[iwar] [fc:Electronic.Attack.-.With.Static.And.Sword]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-01-23 22:35:39
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Electronic Attack - With Static And Sword

Ref:  Journal of Electronic Defense, Dec 2001

<a href="http://www.jedonline.com/default.asp?journalid=4&func=articles&page=0112j13&year=2001&month=12&doct=cover%20story">http://www.jedonline.com/default.asp?journalid=4&func=articles&page=0112j13&year=2001&month=12&doct=cover%20story>

Part I: The Offensive EW Concept
Tactical Aircraft Must Take The Offensive Against Future Threats

by Lt. Colonel Omer Regev (ret.)

Air-search and fire control radars are widely available, mobile, and effective. 
The aspects availability, mobility (or transportability), and effectiveness combine 
with modern communications and networking to enable many armed forces to construct 
first-rate air-defense systems. This fact of life means that the electronic warfare 
self-protection system - or suite of systems - is an essential feature of every modern 
or upgraded fighter. 

The EW systems for self-protection were developed to counter radar threats as they 
became lethal to the aircraft. This traditional self-protection concept deals with 
the threat as one might approach peeling an onion, with priorities forming a series 
of layers. Unlike an onion, the aspects of the task most likely to bring tears to 
the eyes are widely regarded as the easiest to deal with. 

The first priority is to counter the approaching missile by increasing the missile's 
miss distance. The second priority is to deceive or to "break" the lock of the threat's 
target acquisition sensor or fire control radar before launch, or even after launch, 
if the missile is semi-active homing. The third priority is to counter the acquisition 
phase of the threat's fire-control radar trying to deny successful lock on. 

Taken as a whole, comparatively low priority is dedicated to deal with the threat's 
search phases. This is because it is extremely difficult to deal with air-search 
radars on a technical basis. Only a few of the world's nations have the ability to 
avoid detection by the air-search radars of a modern air-defense network through 
some combination of low-observable technology (stealth), signature damping, and jamming. 
More commonly, countermeasures to air search radars are found in tactics, such as 
terrain following or striking from unexpected quarters. 

Self-protection concepts have evolved through few generations, the oldest of which 
are systems destined for aircraft survivability over the battlefield. These concepts 
employ the inner protection layer of the onion. Unfortunately, countering a threat 
in the terminal phase calls for "panic" (emergency weapon release) and mission abort. 
Thus, it is possible for an air defense unit to win an engagement with a combat aircraft 
even if the aircraft lives to fight another day. It could be argued that a mission 
aborted is a battle won by the defending side.

Rather than thinking about protection in terms of platforms, it is time to start 
thinking about it in terms of missions. Mission protection implies the survival of 
the platform and crew while at the same time encompassing the survival of the purpose 
that put them in harms way to begin with. A mission aborted is a mission that will 
have to be undertaken again, perhaps with a loss of operational surprise or other 
less than ideal conditions in play. Furthermore, there are few air forces that have 
the resources or leisure to stage sortie after sortie and above all there are particular 
missions where there is no substitute for success. 

Modern self protection concepts for mission survivability employ the outer protection 
layers of the onion; countering the threats with sophisticated techniques that allow 
the aircraft successful ingress to attack the target within SAM protected zones and 
then egress to safety when the job is done. 

Be offensive

A fundamental weakness of the platform self-protection concept is that supporting 
technologies are reaching the limits of cost effectiveness. Modern threats incorporate 
phased array radar technology, low probability of intercept capabilities, and effective 
ECCM. Maintaining and improving EW systems capabilities to counter improved and modern 
threats grows asymptotically expensive while the outcome merit of "total EW effectiveness" 
is almost unchanged. EW systems for platform protection are growing as expensive 
as the threats, which enjoy the distinct advantage of being procured in greater quantity 
than platform EW systems (perhaps excepting expendables rounds). 

