Return-Path: <sentto-279987-4057-1008254674-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Thu, 13 Dec 2001 06:46:08 -0800 (PST) Received: (qmail 32572 invoked by uid 510); 13 Dec 2001 14:44:48 -0000 Received: from n35.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.85) by all.net with SMTP; 13 Dec 2001 14:44:48 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-4057-1008254674-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [216.115.97.188] by n35.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 13 Dec 2001 14:44:34 -0000 X-Sender: fc@red.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_1_2); 13 Dec 2001 14:44:34 -0000 Received: (qmail 60295 invoked from network); 13 Dec 2001 14:44:33 -0000 Received: from unknown (216.115.97.171) by m2.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 13 Dec 2001 14:44:33 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (12.232.125.69) by mta3.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 13 Dec 2001 14:44:32 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id fBDEjDK00954 for iwar@onelist.com; Thu, 13 Dec 2001 06:45:13 -0800 Message-Id: <200112131445.fBDEjDK00954@red.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2001 06:45:13 -0800 (PST) Subject: [iwar] [fc:Alumni.Of.Camps.Run.By.Bin.Laden.Raise.Fears.About.Further.Attacks] Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Wall Street Journal December 13, 2001 Alumni Of Camps Run By Bin Laden Raise Fears About Further Attacks Trained in Afghanistan, Many Have Since Fanned Out to Wield Their Skills, Influence By Jay Solomon, Steve Levine, David Cloud and Almar Latour, Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal As the noose tightens around Osama bin Laden, intelligence and law-enforcement officials are shifting their focus to an equally elusive and dangerous target: the thousands of Muslims around the world who have been trained over the years in Mr. bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. Just this week, Attorney General John Ashcroft asserted that the U.S. now believes that all 19 of the hijackers in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks attended camps in Afghanistan, as did Zacarias Moussaoui, a French Moroccan who was indicted this week for alleged conspiracy in the terrorist plot. Officials in America, Europe and Asia fear that, just as the Sept. 11 hijackers were, other camp alumni are concealed in "sleeper cells," undetected but capable of becoming active at any time. Aware that they are being hunted, these cells may move deeper underground in the short term, making them even harder to find. Whatever they do, it is becoming clear that the alumni have helped spread the camps' influence, recruiting and training others in cells around the world -- some aligned with al Qaeda, some with their own agendas and grievances. "There may no longer be a command headquarters like there was in Afghanistan," says Roland Jacquard, a French terrorism expert who advises the United Nations Security Council on terrorism matters. "But now smaller, more numerous, more cloistered sleeper cells are likely to multiply across the world." In the U.S., the Central Intelligence Agency has established a special unit specifically to deal with cells of Mr. bin Laden's al Qaeda network. In Europe, a few of the cells have already been cracked. The bin Laden alumni network grew out of Afghanistan's war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s, when thousands of Muslim men from around the world flocked to the country to help the Afghans. Among these foreigners was Saudi-born Mr. bin Laden, who with his own money set up his first camp for such foreigners near the eastern city of Khost. Mr. bin Laden settled permanently in Afghanistan in 1996. He and his al Qaeda network established a dozen or so camps, most of them located outside Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Khost. Authorities on terrorism estimate that 50,000 militants from more than 50 countries have received training and sanctuary in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan over the years. Some went to these camps to focus on fomenting Islamic revolutions in their homelands -- Egypt, Yemen, Uzbekistan and Chechnya, for example. Others, such as detained American John Walker, went to al Qaeda camps to become conventional soldiers to fight alongside the Taliban army inside Afghanistan. And still others who trooped through Afghanistan -- perhaps 5,000 by U.S. estimates -- were trained at camps set up specifically to produce operatives for al Qaeda's own terrorist network. The two most notorious of these camps were Darunta and Tarnak Farms, outside Jalalabad. In its indictment of Mr. Moussaoui, the U.S. asserted that he went to a third al Qaeda camp called Khalden in the spring of 1998. Today, the bin Laden camps lie deserted or in ruins. Before Sept. 11, al Qaeda's main sources of recruits for these camps were Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Persian Gulf states and Algeria, places where young Muslim men, many of them well-educated but with few job prospects, respond to the organization's call to overthrow Western-oriented and often repressive regimes. Experts caution that a trip to a training camp doesn't mean that someone has become a committed terrorist willing to risk his life for a cause or has picked up the skills needed to become a terrorism expert. Still, the network's reach is wide. That's evident at the headquarters of the Islamic Youth Movement in central Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. Set up in