[iwar] [fc:The.Sabre-Rattlers.Are.at.It.Again]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-12-29 18:53:39
Next message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:Judge:.FBI's.PC-snooping.perfectly.lawful]"
Previous message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:And.the.Password.Is.......Waterloo]"
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Message-Id: <200112300253.fBU2red19608@red.all.net>
To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List)
Organization: I'm not allowed to say
From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com
Precedence: bulk
Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2001 18:53:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:The.Sabre-Rattlers.Are.at.It.Again]
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

The Sabre-Rattlers Are at It Again
Asia, December 28, 2001 [ 17:30 ]
By Mahir Ali, Dawn

ISLAMABAD. It is instructive to note how the rhetoric unleashed by the United States 
in response to the outrages of September 11 has been adapted by governments in different 
parts of the world to serve their own purposes. Ariel Sharon was first off the mark: 
he not only described Yasser Arafat as "our Osama bin Laden" but also sent Israeli 
tanks into Palestinian towns while the world's eyes were focused more or less exclusively 
on New York. India, too, lost little time in claiming common cause and offering the 
use of its territory for US military bases. These particular nephews clearly want 
to be like Uncle Sam when they grow up. 

India has now gone a step further. The extremely reprehensible attack on the federal 
parliament in New Delhi earlier this month has prompted it to loudly contemplate 
military action against the Pakistan-based groups it suspects of being behind the 
violence. Messrs Atal Behari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani couldn't possibly be 
ignorant of the fact that punitive expeditions across the border could lead to war. 
And war is not a prospect that any sane person in the subcontinent could possibly 
welcome - not only because it would exact a toll in human and economic terms that 
India and Pakistan can ill afford, but also because history shows that hostilities 
tend to exacerbate rather than solve existing problems. 

The only exception in this regard is India's intervention on the side of the Mukti 
Bahini in East Pakistan 30 years ago. But even in 1971, Pakistan's decision to open 
up a western front served no purpose. 

The excursion into Kashmir in 1965, reputedly masterminded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
brought no gains. And the conflict in 1948 had served merely to divide Kashmir, no 
doubt playing a significant role in converting the disputed territory into a festering 
sore. The Kargil excursion in 1999 caught Indian forces unawares and brought the 
neighbours to the brink of a showdown - and seriously undermined a rare thaw in relations 
between New Delhi and Islamabad. 

There can be little question that India does face a terrorist threat. It has been 
in this position since independence. After all, Gandhis of three generations (and 
two families) fell prey to it: the Mahatma was slain by a Hindu fanatic in 1948, 
Indira died in a hail of bullets fired by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984, and a Tamil 
suicide bomber claimed her son Rajiv's life in 1991. None of these terrorists had 
anything to do with Pakistan. 

This is not to suggest that Pakistan has played no role in terror on Indian soil. 
Unfortunately, it has. And it is widely suspected that India has lost few opportunities 
to reciprocate. But India's main worry all along has been - or should have been - 
terrorism of the home-grown variety. (Much the same could be said about the US, of 
course, where the figure for the World Trade Centre death toll has been revised downwards 
to a considerably smaller number than the lives lost in Afghanistan since October.) 
And it is particularly ironic that the present Indian government is fairly cosy with 
fundamentalist paramilitaries of the ilk that engineered the assassination of the 
Mahatma because he was perceived as being too soft on Pakistan. 

If Pakistan has cause to be ashamed of the activities of groups such as Lashkar-e-Tiaba, 
India has little reason to be proud of the RSS and the Shiv Sena. 

India's seemingly ominous decision to recall its high commissioner from Islamabad 
and to seal its western border may primarily have been intended to placate public 
opinion. New Delhi claims to have proof that the Lashkar and Jaish-e-Muhammad were 
responsible for the parliamentary assault, floridly described by Mr Advani as "aimed 
at wiping out our political leadership". Yet Pakistan's offer of a joint inquiry 
failed to elicit any interest. 

This is reminiscent of the George W. Bush school of diplomacy: an attempt by the 
aggrieved party, on the basis of its firepower, to lay down the rules. However credible 
the charges against the allegedly Pakistan-based groups may be, the Musharraf regime 
could hardly be expected to take any action against them without reasonable evidence. 


