Re: [iwar] Memo from Coleen Rowley

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Date: 2002-05-26 20:40:53
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 she is my hero for finally going after this stale organization and nailed them in the teeth.
  televr <yangyun@metacrawler.com> wrote: TIMEmagazine
Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller
An edited version of the agent's 13-page letter 

May 21, 2002

FBI Director Robert Mueller
FBI Headquarters Washington, D.C.

Dear Director Mueller:

I feel at this point that I have to put my concerns in writing
concerning the important topic of the FBI's response to evidence of
terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11th. The
issues are fundamentally ones of INTEGRITY and go to the heart of the
FBI's law enforcement mission and mandate. Moreover, at this critical
juncture in fashioning future policy to promote the most effective
handling of ongoing and future threats to United States citizens'
security, it is of absolute importance that an unbiased, completely
accurate picture emerge of the FBI's current investigative and
management strengths and failures.

To get to the point, I have deep concerns that a delicate and subtle
shading/skewing of facts by you and others at the highest levels of
FBI management has occurred and is occurring. The term "cover up"
would be too strong a characterization which is why I am attempting to
carefully (and perhaps over laboriously) choose my words here. I base
my concerns on my relatively small, peripheral but unique role in the
Moussaoui investigation in the Minneapolis Division prior to, during
and after September 11th and my analysis of the comments I have heard
both inside the FBI (originating, I believe, from you and other high
levels of management) as well as your Congressional testimony and
public comments.

I feel that certain facts, including the following, have, up to now,
been omitted, downplayed, glossed over and/or mis-characterized in an
effort to avoid or minimize personal and/or institutional
embarrassment on the part of the FBI and/or perhaps even for improper
political reasons:

1) The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about Moussaoui's
flight training identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early
point. The decision to take him into custody on August 15, 2001, on
the INS "overstay" charge was a deliberate one to counter that threat
and was based on the agents' reasonable suspicions. While it can be
said that Moussaoui's overstay status was fortuitous, because it
allowed for him to be taken into immediate custody and prevented him
receiving any more flight training, it was certainly not something the
INS coincidentally undertook of their own volition. I base this on the
conversation I had when the agents called me at home late on the
evening Moussaoui was taken into custody to confer and ask for legal
advice about their next course of action. The INS agents was assigned
to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and was therefore working in
tandem with FBI agents.

2) As the Minneapolis agents' reasonable suspicions quickly ripened
into probable cause, which, at the latest, occurred within days of
Moussaoui's arrest when the French Intelligence Service confirmed his
affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities
connected to Osama Bin Laden, they became desperate to search the
computer lap top that had been taken from Moussaoui as well as conduct
a more thorough search of his personal effects. The agents in
particular believed that Moussaoui signaled he had something to hide
in the way he refused to allow them to search his computer.

