[iwar] [fc:Forgotten.Computer.Reveals.Thinking.Behind.Four.Years.Of.Al.Qaeda.Doings]

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Date: 2001-12-31 13:19:27


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Forgotten.Computer.Reveals.Thinking.Behind.Four.Years.Of.Al.Qaeda.Doings]
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Wall Street Journal
December 31, 2001
Pg. 1
Forgotten Computer Reveals Thinking Behind Four Years Of Al Qaeda Doings
By Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, Staff Reporters of The Wall Street
Journal
KABUL, Afghanistan -- Last May, someone sat down at an IBM desktop here and
typed out a polite letter to a bitter foe of al Qaeda, the anti-Taliban
leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. The writer tapped at the computer for 97 minutes,
according to its internal record, then printed out the fruit of his labor: a
request for an interview with Mr. Massoud, to be conducted by "one of our
best journalists, Mr. Karim Touzani."
On Sept. 9, two men posing as journalists, one carrying a passport in the
name of Karim Touzani, detonated a hidden bomb as they interviewed Mr.
Massoud. The legendary Afghan commander was mortally wounded. Two days later
came the suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
Now, as al Qaeda, the group blamed for all of those lethal attacks, is
uprooted from its Afghan sanctuaries, it is leaving behind
cyber-fingerprints. The letter to Mr. Massoud is one of hundreds of text
documents and video files in a computer evidently used for four years by al
Qaeda chieftains in Kabul. Its hard drive is a repository for correspondence
with militant Muslims around the world, portraying al Qaeda bosses
struggling to administer, inspire and discipline the sprawling global
organization.
Daily Concerns
Dating from early 1997 through this fall, the files paint a picture of both
ghoulish ambitions and quotidian frustrations within an organization that,
despite its medieval zealotry, sometimes mimicked a multinational
corporation. Memos refer to al Qaeda as "the company" and its leadership as
"the general management."
The computer files don't appear to detail the plotting of Sept. 11 or to
contain any clear plans for future attacks. But hundreds of documents,
ranging from the murderous to the mundane, illuminate issues bearing on
America's war on terrorism. Among them:
Files outlining al Qaeda efforts to launch a program of chemical and
biological weapons, code-named al Zabadi, Arabic for curdled milk. As part
of the plan to develop a "home-brew nerve gas," members were given a long
reading list that included a study titled "Current Concepts: Napalm."
A video file in which Osama bin Laden speaks for 23 minutes, focusing on
what he calls America's anti-Muslim crusade and mentioning the Sept. 11
attacks. Another video shows a top al Qaeda cleric and spokesman, Sheikh Abu
Gaith, appearing to acknowledge al Qaeda responsibility for the strikes.
"God Almighty has enabled our brothers to carry out these strikes," he says,
"and make the enemies of God taste what they made our brothers taste."
A letter in which a militant using the name Abu Yaser stresses that "hitting
the Americans and Jews is a target of great value and has its rewards in
this life and, God willing, the afterlife." The letter is addressed to top
al Qaeda lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahri and the author says he has written to
Mr. bin Laden separately.
A memo referring to a "legal study" on "the killing of civilians." The
writer, acknowledging this is "a sensitive issue," says he has found ways to
keep "the enemy" from using the killing of "civilians, specifically women
and children," to undermine the militants' cause.
Streets of Kabul
How a computer apparently stuffed with al Qaeda secrets came to light
involves a combination of happenstance and the opportunism of war in a
country schooled for 20 years in conflict and chaos. The desktop was
installed in a two-story brick building in Kabul that was used by al Qaeda
as an office, according to a looter who says he grabbed it and a Compaq
laptop from the office. He says he entered the building, which is now
occupied by Northern Alliance soldiers, after a November U.S. bombing raid
killed several senior al Qaeda officials in a nearby property.
As surviving al Qaeda operatives fled Kabul ahead of the city's fall, the
looter offered the computers for sale to a local computer merchant. A Wall
Street Journal reporter acquired them for $1,100, copying hundreds of files
and getting some of them translated from the Arabic. U.S. officials confirm
the authenticity of the files, most protected by passwords, and say they
provide a trove of information about the inner workings of the secretive
organization.
Frequent users of the computer, who left their names or aliases on dozens of
files, appear to include two top lieutenants of Mr. bin Laden: Dr. Zawahri
and Mohammed Atef. Dr. Zawahri is a former Cairo surgeon who merged his own
Egyptian terror outfit with al Qaeda in 1998, and is widely regarded as Mr.
bin Laden's chief strategist. Mr. Atef, killed in a November bombing raid
near Kabul, headed al Qaeda's military wing. U.S. officials believe he
masterminded the lethal 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.
It is unclear whether Mr. bin Laden used the computer, though several texts
stored on the hard drive make elliptical references to the Saudi exile,
referring to "Abu Abdullah" and other bin Laden aliases.
