NSDDs 45, 77,
and 130 and PDDs 56 and 68) has required broad interagency coordination of
PSYOP between DoD and other national security departments and agencies,
under the purview of special ad hoc groups. Nonetheless, DoD PSYOP Master
Plans (1985, 1990), and critical assessments during the same period, called
repeatedly for improved and streamlined interagency coordination of PSYOP
plans and products.

Under PDD 68, the International Public Information Core Group (ICG), chaired
by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
coordinates all agencies' IPI activities. If PSYOP campaign plans are not
already prepared, the coordination required throughout the U.S. national
security community will take time. As a result, the influence of PSYOP on a
crisis will not be timely.

During crises PSYOP campaign plans wait upon a complex process of
interagency review, coordination, and approval. The most insightful and
creative processes for developing PSYOP products, and the most modern media
and technologies for delivering PSYOP messages, avail nothing if
organizational structures are too complex, inexperienced, or inefficient to
coordinate and approve campaign plans in time to influence developing or
ongoing crises. As PSYOP adapt to support "Internet War" and as future
information operations occur in "Internet time," these issues become even
more difficult. 

The U.S. PSYOP organizational challenges offer adversaries a clear
asymmetric opportunity during crises: they can beat the United States and
its allies in getting out the first PSYOP messages. Moreover, if the
opponent plans the actions that trigger the crisis, the opponent has that
much more lead time to ready its PSYOP campaign.

This DSB Task Force believes that a permanent, properly constituted
interagency body should be established within the National Security Council
charged with all U.S. Government IPI, PD, PSYOP and other peacetime
management policies and operations. An authoritative standing body would
ensure on-going, front-end, continuous interagency dialogue, coordination,
and integration. 

PSYOP actions cue a very flexible component of an overall IO plan. During
times of peace or crisis, PSYOP can support strategic international
information operations through planning and, if tasked, through the
dissemination of assets. This Task Force found military PSYOP capabilities
during periods ofpeace and crisis to be especially wanting. Tradftionally
focused on tactical military support, PSYOP forces are particularly
challenged to provide support at the strategic level. To retain relevancy
and raise effectiveness, military PSYOP forces must augment their current
strategic capabilities.

Strategic international information operations have global policy
implications and, in accordance with PDD 68, are planned at the national
level. Nevertheless, military PSYOP planners can serve as a link to inform
and synchronize the actions of the geographic CINC in whose theater the
strategic perception-management action may be targeted. Additionally,
geographic CINCs are now engaged in vigorous theater peacetime engagement
activities, where PSYOP forces often play a robust and sometimes key role.
As part of these engagement activities, PSYOP forces often develop an Overt
Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3) tailored for the supported geographic CINC.

This Task Force believes that strategic-level PSYOP suffer from a lack of
coordination with other U.S. Government organizations that disseminate
information to foreign audiences (such as, Radio Marti, Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, and Worldnet Television). This can lead to an
uncoordinated effort in various regions around the world, where the U.S.
Government's information dissemination power is not used to its fullest
advantage. In addition, contradictory information themes could be broadcast
simultaneously through the various venues. PDD 68 is designed to help make
this coordination occur more effectively. Still, military PSYOP often
conduct their information activities oblivious to the higher level
perception-management efforts emanating from the Department of State and
National Security Council. In addition, U.S. Government agencies outside DoD
often do not fully exploit the expertise resident in military PISYOP with
respect to knowledge of foreign audiences and information planning
capabilities. Therefore, DoD should create a small military PSYOP planning
staff, unde'r the coordination authority of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
(OASD(SO/LIC)) to ensure that operational- and tactical-level PSYOP are
integrated with strategic perceptionmanagement initiatives and that planning
support is providedfor strategic PSYOP activities.

2.1.1 The Requirement for a PSYOP Vision and Operational Concept

The 1985 and 1990 PSYOP Master Plans called for a Joint PSYOP vision and
operational concept. The publication of Joint Vision 2010 and the
corresponding service vision statements make these recommendations even more
compelling. The call for a PSYOP vision and operational concept is repeated
again in the 1999 Joint Psychological Operations Enhancement Study and
endorsed by USSOCOM's review of that study. During the revival of U.S. PSYOP
capabilities over the past 15 years, there has been much consensus on the
need for a PSYOP vision and operational concept but the production of this
document is long overdue.

Weaknesses exposed in U.S. military PSYOP response to recent events in both
Bosnia and Kosovo have awakened many to the need to make significant
changes. The vast majority of U.S. military PSYOP forces reside in the U.S.
Army. This rather small group has a Cold 'War-oriented structure, often
antiquated equipment, and limited financial support. Yet, it is inundated
with requests for support from the geographic CINCs to get information to
foreign target audiences -- audiences that are being served by an ever
expanding array of information dissemination options. The good news is that
within military PSYOP forces there is both a willingness to consider new
ways to conduct their mission and movement in positive directions to effect
change. Nevertheless, it is clear that this movement is neither robust
enough to quickly solve identified deficiencies, nor is it sufficiently
supported outside the PSYOP community.

Until a 'road map' for the future of PSYOP is drafted and implemented, it is
difficult to see how PSYOP can remain relevant and develop the capabilities
to best serve the geographic CINCs. As the first step to remedy the
deficiencies within military PSYOP, the Department of Defense must draft a
military PSYOP Vision as well as an accompanying future PSYOP Operational
Concept. 

This action should be undertaken by OASD(SO/LIC), in conjunction with the
Joint Staff J39, and USSOCOM. Furthermore, the Task Force believes that
these actions should be completed within 12 months. These documents need to
be multi-service and interagency in scope, and revolutionary in perspective.
As a touchstone, the PSYOP Vision must be in accordance with the Chairman of
Joint Chiefs of Staff s Joint Vision 2010. To avoid the problems experienced
with the previous Master Plans, the document should be signed by the
Secretary of Defense and have clear implementation schedules to ensure its
adoption. 

2.2 Should PSYOP Forces Be Exclusively Under USSOCOM?

Since the 1950s, the center of gravity of military PSYOP has been Fort
Bragg, NC, and the Special Warfare Center. Indeed, the Special Warfare
Center, established in 1956, evolved from the Psychological Warfare Center,
established in 1952. Not surprisingly, as PSYOP capabilities were revived
during the 1980s, they were aligned organizationally with special
operations. Figure 2.1 shows the current organizational structure within
USSOCOM where the bulk of PSYOP forces are concentrated in the 4th PSYOP
Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

 

Figure 2.1 Current SOCOM PSYOP Structure

The authors of the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan, however, believed that the
subordination of PSYOP to special operations "detracted from the recognition
of the overall applicability of PSYOP in times of peace, crisis, and war...,
contributed to the lack of understanding of PSYOP," and reduced the
effectiveness of PSYOP planning at unified and specified commands. Despite
guidance from the Secretary of Defense to separate PSYOP and special
operations in implementing the 1985 Master Plan, after long review PSYOP
were subordinated to USSOCOM in 1987.

The 1997 Critical Assessment, authored by the former commanders of the U.S.
Army's 4th PSYOP Group, called for the creation of a Joint PSYOP Command
under USSOCOM.1 These former commanders saw future PSYOP enhancements as
being dependent on:


€ far more, rank and representation for PSYOP at national levels and in the
unified and specified commands and their components;


€ far more, independence of PSYOP from special operations in staffing,
planning, and execution; and


€ an all-but independent national-level Joint PSYOP Command, which would
coordinate PSYOP support for transnational and national strategic-level, as
well as theater-level, operational plans and operations.

The Task Force's investigations led to the conclusion that during periods of
conflict, military PSYOP capabilities, particularly at the tactical level
(Army Corps equivalent and below), are more developed and effective.
Military PSYOP doctrine and organizational structure are primarily
configured to respond during a conflict.

____________________

1 Psychological Operations into the 21st Century: A Critical Assessment, 15
May 1997, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

During warfighting, PSYOP elements are flexible and can provide
tactical-level support with a small team or operational-level support with a
robust Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF), potentially consisting of thousands
of individuals. Given enough time during a crisis, PSYOP forces can provide
surge capability from bases in the United States to the theater CINC
headquarters. supplementina existinc, PSYOP planning capabilities and/or
establishing PSYOP headquarters for multiple Joint Task Forces at the
operational-strategic level of war.

 

Figure 2.2 PSYOP relevance

In addition to issues regarding PSYOP organization and USSOCOM. there are
other organizational issues that merit further discussion.

ServicePSYOP. Both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy are engaged at the
service level, to a relatively limited extent, in PSYOP research, training,
and doctrinal development, as well as in developing PSYOP organizations.
Since joint military PSYOP is subordinated to USSOCOM, PSYOP doctrine,
training, and organization should come under that command's purview.

PSYOP and Information Operations. While USSOCOM has responsibility for joint
PSY0P, joint doctrine has established PSYOP as one of the "five pillars" of
information IO, and DoD has assigned authority for some elements of IO to
other commands (for example, USSPACECOM). The Task Force believes that the
role of PSYOP in an overall IO strategy should be considered as part of the
development of a PSYOP vision and operational concept.

Military PSYOP and Civilian Perception Management. There are repeated
instances of military PSYOP absorbing and employing the talents and
resources of civilian perception-management industries durinc, conflict, and
then dismissing them entirely from post-conflict PSYOP organization,
planning, doctrine, and training. This issue is discussed in chapter 3.

2.3 Forward PSYOP Deployment To Support CINCs

The Task Force recognizes that the shortcomings of the recent NATO PSYOP
campaign in Serbia and Kosovo will revive older questions regarding the
effectiveness of PSYOP planning ort the staffs of the warfighting CINCs. The
shortcomings can be explained in part by the inadequacy of PSYOP planning
support to the geographic CINCs, and in part by the lack of resources
available for ongoing theater engagements of all types, including the CINCs'
overt peacetime psychological operations programs.

The 1985 PSYOP Master Plan identified numerous shortcomings in PSYOP
planning in the Unified and Specified (U&amp;S) Commands. The 1985 Master Plan
led to changes in Defense Planning Guidance, the Joint Operations Planning
and Execution System, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The 1990
PSYOP Master Plan pointed out that "the effect of the 1985 Plan was to
initiate measurable improvements in each identified area, ameliorating many
of the problems...." While the 1990 Master Plan included recommendations to
further enhance PSYOP planning, none was directed at the U&amp;S CINCs.