3) The Minneapolis agents' initial thought was to obtain a criminal
search warrant, but in order to do so, they needed to get FBI
Headquarters' (FBIHQ's) approval in order to ask for DOJ OIPR's
approval to contact the United States Attorney's Office in Minnesota.
Prior to and even after receipt of information provided by the French,
FBIHQ personnel disputed with the Minneapolis agents the existence of
probable cause to believe that a criminal violation had occurred/was
occurring. As such, FBIHQ personnel refused to contact OIPR to attempt
to get the authority. While reasonable minds may differ as to whether
probable cause existed prior to receipt of the French intelligence
information, it was certainly established after that point and became
even greater with successive, more detailed information from the
French and other intelligence sources. The two possible criminal
violations initially identified by Minneapolis Agents were violations
of Title 18 United States Code Section 2332b (Acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries, which, notably, includes "creating a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by
destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or
personal property within the United States or by attempting or
conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or other
real or personal property within the United States") and Section 32
(Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities). It is important to
note that the actual search warrant obtained on September 11th was
based on probable cause of a violation of Section 32.1 Notably also,
the actual search warrant obtained on September 11th did not include
the French intelligence information. Therefore, the only main
difference between the information being submitted to FBIHQ from an
early date which HQ personnel continued to deem insufficient and the
actual criminal search warrant which a federal district judge signed
and approved on September 11th, was the fact that, by the time the
actual warrant was obtained, suspected terrorists were known to have
highjacked planes which they then deliberately crashed into the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. To say then, as has been iterated
numerous times, that probable cause did not exist until after the
disasterous event occurred, is really to acknowledge that the missing
piece of probable cause was only the FBI's (FBIHQ's) failure to
appreciate that such an event could occur. The probable cause did not
otherwise improve or change. When we went to the United States
Attorney's Office that morning of September 11th, in the first hour
after the attack, we used a disk containing the same information that
had already been provided to FBIHQ; then we quickly added Paragraph 19
which was the little we knew from news reports of the actual attacks
that morning. The problem with chalking this all up to the "20-20
hindsight is perfect" problem, (which I, as all attorneys who have
been involved in deadly force training or the defense of various
lawsuits are fully appreciative of), is that this is not a case of
everyone in the FBI failing to appreciate the potential consequences.
It is obvious, from my firsthand knowledge of the events and the
detailed documentation that exists, that the agents in Minneapolis who
were closest to the action and in the best position to gauge the
situation locally, did fully appreciate the terrorist risk/danger
posed by Moussaoui and his possible co-conspirators even prior to
September 11th. Even without knowledge of the Phoenix communication
(and any number of other additional intelligence communications that
FBIHQ personnel were privy to in their central coordination roles),
the Minneapolis agents appreciated the risk. So I think it's very hard
for the FBI to offer the "20-20 hindsight" justification for its
failure to act! Also intertwined with my reluctance in this case to
accept the "20-20 hindsight" rationale is first-hand knowledge that I
have of statements made on September 11th, after the first attacks on
the World Trade Center had already occurred, made telephonically by
the FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who was the one most involved
in the Moussaoui matter and who, up to that point, seemed to have been
consistently, almost deliberately thwarting the Minneapolis FBI
agents' efforts (see number 5). Even after the attacks had begun, the
SSA in question was still attempting to block the search of
Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as
a mere coincidence with Misseapolis' prior suspicions about Moussaoui.2

4) In one of my peripheral roles on the Moussaoui matter, I answered
an e-mail message on August 22, 2001, from an attorney at the National
Security Law Unit (NSLU). Of course, with (ever important!) 20-20
hindsight, I now wish I had taken more time and care to compose my
response. When asked by NSLU for my "assessment of (our) chances of
getting a criminal warrant to search Moussaoui's computer", I
answered, "Although I think there's a decent chance of being able to
get a judge to sign a criminal search warrant, our USAO seems to have
an even higher standard much of the time, so rather than risk it, I
advised that they should try the other route." Leaked news accounts
which said the Minneapolis Legal Counsel (referring to me) concurred
with the FBIHQ that probable cause was lacking to search Moussaoui's
computer are in error. (or possibly the leak was deliberately skewed
in this fashion?) What I meant by this pithy e-mail response, was that
although I thought probable cause existed ("probable cause" meaning
that the proposition has to be more likely than not, or if quantified,
a 51% likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney's Office, (for
a lot of reasons including just to play it safe) in regularly
requiring much more than probable cause before approving affidavits,
(maybe, if quantified, 75%-80% probability and sometimes even higher),
and depending on the actual AUSA who would be assigned, might turn us
down. As a tactical choice, I therefore thought it would be better to
pursue the "other route" (the FISA search warrant) first, the reason
being that there is a common perception, which for lack of a better
term, I'll call the "smell test" which has arisen that if the FBI
can't do something through straight-up criminal methods, it will then
resort to using less-demanding intelligence methods. Of course this
isn't true, but I think the perception still exists. So, by this line
of reasoning, I was afraid that if we first attempted to go criminal
and failed to convinced an AUSA, we wouldn't pass the "smell test" in
subsequently seeking a FISA. I thought our best chances therefore lay
in first seeking the FISA. Both of the factors that influenced my
thinking are areas arguably in need of improvement: requiring an
excessively high standard of probable cause in terrorism cases and
getting rid of the "smell test" perception. It could even be argued
that FBI agents, especially in terrorism cases where time is of the
essence, should be allowed ot go directly to federal judges to have
their probable cause reviewed for arrests or searches without having
to gain the USAO's approval.4

