[iwar] [fc:32.Deciphering.Asymmetry's.Word.Game]

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<a href="http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug01/thomas.htm">http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug01/thomas.htm>

32 Deciphering Asymmetry's Word Game
by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, US Army, Retired



The terms "asymmetry," "asymmetric warfare," "asymmetric approaches" and
"asym-metric options" are popular sound bites found in many military
journals today. Asymmetric-related terms are commonly associated with a
potential opponent's operations or actions against US interests or forces.
The attacks are commonly described as chemical, biological, nuclear,
terrorist or information attacks, or attacks against weak points. Arguably,
these attacks are not asymmetric. In fact, except for the terrorist example,
these are symmetrical attacks. The United States has chemical, biological,
nuclear and information means; therefore, such attacks cannot be asymmetric.
The asymmetric aspect of a chemical, nuclear, information or traditional
attack actually relates to asymmetries in capabilities, reliance,
vulnerabilities and values. The capabilities of certain forces-some
information systems can shut down command and control systems and prevent
nuclear systems from launching-constitute one variable. A nation's reliance
on a particular system is another. For example, both sides can have
information weapons, but one side may rely more on them than the other. The
vulnerability of a system or platform's performance parameters, operating
principles or situational context is another asymmetric opening, the one
most often associated with weak spots. Finally, cultural values determine
whether a nation will or will not use one of these methods.
The Russo-US relationship provides an example of such reasoning. Both
countries have had biological and nuclear weapons for decades, yet no one
has called this an asymmetric Russian threat. Neither side has used these
weapons because of discussions that led to a common understanding and
because of a value structure that placed national interests above other
interests. However, if a country that conducts operations based on very
different values obtains biological weapons, then we should worry. In some
cultures, social and religious reasons may override national interests when
choosing whether to use such weapons.
What is Asymmetry?
Judging by the multiple applications of the term in military journals-"not
fighting fair," "attacking a weak point," "information or cyberwar," "public
relations war," "weapons of mass destruction"-very few people understand
asymmetry's formal definition. This is understandable since joint doctrine
does not define the term.1 One civilian lexicon explains asymmetry using the
mathematical term "incommensurability," the relationship between things
which have no common measure.2 Another civilian definition refers to
defective, disproportionate correspondence between things or their parts.3
Other non-English-speaking cultures define the term in more distinct ways. A
Russian dictionary definition of asymmetry is "the absence or destruction of
symmetry."4 This concept implies a more active role in changing symmetry's
parameters than the US or British definition, even the creation of
asymmetry. Compared to Western deductive thinking, the Russian dialectic
thought process of thesis and antithesis encourages an analysis of a
situation from a different, more confrontational perspective.
There is no distinct word for asymmetry in Chinese. To express this concept
one would negate the word for "to be symmetrical." This word for symmetry,
duicheng, is also comprised of two characters. The word dui in ancient texts
means "to respond," "to face or face off," "to match"-both in the sense of
complement but also in the sense of enemies matching in skill. The term
cheng initially signified the concept of "a balance" and then evolved into a
broader semantic sense of "to accord with."5 Thus, in China, asymmetry would
involve things not in accord with, out of balance, not responding and not
matching or facing one another.
These definitions indicate that our understanding of asymmetry has strayed
and become misused. None of the recognized definitions discusses weak
points, unfair fighting or nontraditional means that many authors assert.
The term apparently assumes whatever meaning military authors wish to
portray and is thrown around like the grammatically incorrect term
"irregardless."
While it may be hard for US military leaders to recognize, the dictionary
definition suggests that the United States is the world's most asymmetric
military force. While degrees of symmetry exist between other forces in
developed countries, no one can symmetrically match up with US equipment and
firepower. This was most evident in the after-action comments following the
conflict over Kosovo. Department of Defense (DOD) officials admonished other
NATO countries that their equipment was not compatible with or as capable as
US equipment.
A Predator flies above the USS Carl Vinson during a training exercise. The
unmanned aerial vehicle broadcast real-time infrared and color video to
intelligence analysts and controllers on the ground and the ships of the
carrier battle group.
If the United States is the most asymmetric force in the world, why are
potential threats to US security almost always labeled asymmetric? For
example, the US National Defense University (NDU), in its 1998 strategic
assessment, listed four asymmetric responses that other nations could take
to counter US superiority: acquiring weapons of mass destruction; acquiring
high-technology weapons; acquiring cyberweapons; and fighting in
environments that degrade US capabilities. The logic of considering these
approaches asymmetric escapes reason, for the first three responses would
improve symmetry according to the dictionary definitions. The United States
has all of these capabilities now; if someone else acquires them, then we
are in a symmetric relationship. Threats are mislabeled "asymmetric" because
we do not understand what asymmetry means.
Some highly respected publications stress that if an opponent does not fight
the way we expect, then we automatically label his fighting technique
asymmetric. The NDU study stated that "asymmetric threats or techniques are
a version of `not fighting fair,' which can include the use of surprise in
all its operational and strategic dimensions and the use of weapons in ways
unplanned by the U.S." If this definition were accurate, Serbs and Iraqis
could claim that NATO and the multinational coalition did not fight
fair-face to face-but from afar with long-range, precision weapons. With
such a broad application, any action can be considered asymmetric and