Moreover, the problem of protecting a platform is generally more difficult than 
deterring or destroying it. Intimate intelligence database for each threat and for 
each threat-mode is required in order to generate effective techniques. Gathering 
this data and maintaining this database updated requires large budgets and massive 
effort. There is only one short window of opportunity to counter the threat, and 
false data might cause fatalities. On the other hand, the threat has the advantage 
of surprise and superior start position. 

Operational requirements and budget constrains should require more cost-effectiveness 
out of modern EW suites and systems. Analyzing the reasons for the weakness and limitations 
of the self-protection concepts finds the basic "protection-limited" operational 
requirement and a defensive mindset. Modern air forces would benefit from considering 
what might be called the Offensive EW Concept (OEWC). "Best defense is offense" is 
the philosophy of this concept. The fighter (with its EW system) is able to turn 
the tables on the air-defense system. This is a dramatic change in the combat relationship 
between the SAM and the fighter. 

The first step of "going offensive" is upgrading the operational requirements list 
for the EW systems. EW systems and suites are usually the most sophisticated electronic 
asset of the fighter. The system usually incorporates a long-range detection function, 
fast and capable processing functions, and an ultra wide band transmitting function. 
The EW system is tuned to serve self-protection purposes but leaves its fine potential 
as a sensor for electronic attack unexploited. 

The detection function of the radar-warning receiver is very sensitive and able 
to detect numerous threats at beyond visual range in numerous radar modes. However, 
for self-protection purposes, the sensitivity is usually "tuned down" and filtered 
so that only a few threats and threats modes will reach the attention of the aircrew. 
The processing units gather data from the detection function and from the fighter's 
avionics. Fusing this data can generate new and vital information. However, most 
of this data is filtered and only a small portion of it is used by the self-protection 
system. 

The OEWC concept is a SEAD doctrine based upon EW means. The EW system capabilities 
enable the fighter to be first to engage the threat. The EW system will detect, locate 
and identify the threat at beyond visual range and before it start its hostile engagement 
procedure. The fighter will then be able to fully exploit its natural advantages 
of maneuverability and mobility against the threat. 

Detection capability at beyond visual range provides the pilot with all the required 
information and will give him the time to prepare and plan his attack. The EW suite 
generates combat situational picture 360 degrees around the platform. The EW combat 
picture has depth of many layers: target location, target dynamics, target mode of 
operation, target intentions, weapons launch, etc. All of this is vital offensive 
information to the pilot. Threat information will provide accurate geo-location of 
the threat by implementing state-of-the-art location finding technologies. Threat 
information will also provide detailed identification of threat type, threat "tail-number," 
and threat mode of operation.

In approaching to attack the threat, the jammer function will play a major role. 
Using the EW "onion shell" comparison, the jammer will have to deal with the outer 
shells of the threat (search and detection). The jammer will have to provide the 
best electronic environment to help the attack mission. At the long range, the jammer's 
task is to saturate the threat or to deceive it (or both). The jammer will deny any 
relevant information of fighter's location and intentions from the threat. At later 
attack phases, in close range, the jammer will also provide self-protection functions. 


Data fusion of EW data with avionics data is another important layer of the OEWC. 
Fusing the detection function data with the data of other weapon systems and avionic 
systems, such as radar, targeting systems and pods, Link-16, IFF interrogator etc., 
will generate a comprehensive situational awareness for the aircrew. Fusing all the 
data will generate new targets that might otherwise go unnoticed. These targets are 
fused out of partial detections of each system that might otherwise be rejected due 
to lack of information. However, combining the partial data from all the systems 
will generate a legitimate fused target. Every threat or target will be analyzed 
and displayed to its last relevant detail. Threats and targets data fusion will also 
increase the accuracies of the data parameters (direction, location, angles, state 
of operational mode etc.) allowing improved operational effectiveness. 

