[iwar] [fc:India.and.Pakistan:.Crisis.Management.and.Warfighting.Styles]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-06-01 17:01:57
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From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
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Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2002 17:01:57 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:India.and.Pakistan:.Crisis.Management.and.Warfighting.Styles]
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India and Pakistan: Crisis Management and Warfighting Styles

The defense analysis field consists of two types of analysts.  One
gravitates to organizations like Orbat.com.  He studies the nuts and
bolts of defense.  He is diffident in expressing his opinions: the more
he learns, the harder it becomes to generalize.  The other sort has no
inclination, patience, or capability for real research on the subject,
but loves to pontificate about Big Issues.  So you have people who know
what they're talking about, but don't want to talk; and people who do
not know what they are talking about, but want to talk. 

If academics in general know little about defense issues, given the lack
of importance of India and Pakistan, we are even more vulnerable to
lectures by people who know little about the region. 

You editor is going to make a few generalizations.  Anyone unhappy with
any of them can write in, and he will try and explain better. 

In the past 55 years, we have a large base of data to draw from.  India
and Pakistan have engaged in open, declared war in 1947-48, 1965, and
1971.  They have engaged in limited fighting in 1965 (Rann of Kutch) and
1999 (Kargil).  They have been engaged in an insurgency/CI situation
continuously between 1987-present; some date it as 1989-present.  There
have been any number of mobilization crises: there were two in the 1950s
(your editor does not have his notes at hand), there was
Brasstacks/Trident in 1986-87, there were two crises that could have led
to war in the late 1980s, there was the Siachin War of 1984-today, there
was the winter 2001-02 mobilization, and of course, the present
situation. 

There is a discernable pattern in all these crises. 

1.  Extreme Caution Before Going to War Both sides are exceptionally
hesitant to cross that final red line between peace and war.  Pakistan
because it is the weaker and has more to lose if things go wrong, India
for many reasons we can discuss another day.  The proof of this is that
India has been under Pakistani attack for 15 years and has never
retaliated. 

2.  India has Initiated Hostilities Twice Once was in 1971.  Because of
various reasons, the capability gap between India and Pakistan was the
widest it has ever been; even then, India laid the ground by years of
covert action in East Bengal, and could take advantage of Pakistan's
Civil War.  India still took eight months to prepare the diplomatic and
military field before attacking, and still went in only for a limited
war with limited aims.  A more typical Indian action is Siachin 1984:
whatever the original aims, India limited itself very strictly to
grabbing a few hundred square kilometers of No Man's Land. 

3.  Pakistan has Attacked Four Times Pakistan initiated hostilities in
the Rann of Kutch, Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965, and in Kargil 1999.  In
two cases it kept its aims very limited.  Kutch was a brigade action
against a few border posts.  Kargil was a grab of a few hundred square
kilometers that India vacated every winter.  Kashmir 1947-48 and 1965
were bold moves with big stakes.  The circumstances were so unusual that
we'd need much more time to discuss them; in any case, no one is talking
of Pakistan starting a war at this time. 

4.  Demonstrated Warfighting Behavior Is Also Exceptionally Cautious
Both sides have repeatedly shown on the battlefield that they operate
with extreme caution and much thought.  There are any number of
break-points at which the situation can be deescalated without
difficulty. 

5.  Both Sides Quickly Accept International Intervention A fundamental
tenet of Indo-Pakistan strategic doctrine is that international
intervention will bring hostilities to an early end: early as in days
and weeks.  Kashmir 1947-48 was the sole exception, for many reasons. 
Siachin and Kutch do not count because they were true sideshows and both
sides carefully avoided escalation: India in 1965 and Pakistan in 1999. 

Because of the above reasons, people in India and Pakistan are perfectly
calm even as the west, and the US in particular, whips itself into a
frenzy about an imminent war.  The US is hopelessly guilty of assuming
India and Pakistan think like the US does.  In fact, Washington is badly
aggravating the situation even as it says it is trying to calm things. 
This entire situation would not have arises had Washington not jumped in
- we'll discuss this day after tomorrow. 

United States analysts are relying on two untenable assumptions to
justify their war scares. 

First, they assume that one side or the other will do something rash
because both sides lack accurate intelligence on the other, and each
fears the other may gain an advantage by striking first.  Bosh, twaddle,
and sewage.  This is America talking, not India and Pakistan, and it's
because of such talk that to this day many in the 3rd World and Europe
are frightened of America than of the Soviets in years past, and Iraq
today.  A knowledgeable reader is sure to bring up the events of the
late afternoon of December 3, 1971, but this is yet another issue we'll
have to discuss later.  It has no relevance to the present situation. 