5) The fact is that key FBIHQ personnel whose jobs it was to assist
and coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations
and the obtaining and use of FISA searches (and who theoretically were
privy to many more sources of intelligence information than field
division agents), continued to, almost inexplicably,5 throw up
roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis' by-now desperate efforts to
obtain a FISA search warrant, long after the French intelligence
service provided its information and probable cause became clear. HQ
personnel brought up almost ridiculous questions in their apparent
efforts to undermine the probable cause.6 In all of their
conversations and correspondence, HQ personnel never disclosed to the
Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had, only approximately
three weeks earlier, warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools
seeking flight training for terrorist purposes!

Nor did FBIHQ personnel do much to disseminate the information about
Moussaoui to other appropriate intelligence/law enforcement
authorities. When, in a desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the
FBIHQ roadblock, the Minneapolis Division undertook to directly notify
the CIA's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), FBIHQ personnel actually
chastised the Minneapolis agents for making the direct notification
without their approval!

6 ) Eventually on august 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between
Minneapolis and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately
further undercut the FISA effort by not adding the further
intelligence information which he had promised to add that supported
Moussaoui's foreign power connection and making several changes in the
wording of the information that had been provided by the Minneapolis
Agent, the Minneapolis agents were notified that the NSLU Unit Chief
did not think there was sufficient evidence of Moussaoui's connection
to a foreign power. Minneapolis personnel are, to this date, unaware
of the specifics of the verbal presentations by the FBIHQ SSA to NSLU
or whether anyone in NSLU ever was afforded the opportunity to
actually read for him/herself all of the information on Moussaoui that
had been gathered by the Minneapolis Division and the French
intelligence service. Obviously verbal presentations are far more
susceptible to mis-characterization and error. The e-mail
communications between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, however, speak for
themselves and there are far better witnesses than me who can provide
their first hand knowledge of these events characterized in one
Minneapolis agent's e-mail as FBIHQ is "setting this up for failure."
My only comment is that the process of allowing the FBI supervisors to
make changes in affidavits is itself fundamentally wrong, just as, in
the follow-up to FBI Laboratory Whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst's
allegations, this process was revealed to be wrong in the context of
writing up laboratory results. With the Whitehurst allegations, this
process of allowing supervisors to re-write portions of laboratory
reports, was found to provide opportunities for over-zealous
supervisors to skew the results in favor of the prosecution. In the
Moussaoui case, it was the opposite -- the process allowed the
Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance of the
information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of
having to see the FISA application through or possibly to avoid taking
what he may have perceived as an unnecessary career risk.7 I
understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in the
Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused because they were
too busy with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other
important terrorism matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time
to read each word of the information submitted by Minneapolis and then
substitute his own choice of wording belies to some extent the notion
that he was too busy. As an FBI division legal advisor for 12 years
(and an FBI agent for over 21 years), I can state that an affidavit is
better and will tend to be more accurate when the affiant has first
hand information of all the information he/she must attest to. Of
necessity, agents must continually rely upon information from
confidential sources, third parties and other law enforcement officers
in drafting affidavits, but the repeating of information from others
greatly adds to the opportunities for factual discrepancies and errors
to arise. To the extent that we can minimize the opportunity for this
type of error to arise by simply not allowing unnecessary re-writes by
supervisory staff, it ought to be done. (I'm not talking, of course,
about mere grammatical corrections, but changes of some substance as
apparently occurred with the Moussaoui information which had to be,
for lack of a better term, "filtered" through FBIHQ before any action,
whether to seek a criminal or a FISA warrant, could be taken.) Even
after September 11th, the fear was great on the part of Minneapolis
Division personnel that the same FBIHQ personnel would continue their
"filtering" with respect to the Moussaoui investigation, and now with
the added incentive of preventing their prior mistakes from coming to
light. For this reason, for weeks, Minneapolis prefaced all outgoing
communications (ECs) in the PENTTBOM investigation with a summary of
the information about Moussaoui. We just wanted to make sure the
information got to the proper prosecutive authorities and was not
further suppressed! This fear was probably irrational but was
nonetheless understandable in light of the Minneapolis agents' prior
experiences and frustrations involving FBIHQ. (The redundant preface
information regarding Moussaoui on otherwise unrelative PENTTBOM
communications has ended up adding to criminal discovery issues, but
this is the reason it was done.)