The OEWC is capable of high accuracies of direction and sometimes range. These capabilities 
are part of the cooperation with avionics and the data fusion. Combined with all 
the complementary ESM, data the OEWC is capable of generating targeting, weapon cueing 
and offensive recommendations to the pilot. By using network such as the Link-16, 
all of its capabilities and accuracies are increased while gathering the information 
from what has become a multi-source system. Networking sensors will increase the 
chances of mission success. The targeting function will be comprehensive and accurate, 
while the jamming function will be coordinated between all the attackers to gain 
best saturation and deception results. 

The OEWC will enable operational requirement organizations and platform designers 
to design an EW system that will be an inherent function of the fighter's avionics 
and fighter's missions. In the next few years we will witness the EW suite becoming 
one of the most important systems in the fighter due to its advanced offensive capabilities. 
The OEWC concept exploits the EW system resources and capabilities to its maximum. 
Using the offensive concept as part of the avionics or as a weapon will result in 
expanded and improved operational capabilities even when using the same basic EW 
system. The future fighter generation -- F-22, JSF, F-16 Block 60, etc. -- are already 
employing some major parts of the offensive concept.

Lt. Colonel Omer Regev (ret.) served 22 years of operational service. He is an expert 
in operational requirements for EW &amp; electronic systems, as well as in flight-testing 
electronic systems, avionics, and weapons. Currently he is president of OMERTEC Ltd., 
a consulting and marketing firm based in Israel. 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Part II: Offensive EW In Action 
The Shooters Can Also Be The Sensors 

by Maj. Mike "Starbaby" Pietrucha, USAF
 
&lt;image  Low-power signals are particularly difficult for intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance sensors to pick out at range. The shooter is in an excellent position 
to locate a SAM system and then make the decision to employ weapons or electronic 
attack. USAF photo 

0300 Zulu, 26 June, 2006, the Persian Gulf. Four F-15E Strike Eagles fly through 
the Zagros mountain range in southern Iran, their terrain-following radars guiding 
the aircraft safely at 300 feet in pitch-black conditions. In addition to their normal 
self-defense AMRAAM/ Sidewinder loadout, the aircraft carry a variety of munitions 
intended for use against a specific SAM array - the S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) batteries 
guarding the naval base at Bandar Abbas - and incidentally covering much of Oman, 
the UAE, and all of the Straits of Hormuz.

The Strike Eagles are running under emissions control (EMCON) with only low power 
modes of the terrain-following radar and the radar altimeter to betray them. Given 
the terrain, detection by active or passive means is extremely unlikely. But the 
crews are not blind - a low-bandwidth datalink, relayed by satellite, is providing 
them with a partial picture from offboard sensors far from the area. An onboard precision 
radar-warning receiver (RWR) is silently listening for nearby threats. 

As the F-15Es run in, the #1 and #3 aircraft pop above a ridgeline in a preplanned 
target acquisition maneuver. The electronic surveillance (ES) sensors on board the 
aircraft detect the S-300's "Clam Shell" radar, but the F-15Es are lurking in the 
shadows of high mountains and remain undetected. (Pity the defenders for not springing 
for the "Big Bird" early warning radar tower.) While the Strike Eagles' individual 
RWRs locate the threat, the two aircraft communicate via a low-power intra-flight 
datalink, improving their passive solution. Within seconds, all four aircraft now 
have a location for the Clam Shell: not good enough for weapons employment, but enough 
to confirm that the previous coordinates are out of date and provide a cue for other 
sensors.

The Strike Eagles are 90 seconds from the IP when the trailing element launches 
a total of 24 miniature air-launched decoys (MALDs). The decoys fly up and proceed 
toward the target area - providing a rather rude awakening to the crew at the "Flap 
Lid" acquisition radar who have been presented with a convincing imitation of a large 
strike package headed toward the naval base. The automatic features of the SAMs come 
into play against the decoys, and the first S-300 missiles clear the canisters before 
the MALDs are a third of the way toward the target. Within seconds, every target 
engagement radar is radiating. 