further confuse the issue. The terms "atypical" or "nontraditional" better
fit a situation in which an opponent uses an unexpected technique or
exploits some factor better or faster than his opponent. The imprecise US
terminology is faulty.
In January 2000, Russian forces stayed outside Grozny, nullifying Chechen
terrain advantages by destroying the city "asymmetrically" with artillery
and tank fire.
An Australian officer, Major J.J. Frewen, offered a reason for this
imprecision. He noted that globalization has expanded the definition of
national security beyond physical security to include economic,
environmental, informational and cultural security.6 Threats to these
elements are often considered asymmetric by many US academic institutes and
leaders when, more precisely, these are matters for which our armed forces
are not well designed. They undermine national interests without shots being
fired and demonstrate that military intervention is problematic when the
definition of "decisive force" is unclear. Frewen notes that problems in
Somalia were caused not by a lack of armored vehicles but by failure to
understand the environment. The problem was about "apples" attending an
"oranges" event; any hardware-only solution suggests asymmetric
vulnerability.
Some analysts have defined asymmetry with vision. Lloyd J. Matthews offers a
strategic vision for his description of asymmetry. He defines it as any
militarily significant disparity between contending parties that clearly
fits the "lack or want" of symmetry idea expressed in Webster's. He notes:
"The process of calculating the resultant of the various vectors of power
wielded by two asymmetrically related opponents-in order to measure the
dimensions of the threat that each poses to the other-can be quite
problematic. But it is a process that must be undertaken if we are to give
due weight to all the relevant elements of power."7 Threats in the sense of
capabilities, reliance on systems and vulnerabilities are important in this
regard.
Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson of the US Army War College offer another
visionary definition of asymmetry: "acting, organizing and thinking
differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages,
exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative or gain greater
freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic,
operational or a combination of these. It can entail different methods,
technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives or some combination
of these." The authors add that asymmetry can be short-term or long-term,
deliberate or by default, discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric
approaches and can have both psychological and physical dimensions.8
Retired Brigadier General David L. Grange writes that asymmetry is best
understood as a strategy, tactic or method of warfare and conflict. It is
not something new, he reminds us, noting that strategists define asymmetric
warfare as conflict deviating from the norm or an indirect approach to
affect the balance of forces.9
Perhaps the most asymmetric and least-discussed element is values. Operating
principles-individual, social group and national values-all play a role in
the information age. There is always a lack of symmetry in values, even
between two people. For example, discussions of abortion, homosexuality and
religion bring out individual differences. In the international arena, some
decisionmakers abide by international treaties; others do not. The values of
President George H. Bush and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War
clearly represented this asymmetry. Bush prevented a march on Baghdad
because it was not in the UN mandate, while Hussein ignored international
treaties and invaded Kuwait.
Vulnerabilities and Asymmetries
Many authors consider asymmetry to be the ability to exploit situations by
attacking weak points or using nontraditional approaches in unexpected ways.
These vulnerabilities can be uncovered by using a specific methodology to
examine a situation. The methodology uses one of four means:
lPerformance parameters.
Situational context.
Operating principles and rules of engagement.
Will.
Each mean uses nontraditional or intellectual methods to exploit a
situation, degrading capabilities and inducing unpredictability and chaos
into military operations. It limits advantages, capitalizes on weaknesses,
and tests patience and will. The methodology is a thinking man's strategy
that encourages out-of-the-box concepts that could be labeled asymmetric
because they capitalize on asymmetries in capabilities and reliance.
Such moves would be innovative or bold actions that could apply equally to
either high- or low-tech opponents. It might mean using low-tech options to
counter high-tech equipment-the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher
versus a helicopter or using fuel-air explosives on an opponent. Or it could
mean attempts to strike a people's political will and patience. The United
States lost the battle of wills at home but not on the Vietnam battlefield.
Asymmetry can even express itself as a strategy of mass destruction or
annihilation, prolonged attrition or creating large groups of refugees.
Performance parameters. Weapon parameters, whether signature, such as sound
or image display, or performance characteristics, are susceptible to
manipulation and are vulnerable. The Serbian military demonstrated its
awareness of this principle during the recent conflict in Kosovo. The Serbs
reportedly sent air defense crews to Iraq in February 1999 to study Iraqi
procedures. The Iraqis have fought against these planes and tactics for 10
years. Who could better tell Serbian crews what a NATO or US air attack
might look like? Every performance parameter was recorded on radar.
An Iraqi SA-3 Goa crew trains with their medium-altitude surface-to-air
missile battery.
In another example, the Serbs reportedly used smoke to deflect NATO
precision-guided weapons. When the pilot could no longer keep the cross hair
on a smoked target, the weapons went off-course as the performance parameter
was exploited. In Chechnya, the Chechens knew the elevation and depression
limits of the Russian T-72 battle tank's main gun. They hid below the
depression level in basements and in windows above the maximum elevation
while fighting in Grozny during 1994 and 1995 and used RPGs to immobilize
tanks.
When NATO's air forces engaged Serbia's armed forces, Serbian deceptions
fooled NATO's high-tech equipment. The Serbian military found a flaw in
NATO's electronic-reconnaissance system-targets could be seen but not
clearly identified. Decoys and fake positions protected the real ones. When
the Serbs wanted to block NATO's thermal-imaging systems, they used
industrial heat sources to construct "thermal-cover" positions to protect