More recently, J39's Joint PSYOP Enhancement Study, and the former PSYOP
Group commanders' Critical Assessment identified problems in PSYOP task
organization to support walfighting CINCs. For example, the Joint PSYOP
Enhancement Study found: "Each of the supported CINCs cited inadequate
[PSYOP] force commitment to theater as a root cause: of many deficiencies
and problems during their evaluation of PSYOP support war scenarios" (p.
2-2-12). The Critical Assessment recommended that "PSYOP teams forward
deploy to all theater SOCs (Special Operations Commands) to coordinate and
participate in deliberate and crisis planning to ensure PSYOP participation
on the front end and as the lead elements for the formation of Joint
Psychological Operations Task Forces (JPOTFs) when called for by OPLANS" (p.
30). Some CINC staffs recommend a "standing JPOTF" comprised of CINC staff
(implying great numbers of CINC PSYOP staff and planners) and personnel from
the regional PSYOP support battalions.

The CINC staff participants in the Joint PSYOP Enhancement Study identified
PSYOP organization for allied and coalition operations as a major
shortcoming. The problems include a lack of a standing JPOTF organization,
lack of SOPS, and inadequate training. Compounding these problems is the
lack of PSYOP forces, SOPs, or doctrine among many allies and coalition
partners. 

This DSB Task Force agrees with the various recommendations offered by the
Critical Assessment and by the Joint PSYOP Enhancement Study. To address the
issue of PSYOP support to the CINCs, these recommendations depend on some
combination of the following:


€ more PSYOP staff and planners on the CINC staff;


€ enhanced capabilities to task and organize rapidly to support CINC
planning and crisis action;


€ establishment of a standing "nucleus" (possibly including CINCstaffi
around which a JPOTF or CPOTF would be established

- the Joint Staff (J39) and USSOCCOM should examine the adequacy of the
existing PSYOP force structure (active and reserve) to fully support the
doctrinal recommendation that the JTF be supported by a component-level
JPOTF. 

2.4 Rank Structure of PSYOP Forces

There are several arguments favoring greater rank within PSYOP forces.

First, there are the high interest in and high expectations of PSYOP across
the spectrum of peace, crisis, and war, coupled with demands for "wide-band"
coordination up and down the chain of command. With such expectations must
go commensurate responsibility and authority.

Second, the ongoing efforts to modernize and capitalize military PSYOP with
advanced capabilities for production, dissemination, and delivery put PSYOP
in competition with the most competitive sectors of the services and the
general economy for talent and experience. Professionalization of military
PSYOP requires specialization in the career field, and that field should
offer the possibility of high rank.

Third, the rank of the senior PSYOP advisor in the theater is often much
lower than that of the JTF principle staff that effective planning,
coordination, and decision-making are severely impaired. PSYOP officers
often have little direct access to the warfighting coniniander.

Fourth, PSYOP officers on staff of the geographic CINCs lack the rank and
the access to the CINC for effective long-range PSYOP planning, or for
effectively coordinating the CINC's theater-operational PSYOP with national
and transnational strategic-level international information campaigns.

The Task Force concluded that rank structure and career paths within PSYOP
forces should be reassessed and more specifically:


€ the senior PSYOP advisor to the geographical CINCs should be an O-6 or
equivalent civilian; and


€ the commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting the Joint Task
Force Commander (typically a three-star flag officer) in theater should also
be an O-6. 

____________________

[Footnote not keyed to text.]

2 Steven Collins, "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints,"
Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 57-73.

CHAPTER 3 

Reaching the Target Audience

3.1 Packaging the Product

It bears repeating that the goal of PSYOP is to influence the behavior of
the target audience. This presumes that the goal can be accomplished by
influencing their perception.s. Critical, of course, is the theme of the
message. But equally important is the packaging,of the message, which must
be suitable for the target audience and the dissemination media of choice.
This requires considerable understanding of the target audience and their
information milieu in order to tailor the message to the audience and choose
dissemination media that can be expected to reach that audience.

Today's PSYOP force includes a small but dedicated cadre of country experts
familiar with the cultures and fluent in the languages of their accounts.
There is also a small and equally dedicated cadre of production personnel,
operating a modest suite of production capabilities.

The Task Force considers it important for the PSYOP force to maintain some
organic capability for in-house production. Situations arise that require an
immediate response, and some situations may be of sufficient sensitivity
that outsourcing would be undesirable. However, the Task Force also believes
that consistent production of the highest quality products can be
accomplished best by relying on a readily accessible set of professional
firms that specialize in the desired products for the target audiences and
chosen media. 

The Task Force has concluded that OASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM should strive to
improve overall product quality and recommends increased reliance on
commercial providersfir high-quality products. The Task Force believes,
therefore, that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced and trained to
engage a stable of commercial providers who can deliver these quality
products. 

In addition to training in acquisition skills, government PSYOP personnel
require intensive instruction, refresher training, and hands-on
familiarization with state-of-the-practice techniques across the spectrum of
traditional and emerging media. This should ensure knowledgeable oversight
and management of outsourced production, and likewise ensure that -there are
sufficient in-house skills to operate the modest organic QRC facilities.
Once these in-house facilities complete their modernization changeover from
analog to digital production, modest but continuing recapitalization may be
required to assure compatibility with evolving media and state-of
the-practice. 

3.2 Developing the Message

Presenting the message so that it is compelling and credible requires a
careful blend of creativity and sensitivity. The product must grab the
attention of the target audience -- in a wholly positive way -- and leave
the message with them in an unambiguous and mernorable fashion. Unless a
rough-and-ready message has special cachet, the more polished and
professional the message is, the better. While there surely are dedicated
and creative individuals in the PSYOP force, turning to commercial
producers, where possible, is recommended. As previously mentioned, the Task
Force recommends that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced to engage
commercial providers, and adequately trained to get the most for the
expenditure. However, background information required for framing the
message and selecting distribution channels, most likely, must be supplied
by the government. 

Three sources of intelligence contribute to a capable PSYOP program. These
are perhaps best described as proprietary inforination, classified
intelligence, and information from the public domain.

Proprietary or privately held information requires considerable diplomatic
expertise to acquire. It is best acquired through organizational
interchanges, either among governments or non-government entities, or
through contacts, meetings, international or transnational coalitions, and
the like. 

Classified intelligence supports PSYOP in largely traditional ways, except
that the ratio between technical collection and clandestine collection is
reversed -- that is, the raw information of most value to the conduct of
PSYOP is often acquired by clandestine collection. To the extent that the
necessary information comes from public and private sources, it should be
reinforced through clandestine means as a quality check. A cooperative
effort involving intelligence agencies and country teams (coalition,
perhaps) is vital. 

The Task Force observes that the PSYOP community must better specify the
intelligence support it requires, especially for classified collection and
tailored production. Currently, the PSYOP community seems to expect that the
provision of tailored intelligence and other necessary information will be
serendipitous. This is decidedly not the case, and raises a risk that the
planning, execution, and assessment of PSYOP effectiveness will be based
upon faulty information.

The Task Force believes that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be
tasked by the Secretary of Defense through his Assistant for C3I to
establish a psychological warfare intelligence element. This element, in
cooperation with the PSYOP community, should develop intelligence
requirements, task the appropriate collectors (overt, technical, or
clandestine), and analyze and produce finished intelligence products
specifically meeting PSYOP needs. The PSYOP community should have
representation within this DIA element, and DIA must be able to access the
4th PSYOP Group's research and analysis group. The DIA element should be
authorized to coordinate fully with the other U.S. intelligence agencies,
certain law-enforcement agencies, and U.S. and other allied information
services. 

In addition to proprietary information and classified intelligence, a
considerable amount of information needed for the development and employment
of PSYOP products is available via open source acquisition and an increasing
amount of that information is available on the public Internet. The Task
Force distinguishes between two kinds of open source acquisition activities.
The first is simply the use of commercial contractors to provide suitable
open source products to fit PSYOP needs. This would largely be geared to
derivative products and non-Internet sources. In many cases, there are
contractors who already supply a market with such information and the costs
are merely subscription and licensing costs. In other cases, general
products could be tailored to special PSYOP needs at minor cost. Even in
cases where the contractor would be required to start from scratch to
collect, organize, and synthesize such materials for the PSYOP community,
the Task Force anticipates that one can negotiate favorable terms insofar as
the contractor is permitted to re-purpose the materials for commercial
customers. The second category of open source. acquisition involves direct
online access. A considerable and increasing amount of the information
needed for the development and dissemination of PSYOP products is available
on the public Internet. Harvesting that information -- often translating it,
organizing it, and providing quality assurance -- is manpower intensive. And
while it can be accessed by any individual analyst or tool developer, there
are major economies of scale in doing it once, centrally and making it
available for the community.

Because the Intelligence Community has declined the opportunity to
aggressively organize the open source effort, it falls to individual
organizations, such as the 4th PSYOP Group, to shoulder the burden
themselves. The Task Force is unanimous in recommending that harvesting this
information be done just once and well for the PSYOP community and,
moreover, that it be made broadly available within the Department of
Defense. 

The Task Force believes that ASD C3I should be charged to either: (a)
provide resources to the PSYOP community to implement a robust organic
program of open source acquisition, or (b) task the Intelligence Community
to fulfill the need for on-the-shelf, worldwide basic information, including
the media and cultural background information that is necessary to
adequately inform PSYOP products in a given country.

Military reservists offer a largely untapped personnel resource that can be
profitably applied to the business of mining open sources for the technical
and cultural information needed for the development and dissemination of
PSYOP products. Unfortunately, reserve forces are not currently structured
to optimize their potential contribution to this effort. The principal
mismatch -- which, indeed, reflects an active duty problem -- is that the
reserve forces are organized around the reservist's wartime Military
Occupational Specialty (MOS). In this day and age, however, many reservists
have civilian employment in information technology areas, which makes them
especially suitable for this open source mission.

The Task Force is not ready to advocate major structural changes in the
active reserves. However, there is a large reservoir of individual ready
reservists (IRR) and individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) who could be
formed into virtual units, disconnected from their earlier active duty
service but especially suited to the 21st century Information Battlespace.
The potential here is to use IRR and IMA personnel in virtual units, which
would participate in "distance drilling" -- participating virtually in unit
activities, even from home. And, of course, there are standing reserve
intelligence units whose mission would require only a modest tweak in order
for them to satisfy the PSYOP information needs more directly.

A prototype effort along these lines was sponsored, originally, by the
Intelligence Comnunity's Open Source Program Office, which used such online
teams to organize and populate the online World Basic Information Library
(WBIL). The WBIL program is now operated by the U.S. Army Foreign Military
Studies Office (FMSO). Beyond the natural desire to serve their country, the
individuals are motivated to "drill for points" so that the dollar costs of
this effort are quite modest.

The Task Force also concluded that ASD C3I and Service Reserve Affairs
organizations should review the WBIL program at FMSO, recognize the
potential of reservists to meet, in a novel way, an otherwise languishing
intelligence need, and provide the modest resources necessary to augment
this effort. 