7) Although the last thing the FBI or the country needs now is a witch
hunt, I do find it odd that (to my knowledge) no inquiry whatsoever
was launched of the relevant FBIHQ personnel's actions a long time
ago. Despite FBI leaders' full knowledge of all the items mentioned
herein (and probably more that I'm unaware of), the SSA, his unit
chief, and other involved HQ personnel were allowed to stay in their
positions and, what's worse, occupy critical positions in the FBI's
SIOC Command Center post September 11th. (The SSA in question actually
received a promotion some months afterward!) It's true we all make
mistakes and I'm not suggesting that HQ personnel in question ought to
be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be held accountable for
serious mistakes. I'm relatively certain that if it appeared that a
lowly field office agent had committed such errors of judgment, the
FBI's OPR would have been notified to investigate and the agent would
have, at the least, been quickly reassigned. I'm afraid the FBI's
failure to submit this matter to OPR (and to the IOB) gives further
impetus to the notion (raised previously by many in the FBI) of a
double standard which results in those of lower rank being
investigated more aggressively and dealt with more harshly for
misconduct while the misconduct of those at the top is often
overlooked or results in minor disciplinary action. From all
appearances, this double standard may also apply between those at
FBIHQ and those in the field.

8) The last official "fact" that I take issue with is not really a
fact, but an opinion, and a completely unsupported opinion at that. In
the day or two following September 11th, you, Director Mueller, made
the statement to the effect that if the FBI had only had any advance
warning of the attacks, we (meaning the FBI), may have been able to
take some action to prevent the tragedy. Fearing that this statement
could easily come back to haunt the FBI upon revelation of the
information that had been developed pre-September 11th about
Moussaoui, I and others in the Minneapolis Office, immediately sought
to reach your office through an assortment of higher level FBIHQ
contacts, in order to quickly make you aware of the background of the
Moussaoui investigation and forewarn you so that your public
statements could be accordingly modified. When such statements from
you and other FBI officials continued, we thought that somehow you had
not received the message and we made further efforts. Finally when
similar comments were made weeks later, in Assistant Director Caruso's
congressional testimony in response to the first public leaks about
Moussaoui we faced the sad realization that the remarks indicated
someone, possibly with your approval, had decided to circle the wagons
at FBIHQ in an apparent effort to protect the FBI from embarrassment
and the relevant FBI officials from scrutiny. Everything I have seen
and heard about the FBI's official stance and the FBI's internal
preparations in anticipation of further congressional inquiry, had,
unfortunately, confirmed my worst suspicions in this regard. After the
details began to emerge concerning the pre-September 11th
investigation of Moussaoui, and subsequently with the recent release
of the information about the Phoenix EC, your statement has changed.
The official statement is now to the effect that even if the FBI had
followed up on the Phoenix lead to conduct checks of flight schools
and the Minneapolis request to search Moussaoui's personal effects and
laptop, nothing would have changed and such actions certainly could
not have prevented the terrorist attacks and resulting loss of life.
With all due respect, this statement is as bad as the first! It is
also quite at odds with the earlier statement (which I'm surprised has
not already been pointed out by those in the media!) I don't know how
you or anyone at FBI Headquarters, no matter how much genius or
prescience you may possess, could so blithely make this affirmation
without anything to back the opinion up than your stature as FBI
Director. The truth is, as with most predictions into the future, no
one will ever know what impact, if any, the FBI's following up on
those requests, would have had. Although I agree that it's very
doubtful that the full scope of the tragedy could have been prevented,
it's at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or
two more of the terrorists in flight training prior to September 11th,
just as Moussaoui was discovered, after making contact with his flight
instructors. If is certainly not beyond the realm of imagination to
hypothesize that Moussaoui's fortuitous arrest alone, even if he
merely was the 20th hijacker, allowed the hero passengers of Flight 93
to overcome their terrorist hijackers and thus spare more lives on the
ground. And even greater casualties, possibly of our Nation's highest
government officials, may have been prevented if Al Qaeda intended for
Moussaoui to pilot an entirely different aircraft. There is, therefore
at least some chance that discovery of other terrorist pilots prior to
September 11th may have limited the September 11th attacks and
resulting loss of life. Although your conclusion otherwise has to be
very reassuring for some in the FBI to hear being repeated so often
(as if saying it's so may make it so), I think your statements
demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all costs. I
think the only fair response to this type of question would be that no
one can pretend to know one way or another.