Four miles from the IP, the F-15Es enter a valley and obtain direct line of sight 
to the very active radar array that is engaging the MALDs. The F-15Es are immediately 
detected, but it is already too late. The F-15E radars are fully active now, mapping 
the target array that has been located by onboard sensors. Target location data is 
passed from the F-15Es via datalink back to the satellite for use by other assets 
in theater. Within 10 seconds of unmasking, the trailing element launches a pair 
of anti-radiation missiles at the enemy target engagement radars. The crews identify 
target coordinates from the SAR maps and the jets mask behind a ridgeline. Total 
exposure time: 20 seconds. 

The scenario above is entirely notional. The F-15E does not have the RWR to make 
this vision a reality. In fact, no US combat aircraft has the sensor array described 
above, and the MALD is not yet fielded. Having said that, neither are beyond the 
technical or financial reach of a combat air force, especially given the high stakes 
involved. 

Radar defenses are very difficult targets. The addition of mobility to their arsenal 
has greatly complicated the problem of finding and killing the radars that serve 
as the backbone of both the surveillance and "shooter" portions of an Integrated 
Air Defense System (IADS). The US is highly reliant on its standoff sensors to find 
radar targets. Unfortunately, the picture provided by these sensors is incomplete 
and lags the event significantly behind. It is long past time to take advantage of 
our other, underutilized sensor array - the gear on board the strike aircraft. If 
we want to detect and target the threat in single-digit minutes, the shooters must 
also be the sensors. 

The use of offboard sensors and datalink to provide data to the fighters is an established 
concept, and is often used as a model for passing high-fidelity data to strike aircraft. 
The idea is valuable when considered as an adjunct to the striker's own sensor array 
- but is dangerous as a substitute. An example can be drawn with the F-15C in its 
air-to-air role. The aircraft is capable of independent detection, target identification, 
and weapons employment; datalink merely enhances the process. Any suggestion that 
an F-15 would rely on datalinked information from AWACS, to the exclusion of its 
own radar, would be both impractical and unwelcome. 

Implicit in the idea of networked sensors in general, and offboard sensors in particular, 
is the assumption that the participants in the network will have functional datalink. 
Disregarding the considerable effects of equipment failure and operator error, datalink 
cannot be guaranteed. An adversary can be expected to make considerable effort to 
deny us the use of our own datalinks and we cannot design an architecture that is 
reliant on datalink to function. 

Any architecture that requires datalink to function is subject to enemy attack directed 
at a single point of failure. If, for example, a scheme requires a number of sensors 
on various aircraft to coordinate their actions over long distances, then this structure 
can be neutralized if datalink is denied. If, instead, datalink is used to enhance 
and refine a single-ship solution, then datalink is not essential to the process. 
While datalink makes the cooperative solution more precise, the individual aircraft 
can still locate threats without it, allowing graceful degradation of the network. 


Datalinks need not reach across the battlefield. A flight of four aircraft could 
communicate via a low power link that need not even be a radio frequency link. It 
can be designed for jam resistance and low probability of intercept, and can provide 
information exchange between nearby strike aircraft. 

Back to reality 

Putting aside the current fact that US strike aircraft RWR were not designed with 
the modern threat in mind, a hypothetical electronic surveillance sensor suite (think 
advanced RWR) in the target area has a much greater chance of detecting a radar signal 
in its vicinity. After all, the strike aircraft is nearby, and if it is being targeted 
it can be assumed that the sensor is both in the main beam and has a direct line 
of sight to the radar. Thus, the sensor detects the concentrated energy from a radar 
pointed directly at it rather than the much weaker sidelobes scattered in other directions. 


Against a modern threat, the ability of a RWR to locate a SAM system is critical 
to the survival of the aircraft. Against pulse-Doppler (PD) radars, aircraft try 
to maneuver to the zero-Doppler region to interrupt track, enhance the effectiveness 
of chaff and decoys, and hide in the ground clutter. Against a system with a +/- 
30-knot Doppler filter, a strike aircraft at 540 knots must hold a tangential heading 
to the radar +/- 3 degrees to stay "in the notch." The ability to locate the threat 
is critical to survival and critical to targeting.