To take full advantage of efforts like the FMSO WBIL will require the
deployment to the PSYOP community of state-of-the-practice data mining
software, connectivity, and computing power. The Task Force also notes, in
passing, the need for ever more powerful data mining tools to keep up with
the explosive growth in online information, which inevitably worsens the
"signal-to-noise ratio" -- more wheat, but a lot more chaff, more nuggets,
but a lot more ore to be refined.

Correctly choosing the media dissemination channels that reach the target
audience is an essential element of PSYOP. This requires knowing the "market
penetration" of the media, and the viewing, reading and/or listening habits
of the target audience. Media penetration, particularly for electronic
media, is a subject of constant commercial study, especially in North
America and Europe. An admittedly somewhat cursory search for media
penetration data for other regions of the world indicated that there is
little or no information available. Those studies that do exist are
generally available by subscription or on a selective, one-time-purchase
basis. For purposes of long-term planning and quick reaction, these general
data sets need to be acquired and on-the-shelf. This requires a certain
attention span that is sometimes lacking in the case of the Intelligence
Community -- as, for example, its lassitude with respect to global (open
source) coverage. Absent a reinvigorated Intelligence Community open source
effort, the local solution is to ensure that the PSYOP force has the
resources to purchase these materials directly. It is important, however, to
acquire and maintain these data sets, where available, for easy access by
the entire national security community.

The Task Force encourages ASD C3I to make NFIP/JMIP funds available to
USSOCOM for the express purpose of acquiring available data sets,
particularly those for countries outside North America and Europe. The Task
Force also recommends that USSOCOM work with FMSO to ensure the integration
of these data sets with the WBIL and their community-wide accessibility.
Moreover, the Intelligence Community should be further tasked through ASD
C3I to develop methods and sources to obtain media-use demographic
information where it is not now available, and where the United States might
plausibly have future national security interests in which PSYOP might be
employed. The underlying premise is that the right business principle is to
turn the "consumers" into "customers."

3.3 Brand Identity 

The Task Force is persuaded that a considerable foundation must be laid well
in advance of the actual need to deliver a PSYOP product to a particular
audience. In general, the distribution channels need to be acquired in
advance and a suitable "brand identity" needs to be established. Both need
to be exercised with sufficient periodicity that good will and market
penetration are ready when needed. Such channels and brand identities are at
least as important as any technical dissemination platform such as Commando
Solo, and their operations and maintenance are no less important. This will
be increasingly the case as the diversity of programming choices available
to target audiences continues to expand. Cable and satellite TV and radio,
and especially the public Internet, offer far more choices than over-the-air
networks did formerly. The development of channels and identities will be
particular, in some cases, to geography and, in other cases, to
transnational affinity groups -- Islamic Fundamentalism, for example -- or
to more universal demographics, like teenagers. Of course, the development
of brand identities must be tightly integrated with ongoing, broad public
diplomacy initiatives and themes.

The Task Force notes that preliminary forays into the use of the Internet as
a dissemination medium have been fraught with impediments, which the Task
Force attributes to immature policy in dealing with the use of a medium that
knows no national boundaries.

The Task Force believes, therefore, that OSD should work with the Department
of State to fund, preposition, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution
channels and brand identities, as far as can be reasonably anticipated for
future PSYOP requirements. Policies regarding the use of new and emerging
transnational media must be developed or refined. The Task Force highly
recommends a liberal reliance on recognized professionals and generous use
of highly qualified commercial entities; buying good content on which the
messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. In some
cases, the U.S. Govemment has unique content that it can make available.

It should be understood that the credibility and good will associated with a
brand identity is capital that is built up over time, and in the actual
event that capital may have to be depleted. If such good will has to be
expended in a particular PSYOP, equivalent capacity should be restored at
the earliest opportunity.

3.4 Measures of Effectiveness


€ Receivability: How well did the physical message propagate to the intended
area? 

- Could it be jammed?


€ Receipt: How often did members of the target audience tune in to the
message? 

- Did they have the right receivers? Could they read? Did they read and
speak the language, dialect, and argot in which the message was framed?


€ Receptivity: How favorably did the target audience respond to the message?

- Did they change their behavior in a favorable direction? Did it matter?

Issues of receivability are the proximal cause of this Task Force study --
that is, Congressional interest in whether Commando Solo was sufficiently
capable of propagating the desired media to the desired areas, or whether an
improved platform were justified. Answers to questions about receivability
are generally found in the physics of the situations -- broadcasts should be
higher in the air, higher in the spectrum, higher in power, and so on. This
being so, the modeling and simulation to forecast receivability is a
reasonably well-established art. Moreover, simple physical measurements in
the field can unambiguously answer the question of receivability -- although
this is not always immediately feasible in denied areas.

The actual reception -- as opposed to the predicted "hearability" -- needs
to be measured in the field, either directly or indirectly. This is
necessary in the short term to improve the particular PSYOP. It is necessary
in the longer term to refine the modeling and simulation tools to better
reflect field conditions.

Of critical interest is the question of how favorably those in the target
audience who received the message reacted. The bottom line, of course, is
did they change their behavior in the desired way -- that is, did it matter?
There is a need for behavioral modeling and simulation research. Again,
field measurement is the ultimate test and is nece.ssary to calibrate any
models and validate any focus group pre-testing that may have been employed.

The Task Force recognizes that research in this area is most likely to be
problematic. Notwithstanding, the Task Force believes that DARPA should be
encouraged to consider favorably any research that may further the goal of
developing practical measures of effectiveness.

CHAPTER 4 

Future Trends in Media Creation and Dissemination

4.1 Introduction 

The Task Force recognizes that the technological revolution currently
transforming the TV and radio industries, telephony, and networking will
assuredly have major effects on PSYOP content and dissemination. These three
types of technology -- previously quite distinct --are now rapidly rr~xing
and blurring. Correspondingly, the distinction between channels and content
is coming into much sharper focus since technology now allows one to send
virtually any type of content across any type of dicrital transmission
channel. As one simple example, the content o f a radio station can now be
sent worldwide by the Internet, it no longer relies on transmission through
a geographically constrained RF channel. Figure 4.1 shows this revolution in
schematic form.

 

Figure 4.1 Converaence of transmission networks

This chapter provides a brief survey of current mass media trends in these
three arenas: TV and radio, telephony, and the Internet. Three major themes
will emerge:


€ Conventional terrestrial TV and radio are rapidly being rendered obsolete
by novel, digital, and "converged" types of media.


€ A complex and confusing array of incompatible new technologies is
currently being fielded and it is extremelv difficult to predict which of
these \xill be successful.


€ Broadcasting to mass audiences is quickly being replaced by narrow-casting
to much smaller, more targeted audiences. and even by tailoring media
streams for individuals.

4.2 Terrestrial TV and Radio

The most important contemporary trend in terrestrial TV broadcasting is the
continued, seemingly inexorable cut-over from RF broadcast transmissions to
cable systems. This migration is already well-advanced in many parts of the
world, and it may even accelerate as cable systems begin to provide a full
range of subscriber services, including telephony and high-speed Internet
access. At the same time, however, broadcast High-Definition Television
(HDTV) is being introduced in a number of incompatible formats across the
world. Several less well-known, incompatible forms of digital radio
broadcasting are now emerging for terrestrial stations and will likely be
widely deployed in the next few years.

4.2.1 Cable TV 

Cable TV build-outs are proceeding at very different rates in the different
regions of the world, depending on factors such as local regulations and
population density. Nonetheless, cable TV is clearly a major factor in
television systems worldwide. For example, as shown in figure 4.2, within
the next few years, almost 60 million European households will subscribe to
cable TV service. The subscriber growth rate has been roughly linear in
recent years, but it will likely increase as cable TV systems begin to offer
a full range of telecommunications services (such as, telephony and
Internet, access) through the cable infrastructure.

 

Figure 4.2 Projected European cable TV penetration (Source: Frost &amp;
Sullivan)

Since cable TV offers obvious advantages over broadcast television -- such
as excellent reception, an enlarged number of channels, and the possibility
of subscription-based premium services -- it is likely to become increasing
popular throughout the world as cable plants continue to be built out. The
implications for PSYOP and particularly for Commando Solo are clear: an
ever-increasing number of households worldwide will be unwilling or unable
to receive RF broadcast transmissions of TV signals. In addition, U.S. PSYOP
will need to compete against a very large menu of commercial TV channels.

4.2.2 High-Definition Television (HDTV)

HDTV is a method of transmitting high-quality TV channels over the existing
spectrum allocations for terrestrial RF transmission. As often happens, the
Americans, Japanese, and Europeans have settled upon three incompatible
formats, in part because of the regions' different TV spectrum allocations.
The current Japanese version is analog, the Americans have settled upon a
digital transmission method informally termed 8-VSB: and the Europeans
prefer another method called COFDM. The technical specifications for these
systems are quite complex and each allows a wide range of potential modes;
the Amen'cari'version, for instance, allows 18 different transmission
formats. Although the U.S. HDTV broadcast system is now nominally
operational in at least one station in over 60 percent of the U.S. market,
there appear to be recurring doubts as to whether 8-VSB provides adequate
viewing quality over an entire coverage area. The FCC has rejected a
petition to allow U.S. broadcasters to use COFDM. But even more recently (16
February 2000), the National Broadcasting Corporation's (NBC) Vice President
for technical planning and engineering, Peter Smith, raised "extreme
concerns" about the performance of 8-VSB based on field trials of both 8-VSB
and COFDM. There is also some evidence the 8-VSB will not work with moving
receivers (or transmitters) but that COFDM will since the European standard
was explicitly designed to service mobile subscribers, such as televisions
in cars and buses. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. cable TV industry has shown few, if any, signs of
interest in deploying a version of HDTV compatible with the U.S. broadcast
industry. Rather than aim for a higher quality image in the same bandwidth,
they prefer to employ digital techniques to further compress transmissions
so that they can provide more channels. The Task Force does not know the
plans for digital cable TV outside the United States.

It appears highly likely to this Task Force that broadcast television
signals will, over time, transition from analog to digital. At this moment,
however, the Task Force doubts that anyone has clear insight into how this
transition will unfold, and even whether any of the current HDTV schemes
will gain market acceptance in even limited geographic regions.

The implications for PSYOP are thus uncertain. If HDTV becomes widely
successful, the PSYOP community would likely need to transition to creating
higher quality digital media streams and to distributing them via digital
broadcasts. Depending on the media encoding, such transmissions may be
technically infeasible from moving platforms such as Commando Solo.
Furthermore, the HDTV standards worldwide appear to be as fragmented as the
current analog standards (NTSC, PAL, SECAM), so that PSYOP would need
multiple HDTV systems in order to service all parts of the world.