Mr. Director, I hope my observations can be taken in a constructive
vein. They are from the heart and intended to be completely
apolitical. Hopefully, with our nation's security on the line, you and
our nation's other elected and appointed officials can rise above the
petty politics that often plague other discussions and do the right
thing. You do have some good ideas for change in the FBI but I think
you have also not been completely honest about some of the true
reasons for the FBI's pre-September 11th failures. Until we come clean
and deal with the root causes, the Department of Justice will continue
to experience problems fighting terrorism and fighting crime in general.

I have used the "we" term repeatedly herin to indicate facts about
others in the Minneapolis Office at critical times, but none of the
opinions expressed herin can be attributed to anyone but myself. I
know that those who know me would probably describe me as, by nature,
overly opinionated and sometimes not as discreet as I should be.
Certainly some of the above remarks may be interpreted as falling into
that category, but I really do not intend anything as a personal
criticism of you or anyone else in the FBI, to include the FBIHQ
personnel who I believe were remiss and mishandled their duties with
regard to the Moussaoui investigation. Truly my only purpose is to try
to provide the facts within my purview so that an accurate assessment
can be obtained and we can learn from our mistakes. I have pointed out
a few of the things that I think should be looked at but there are
many, many more.8 An honest acknowledgment of the FBI's mistakes in
this and other cases should not lead to increasing the Headquarters
bureaucracy and approval levels of investigative actions as the
answer. Most often, field office agents and field office management on
the scene will be better suited to the timely and effective solution
of crimes and, in some lucky instances, to the effective prevention of
crimes, including terrorism incidents. The relatively quick solving of
the recent mailbox pipe-bombing incidents which resulted in no serious
injuries to anyone are a good example of effective field office work
(actually several field offices working together) and there are
hundreds of other examples. Although FBIHQ personnel have, no doubt,
been of immeasurable assistance to the field over the years, I'm hard
pressed to think of any case which has been solved by FBIHQ personnel
and I can name several that have been screwed up! Decision-making is
inherently more effective and timely when decentralized instead of
concentrated.

Your plans for an FBI Headquarters' "Super Squad" simply fly in the
face of an honest appraisal of the FBI's pre-September 11th failures.
The Phoenix, Minneapolis and Paris Legal Attache Offices reacted
remarkably exhibiting keen perception and prioritization skills
regarding the terrorist threats they uncovered or were made aware of
pre-September 11th. The same cannot be said for the FBI Headquarters'
bureaucracy and you want to expand that?! Should we put the
counterterrorism unit chief and SSA who previously handled the
Moussaoui matter in charge of the new "Super Squad"?! You are also
apparently disregarding the fact the Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs), operating out of field divisions for years, (the first and
chief one being New York City's JTTF), have successfully handled
numerous terrorism investigations and, in some instances, successfully
prevented acts of terrorism. There's no denying the need for more and
better intelligence and intelligence management, but you should think
carefully about how much gate keeping power should be entrusted with
any HQ entity. If we are indeed in a "war", shouldn't the Generals be
on the battlefield instead of sitting in a spot removed from the
action while still attempting to call the shots?