If the strike aircraft can locate the emitter to within a 2000-ft radius circle, 
it can cue other sensors. The F-15E, F-18, B-1 and B-2 can use high-resolution synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR) maps to precisely locate the target cues by onboard ES, thus 
bridging the gap from the circle provided by ES to GPS-quality coordinates provided 
by the SAR. Most importantly, this precise location is done rapidly, entirely within 
the cockpit of a strike aircraft capable of conducting an immediate attack. 

Rather than simply being a user of the ISR data collected by larger, standoff systems, 
the strike aircraft become a provider of critical sensor data to other assets. Their 
positioning in the battlespace makes them an ideal collector. They stimulate the 
air defenses, becoming the reason that the radars turn on in the first place. They 
are the closest to an air threat. An array of onboard sensors, from IR to radar to 
electro-optics can be used to gather information, record it, and download it after 
the mission, reserving datalink bandwidth for only the most time-critical data. ELINT 
information, for example, can be used to update threat databases, characterize enemy 
radars, and analyze enemy tactics. The ability to bring back recorded data and conduct 
a post-flight download could provide essential intelligence - not everything of value 
is needed in real or near-real time. 

The shortening of the timeline to engage targets like mobile SAMs is also an immediate 
benefit of using strike aircraft sensors. Rather than passing targeting data through 
a sensor, a targeting cell, and the Air Operations Center, the information starts 
and ends where it can do the most good - in the cockpit. Against a threat array that 
can commonly pack up and drive away in less than 10 minutes, strike aircraft have 
a critically short time to engage a threat that has just revealed itself by its radar 
emissions. 

Our sensors should also take advantage of the human-in-the-loop benefits of manned 
combat aircraft. We can make much better use of the crew than we currently do. These 
individuals are well trained in target recognition, threat knowledge, tactics, and 
weapons employment. The combat aircrew is accustomed to making rapid decisions on 
complex problems for high stakes. 

Major Mike "Starbaby" Pietrucha is a former F-4G/F-15E IEWO assigned to HQ USAF/XOXS 
"The Skunk Works." He has 156 combat missions over Iraq and the Yugoslavia, mostly 
hunting SAMs, sometimes successfully. The opinions expressed in this article do not 
reflect the official opinion of any portion of the US Air Force. 

Silent Partners: Unattended Sensors

Any sensor net can have its collection capabilities improved by the inclusion of 
remote, unattended sensors. In Vietnam, IGLOO WHITE sensors were dropped by aircraft 
along the Ho Chi Minh trail to provide target detection data to listening aircraft. 
While there are serious technical limitations on the sensing and communications capability 
of small sensors of this type, even relatively limited sensors can provide important 
information. Strike aircraft will often be the delivery platforms, although cruise 
missiles and rocket artillery could also be used to seed an area with sensors. 

Unattended sensors could be seeded into preplanned areas to pick up specified types 
of data. But they may also be deployed on an ad hoc basis by strike aircraft. For 
example, a strike aircraft that detected a radar threat but could not precisely locate 
it could deploy sensors in the area and wait for the target to move. A beer-can sized 
submunition similar to the BLU-97/B could be loaded in CBU-87 canisters or AGM-154A 
JSOW bodies for easy, predictable dispensing. 

There are other uses for cheap, expendable remote sensors. Small and micro-UAVs 
are often considered as part of an airborne net, but their usefulness need not be 
as limited as their airborne endurance. If the sensors aboard these tiny aircraft 
survived the inevitable crash (as they could be designed to do) after the UAV ran 
out of fuel, they could provide an additional enhancement to a distributed sensor 
net. If one of the MALDs used in the illustrated scenario had a datalink and an ELINT 
sensor, it could have popped up above the mountains and sampled the electronic environment 
for the F-15Es. A cheap, expendable MALD will not have the ability to locate the 
threat, but it could see which signals are "on the air." Then, the Strike Eagles 
could have unmasked their ES sensors knowing which threats to look for. 

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