4.2.3 Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB)

Several efforts are currently under way to introduce a digital form of
standard terrestrial radio stations. Since these new methods are digital,
they are of course incompatible with existing Commando Solo equipment.
Outside the United States -- primarily Europe, Canada. and Australia --
there is great interest in an L-band system called Eureka-147. Within the
United States, at least two incompatible systems are being tested in the
conventional AM and FM bands. One of these systems is now gathering
increased attention worldwide for the AM bands.

Eureka-147. This European-designed system will operate in either the L-Band
(1452-1492 MHz) or Band III (around 221 MHz). It operates at 224 kilobits
per second with Musicam audio coding. Standardization is being carried out
through the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) on behalf
of two trade orcranizations3. Figure 4.3 shows how a Eureka-147 receiver
splits its received bit stream into both compressed music and an overlaid
data stream that contains such information as song titles, performers'
names, and so forth.

 

Figure 4.3 Conceptual schematic for DAB receiver

American DAB Systems. The Eureka-147 system has been rejected for use in the
United States since its L-band spectrum is reserved for telemetry. Instead,
two incompatible U.S. schemes4 have been proposed for use in the current AM
and FM bands. Both schemes preserve the existing analog stations but also
overlay new, higher quality digital versions in the same bands. The FCC is
well under way to approving these systems.

The U.S. System Worldwide - Digital Radio Mondiale. The U.S.,
legacy-compatible approach to DAB has proved appealing enough that it is now
being pursued worldwide under the auspices of a consortium known as the
Dicital Radio Mondiale5 (DRM). DRM's goal is to develop a standard for
digital broadcasting in the AM bands below 30 MHz. DRM has lodged its
proposal for a digital standard with the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) and aims to start broadcasting in late 2001, with receivers
entering the marketplace at about the same time.

____________________

3 The World Forum for Digital Audio Broadcasting (www.worlddab.org) and The
Eureka 147 Consortium (www.eurekadab.org).

4 One is proposed by USA Digital Radio (www.usadr.com), the other by Lucent
(www.lucent.com). 

5 Web site (www.drm.org).

4.3 Satellite TV and Radio

The Task Force notes that space-based TV and radio systems are already
widely deployed throughout the world and they too are beginning a transition
to digitaf formats. This section provides a very brief sampling of current
trends in satellite dissemination systems. Such systems are proving
extremely popular in the developing world since they can be rolled out very
quickly and cheaply.

These satellite systems pose several technical challenges for a mobile PSYOP
dissemination platform such as Commando Solo. First, the media encodings are
digital, and sometimes proprietary, and often encrypted. Thus, they cannot
be serviced by Commando Solo's current transmission suite. Second, the
receivers employ satellite dishes pointed to specific slots in
geosynchronous orbits. It will not be easy for a platform such as Commando
Solo to transmit in such a way that it can be received in these dishes.
Third, the satellite systems operate on a variety of bands (L, C, Ku) not
currently supported by Commando Solo.

Satellite TV. Although U.S. viewers are perhaps most familiar with U.S.
systems such as DirecTV, a. great many non-U.S. systems currently provide
service to other parts of the world. This section briefly discusses one
representative system, AsiaSat6, which should provide an adequate
illustration of the competition that Commando Solo is now encountering.
AsiaSat currently operates three satellites using both the C and Ku bands.
Figure 4.4 shows the footprint for its geosynchronous AsiaSat 2 satellite.

 

Figure 4.4 AsiaSat 2 TV and radio coverage in C and Ku bands

The AsiaSat 2 channels are broadcast in several different digital encodings.
One common ercoding is MPEG-2/DVB, QPSK modulation, symbol rate: 4.42
Msym./sec, FEC: 3/4. It is instructive to peruse the TV and radio channel
listings for the AsiaSat 2 band7, as it shows the very wide variety of
programming already available to developing world subscribers. This one band
provides at least 25 TV channels and a number of radio channels from a
variety of sources around the world. Similar menus are provided for AsiaSat
2 Ku-band and AsiaSat 3 C-band. Consumers in these regions can thus receive
quite a wide and entertaining mix of TV and radio channels through typical
18" satellite dishes.

Satellite Radio. The Task Force received a briefing from WorldSpace Corp.8
on its new satellite radio system, which is currently well on its way to
becoming operational. Accordingly, this section discusses the system as an
example of satellite radio. WorldSpace does, however, have competitors in
the satellite radio business9. Figure 4.5 shows the beam footprint for
Worldspace's AfriStar satellite alongside a Hitachi-built receiver for
WorldSpace broadcasts. Corresponding satellites for Asia and South America
will be launched mid- and late-2000.

 

Figure 4.5 AfriStar satellite coverage and satellite radio receiver

____________________

6 Web site: www.asiasat.com

7 Saudi (TV and 2 x radio), Myanmar TV, Chinese provincial TV (Guangxi,
Shaanxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, Qinghai, Fujian,
Jiangxi, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei), Papua New
Guinea TV, Egyptian Space Channel, Fashion TV, RTPi TV, Antena 1 Radio, Sky
Channel, TVSN, Voice of America, Worldnet, Reuters TV, BBC, AP Television
News, Voice of America, Worldnet, CCTV - Channel 4, Deutsche Welle TV and
Radio, French TV5, TVE Internacional of Spain, MCM France, RAI International
Italy, Radio Finland YLE. Radio France Internationale, Radio Netherlands -
de Wereldomroep, World Radio Network, Radio Canada International, Swiss
Radio International, Radio Exterior de Espana.

8 Worldspace Corp. web site: www.worldspace.com.

9 For instance Sirius Radio (www.siriusradio.com)has targeted U.S. consumers
for a fee-based system in alliance with various car manufacturers.

The WorldSpace system is fully digital and transmits a number of stations
simultaneously in the L-band. Each station is a separate audio stream
encoded in a variant of MPEG-3 audio. Different streams can be sent at
different bit-rates; each stream occupies some multiple of 16 Kbps in the
overall TDMA plan. Stations can switch encodings "on the fly" so that a
number of language-specific commercials can be embedded in the same prograrn
by encoding each of the commercials at a lower rate than the overall rate
for that station. The total number of channels thus depends on the exact
coding rates chosen for each channel, though there will likely be more than
25 channels in each satellite beam.

Since the WorldSpace system is fully digital, it will convey data in
addition to the audio streams. At the very least this will include the names
of the songs and performers. WorldSpace Corp. also expects to transmit
Internet web content via this means, though the Task Force believes that
their system capacity may be somewhat too low for this to be commercially
feasible. 

Taken as a whole, increasing market penetration for satellite TV and radio
poses two distinct problems for U.S. PSYOP. A narrow, technical problem is
that U.S. forces have no available means to disseminate their PSYOP content
to households that rely upon satellite services. In particular, the Commando
Solo aircraft cannot provide this function for the variety reasons listed at
the start of this section. A much wider problem, however, is that the IPSYOP
message now needs to compete against a very rich entertainment menu. As a
result, it will become increasingly difficult for the PSYOP community to
acquire "brandshare" in its target audiences.

On the other hand, as satellite systems become highly subscribed in one or
more regions of the world, they offer an appealing medium for PSYOP
dissemination since a single system generally offers full continental
coverage at relatively modest cost. The insertions of PSYOP "commercials"
and "specials" into existing, branded channels could prove a highly
effective, and cost-effective, means for disseminating PSYOP content. Here
DoD might wish to become an "anchor tenant" within new systems in order to
ensure that such channels exist and are available for DoD use.

4.4 Media Trends in Telephony

As will be discussed, wireless telephony is very rapidly being built out
across the world, and there is great interest in evolving cellular telephony
systems into multimedia systems by providing higher data rates and non-voice
services. This would then allow cellular systems to be used for
dissemination of TV, radio. and web content. On a parallel, but unrelated,
front the tight integration of computers with fax and voice dial-out systems
has begun to allow widespread and economical delivery of voice and graphic
messages through the public telephone system. Both these trends offer some
promise as new ways to disseminate PSYOP content.

Cellular, PCS, and Wireless Local Loop. Both the developed and developing
worlds are building out wireless telephony infrastructures very quickly. It
is, however, difficult to provide aggregate worldwide growth figures since
commercial market intelligence is generally carried out country by country.
Table 4.1 shows a typical projection. Similar growth rates are expected for
large areas of South America and Asia. Unfortunately, the technology base
for wireless telephony is fragmented among a number of incompatible schemes
(GSM, CDMA, TDMA, and various wireless local loop technologies). This makes
it impossible to create a universal wireless telephony solution that is
applicable worldwide.

                                         Revenue
       Subscriptions      Revenues      Growth Rate
Year      (000s)        ($ millions)       (%)
___________________________________________________

1994        423.0            464.5         ---
1995      1,313.5          1,407.2        202.9
1996      2,580.4          2,337.4         66.1
1997      4,414.0          4,048.0         73.2
1998      7,798.7          5,302.4         31.0
1999     12,086.4          7,215.6         36.1
2000     14,987.1          7,658.4          6.1
2001     18,134.4          8,559.4         11.8
2002     20,220.8          9,159.6          7.0
2003     22,060.9         10,147.5         10.8
2004     23,891.8         11,682.6         15.1
___________________________________________________

Table 4.1 Cellular PCS subscriber and revenue forecasts for Brazil,
1994-2004 
(Source: Frost &amp; Sullivan)

Data-Enabled Cellular Systems. Cellular equipment manufacturers and service
providers are currently rolling out data services as fast as possible. A
confused assortment of protocols are currently vying for market share --
representative examples include Short Messaging Service (SMS), General
Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Wireless Access Protocol (WAP), Cellular
Digital Packet Data (CDPD), and others. Some of these are directly
Internet-compatible, while others require gateways -to the Internet. None
has significant market share yet, although the only really widely available
system, NTT DoCoMo in Japan, currently claims a million subscribers for its
cellular data system with 40,000 new customers being added each month.

As consumer interest in data service increases, today's cellular systems
will need significant overhauls in order to efficient] provide
high-bandwidth data services. Figure 4.7 pictures something like the current
state of the art on the left, namely simple text messaging, and the
hoped-for future to its right, namely full motion video and web browsing.
The exact path by which current cellular systems will evolve to these future
so-called "3G" systems is by no means evident. A number of potential
migration paths have been proposed and a variety of incompatible upgrades
are now being fielded. It is unclear to this Task Force when, and indeed if,
these hoped-for upgrades will actually transform the voice cellular system
into a data-centric system.