Second, they assume that any conflict could escalate to a nuclear
exchange.  Incredible as it may seem to Americans, when they talk like
this, the average Indian or Pakistani is not slobberingly grateful that
wise America is concerned to see the bad kids don't get into trouble. 
The typical reaction in the subcontinent is far too rude to repeat in a
family-oriented website like ours.  What Americans need to see - and
some in Washington do see it - is that President Musharraf's nuclear
threats are not directed at India but at Washington.  The Indians and
Pakistanis are acting unconcerned not because they are stupid,
uneducated natives who don't know what damage a nuclear warhead
inflicts.  They are acting unconcerned because even if the two came to
blows - and we'll discuss tomorrow a likely course if that happens -
they know the war will not escalate. 

This is because neither side has open-ended objectives.  India simply
wants to make Pakistan pay a price for sending terrorists - they are
freedom fighters to Pakistanis - into Kashmir.  It does not want to
destroy Pakistan, or even to take back Kashmir.  Pakistan has till now
paid no price at all for the Kashmir insurgency.  Quite the reverse: a
casual back of the envelope calculation shows that Pakistan is spending
one dollar to make India spend a thousand dollars in Kashmir.  That the
Indians have allowed this happens proves only what venal and corrupt
leaders it has, but that's another matter.  Pakistan simply wants to
continue the insurgency.  These are not issues of national survival that
require any talk of nuclear weapons.  They especially do not need to be
placed in a US intellectual framework that had little merit even for the
Americans. 

Diplomacy versus Conflict - the real Middle East War

From our colleague Richard M.  Bennett of AFI Research. 

There are a stream of uncorroborated and at times fanciful reports
emanating from the Middle East that would suggest that the United States
has a new found interest in rescuing Israel from an impasse over
Palestine that military action alone is incapable of solving.  The
increasing urgency felt in Washington has led to bringing Egypt back
into the negotiations as a major player and promoting certain
Palestinian leaders considered largely untainted by close involvement in
the Intifada or Islamic terrorism as either potential replacements for
Yasser Arafat or as a balance to his remaining power base.  Egypt is a
natural partner for Israel in any attempt to defuse the Palestinian
uprising, particularly as Cairo is in a position to control events in
the Gaza Strip and restrict the activities of Hamas, while it also has a
long-term interest in the demilitarization of the Sinai--Negev region
with an eye to tourism and other economic development. 

The position of Saudi Arabia remains less clear as although the recent
Saudi peace plan was heavily touted by both Riyadh and Washington and
may indeed have opened certain minds to a dialogue, the Saudi
Governments long term aims may conflict with the present
US-Egyptian-Israeli round of talks.  Saudi Arabia and particularly its
intelligence service are openly competing with Iran for influence and
have gained considerable control over certain operational aspects of
Hamas, based predominately in the Gaza Strip.  It has also become clear
that large numbers of Chechen fighters have been relocated to the Middle
East and will operate effectively as a Saudi asset in the ongoing
conflict in the region. 

Secret negotiations between the US Government and other Middle Eastern
states such as Syria and Iran have been under way for some time and
intermediaries are reported to be working on a face-saving plan to
defuse the situation in southern Lebanon to allow for the withdrawal of
Iranian and Syrian forces and thereby avoid a major confrontation
between Hizbollah, its main supporters and an increasingly restive
Israel.Washington quite rightly recognizes that a major Israeli assault
on the Beka'a Valley could well lead to a regional war that would
probably fatally derail any US plans for the invasion of Iraq. 

Washington may rethink war on Iraq

Those plans are already firmly on the back burner for now as
Intelligence reports suggest that Saddam Hussein will strongly resist
any attempt to overthrow his regime and may indeed now have the weapons
at his disposal to cause unacceptable levels of destruction to the
invading forces and Iraqs nearest neighbours, including the vital oil
producing areas of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.  The United States Defence
Department has also signalled that a major rethink of the
over-optimistic claims originally being made about the size of force
needed for a successful invasion and indeed the timescale is long
overdue. 

A more realistic view of the military options in the region may now
allow Washington to ease Russia back into the area as an important
influence.  Moscow needs hard currency from massive arms deals with
Syria, Iraq and Iran and in return for Washington's acceptance of
Russia's newly restored and potentially dominating position in the area
it would be expected that President Putin would exercise his new found
influence to persuade those countries to abandon or at least greatly
scale down their support for terrorism and open hostility to Israel. 

Such a scenario would indeed allow Washington to claim that democracy
had won a major victory over international terrorism by means of cleaver
diplomacy without risking the political embarrassment of large numbers
of bodybags arriving at Andrews Air Force Base.  Perhaps it is too much
to hope that Washington will be adept enough to grasp the opportunity to
win the War on Terrorism by statesmanship and exerting its economic and
diplomatic influence, rather than by outright bullying and military
action alone.  It is true that both methods must run in parallel and
that ultimately the military sanction may be the only one that works,
but there are many potentially effective paths open to victory before
President Bush need rely on the use of armed force as the only possible
solution. 

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