Users of the computer evidently didn't make much use of e-mail. Afghan phone
connections are poor and satellite links easily monitored. Instead, it
appears they composed correspondence on the computer, then either copied it
to a diskette or made a print-out to be delivered by hand. Notes in the
computer frequently lament hitches in delivery of correspondence. The hard
drive contains messages to or from activists in Western Europe and Asia,
Albania, Yemen, Egypt and other outposts of the network.
Identifying the authors of texts stored on the computer is often difficult.
Most use code names or aliases. There are frequent references, for example,
to "Abdel Moez" or "Nur al-Din" -- names U.S. authorities list as among
aliases for Dr. Zawahri. "Salah al-din," another name that appears
frequently on the files, also appears to be an alias for Dr. Zawahri.
A series of files stored in a folder labeled "Hafs" appears to contain
documents of Mr. Atef, who, according to a U.S. indictment relating to the
embassy bombings, used "Abu Hafs" as his primary alias.
Keep Out
Sometimes, real names appear. The computer was used to compose a sign for an
office, reading "This is a work place! For those who do not work here,
please do not enter at all. Dr. Ayman."
Many of the documents stored on the computer focus on housekeeping matters,
particularly funding and personnel problems. Complaints about money and
unpaid salaries turn up frequently. "I am almost broke," wrote one
operative. "The money I have may not last until the feast. Please send money
or bring it to us as soon as possible." Another pinched activist was told to
find a house for just $30 a month.
Other files offer practical if chilling advice. A bomb-making guide provides
tips on the use of dishwasher timers, alarm clocks and digital watches.
There is also a table giving recommended lethal doses for various poisons:
how much it takes to kill people of different body weights.
The computer files also show al Qaeda leaders celebrating. A homemade video
file made after Sept. 11 features television footage of terrified Americans
fleeing the flaming World Trade Center, overlain with a soundtrack of
mocking chants and prayer in Arabic.
And, after the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998, a congratulatory
message to Dr. Zawahri praised "what you did and all the works and the
labors that you did to plague the enemy of God." The message, stored in the
computer as a Microsoft Word document, is signed "Abu Yaser."
The bombings killed at least 224 people, mostly local Africans rather than
Americans, and injured more than 5,000. Apparently emboldened by the death
toll, the writer of the message advised: "We should not look for the easier
targets, but we should look for the more strategic places, the targets which
will harm the enemy and exact revenge upon them."
Home Brew
Soon after the African bombings, the computer files show al Qaeda embarking
on potentially its most deadly project: the "curdled milk" biological- and
chemical-warfare program. A memo written in April 1999, apparently by Dr.
Zawahri, notes that "the destructive power of these weapons is no less than
that of nuclear weapons."
The memo laments al Qaeda's sluggishness in realizing the menace of these
weapons, noting that "despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of
them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing
concern that they can be produced simply."
As a first step, the memo suggests, militants must brush up on their
reading. The memo gives a detailed precis of an American history of chemical
and germ warfare. It lists a catalog of exotic killers, from anthrax to
Rocky Mountain spotted fever.
A May 7, 1999, file indicates that by that time, al Qaeda leaders had
earmarked $2,000 to $4,000 for "start-up" costs of the program. In a letter
dated May 23 and written under one of Dr. Zawahri's aliases, the author
reports discussing some "very useful ideas" during a visit to Abu Khabab,
the alias of an elderly Egyptian scientist. "It just needs some experiments
to develop its practical use."
Particularly encouraging, the letter in the computer files said, was a
home-brew nerve gas made from insecticides and a chemical additive that
would help speed up penetration into the skin. The writer said Mr. Khabab
had supplied a computer disk that gave details of "his product" in a WinZip
file, and "my neighbor opened it by God's will."
U.S. officials, citing satellite photos and intelligence gathered from local
residents, say Abu Khabab experimented with nerve gas on dogs and rabbits at
a camp near the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad. The camp, one of several
in the area hit by U.S. bombs after Sept. 11, was known as Abu Khabab in
honor of the scientist.
In a letter dated May 26 and stored in the computer under the same alias as
earlier correspondence, the author says he was "very enthusiastic" about the
Zabadi project and was especially pleased with Abu Khabab's "significant
progress."
It isn't clear how far al Qaeda got in making nerve gas. A June 1999 memo
found on the hard drive and addressed to "Abu Hafs" -- Mr. Atef's alias --
gave instructions for building a laboratory, ordering that walls be covered
with oil paint and floors with tiles or cement "to facilitate cleaning with
insecticides." But, noted the memo, "construction should not start until
electricity is installed." It also called for evasive action to avoid
detection: "Periodically (for example about every three months) one of the
locations is to be canceled and replaced by another."
A progress report complained that the use of nonspecialists had "resulted in
a waste of effort and money," urging the recruitment of experts as the
"fastest, safest and cheapest" route. A June 1999 memo said the program
should seek cover and talent in educational institutions, which it said were
"more beneficial to us and allow easy access to specialists, which will
greatly benefit us in the first stage, God willing."