tanks and artillery.
Another performance parameter is that of an actual force: tempo.
Understanding an opponent's concept of operational tempo gets one inside an
important performance parameter of his force and provides an asymmetric
option.
Situational context. Situational context includes an area's dominant
historical, cultural, geographic and political factors and how an opponent
might manipulate them. For example, what is the regime protecting and what
does it want? Other factors include a country's particular warrior culture,
guerilla movements or use of time and geography. In most conflicts, both
combatants have some elements that a thinking belligerent can exploit. Two
unequal forces, such as a high-tech force confronting a low-tech force,
fighting on similar terrain could use an asymmetric approach. If a low-tech
force moves to the sanctuary a city offers, it can offset the high-tech
force's superior firepower, maneuverability and intelligence capability. In
the city environment, the high-tech force often finds that its force
structure does not fit the terrain. The high-tech force may find itself
opposed by an entire population, as the Russians were in Grozny in 1996. A
high-tech force, on the other hand, could prevent the low-tech force from
entering the city.
Operating principles and rules of engagement. Operating principles of
presidents, parliaments and armed forces vary from nation to nation.
International treaties bind most nations to some common principles, but this
adherence varies with time and opponents. Warsaw Pact members' allegiance to
the Soviet Union waned and disappeared in the 1990s. The recent NATO
operation over Kosovo offers a stark example. Breaking with traditions of
time, opponent and principles, NATO acted out of area and may have placed
human rights above sovereignty. If democratic nations bend their operating
principles, what type of behavior and adherence to operating principles
might we expect from totalitarian or rogue regimes?
Below the level of presidents and parliaments, combat involves operating
principles. Combatants can estimate opposing leaders' tolerance for loss and
damage, and threshold for capitulation. Unlike nation-states, guerillas are
not bound by international treaties, codes of conduct or operating
principles. This difficulty is compounded by Western reliance on technology,
a vulnerable operating principle in the age of off-the-shelf products.
Sometimes underdeveloped countries can acquire high-tech equipment faster
than developed countries because of research, development and acquisition
time lines: "In a world in which state-of-the-art is off-the-shelf,
industry, and potentially our foes, can obtain better information systems
and technology cheaper and faster than DOD because our current acquisition
system buys computers in the same way we buy bullets."10 Buying off the
shelf becomes an asymmetric approach to developed nations' longer-term
procurement cycles.
Operating principles also refer to the rules of engagement, strategy,
tactics and organizational principles that guide a side's actions and
decisions. NATO politicians decided that pilots could fly only above 15,000
feet in Kosovo, a rule of engagement that affected precision.
Will. Colonel Charles Dunlap Jr. notes that the Western mind-set Samuel
Huntington describes includes concepts (values) such as "individualism,
liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of
law, democracy, free markets, [and] the separation of church and state."11
However, entirely different principles and ideologies may drive logic in
other cultures. Foreign societies may believe it is easier to attack the
Western psyche or will to fight than to meet it on the battlefield in a
contest between technologies, a truly asymmetric approach from the Western
viewpoint. Many Russians believe that the United States did just that when
it convinced Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev to end the Cold War.
His loss of will allowed the West to win the Cold War without firing a shot.
This discussion offers several conclusions. First, the word "asymmetry"
highlights the problem of using terms loosely or improperly. When this
happens, words are not properly understood, confusion reigns, and endless
time is spent in futile explanation. The international arena further
exacerbates the situation because different cultures interpret words with
slight nuances. Not using one's own language correctly only heightens
misunderstanding. Second, a methodology that considers a situation
asymmetrically offers a way to analyze and choose courses of action. Third,
perspective is equally as important as methodology. The United States might
be the most asymmetric force on Earth, but Americans do not see themselves
that way. They view others as an asymmetric force or threat when, in fact,
they are not. US citizens should be proud to be on the right side of the
asymmetric ledger.
Asymmetries exist everywhere, of course. They can be found in market
economies of varying degrees versus centrally planned economies and in
political systems. There are also strategic, operational and tactical
asymmetries. Strategically, theorists discuss asymmetries in the force
structure of intercontinental ballistic missiles or information warfare
forces, while tactical-level analysts try to calculate the correlation of
forces between sides. In these cases, asymmetries refer to quantities, total
numbers or different philosophies. Asymmetries also refer to approaches to
attack vulnerabilities.
Asymmetry is a matter of two unlike systems interacting, each within its
capabilities. Attacks can be swift (like an earthquake) or progressive (like
termites or rust, silently undermining a formidable structure). Progressive
attacks are usually associated with cultural strengths than can be
maintained for long periods (sacrifice, resilience, deception, media
sympathy). Unlike systems do not understand how to counter each other
because of contradictory paradigms. Consider the term "rasingingin." When
the term is understood as "singing in the rain," then deciphering other
terms is easier. For example, the word insertion paradigm helps interpret
the term "beilld" as "sick in bed." Understanding the threat requires
thinking in threat paradigms.
Agents using asymmetric analytic methodologies-performance parameters,
situational context, operating principles and will-start with an advantage.
When striving to attack a vulnerability, having a template for action is the
name of the game. Each methodology allows analysts to visualize better how
to attack and defend enemy and friendly vulnerabilities. In the end, this is
where the focus should be and not on the so-called asymmetric threats of
weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological and information
attacks.