 

Figure 4.7 Emerging trends in wireless telephony (cell-phone) technology

Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) - Automated Call- Out and Fax
Broadcasts. For some years, computers have been tightly, integrated with
telephony systems in large call centers (for example, for telemarketing).
Such systems combine the database functions of computers with voice and/or
fax systems in a number of ways. Such systems can, of course. be used for
deliverv of arbitrary voice and graphic messages, either by call-in (where
the other end places the call) or by call-out. In the most extreme form, CTI
systems are used for voice and/or fax broadcast. Here, a single voice or fax
message is delivered to a potentially unlimited number of recipients. In
essence, an operator provides a voice recording or file containing a fax
document, together with a list of thousands or tens of thousands of phone
numbers, and the computers place a number of calls one after another to
deliver the messaae to each of its intended recipients. Since the computer
can tell whether a message has been fully delivered or not, it can keep
placing a call or sendine a fax until it has been successfully delivered.
The computers can also distinguish a human respondent from a fax machine,
and deliver a voice message to the former but a graphic document to the
latter. 

Such voice and fax broadcasts can be implemented in-house or out-sourced to
any of a number of companies. Simple arithmetic shows the potential PSYOP
impact of such technology. If each call takes 30 seconds, a single calling
interface can place two messages per minute, or 120 per hour. Ganging 100
such interfaces can thus deliver 12,000 messages per hour, which can
accommodate a mid-size town. In addition, international phone rates are
falling rapidly; at today's best consumer rate of 10 cents per international
minute, such a fax or voice message broadcast costs only $1,200. This rate
is likely to plummet in the near future as additional capacities come
online. 

4.5 The Internet 

The Internet is, of course, the dominant feature of the "new media" in our
time. However, since it is large and highly decentralized, there are no
definitive measures of its actual size or growth rate. For this study. the
Task Force has relied on the most recently published figures (December 1999)
from Telcordia's Dr. Christian Huitema, a well-respected researcher who
produces monthly estimates10. Overall Dr. Huitema estimates the total number
of Internet users at somewhere between 295.0 and 398.8 million, though of
course this number is very hard to pin down. He further estimates that 78.9
million computers were directly attached to the Internet in December 1999,
which is an annual increase of 36 million computers (84 percent) from the
estimate of 42.9 million computers in December 1998. This figure represents
those computers listed in the global Domain Name Service, and hence it
represents only a subset of all computers that can access the Internet. For
example, it does not include most home computers that connect via dial-in
lines. The regional breakdown of Dr. Huitema's figures is as follows: United
States, 60.7 percent; Europe, 24.2 percent; Asia, 12.2 percent; Latin
America, 2.3 percent: and Africa. 0.7 percent. Note that even the relatively
low percentage for Africa represents over half a million computers.

____________________

10 ftp://ftp.telecordia.com/pub/huitema/stas/dec99.html

Web Sites. Web sites are so widely known that this report shall skip all
discussion of them except to briefly remark that they are quite suitable for
dissemination of PSYOP content.

Email. Email is probably the predominant means of communication for Internet
consumers and could also be an excellent medium for PSYOP. It would be
rather easy to find a large number of email addresses for users in a
country, and then begin to send them email. This can be blocked, but such
blocking is generally done by the receiving organization rather than by the
service provider. Hence, one might expect a rather porous barrier to
unsolicited email into a country. This email could of course contain images
and sounds in addition to text. If desired, each message could be tailored
to an individual recipient, thus providing some rough form of geographic
tailoring and helping to keep opposing authorities somewhat in the dark
about what everyone is receiving.

Chat Rooms and Messaging. Internet chat rooms may also have potential PSYOP
uses, in that "guided discussions" could perhaps be used to influence how
citizens think about certain topics. This example is already in practical
use with the candidates in the U.S. presidential elections. China has begun
to set up monitored chat rooms so its citizens can discuss a wide range of
matters. In the Chinese approach, offending messages are deleted before, or
just after, they have been sent to everyone. Such chat rooms might be a way
to allow citizens of a country to air their grievances. While the
originating point of a chat message is not hard to discover, there are ways
around such monitoring. In China, for instance. a great many chat messages
come from Internet cafes, and so cannot be traced back to specific people.

4.5.1 New Forms of Wireless Internet Access

The first "pure Internet" wireless networks are just beginning to emerge
within the United States. Such networks are entirely designed for Internet
devices; they are technically quite different from telephony systems, which
have had the primary design goal of carrying human speech. Figure 4.8 shows
a typical wireless Internet device (Palm VIITM) side by side with a network
schematic for the RicochetTM network by Metricom11. The Task Force does not
have detailed market estimates for wireless Internet access, but Killen &amp;
Associates has forecast a 71 percent compound annual growth rate for this
market, from $1.3 billion in 1998 to $19.2 billion in 2002. These figures
include access through cellular systems as well as "pure Internet" systems.

___________________

11 Metricom web site: www.metricom.com

 

Figure 4.8 Wireless Internet devices and metropolitan wireless Internets

At present, RicochetTM is the only wireless Internet suitable for hand-held
or vehiclemounted devices and operational on a metropolitan level. It
operates solely within the United States. The current RicochetTM network
covers the San Francisco bay area, Seattle, and Washinaton, DC, as well as a
number of U.S. airports. It employs a proprietary frequency-hopping radio
that operates in the ISM band. Within the past year, however, Metricom has
had a significant infusion of funds ($1.2 billion) in order to build out a
higher speed version of this network across all major U.S. cities. When
operational, this network will provide relatively high-speed (128 Kbps) and
secure Internet access to any device that has a Metricom modem.
Interestingly, these networks are much cheaper to build than those based
upon cellular telephony technology, yet they will likely provide noticeably
higher performance.

Since both the Internet and mobile wireless fields are extremely active and
well-funded at the moment, the Task Force expects that a number of other
companies will also begin to build out such networks in the coming year or
two. At present there are some regulatory barriers to building such networks
in various parts of the world (particularly Europe and Japan), where lower
ceilings on the maximum allowable transmission power make such metropolitan
networks economically infeasible. It seems likely, however, that such
systems will eventually be built throughout the world.

4.5.2 The Internet and the Coming Impact of Fiber Optics

As interestingas the preceding technologies are, the Task Force believes
that by far the most important technology driver for the next decade will be
the extremely high-bandwidth fiber optic cables across which the Internet
will run. Everything described above is an evolution of existing technology.
The coming ultra-high-speed Internet technology, however, will be completely
revolutionary. As a result, it is exceedingly hard to predict. But a glance
at figure 4.9 shows the magnitude of the changes that are almost literally
on today's doorstep.

 

Figure 4.9 The build-out of extraordinary Internet bandwidth in the suburban
United States

Figure 4.9 shows a typical Boston suburban street with a 288-fiber cable
pulled by RCN Corp. during 1999 to provide a new residential communications
infrastructure. Running with current top-of-the-line commercial equipment,
this cable provides full-duplex bandwidth of about 23 terabits to a small
region of the town. Broken down by household, that comes to more than 10
gigabits/second per house. Translating that bandwidth into TV and radio
shows the extent of this revolution. A single HDTV channel occupies
something less than 20 megabits/second. Thus. a given household could have
as many as 500 HDTV channels streaming into it simultaneously with none of
these channels shared with any other house in the town. Obviously, no house
is going to receive 500 TV stations simultaneously, so if indeed the
bandwidth is ever fully used, it will be used by something other than TV or
radio. Thus far, of course, the driver has been the Internet, with its
seemingly insatiable appetite for bandwidth.

Surprising as it may seem, the developing world will not lag terribly far
behind the United States in Internet build-out. Today, for instance,
although less than 5 percent of China's small companies have ever used
Internet services, Frost &amp; Sullivan estimates that over 50 percent are
likely to go online within the next five years. Figure 4.10 shows projected
annual sales of fiber optic cabling worldwide. The yearly production (and
deployment) of fiber is expected to nearly double between 2000 and 2006.

 

Figure 4.10 Projected worldwide market for fiber optic cables
(Source: Frost &amp; Sullivan)

As can be seen from table 4.2, the highest growth rates for fiber optic
cabling, occur outside North America and Europe. In particular, the least
developed parts of the world are projected to have compound annual growth
rates (CAGR) of over 50 percent, though of course from a very small base.

               North                     Asia         Latin
              America     Europe       Pacific       America   Rest-of-world
      Year ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)
___________________________________________________________________________

      1996    1,582.9     1,039.7         739,2         89.8          2.6
      1997    1,681.2     1,228.8         895.8        154.6          3.4
      1998    1,800.0     1,433.8       1,053.0        188.2          5.7
      1999    1,856.0     1,650.9       1,255.7        230.1         10.0
      2000    1,839.4     1,872.4       1,503.4        269.8         22.0
      2001    1,826.1     2,002.1       1,790.3        316.3         32.8
      2002    1,778.3     2,103.4       2,084.3        363.3         44.6
      2003    1,794.7     2,189.4       2,283.7        404.2         64.7
      2004    1,762.1     2,278.7       2,491.0        452.9         92.0
      2005    1,784.1     2,213.4       2,746.4        510.8        148.1
      2006    1,788.2     2,158.2       2,998.4        562.7        200.4

CAGR 1999-2006 (0.5)%      3.9%          13.2%         13.6%        53.4%
___________________________________________________________________________

Table 4.2 Total fiber optic cable market: revenue forecasts. 1996-2006
(Source: Frost &amp; Sullivan)

Even in the next few years, the Internet is likely to have a major impact on
the distribution of radio and TV content within the United States and, a
little later, in other parts of the world. Indeed, this process has already
begun, though it is currently hampered by the very low bandwidth available
in typical homes (53 thousand bits/second at most).

Internet Radio Stations. In recent years there has been an explosive growth
of radio stations transmitting real-time audio streams through the Internet.
One MIT database records more than 9,000 radio stations transmitting through
the Internet12. Any of these stations can be heard anywhere in the world by
anyone who has a cheap PC and an Internet connection. The list of stations
already available online is perhaps even more interesting than the sheer
number of such stations13.

Internet TV Stations. More surprisingly, a number of TV stations are already
transmitting through the Internet even though the typical household
bandwidths are not yet high enough for satisfactory TV quality. A quick
search of one vendor's web site14 found 85 TV stations broadcasting through
the Internet. Transmissions originate in such countries as Brazil, Cyprus,
Peru, Russia, Bahrain, Korea, Philippines, Slovenia, Croatia, and India. The
Task Force expects the number of such stations to grow very rapidly once
cable modems, ADSL, and other high-speed consumer Internet technologies have
reached a critical mass.