Yet India also claims involvement in cross-border terrorism by the Inter-Services 
Intelligence agency - a considerably more serious charge which, in New Delhi's eyes, 
absolves it from the obligation to share whatever information it may have with Pakistani 
authorities. Matters are a bit more complicated than that, however. The ISI has enjoyed 
a considerable degree of autonomy since the early 1980s, having being emboldened 
- much like Osama bin Laden - by its role in the original US-sponsored Afghan adventure. 


Shared ideological and strategic goals may have prevented any tension from arising 
between Generals Hamid Gul and Ziaul Haq, but subsequent civilian governments were 
by and large frustrated in their attempts to bring the ISI to heel. The agency was 
involved in efforts first to deny power to the Pakistan People's Party and then to 
destabilize the Benazir Bhutto government. Having nurtured him out of political obscurity, 
it had fewer problems with Nawaz Sharif, but that is not to suggest that Mr Sharif 
was ever in a commanding position vis-a-vis the ISI. 

Apart from its interventions on the domestic front, the agency was instrumental 
in guiding the Taliban, and there can be little question that it has, at least in 
the past, devoted considerable attention to the Kashmir question. Following the 1999 
coup, it was assumed that the ISI would at least be subject to government discipline. 
But the fact that General Pervez Musharraf felt obliged to demote ISI chief Lieutenant-General 
Mahmood Ahmed last October suggests that that may not have been the case. 

Should it turn out that the agency was indeed implicated at any level, and at any 
stage, in the December 13 terrorist attack in New Delhi, that would be cause for 
extreme concern in Islamabad. It would suggest, among other things, that the ISI's 
autonomy remains largely intact. It is hard to imagine General Musharraf sanctioning 
such a brash and clearly criminal act under virtually any circumstances, but it is 
simply out of the question that he could have done so under the present conditions. 


Unless India is jumping to conclusions, the foregoing underscores the need for it 
to share crucial bits of intelligence with the Pakistan government. An out-of-control 
ISI poses more of a threat to Pakistan than to India. It would clearly be in New 
Delhi's interests to engage rather than antagonize the Musharraf administration, 
which has, predictably, already been placed in a precarious position as a consequence 
of the US military action in Afghanistan. A joint strategy against terror would be 
more likely to bear fruit than ma-king difficult demands or taking unilateral action. 


Islamabad is understandably desperate to thwart attempts by remnants of the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda to take refuge on Pakistani soil. It must also acknowledge that it has 
done Kashmiris a grave disservice by lending sustenance to bands of religious fanatics 
who, if they were to have their way, would establish an order that most people would 
find even more oppressive than Indian rule. 

Far from furthering the cause of liberation, the activities of these groups have 
diminished the appeal of Kashmiri nationalism and provided Indian security forces 
with an excuse for an increased - and increasingly repressive - presence in the territory. 
Regardless of who was responsible for the attack in New Delhi, Pakistan ought to 
dismantle training camps for militants and deny extremist groups access to funds 
and weaponry. It should do so not so much in response to Indian demands but as a 
domestic safeguard. 

In this context, it may also be necessary to completely restructure the ISI. It 
would probably make sense to alter its nomenclature, but what's vital is that its 
culture should be revamped to make it answerable to the government of the day. For 
obvious reasons, General Musharraf is in a better position to effect such a change 
than a civilian head of government would be. The agency's Indian equivalent is also 
prone to behavioural disorders, but there is little evidence that the RAW routinely 
exceeds the powers vested in it. 

Meanwhile, it simply would not do to allow militants on both sides of the border 
the satisfaction of fomenting another subcontinental conflagaration. Indian and Pakistani 
leaders are well aware how easy it is to whip up suspicions and hatred. But it is 
not all that much harder to inculcate the spirit of peace and goodwill, except that 
it requires a greater degree of political courage. 

The sort of fortitude necessary for striving towards a sensible resolution of the 
Kashmir dispute could be a long time coming. 

In the interim, it would be considerably more pleasant - and safer - to devote our 
energies to building bridges rather than rattling sabres.

------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-->
Tiny Wireless Camera under $80!
Order Now! FREE VCR Commander!
Click Here - Only 1 Day Left!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/WoOlbB/7.PDAA/ySSFAA/kgFolB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------~->

------------------
http://all.net/ 

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Next message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:Judge:.FBI's.PC-snooping.perfectly.lawful]"
Previous message: Fred Cohen: "[iwar] [fc:And.the.Password.Is.......Waterloo]"
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-12-31 21:00:00 PST