The computer files show leaders in Kabul trying to keep a tight leash on
militants abroad. "The general management shall be consulted on issues
related to joining and firing from the company, the general strategy and the
company name," intoned a lengthy report on the wayward ways of an al Qaeda
cell in Yemen. A member of the cell, the report complained, had been
overheard talking "in an unsuitable way" with a woman on the telephone and
had then tried to dodge questions about the relationship by "pretending to
be busy reading the Quran."
An activist code-named "Abbas," apparently under a cloud for talking too
much and other infractions, sent groveling messages from an unidentified
outpost promising to stick to "orders issued by the management" and "refrain
from giving any interviews to the press or the radio ... without consulting
with you and taking your permission."
In a stern note warning against lax security, a message bearing what appears
to be Dr. Zawahri's code name ordered someone called "Hamza" to stop
"writing my name on messages as he did" and start using two envelopes.
"Place my name on the inner envelope," he instructed.
Islamic militants in Egypt, meanwhile, were grilled over their 1998 decision
to declare a truce with the government in Cairo and give up violence.
Several files on the computer focus on this quarrel over strategy. "Noble
brother, I hesitated in writing this letter when it was announced that you
had called for a stop to all military operations," reads a letter from Dr.
Zawahri to a leader of Egypt's Islamic Group. "Does that position apply to
inciting people to perform jihad against Americans? And does it apply to
Israel as well?"
Squabbling With the Taliban
Another headache was al Qaeda's relationship with the Taliban. A July 1998
report stored in the computer details what seems to have been a near rupture
in relations between Afghanistan's then leaders and Mr. bin Laden's network.
Addressed to Dr. Ayman -- apparently Dr. Zawahri -- the report describes an
angry meeting between the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, and "Abu
Abdullah." This could be a reference to Mr. bin Laden, since that was one of
his aliases. The report blames the quarrel on a "bankrupt failure to achieve
any real external victory." It warns that Arabs operating in Afghanistan
risk losing access to their training camps, just as they were earlier
expelled from Sudan, Mr. bin Laden's main base until 1996.
Discontent sometimes nearly bubbled over into mutiny. The unnamed author of
a June 1998 memorandum outlined a catalog of 21 gripes presented to "the
doctor." They suggest an organization swamped by feuds and petty
back-biting: Why has Yunis been put in charge of the archives? Why did a
hard drive with "important documents relating to the company" get lost in
Sudan? How much money was spent on a trip to Malaysia? What was the point of
a visit to Chechnya?
In a final burst of disgust, the author questioned "management methods that
have led to the departure of some brothers from the company and nearly led
to the temptation of others."
A more mundane concern, fund raising, evidently prompted a project to which
Mr. Atef, the al Qaeda military chief, lent his name free of aliases. Its
goal: to cash in on Mr. bin Laden's notoriety. In October 1998, shortly
after U.S. cruise missiles slammed into an al Qaeda training camp in
retaliation for the Africa embassy bombings, the Kabul computer was used to
create letterhead for a fictional company, Challenge for Media Services, and
to draft letters to ABC, CNN and CBS. Each was signed Dr. Mohammed Atef and
offered a business deal: cash for film of Mr. bin Laden and his
bomb-destroyed training camp at Khost in eastern Afghanistan.
Promising a Threat
The letters promised the networks footage in which Mr. bin Laden "openly
threatened U.S. and Israeli troops" and urged the networks to send
representatives to Kabul or Jalalabad, to ensure "priority in getting the
material and easiness in negotiation." But the letters don't appear to have
been sent. They were left in a folder marked "not sent" on the computer's
hard drive. ABC, CBS and CNN say they never received any letters nor bought
any videos from Mr. Atef.
More sinister was the missive drafted early this summer to Mr. Massoud, who
was the leader of the Taliban's only significant opposition in Afghanistan.
"We ... are at your service in the hope that our collaboration will be long
and fruitful," read the letter, written in clumsy French in the name of an
obscure, London-based Islamic information agency. It outlined what it said
were plans for television reportage on Afghanistan. The interview request
carried the name of Yasser Al-Siri, director of the Islamic Observation
Center in London. Mr. Al-Siri was arrested in London in October and last
month charged with conspiring to murder Mr. Massoud. He has denied any
involvement in the assassination.
Though written under Mr. Al-Siri's name, the letter, according to the Kabul
computer's internal properties, which give the user's name in Arabic, was
crafted by Mohammed Zawahri. It is unclear whether this refers to Dr.
Zawahri, who is known to speak French and sometimes goes by the alias "Abu
Mohammed," or possibly to his brother, Mohammed Zawahiri, a fellow Islamic
militant who helped set up a terror cell in Albania in the 1990s.
The two men who posed as journalists to interview Mr. Massoud Sept. 9, both
French-speaking Arabs, carried stolen Belgian passports. One died
immediately after setting off a hidden explosive. The other, wounded, was
shot dead by guards. Witnesses say they detonated the bomb moments after
asking Mr. Massoud one of the questions from a list proposed in a
French-language document contained in the Kabul computer: "How will you deal
with the Osama bin Laden issue when you are in power and what do you see as
the solution to this issue?"
-- Hugh Pope and Christopher Cooper contributed to this article.

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