____________________

12 MIT Internet radio web site: http://wmbr.mit.edu/stations/.

13 Lists of countries taken at random, with the number of online radio
stations in each country. Papua New Guinea (4), Kazakhstan (4). Kyrgyzstan
(3), Philippines (30), Mongolia (2), Lebanon (10), Iran (1), Ghana (10),
Madagascar (2), Saint Helena (1), and South Africa (30).

14 Web site: www.real.com.

Audio and Video On Demand. Of course it is a mistake to conceive of the
Internet only as a replacement of conventional radio and TV stations. Even
when restricting the discussion to only audio and video media, the Internet
brings the enormous advantage of being able to supply media clips on demand.
Thus, it is rapidly emerging as an important distribution medium for popular
music and, in time, it will likely be a prevalent means for distributing
video products. Table 4.3, which forecasts the number of free Internet audio
players that will be downloaded in the coming years, gives some notion of
the projected size of these markets. At present, Internet audio companies
offer promotional audio files in order to entice users to use their software
products. These free audio files also attract end users to purchase the full
CD of the featured artist. By 2001, a wide variety of popular music content
is expected to become available and the number of paid audio files is
projected to rise to 28 percent of total audio downloads. By 2005, 52
percent of audio downloads are expected to be paid for, while 48 percent of
audio downloads are projected to be free and used for promotional purposes.

                             Unit
             Units       growth rate
Year      (millions)         (%)
____________________________________

1995           0             ---
1996           0             ---
1997          5.8            ---
1998         39.5            581
1999         43.4             10
2000         53.8             24
2001         65.1             21
2002         84.7             30
2003         96.4             14
2004        102.5              6
2005        126.3             23
____________________________________

Table 4.3 Forecast of free Internet audio player downloads, 1995-2005
(Source: Frost &amp; Sullivan)

Trends in Personalization of Web Pages and Media Streams. Internet radio and
TV stations will be further distineuished from their classic predecessors in
that they will be highly personalized. The preferences of each customer will
be maintained in a database and the media stream flowinc, to that customer
will be tailored accordingly. Each customer will receiver his or her own
personalized stream of media content and commercials, targeted as carefully
as the media supplier can manage. The first results of this technology are
already widely deployed in personalized web pages and Internet storefronts.
A "My Yahoo" page, for example, contains content tailored for the individual
consumer, and the Amazon.com online store records previous purchases in an
attempt to suggest tempting new offerings when a consumer re-appears. In a
sense, such technology takes "narrow-casting" to an extreme -- it is
precisely the opposite of broadcasting.

4.6 Other Media 

A number of other media types, and means of dissemination, are also widely
popular. Video games are perhaps the most popular. They can be disseminated
by a number of techniques, ranging from diskettes to web downloads. Internet
ames allow a number of geographically dispersed players to participate in a
large, shared virtual space. Web animations are also popular, as are Java
applets. Other important media at this moment include CDs, CD-ROMs, and
DVDs. All are suitable for PSYOP in some situations.

4.7 Summary of Media Content and Dissemination Channels

Table 4.4 shows a number of potential types of content (columns) and how
such content can be mapped onto a variety of channels (rows). Those
intersections marked with a "Y" are those in which a given type of content
can be carried via a given medium. Shaded areas indicate content that can be
created and disseminated bv traditional PSYOP. Only a very small subset of
the potential types of content fall into this category.

Channel/     Broad  Video  Audio  Text/   Short   Interactive  Interactive
Video
Content      cast?                Photo  Message     Voice         Web
Game
____________________________________________________________________________
_____

Radio
 AM / FM       Y             Y
 Shortwave     Y             Y
 Digital       Y             Y              Y
 Satellite     Y             Y
____________________________________________________________________________
_____

Television
 VHF / UHF     Y      Y      Y      Y       Y
 Cable         a      Y      Y      Y       Y
 HDTV          Y      Y      Y      Y       Y
 Satellite     Y      Y      Y      Y       Y
____________________________________________________________________________
_____

Internet
 Classic Web   b                    Y       Y                       Y
Y
 Streaming     b      Y      Y      Y       Y                       Y
Y
 Media
 Email         c      Y      Y      Y       Y                       Y
Y
 Chat /        d                            Y                       Y
 Messaging
____________________________________________________________________________
_____

Telephony
 PSTN                        Y                          Y
 Cellular      e             Y              Y           Y
 Satellite     e             Y              Y           Y
 Fax           c                    Y       Y
 Paging        f                            Y
____________________________________________________________________________
_____

Physical
Media
 Leaflet                            Y       Y
 Cassette                    Y
 CD                          Y
 CD-ROM               Y      Y      Y
Y
____________________________________________________________________________
_____

Notes: 

a. Cable is typically transmitted through coaxial cables. This would make it
hard to insert content without permission from the cable's operator. Some
parts of cable distribution systems are microwaves, however. In addition,
some distribution to users is via RF (for example, MMDS and LMDS in the
United States). 

b. Although these media appear to be broadcast, in fact they are implemented
by a number of individual sessions much like individual phone calls. These
individual sessions are generally traceable by the operators of the local
Internet service: hence, privacy cannot be guaranteed. In addition, entire
web site addresses can be blocked rather easily by a local Internet service.

c. These media can be broadcast by the repeated sending of the messages to
individual destinations. Since this is automated, it takes little trouble,
but it does take a certain amount of transmission capacity to send so many
duplicated messages. In addition, these transmissions can easily be
monitored and/or blocked by the local Internet and telephone service
providers 

d. As with the classic web, these features are easily monitored and/or
blocked, assuming that the local Internet service provider can determine the
addresses of the chat / messaging sites.

e. Basic cellular and satellite telephone service is one-to-one rather than
broadcast. However there might be certain features of some cellular
technology that would allow insertion of broadcast messages (audio or text).

f. Basic paging service is one-to-one rather than broadcast. However many
pager technologies include groups (for example, for stock market or news
updates). These could probably be used for short message delivery.

Table 4-4 Content types and distribution channels

4.8 Findings 

The following are the Task Force's findings on current and future trends in
media creation and dissemination.

Fundamental Changes in Media and its Dissemination. The Internet is the most
obvious sign of media change, but in fact change is occurring on all fronts.
Conventional terrestrial broadcast of TV and radio grows ever less important
as consumers switch to cable and direct-to-the-home satellite. Geographic
broadcasting is breaking down as satellites broadcast TV and radio channels
worldwide. Many thousands of radio stations are now broadcasting through the
Internet. And web sites are rapidly becoming a new and as-yet unknown blend
of media sites, newspapers, and discussion forums.

Unstable, Rapidly Changing Technology. The worlds of media content and
medil6m dissemination are currently in a state of extraordinary flux.
Technological innovations are occurring at a rapid pace and impacting deeply
enough to fundamentally alter the structure of the world economy. The stable
world of conventional broadcast TV and radio is rapidly vanishing and in its
place a large variety of new and incompatible technologies are being fielded
around the world. No one can tell which, if any, of these new technologies
will emerge victorious. But it seems evident that this unstable, rapidly
changing environment is likely to last for years or perhaps even decades.

Narrow-casting. All current media trends lead away from the old broadcasting
model irM which a large number of consumers all receive a relatively small
number of widely shared content streams and toward a tightly targeted
narrow-casting model. At present, many consumers have hundreds of media
channels at their fingertips. Very quickly, even the narrow-casting model
will be superceded as media streams are specifically designed for individual
consumers. Very large consumer databases will ensure that each consumer
receives a stream of images, sounds, and advertisements that are aimed
precisely at his or her taste.

Based on these trends, the traditional use of TV and radio broadcasts from
an airborne platform (Commando Solo) is becoming a less effective method to
disseminate PSYOP products in a tactical setting, Consumers in many parts of
the world have access to a very wide range of media -- indeed, many may not
even be able to receive Commando Solo broadcasts of UHF and VHF TV because
they have cable or satellite TVs. The consumer's center of gravity is
rapidly shifting to the Internet. Broadcasting is no longer how the media
works. Instead, everything is becoming more tightly focused as the number of
distinct media channels grows ever larger.

CHAPTER 5 

FM and TV Broadcast from Aircraft

5.1 FM and TV Broadcast from Aircraft

A critical element of tactical PSYOP has been radio and TV broadcasts from a
standoff airborne platform. Transmissions from aircraft altitudes offer an
advantage over terrestrial transmissions because obstacles standing between
transmitter and receiver in terrestrial transmissions -- such as vegetation,
buildings, and terrain -- attenuate transmitted signals and degrade
reception. For this reason, aircraft allow access to relatively large areas.
The effective range of a transmitter generally improves with altitude, but
it is subject to frequency-dependent absorption, reflection, and
diffraction. In addition to the broad coverage made possible by altitude, an
aircraft broadcast platform can be deployed anywhere on the globe and begin
operating in a short amount of time. An element of survivability is also
gained over fixed or even portable terrestrial stations.

Radio broadcasts occur in HF, VHF, or UHF. Commercial and
government-sponsored radio broadcasters transmit amplitude modulated (AM)
signals in the so-called AM band (535 to 1700 kHz) and in any of several
short-wave (SW) bands ranging from about 2.3 MHz to 22 MHz. Frequency
Modulated (FM) radio broadcasts occupy the FM band, which spans 88 MHz to
108 MHz. TV broadcasts, because of their much higher bandwidth, are confined
to VHF and UHF in several TV bands: 54 to 72 and 76 to 88 MHz (VHF-L), 174
to 216 MHz (VHF-H), and 470 to 608 and 614 to 806 MHz (UHF).

The Commando Solo aircraft is the only current airborne asset equipped for
broadcast PSYOP. A fleet of six EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft are operated
by a reserve unit. Each is equipped with radio and TV transmitters covering
HF, VHF, and UHF commercial and military bands and a variety of other
equipment needed to broadcast messages in audio and video formats. The
aircraft have six 1-kW transmitters -- two for VHF-L, two for VHF-H, and two
for UHF -- and one 10-kW power amplifier that can be operated on VHF or UHF.
Separate antennas for VHF-L, VHF-H, and UHF run along each side of the
aircraft. Providing 6 to 9 dB gain, these antennas must be switched when the
aircraft turns along a typical racetrack pattern. The received signal is
degraded or lost during turns. When operated, Commando Solo transmitters
saturate the front-ends of onboard communications and navigation equipment
-- a problem that should be addressed and resolved with high priority.

The effective range of a broadcast transmitter is governed primarily by
antenna height, effective radiated power (transmitted power multiplied by
antenna gain), transmitted frequency, and receiver noise characteristics.
Though the details of governing relationships are complex and usually
treated by computer models, simple rules can be applied to predict overall
performance. 