1.Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 10 June 1998).
2.Philip Babcock Gove, ed., Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language (Unabridged) (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc.,
1981), 136.
3.J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary, Second
Edition, Volume I (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1989), 738.
4.S.I. Ozhegov, Dictionary of the Russian Language (Moscow, 1984), 29.
5.Discussion between the author and Dr. Deborah Porter, University of Utah,
Associate Professor of Chinese, 4 August 2000.
6.Discussion between the author and Royal Australian Infantry Major J.J.
Frewen regarding a two-year exchange with the US Army as a G3 strategic
plans officer, Headquarters, US Army Pacific.
7.Lloyd J. Matthews, Introduction in Challenging the United States
Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated? ed. Lloyd J.
Matthews (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College [USAWC], Strategic
Studies Institute [SSI], July 1998), 20.
8.Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Asymmetry and U.S. Military
Strategy," USAWC, SSI, January 2001, 5, 6.
9.David L. Grange, "Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern," ROA
National Security Report, March 2001, 1. Reprinted with permission from
National Strategy Forum Review, Winter 2000.
10. Ibid., 16.
11.Charles Dunlap Jr., "Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and
the Western Mindset," in Challenging the United States Symmetrically and
Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?, Lloyd Matthews, ed. (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: USAWC, SSI, July 1998), 3.



Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, US Army, Retired, is an analyst with
the US Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and
is an adjunct professor at the US Army's Eurasian Institute, Garmisch,
Germany. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.A. from
the University of Southern California and is a graduate of the US Army
Command and General Staff College and the US Army Russian Institute (USARI).
He has held various command and staff positions in the Continental United
States and Europe, including director, Soviet Studies, USARI, Garmisch. His
article "China's Electronic Strategies" appeared in the May-June 2001 issue
of Military Review.

Photos:
US Navy
DOD
US Army

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