I have been an FBI agent for over 21 years and, for what it's worth,
have never received any form of disciplinary action throughout my
career. From the 5th grade, when I first wrote the FBI and received
the "100 Facts about the FBI" pamphlet, this job has been my dream. I
feel that my career in the FBI has been somewhat exemplary, having
entered on duty at a time when there was only a small percentage of
female Special Agents. I have also been lucky to have had four
children during my time in the FBI and am the sole breadwinner of a
family of six. Due to the frankness with which I have expressed myself
and my deep feelings on these issues, (which is only because I feel I
have a somewhat unique, inside perspective of the Moussaoui matter,
the gravity of the events of September 11th and the current
seriousness of the FBI's and United States' ongoing efforts in the
"war against terrorism"), I hope my continued employment with the FBI
is not somehow placed in jeopardy. I have never written to an FBI
Director in my life before on any topic. Although I would hope it is
not necessary, I would therefore wish to take advantage of the federal
"Whistleblower Protection" provisions by so characterizing my remarks.



Sincerely



Coleen M. Rowley
Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Division Counsel

NOTES

1) And both of the violations originally cited in vain by the
Minneapolis agents disputing the issue with FBIHQ personnel are among
those on which Moussaoui is currently indicted.

2) Just minutes after I saw the first news of the World Trade Center
attack(s), I was standing outside the office of Minneapolis ASAC M.
Chris Briesse waiting for him to finish with a phone call, when he
received a call on another line from this SSA. Since I figured I knew
what the call may be about and wanted to ask, in light of the
unfolding events and the apparent urgency of the situation, if we
should now immediately attempt to obtain a criminal search warrant for
Moussaoui's laptop and personal property, I took the call. I said
something to the effect that, in light of what had just happened in
New York, it would have to be the "hugest coincidence" at this point
if Moussaoui was not involved with the terrorists. The SSA stated
something to the effect that I had used the right term, "coincidence"
and that this was probably all just a coincidence and we were to do
nothing in Minneapolis until we got their (HQ's) permission because we
might "screw up" something else going on elsewhere in the country.

4) Certainly Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
begins, "Upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an
attorney for the government" does not contain this requirement.
Although the practice that has evolved is that FBI agents must secure
prior approval for any search or arrest from the United States
Attorneys Office, the Federal Rule governing Search and Seizure
clearly envisions law enforcement officers applying, on their own, for
search warrants.

5) During the early aftermath of September 11th, when I happened to be
recounting the pre-September 11th events concerning the Moussaoui
investigation to other FBI personnel in other divisions or in FBIHQ,
almost everyone's first question was "Why?--Why would an FBI agent(s)
deliberately sabotage a case? (I know I shouldn't be flippant about
this, but jokes were actually made that the key FBIHQ personnel had to
be spies or moles, like Robert Hansen, who were actually working for
Osama Bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis' effort.) Our best
real guess, however, is that, in most cases avoidance of all
"unnecessary" actions/decisions by FBIHQ managers (and maybe to some
extent field managers as well) has, in recent years, been seen as the
safest FBI career course. Numerous high-ranking FBI officials who have
made decisions or have taken actions which, in hindsight, turned out
to be mistaken or just turned out badly (i.e. Ruby Ridge, Waco, etc.)
have seen their careers plummet and end. This has in turn resulted in
a climate of fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law enforcement
action/decisions. In a large hierarchal bureaucracy such as the FBI,
with the requirement for numerous superiors approvals/oversight, the
premium on career-enhancement, and interjecting a chilling factor
brought on by recent extreme public and congressional
criticism/oversight, and I think you will see at least the makings of
the most likely explanation. Another factor not to be underestimated
probably explains the SSA and other FBIHQ personnel's reluctance to
act. And so far, I have heard no FBI official even allude to this
problem-- which is that FBI Headquarters is staffed with a number of
short term careerists* who, like the SSA in question, must only serve
an 18 month-just-time-to-get-your-ticket-punched minimum. It's no
wonder why very little expertise can be acquired by a Headquarters
unit! (And no wonder why FBIHQ is mired in mediocrity! -- that maybe a
little strong, but it would definitely be fair to say that there is
unevenness in competency among Headquarters personnel.) (It's also a
well known fact that the FBI Agents Association has complained for
years about the disincentives facing those entering the FBI management
career path which results in very few of the FBI's best and brightest
choosing to go into management. Instead the ranks of FBI management
are filled with many who were failures as street agents. Along these
lines, let me ask the question, why has it suddenly become necessary
for the Director to "handpick" the FBI management?) It's quite
conceivable that many of the HQ personnel who so vigorously disputed
Moussaoui's ability/predisposition to fly a plane into a building were
simply unaware of all the various incidents and reports worldwide of
Al Qaeda terrorists attempting or plotting to do so.