The distance from the antenna to the earth's horizon is a very important
parameter. For an idealized, spherical earth, this distance is the square
root of two times the geometric mean of antenna height and earth radius.
This distance, d, scales as the square root of antenna height,

d = square root of 2 · ht · R0 ,

where ht is the transmitter antenna height and R0 is the earth's radius.
Increased antenna height improves range, but doubling the height (an
ambitious proposition) increases range by only about 40 percent.

For a spherical earth, a clear line of sight exists between the transmitter
and a receiver antenna on the earth's surface inside this distance. Raising
the receiver antenna increases line-of-sight range by a term identical to
the above equation, so the line-of-sight range becomes

d = square root of 2 · ht · R0 + d = square root of 2 · hR · R0 ,

where hR is the receiver antenna height. The second term in this equation is
dominated by the first when ht is an aircraft altitude. Terrain, surface
material properties, vegetation, and atmospheric conditions all influence
the "actual" line-of-sight range; however, as a general rule, higher
transmitter and receiver antennas imply greater range and the situation
improves as the square root of height of either receiver or transmitter.
Table 5.1 serves as an illustrative example where the receiver antenna is
assumed at zero height.

    Approx.
antenna height   Range to
    (kft)        horizon (mi)            Platform
_____________________________________________________________________

       1             39            Typical TV antenna tower
      20            174            EC-130E, EC130J
      40            245            Widebody aircraft (eg. Boeing 767)
      60            301            Global Hawk, Gulfstream
_____________________________________________________________________

Table 5.1 Antenna height and range to horizon

Table 5.1 shows that a receiver with clear line of sight to a 1,000 ft tower
39 miles distant would also have a clear line of sight to an EC-130E at
about 20,000 ft and 174 miles distant. This table and the preceding equation
can be used to roughly estimate effective transmitter range so long as
transmitted power is sufficient for line-of-sight communications, or
sufficient to overcome so-called R-squared losses. The point is that beyond
ranges shown in table 5. 1, signals begin degrading in a different way (a
higher a power of range or even exponentially) and much more rapidly with
increased r nge. 

Table 5.2 lists distances typical of operational constraints placed on an
airborne broadcast system.

 Target audience          Aircraft location        Distance (mi)
________________________________________________________________

    Belgrade              Hungarian border             100
    Belgrade              Romanian border               50
________________________________________________________________

    Baghdad               Saudi border                 250
________________________________________________________________

    Teheran               Persian Gulf                300
    Teheran               Turkey border               300
________________________________________________________________

    Pyongyang             Korean Sea                  40-50
    Pyongyang             DMZ                         80-100
________________________________________________________________

CINC requirement for radio and TV                      300
________________________________________________________________

Table 5.2 Operational constraints on airborne broadcasts

Comparing the two tables above, it becomes clear that the current Commando
Solo aircraft, the EC-130E, is inadequate for many scenarios even in an
idealized situation. Given the real-world issues of obscuration by terrain,
vegetation, and buildings, plus the need to fly somewhat behind a political
border in order to avoid surface-to-air threats, it is clear why Commando
Solo is most effective when transmitting into island or littoral nations. It
is also worth noting that the CINC requirementfor a 300 mile range may not
be large enough to address several important scenarios.

The EC-130E platform currently used for Commando Solo flies at 18, 000 feet.
There is interest in cross-decking the existing Special Mission Equipment
(SME) to an EC-130J platform that would fly at 24,000 feet. This increase in
altitude would have only a marginal impact on Commando Solo performance and
the Task Force is concerned that the SME hardware represents very old
technology and thus projects major weight, size, and power restrictions on
any platform that carries the current hardware. TheTask Force is also
concemed that the debate has focused on the platform and not the payload --
the critical infonnation transport mechanisms in support of PSYOP missions.

Effective radiated power is another important parameter determining
broadcast range. When transmitter and receiver antennas are within line of
sight, the received signal scales inversely with the range squared --
doubling the range requires four times the power to maintainthe same signal
quality. Beyond line of sight, this relationship becomes much more
complicated. Absorption, scattering, diffraction, and reflection of energy
from the transmitter are a strong function of frequency and can vary
considerably with time of day, time of year, and even solar activity. Table
5.3 provides a qualitative summary of these effects.

Transmission   Frequency
    type      range (MHz)  Band                 Beyond LOS propagation
____________________________________________________________________________
__________

                                  Reception beyond LOS due to diftraction;
much longe
 AM radio     0.535-1.7     AM    range at night due to ionospheric
reflection, some
                                  variation with season and sunspot cycle

                                  Degraded reception beyond LOS; some
absorption in
 FM radio      88-108       FM    foliage and other obstacles; some seasonal
variation
                                  with foliage

                                  Degraded reception beyond LOS; some
absorption in
 TV            54-88      VHF-L   foliage and other obstacles; some seasonal
variation
                                  with foliage

                                  More degraded reception beyond LOS; more
 TV           174-220     VHF-H   absorption in foliage and other obstacles;
some
                                  seasonal variation with foliage

                                  Highly degraded reception beyond LOS;
significant
 TV           470-800      UHF    absorption in foliage and other obstacles;
more
                                  seasonal variation with foliage

Analog and
 digital      50-400   VHF &amp; UHF  Varies with frequency, as described above
telephony
____________________________________________________________________________
__________

Table 5.3 Effectiveness of transmissions from beyond line of sight

The dependence of propagation strength on frequency is also illustrated by
typical effective radiated power for U.S. broadcasters: AM radio: &lt;20 kW, FM
radio: &lt; 200 kW, VHF TV: &lt; 300 kW, UHV TV: &lt; 5 MW. The largest AM radio
stations on clear channels reach 1,000 miles or more at night while UHF and
VHF TV stations with large antenna towers and high power typically reach 100
miles or less depending strongly on receiver antenna gain and height.

Other important factors determining broadcast range are receiver quality and
bandwidth. Receiver quality in the AM band is less important than for VHF
and UHF because atmospheric noise tends to dominate signal quality below 30
MHz or so. In the VHF ans UHF, however, noise generated by the receiver is
important and so newer receivers will tend to be useful with weaker signals.
This is particularly true for the UHF. Larger bandwidth implies more
receiver noise, so the audio portion of a TV transmission is typically
useful beyond the range where the video becomes unacceptable. This effect
is, to some extent, a result of the modulation and demodulation techniques
used (typically FM foraudio and AM for video) and of differences in the way
noise is perceived on audio and video information.

Table 5.3 illustrates why Commando Solo performance is best for AM radio
broadcasts and poorest for UHF TV broadcasts. All Commando Solo systems
worked well in Haiti, Panama, and Grenada, as would be expected from tables
5.1 and 5.3. Radio broadcasts worked acceptably in Iraq and Kosovo, while TV
broadcasts were not satisfactory. During the Kosovo campaign, Commando Solo
was orbiting at 18,000 to 20,000 ft over Hungary -- about 100 miles from
Belgrade. Transmitting 10 kW on UBF channel 21, the video quality was
unacceptable while the audio was understandable, again in general agreement
with the above discussion even though many details are omitted.

The above discussion and the Kosovo experience can be used to predict, with
some confidence, how various options will perform if called upon in future
military operations. Table 5.4 summarizes these qualitative predictions
assuming a clear channel for each case.

Target audience      AM            FM          VHF TV           UHF TV
____________________________________________________________________________
__

 Island nations    EC-130        EC-130       EC-130            EC-130

 Pongyang          EC-130        EC-130       EC-130 + ERP,     Widebody
                                               widebody

 Belgrade          EC-130        EC-130       EC-130 + ERP      Widebody
                                               widebody

 Baghdad         EC-130 night,               Widebody + ERP,   Widebody +
ERP,
                 widebody day   Widebody      Global Hawk       Global Hawk

 Teheran         EC-130 night,  Widebody      Global Hawk       Global Hawk
                 widebody day   Global Hawk
____________________________________________________________________________
__

Table 5.4 Predicted performance of broadcast transmissions in selected
operational scenarios

Table 5.4 illustrates the limitations of the EC-130 platform (whether the
EC-130E or J variants), attributable primarily to its limited altitude. A
widebody platform, flying at 40,000 ft and possibly with 3 to 6 dB
additional ERP, would allow radio and TV broadcasts into many additional
areas of interest. A Global Hawk UAV platform or a high-altitude unarmed
platform flying at 60,000 ft could potentially stand off even further than a
widebody; however, issues of payload capacity and flexibility call for
careful consideration when comparing the two. At 60,000 ft there is only a
22 percent increase in horizon distance over a widebody (see table 5.1). On
the other hand, loss of an unmanned Global Hawk to hostile action is
considerably preferable to loss of a manned aircraft.

In the discussions above, a clear channel is assumed -- that is, there is no
other radio or TV station transmitting on the frequency in question and
there is no jamming. The first of these is a reasonable assumption because
it can be safely assumed that several radio and TV channels will be free of
existing transmitters even in a dense urban area. The VHF-L TV channels are
most desirable for reasons listed in table 5.3, so these will often be
occupied, as they are in U.S. urban areas. Next in desirability are the
VHF-H channels, and finally the UHF channels, where degradation beyond line
of sight is very rapid. Transmissions from Commando Solo into Belgrade were
confined to UHF because of existing broadcasts into Belgrade and, very
importantly, because of potential interference in neighboring countries.
Performance deficiencies were clearly exacerbated by operation in UHF.

The question of jamming seems a very important one. If broadcast PSYOP are
having a tangible effect on an opponent, then it seems reasonable that
jamming will be present. The above discussion illustrates that broadcast
quality is marginal in many cases, especially against sophisticated
adversaries including North Korea, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Iran. Given the
asymmetries of today's warfare, the placement of jammers on civilian centers
would make them quite immune to attack. The very real possibility of
broadcast jamming should, therefore, be included in any decision to
significantly upgrade system performance.

Several options might be pursued in an effort to maintain the viability of
U.S. broadcast PSYOP capabilities. One extreme is to keep the EC-130E fleet
and install modest upgrades. This approach does not deny that there are
serious inadequacies in the current platform's altitude capability and in
the suite of onboard electronics, as demonstrated in Kosovo. However, it
does recognize the rapid changes taking place in broadcast
telecommunications and expects other broadcast modes to become available and
popular in those portions of the world where Commando Solo would not perform
adequately today, as discussed in chapter 4. Another approach that is
currently being studied by DoD is to upgrade and cross-deck current Commando
Solo equipment to EC-130J aircraft, which have slightly better flight
performance and, most likely, lower maintenance costs. On the other end of
the spectrum are approaches that would develop a new widebody or even
high-altitude UAV (such as Global Hawk), complete with state-of-the-art
transmitters and antennas capable of reaching perhaps 300 miles with TV and
radio signals -- a large improvement over Commando Solo that would, at best,
be marginal in Teheran. Such an approach might also require fewer aircraft
due to longer endurance.