a crumbling Dutch-colonial villa, the group indicates its presence with a sign out front that reads: "Israel and the U.S.: The Real Terrorist Nations and Killers." Three hundred of the Islamic Youth Movement's members have been fighting in Afghanistan, some alongside the Taliban in Kandahar and Kunduz, says Chairman Suaib Didu. The group's "trainers," mostly 80 veterans from past battles and the camps in Afghanistan, are constantly in contact with colleagues in the Middle East, he says. Ishar and Luti, two Youth Movement recruits -- like many Indonesians, they use one name -- say they've been benefiting from the Afghan veterans' expertise. Both men say they have taken part in extensive military and religious training at a secret camp outside Jakarta in recent weeks. Here, they say, they've learned about the landscape of Afghanistan, how to fire guns, and how to live in a place that's being bombed. "They're teaching me how to survive in war times," says the 23-year-old Mr. Luti, who wears green military fatigues. On the wall nearby hangs a photo of Mr. bin Laden. Mr. Suaib, the Youth Movement's chairman, says his recruits could be called for action outside of Indonesia and Afghanistan in the years ahead. He says he hopes to send some members to Europe and the U.S. to monitor how Muslim interests are being served in the Western world. Some of his fighters could resort to bombings or suicide attacks, he says, if they feel that Muslims are being discredited in those countries. A troubling mystery of the current Afghanistan conflict is the fate of the foreigners -- from Pakistan, Arab countries and beyond -- who arrived to fight in an al Qaeda brigade that battled alongside the Taliban army. Many died or were captured, but some are believed to have slipped across the region's porous borders. Hada Farm is among three major bases and camps that Mr. bin Laden and an estimated several hundred Arab fighters occupied in and near Jalalabad at any one time. It sits within a sprawling agricultural complex where Afghans maintain herds, fruit orchards and vegetable gardens. Some of the Arabs inhabited an area behind high walls along a dirt road. Inside, a maze of open-air passageways leads through courtyards that connect clusters of traditional mud-brick cottages. The compound was abandoned when the city fell to anti-Taliban forces last month. Before fleeing for nearby mountains in a convoy of about 80 vehicles, the Arabs and other foreign fighters who occupied the compound methodically emptied most of the rooms. But in three rooms, the fighters left behind dozens of textbooks and catalogs, including titles like "Fundamentals of Physics," "Chemistry: An Introduction" and "Engineering Materials." Wiring, alligator clips and other communications hardware is still wrapped carefully in plastic bags and stowed in the small wooden drawers of an electronics case. Near the camps and around Jalalabad, merchants say they rarely exchanged words with the foreign fighters who sometimes patronized their shops. "They didn't trust anyone. They just drove through town very fast in their 4-by-4s and Pajeros," says Gul Rahman, 70 years old, who sells firewood next to Hada Farm. "They only came by when they needed food and bread. Then, they came in one or two vehicles, and mostly at night." At least three of the camps that U.S. and European officials believe were used specifically to train al Qaeda terrorist operatives appear to have been organized by nationality -- Algerians in one camp, Egyptians in another, and so on. An al Qaeda camp near Kabul handled training for Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a group that merged with al Qaeda in 1998. From the camps, the alumni have fanned out across the globe, frequently using aliases and fictitious passports. Intelligence officials in the U.S. and elsewhere say they don't have enough information to track them down. European governments and intelligence experts are divided over how many may have settled in Europe. Some put the number as high as 3,000. Already, about 20 bin Laden lieutenants are behind bars in Europe, while dozens of Islamic extremists with no direct links to Mr. bin Laden's network have been arrested in the past year. Among the biggest catches is Mohammed Bensakhria, who is believed to be Mr. bin Laden's top man in Europe. He has been in French custody since July, after having been extradited from Spain, where he was arrested in June. In September, French, Belgian and Dutch law-enforcement agencies arrested key players in a terrorist cell that is believed to have been planning an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Paris. In British custody is Lotfi Raissi, who is alleged to have given pilot training to several of the Sept. 11 pilots. And last month, Spain arrested eight suspected terrorists with alleged links to al Qaeda and the Sept. 11 attacks. In Britain, preoccupied with the Irish Republican Army for decades, intelligence services are today suffering from an "intelligence gap" on Islamic terrorist groups in their country, says Prof. Paul Wilkinson, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism at the University of St. Andrews. Also, once-lax antiterrorism laws made it hard for British security forces to arrest suspected terrorists, while the British legal system made it possible for suspected terrorists to fight lengthy legal battles to avoid extradition. France has been more aggressive. Today there are about 50 people in France who have been identified as having passed through al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many