*By the way, just in the event you did not know, let me furnish you
the Webster's definition of "careerism" - - the policy or practice of
advancing one's career often at the cost of one's integrity". Maybe
that sums up the whole problem!

6) For example, at one point, the Supervisory Special Agent at FBIHQ
posited that the French information could be worthless because it only
identified Zacarias Moussaoui by name and he, the SSA, didn't know how
many people by that name existed in France. A Minneapolis agent
attempted to surmount that problem by quickly phoning the FBI's legal
Attache (Legat) in Paris, France, so that a check could be made of the
French telephone directories. Although the Legat in France did not
have access to all of the French telephone directories, he was able to
quickly ascertain that there was only one listed in the Paris
directory. It is not known if this sufficiently answered the question,
for the SSA continued to find new reasons to stall.

7) Another factor that cannot be underestimated as to the HQ
Supervisor's apparent reluctance to do anything was/is the ever
present risk of being "written up" for an Intelligence Oversight Board
(IOB) "error." In the year(s) preceding the September 11th acts of
terrorism, numerous alleged IOB violations on the part of FBI
personnel had to be submitted to the FBI's Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) as well as the IOB. I believe the chilling effect
upon all levels of FBI agents assigned to intelligence matters and
their manager hampered us from aggressive investigation of terrorists.
Since one generally only runs the risk of IOB violations when one does
something, the safer course is to do nothing. Ironically, in this
case, a potentially huge IOB violation arguably occurred due to
FBIHQ's failure to act, that is, FBIHQ's failure to inform the
Department of Justice Criminal Division of Moussaoui's potential
criminal violations (which, as I've already said, were quickly
identified in Minneapolis as violations of Title 18 United States Code
Section 2332b [Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries] and
Section 32 [Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities]). This
failure would seem to run clearly afoul of the Attorney General
directive contained in the "1995 Procedures for Contacts Between the
FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and
Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations" which mandatorily require
the FBI to notify the Criminal Division when "facts or circumstances
are developed" in an FI or FCI investigation "that reasonably indicate
that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be
committed." I believe that Minneapolis agents actually brought this
point to FBIHQ's attention on August 22, 2001, but HQ personnel
apparently ignored the directive, ostensibly due to their opinion of
the lack of probably cause. But the issue of whether HQ personnel
deliberately undercut the probable cause can be sidestepped at this
point because the Directive does not require probable cause. It
requires only a "reasonable indication" which is defined as
"substantially lower than probable cause." Given that the Minneapolis
Division had accumulated far more than "a mere hunch" (which the
directive would deem as insufficient), the information ought to have,
at least, been passed on to the "Core Group" created to assess whether
the information needed to be further disseminated to the Criminal
Division. However, (and I don't know for sure), but to date, I have
never heard that any potential violation of this directive has been
submitted to the IOB or to the FBI's OPR. It should also be noted that
when making determinations of whether items need to be submitted to
the IOB, it is my understanding that NSLU normally used/uses a broad
approach, erring, when in doubt, on the side of submitting potential
violations.

8) For starters, if prevention rather than prosecution is to be our
new main goal, (an objective I totally agree with), we need more
guidance on when we can apply the Quarles "public safety" exception to
Miranda's 5 Amendment requirements. We were prevented from even
attempting to question Moussaoui on the day of the attacks when, in
theory, he could have possessed further information about other
co-conspirators. (Apparently no government attorney believes there is
a "public safety" exception in a situation like this?!)




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