The Task Force has weighed all of these options and finds that the costs
associated with cross-decking the current Commando Solo SME from the EC-130E
to the EC-130J platforms (estimated to be about $250 million) are excessive
and would not result in substantively improved performance. Furthermore, the
trends in future information transport discussed in chapter 4 indicate
movement away from TV and radio broadcast in many parts of the world For
these reasons, the Task Force believes that these funds would be better
spent for improvements in overall PSYOP capabilities, the utilization of
modern media product creation and dissemination capabilities, and the
development of modular TV and radio broadcast equipment to allow for their
utilization on a variety of platforms.

CHAPTER 6 

Recommendations

This DSB Task Force was originally created because of concern over the
inability of the Commando Solo (EC-130E) aircraft to disseminate TV and
radio broadcasts during the recent military operation in the Balkans. The
Task Force chose to broaden its charter and address issues associated with
PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations (IO) campaign during
peace, crisis, and armed hostilities. The Task Force also evaluated
organizational issues associated with PSYOP forces within DoD and addressed
issues associated with the PSYOP community's relationship to the
Intelligence Community. Of particular interest is the on-going worldwide
explosion of information creation and dissemination technologies and
capabilities. The Task Force spent considerable effort addressing modern
trends in information dissemination and media content creation. With those
trends as a backdrop, the Task Force then assessed the viability of the
current Commando Solo fleet and a variety of options currently being studied
by DoD. The following recommendations were derived from all of these
considerations. 

Recommendation 1 

The Task Force recommends that DoD create a PSYOP policy planning staff,
under the coordination authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC)), to ensure the
integration of operational- and tactical-level PSYOP with strategic
perception-management initiatives and provide planning support for strategic
PSYOP activities. 

Recommendation 2 

The Task Force recommends that rank structure and career paths within PSYOP
forces should be reassessed and more specifically:
- the senior PSYOP Advisor to the geographical CINCs should be an O-6 or
equivalent civilian and should be assigned to the CINC Special Staff, and

- the Commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting the Joint Task
Force Commander in theater (typically a three-starflag officer) should also
be an O-6. 

Recommendation 3 

The Task Force recommends that the Office of OASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM strive
to improve overall product quality through increased reliance on commercial
providers for high-quality products. Furthermore, the Task Force recommends
that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced and trained to engage a stable
of commercial media content providers who can deliver these quality
products. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10
million per year. 

Recommendation 4 

The Task Force recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency be tasked by
the ASD C3I to establish a psychological warfare intelligence element. ASD
C3I should be charged to either (a) provide resources to the PSYOP community
to implement a robust organic program of open source acquisition, or (b)
task the Intelligence Community to fulfill the need for on-the-shelf,
worldwide basic information, including the media and cultural background
information necessary to adequately infonn PSYOP products in a given
country. The Task Force believes that this can be accomplished without
incurring an additional budgetary burden.

Recommendation 5 

The Task Force recommends that ASD C3I make NFIP/JMIP funds available to
USSOCOM for the express purpose of acquiring available data sets,
particularly for countries outside North America and Europe. The Task Force
also recommends that CINCSOC work with the Foreign Military Studies Office
(FMSO) to ensure the integration of these data sets with the World Basic
Information Library (WBIL) and their community-wide accessibility. Moreover,
the Intelligence Community should be further tasked through ASD C3I to
develop methods and sources to obtain media use demographic information
where it is not now available but where the U.S. might plausibly have future
national security interests in which PSYOP might be employed. The Task Force
estimates this investment to be approximately $5 million per year.

Recommendation 6 

The Task Force recommends that OSD work with the Department of State to
fund, position, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution channels and
brand identities, insofar as these can be reasonably anticipated for future
PSYOP requirements. Policies with respect to the use of new and emerging
transnational media need to be developed or refined. Liberal reliance on
recognized professionals and the generous use of highly qualified commercial
entities are highly recommended. Buying good content on which the messages
will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. The Task Force
estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 7 

The Task Force recommends that DoD acquire the technical capability to
understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies.
Furthermore, DoD should provide the resources to acquire (rent or purchase)
emerging media content and dissemination channels from commercial
organizations. Here, DoD may be able to acquire good channels very cheaply
by means of being an "anchor tenant." The Task Force estimates this
investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 8 

The Task Force recommends that DoD maintain the current EC-130E Commando
Solo fleet with existing Special Mission Equipment (SME). The estimated cost
of $250 million to cross-deck the SME to a EC-130J platform is not justified
by the marginal increase in performance offered by this option. In addition,
future worldwide media dissemination trends will limit the effectiveness of
radio and TV broadcasts. The Task Force recommends that USSOCOM investigate
the creation of small and easily reconfigurable information-dissemination
packages that would be compatible with multiple platforms, including UAVs
and leased aircraft, for a variety of missions. The Task Force estimates the
initial investment for design and development of these packages to be $10 to
$20 million per year.

Recommendation 9 

The Task Force has recommended annual funding increases (in recommendations
1 through 8) of approximately $50 million per year. The Task Force believes
that this increase would be readily supported by reprogramming the $250
million that would be required to fund cross-decking the existing Commando
Solo SME to the EC-130J platforms.

The prompt and effective use of PSYOP in military operations can avert
crises, end wars, and save lives. DoD should prioritize Psychological
Operations appropriately, because the misuse of PSYOP can cause untold
damage to military operations. A relatively small investment over time can
reap huge rewards for the United States and its allies, both diplomatically
and militarily. 

Appendix A

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

27 October 1999 

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference--Defense Science Board Task Force on the
Creation and Dissemination of all Forms of Information in Support of PSYOPS
in Time of Military Conflict

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on all
forms of information-creation and dissemination in support of PSYOPS in
times of military conflict. The Task Force is to support the Congressional
directive for the Secretary of Defense to examine the creation and
dissemination of all forms of information and the adequacy of the
capabilities of the United States Armed Forces in this area to deal with
situations such as the conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In support of this Congressional direction, the Task Force should:

1. Assess the capabilities of the United States Armed Forces to develop
programming and to broadcast factual information that can reach a large
segment of the general public in a country like the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia; 

2. Assess the potential of various airborne or land-based mechanisms to have
the capabilities described above, including but not limited to desirable
improvements to the EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft, and the utilization of
other airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, and landbased
transmitters in conjunction with.satellites;

3. Assess other issues relating to the creation and dissemination of all
forms of information in time of conflict, to include satellite broadcasts
and the utilization of emerging mobile communication technologies;

The Task Force should provide a progress report by February 1, 2000 to the
DoD so that the Secretary of Defense can provide his assessment and
recommendations to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2000.

The Task Force will be co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations &amp; Low Intensity Conflict. Mr. Vince Vitto will serve
as Chairman of the Task Force. COL Fred Gilbert will serve as Executive
Secretary; and CDR Brian Hughes, USN will serve as the DSB Secretariat
Representative. 

The Task Force shall have access to classified information needed to develop
its assessment and recommendations.

The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L.
92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, "The
DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated
that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within
the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any
member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

[Signature] 

Jacques S. Gansler 

Appendix B

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

Chairman 
Vincent Vitto* 
C.S. Draper Laboratories

Executive Secretary
Col Fred Gilbert 
OASD [SOLIC] PRNA 

Members 

Jim Babcock 
MITRE 

Denis Bovin* 
Bear Stearns &amp; Co., Inc

Ruth David*
ANSER 

Chip Elliott
BBN Technologies 

Bran Ferren
Walt Disney Imagineering

Bert Fowler
C.A. Fowler Assoc. 

Charlie Hawkins 

Peter Marino* 

Joe Markowitz 

Greg Poe 
Logos Technologies 

Frank Stech 
Mitretek Corp. 

Larry Wright
Booz, Allen, &amp; Hamilton

Advisors 

LTC Steve Collins 
USSOCOM 

COL Lawrence D. Dietz
351st Civil Affairs Command

CDR Jeffrey Stratton
USN 

Support Staff 

CDR Brian Hughes 
DSB Office 

Melinda K. Baran
SAIC 

* Denotes DSB Member

Appendix C 

BRIEFERS 

Buck Adams 
World Space 

John Arnold 
ANSER 

LtCol Jim Coffman 
SOCOM 

Chuck de Caro
AeroBureau 

Doug Elwell
4th Psychological Operations Group

LTC Scott Fedorchak
USCENTCOM/CCJ3PI 

Mike Furlong 
SAIC 

Col Fred Goldstein 
Chief Psychological Operations Division
Air Intelligence Agency

Paul Kolodzy
DARPA 

Bill Malone
FIWC 

Col Dusty Rhoads
JCS J39 

Richard Shiffrin
Dep Gen Counsel (Intelligence)
DoD General Counsel

MAJ Bill Steinhagen
4th Psychological Operations Group

COL Bob Trost
J39 

Graham Turbiville
World Basic Information Library

LTC Brad Ward 
4th Psychological Operations Groups

LtCol Eric Weller 
193rd Special Operations Wing

Chuck Williamson 
OASD (SO/LIC(SOP)) 

Appendix D 

CONGRESSIONAL LANGUAGE

Public Law 106-65 

Title - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000

Subtitle G -- Other Matters

Sec. 1061 -- Defense Science Board Task Force on Use of Television and Radio
as a Propaganda Instrument in Time of Military Conflict

(a) Establishment of Task Force -- The Secretary of Defense shall establish
a task force of the Defense Science Board to examine --

(1) the use of radio and television broadcasting as a propaganda instrument
in time of military conflict; and

(2) the adequacy of the capabilities of the Armed Forces to make such uses
of radio and television during conflicts such as the conflict in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999.

(b) Duties of Task Force: The task force shall assess and develop
recommendations as to the appropriate capabilities, if any, that the Armed
Forces should have to broadcast radio and television into a region in time
of military conflict so as to ensure that the general public in that region
is exposed to the facts of the conflict. In making that assessment and
developing those recommendations, the task force shall review the following
-- 

(1) The capabilities of the Armed Forces to develop programming and to make
broadcasts that can reach a large segment of the general public in a country
such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

(2) The potential of various Department of Defense airborne or land-based
mechanisms to have capabilities described in paragraph (1), including
improvements to the EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft and the use of other
airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, and land-based transmitters in
conjunction with satellites.

(3) Other issues relating to he use of television and radio as a propaganda
instrument in time of conflict.

(c) Report: The task force shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report
containing its assessments and recommendations under subsection (b) not
later than February 1, 2000. The Secretary shall submit the report, together
with the comments and recommendations of the Secretary to the congressional
defense committees not later than March 1, 2000.

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