Return-Path: <sentto-279987-4334-1011296522-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Thu, 17 Jan 2002 11:43:09 -0800 (PST) Received: (qmail 22066 invoked by uid 510); 17 Jan 2002 19:42:09 -0000 Received: from n9.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.59) by all.net with SMTP; 17 Jan 2002 19:42:09 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-4334-1011296522-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [216.115.97.189] by n9.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 17 Jan 2002 19:42:02 -0000 X-Sender: cpreston@gci.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_1_3); 17 Jan 2002 19:42:02 -0000 Received: (qmail 99443 invoked from network); 17 Jan 2002 19:42:01 -0000 Received: from unknown (216.115.97.171) by m3.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 17 Jan 2002 19:42:01 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO mta-1.gci.net) (208.138.130.82) by mta3.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 17 Jan 2002 19:42:01 -0000 Received: from mmp-2.gci.net ([208.138.130.81]) by mta-1.gci.net (Netscape Messaging Server 4.15) with ESMTP id GQ3LE001.JLW for <iwar@yahoogroups.com>; Thu, 17 Jan 2002 10:42:00 -0900 Received: from graywolf3 ([24.237.1.40]) by mmp-2.gci.net (Netscape Messaging Server 4.15) with SMTP id GQ3LE000.82F for <iwar@yahoogroups.com>; Thu, 17 Jan 2002 10:42:00 -0900 To: <iwar@yahoogroups.com> Message-ID: <OCEDLLJFJEMAFJGHDCLNEECLDBAA.cpreston@gci.net> X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000 Importance: Normal X-eGroups-From: "Charles Preston" <cpreston@gci.net> From: "Charles Preston" <cpreston@sinbad.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: cpreston_2000 Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 10:41:55 -0900 Subject: [iwar] IT security funding vs. biowar funding Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit People concerned about funding for IT security research, and action instead of talk in this field, could make a parallel with funding and action on bioterrorism. --------------------------- The following excerpt is from Germs, by Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William Broad, Simon & Schuster, 2001, p. 320 A half century ago, a group of eminent citizens warned James Forrestal, the first secretary of defense, that the United States was defenseless against germ attacks. But its recommendations for better intelligence, more research, drug stockpiles, and medical surveillance systems were largely ignored. Over the next five decades, a series of American presidents confronted the problem, considered various remedies, and shuffled the issue into the "too hard" box. Such denial is understandable. Biodefense has no natural political constituency in Washington. The military-industrial complex that supports weapons systems has little interest in vaccines and public health. "Plans should be prepared for the establishment of adequate laboratory and vaccine production facilities and stockpiles of essential basic medical supplies in the event the danger from enemy attack appears imminent," Forrestal's committee concluded in 1949. "Prompt action should be taken to establish a civil defense program." Those words could have been written yesterday. The question is whether the United States will be able to wait another fifty years to act on them. If we as a nation believe that the germ threat is a hoax, we are spending too much money on it. But if the danger is real, as we conclude it is, then the investment is much too haphazard and diffuse. We remain woefully unprepared for a calamity that would be unlike any this country has ever experienced. --------------------------- Optimists would say that IT security is doing ok by comparison, since bioweapons would result in very real and visible (as opposed to abstract) sickness and death. An infowar study from several years ago made the point that "a good offense is not a good defense" where you can't easily identify targets for that offensive action. The same problem exists with bioterrorism. Any U.S. progress in offensive biowar or infowar isn't a substitute for protection. Parity in weapons with other select nation-states is only part of the answer. Even large opponents of the U.S. may be willing to bet that it will take months or years for intelligence and investigation to lead back to them from the agents they support. cmp ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Tiny Wireless Camera under $80! Order Now! FREE VCR Commander! Click Here - Only 1 Day Left! http://us.click.yahoo.com/WoOlbB/7.PDAA/ySSFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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