[iwar] [fc:USA.Sets.Sights.On.GPS.Security.Enhancements]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-01-15 20:10:21


Return-Path: <sentto-279987-4309-1011154152-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com>
Delivered-To: fc@all.net
Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Tue, 15 Jan 2002 20:12:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 17971 invoked by uid 510); 16 Jan 2002 04:09:20 -0000
Received: from n20.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.70) by all.net with SMTP; 16 Jan 2002 04:09:20 -0000
X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-4309-1011154152-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com
Received: from [216.115.97.163] by n20.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 16 Jan 2002 03:59:57 -0000
X-Sender: fc@red.all.net
X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com
Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_1_3); 16 Jan 2002 04:09:12 -0000
Received: (qmail 64268 invoked from network); 16 Jan 2002 04:09:12 -0000
Received: from unknown (216.115.97.167) by m9.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 16 Jan 2002 04:09:12 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (12.232.72.98) by mta1.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 16 Jan 2002 04:09:11 -0000
Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id g0G4AL508625 for iwar@onelist.com; Tue, 15 Jan 2002 20:10:21 -0800
Message-Id: <200201160410.g0G4AL508625@red.all.net>
To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List)
Organization: I'm not allowed to say
X-Mailer: don't even ask
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3]
From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet
Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com
Precedence: bulk
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2002 20:10:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:USA.Sets.Sights.On.GPS.Security.Enhancements]
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Jane's Defence Weekly
January 16, 2002
USA Sets Sights On GPS Security Enhancements
By Michael Sirak, JDW Staff Reporter, Washington DC 
With the US military's growing reliance on the precision navigation and
timing functions offered by global positioning system (GPS) satellites, the
Department of Defense (DoD), led by the US Air Force (USAF), is taking a
comprehensive approach to safeguard the integrity of the GPS signal and
increase its jam resistance. 
DoD officials say the measures involve not only increasing the satellites'
signal strength and refining their signal-processing capabilities, but also
fielding more sophisticated GPS receivers in its aircraft, ships, ground
vehicles and weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition. 
"This really is a matter of getting the right systems solution," says Brig
Gen Michael Hamel, the air force's director of space operations and
integration. "We know that technically [the jamming of GPS signals] can be
done. We have seen evidence of the equipment that is available on world
markets, but we still don't have a definitive threat that the [GPS] system
has to be designed to. So we are trying to take as balanced an approach in
terms of what capabilities do you put on the satellite, what kinds of
capabilities do you embed in the user equipment and how do you integrate the
user equipment into the using platforms." 
The DoD has a requirement for 24 GPS satellites, but operates 28 satellites
for greater accuracy. USAF Maj Ed Rivera, who oversees operation of the GPS
constellation at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, said he can guarantee
both civil and military user groups that "they will have at least 7m of
accuracy". Military users, however, receive more precise real-time accuracy
because they operate with encrypted receivers that better compensate for
atmospheric error.
Over most areas of the Earth, there are between seven and 11 satellites
within range, Maj Rivera notes. Three satellites are needed to provide 2-D
navigational co-ordinates. Four satellites provide 3-D accuracy, he added.
The satellites also provide timing accuracy of up to 80 picoseconds for
anywhere on the globe, he said. 
The satellites, which are currently in the Block II, IIA and IIR
configurations, operate approximately 11,000nm above the Earth. They
broadcast signals in two military codes, designated P (Y) and one civil
code, L1. In March, the USAF plans to launch the seventh of 20 planned
Lockheed Martin GPS Block IIR satellites. 
The DoD is developing a new military code, the M-code, which will provide
improved signal-processing techniques for enhanced jamming resistance. It is
modernising the remaining Block IIR satellites with the M-code. The first
M-code-equipped Block IIR satellite is scheduled for launch in 2003. These
Block IIR-M satellites will also feature a second civil code, L2. 
Starting in 2005, the USAF will begin launching the first of 16 planned
Boeing Block IIF GPS satellites that will feature the M-code signal as well
as a third civil code, designated L5. The USAF also plans a follow-on GPS
Block III constellation that will substantially increase the power of the
M-code signal. "The way we will do that is to add additional spot beams that
will be able to put more power in particular regions where we are conducting
operations or have particular concerns about," Gen Hamel told Jane's Defence
Weekly. He added that the service is also looking at how much additional
transmission power can be achieved from the Block IIR and Block IIF
satellites. 
Gen Hamel expects the GPS III satellites, which are scheduled for first
launch around 2010, will have "somewhere in the range of 100-300 times the
transmission power" of the current GPS constellation. Beyond the improvement
to the satellites themselves, sophisticated anti-jam and anti-spoof antennas
for high-value assets like strike aircraft and precision-guided munitions
will also contribute to significant increases in system robustness, he says.

To that end, the Air Force Research Laboratory's sensors directorate has
developed an Antenna Wave Front Simulator to evaluate the effectiveness of
anti-jam GPS antenna electronics units. It also has a GPS Interference and
Navigation Tool used to asses the performance of GPS/inertial navigation
system-equipped platforms and munitions while they are moving over terrain
and through an array of GPS interference and jamming. Further, its Virtual
Flight Test system can replicate real-world radio-frequency jamming levels
to assess the anti-jam capabilities of actual hardware, according to the
lab. 
Denice Jacobs, team leader in the directorate's electronic warfare
technology branch, says these simulation tools can be used both to predict
flight characteristics of weapons with anti-jam technologies and to provide
post-flight test verification. Equally important, the simulation tools can
measure the impact on friendly legacy systems of new anti-jam technologies,
she added. 
Gen Hamel says this 'backward computability' is one of the biggest
challenges related to GPS. Because of this, Maj Rivera says, for example, he
can currently only increase the power of the GPS signal to 25dB. Otherwise,
he says, the strength of the signal would blow out older receivers, mostly
on the civilian side. 
The USAF is also looking at what improvements in GPS accuracy could be
achieved with the Block III satellites. Although the service believes
greater accuracy would have a high operational payoff, it is weighing the
costs of achieving further accuracy refinements, Gen Hamel says. "I think we
sometimes get jaded about this," he notes. "We say 'why don't we improve
from 3m to 1m [accuracy]?' That is the difference [between one end of a
table and the next] measured at 10,000 miles away . . . It isn't just about
how accurate can we make GPS. It is about how accurate do you need to be in
order to do a useful task, function or mission." In many cases, he says, the
GPS system can provide accuracy greater than the geodetic reference system
used by the military to map the Earth's surface for targeting purposes. 
The DoD is also developing other concepts to increase the robustness of the
GPS system. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Global
Positioning Experiments programme, for example, is exploring the feasibility
of housing GPS signal relays on multiple high-altitude unmanned air vehicles
(UAVs) or other aerial platforms, which amplify the GPS signal as they pass
it downward over a battlefield. The programme has already conducted an
aerial demonstration with a US Army Hunter UAV.

------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-->
Tiny Wireless Camera under $80!
Order Now! FREE VCR Commander!
Click Here - Only 1 Day Left!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/WoOlbB/7.PDAA/ySSFAA/kgFolB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------~->

------------------
http://all.net/ 

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 



This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2002-12-31 02:15:03 PST