of them have been arrested and questioned at one time or another, and 15 are behind bars. Arrests of other Islamic militants in France in the past few years number in the hundreds. "We keep close tabs on them," says Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France's top counterterrorism investigating magistrate. Still, he cautions: "It's impossible to know how many sleeper cells there are in France at the moment." In Southeast Asia, hundreds -- perhaps thousands -- of local Muslims have trained and fought in Afghanistan in the past 15 years and now have returned to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. These Islamists are using their military and religious training to try to lead revolts against their secular governments and "holy wars" against non-Muslim populations. Many of these Afghan veterans deny allegations by U.S. and European officials that they are members of Mr. bin Laden's network. Many say that they are either acting independently of Mr. bin Laden or are hostile toward him. That could pose a challenge of its own kind in a region that's home to a quarter of the world's Muslims, as most of these militants say they will continue their struggles regardless of Mr. bin Laden's fate. Ja'far Umar Thalib, the commander of the Laskar Jihad militia in Indonesia, probably has been scrutinized by U.S. intelligence operatives more than any other Islamist in Southeast Asia in recent months. The 40-year-old Indonesian of Yemeni heritage met and fought alongside Mr. bin Laden in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. He oversees a militia that since 1999 has led thousands of Muslims into battles against Christians for control of islands in central and eastern Indonesia. And he is deeply committed to establishing Islamic law in his country. In recent weeks, Spanish officials have alleged that Mr. Ja'far's organization helped train thousands of al Qaeda operatives at secret Indonesian camps. The Spanish investigators are looking into an alleged Madrid-based cell of Mr. bin Laden's organization. Mr. Ja'far denies the allegations. At his headquarters, an Islamic boarding school in the central Javanese city of Yogyakarta, women in Afghan burkhas peer out warily from wooden homes on stilts, their bodies covered from head to toe in long-black cloth. On Fridays, students at Mr. Ja'far's school -- mostly refugees from the sectarian conflict in eastern Indonesia -- are trained in the arts of war. Mr. Ja'far also controls a media center in Jakarta that puts out five publications that focus largely on conflicts pitting Muslims against non-Muslims in Indonesia. The Laskar Jihad's Web site is also run out of the media center. Some U.S. officials say similarities between the site and others run by Islamist groups indicate that Laskar Jihad is part of a wider global terrorist network. Mr. Ja'far says 10 Indonesians with Afghanistan experience are working as "trainers" for the Laskar Jihad. But in an interview at a Jakarta hotel, he denies that his group has any links to al Qaeda. He says that Mr. bin Laden practices a form of Islam that he rejects and that the U.S. has been trying to tie Laskar Jihad to the Saudi terrorist suspect as a way to discredit the organization. Mr. Ja'far says that some al Qaeda operatives visited his organization last year in an attempt to establish financial links but that he turned them down. "Laskar Jihad is purely an Indonesian organization," Mr. Ja'far says. Dozens of other, smaller Islamist organizations have sprung up in Indonesia, focused nearly exclusively on the domestic conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. Many of them have members who fought or trained in Afghanistan. This week, Hendropriyono, head of Indonesia's top intelligence body, told reporters that foreign terrorists, including some from al Qaeda, are cooperating with Indonesian radicals. In the U.S., totting up the number of bin Laden alumni at large is hard because of the ease of moving around and because, as the Sept. 11 hijackers showed, it's possible to work well below the surface. Airline passenger records showing who has been flying to and from Pakistan, the main conduit in and out of Afghanistan, are of limited use because of the similarity of Arab names and the use of false identities. In early 2000, the CIA began making covert contacts with Taliban commanders in Afghanistan, but the effort was focused mainly on tracking Mr. bin Laden's movements. The CIA's counterterrorism center has operated a separate al Qaeda unit since 1997. Since Sept. 11, the center has been reorganized into two parts, the larger of which focuses on finding remaining al Qaeda cells around the world, according to a center official. The smaller one tries to identify al Qaeda members inside Afghanistan. Names and locations of possible cell members are gathered and sent out to CIA stations in the field so suspects can be arrested or monitored, or so cell members can be approached for possible recruitment, an intelligence official says. Since Sept. 11, the CIA has attached many more field agents to the counterterrorism center. Still, the best information on suspected terrorists with ties to al Qaeda comes from other countries' intelligence services. If the CIA hopes to eradicate the bin Laden alumni association, current and former intelligence officials say, it will have to rebuild its ability to penetrate and monitor sleeper cells on its own. -- John Carreyrou in Paris contributed to this article. ------------------------ Yahoo! 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