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From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-06-13 23:15:25


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Source site w/ graphics:  http://www.tfd.chalmers.se/~valeri/EMP.html

Source Reliability:  ?, but worth the read.

Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP) Systems
"Russia is among the best in the world when it comes to manufacturing this type 
of electronic weapon," said Anders Kallenaas of the Swedish National Defense's Research 
Institute (FOA). 

  Quoting the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (1-23-98), the news
agency AFP said the high-power microwave bombs ("bear cans") could be
bought on the Russian market for "several hundreds of thousands kronor"
(&lt; $150,000) and had already been bought by the Australian military
among others.  It said the bomb was stored in a briefcase and emitted
short, high-energy pulses reaching 10 gigawatts, which could destroy
complex electronics systems.  As tested, the bomb presents a threat to
the Swedish military, in particular to the JAS 39 Gripen jet fighter
that it is trying to export.  It can also knock out electronic systems
of nuclear or electric power plants, banks, trains, or even a simple
telephone switchboard. 

Despite the science-fiction flavor, the electro-magnetic bomb is close
to reality.  It has been the subject of extensive research in the US and
presumably (Sakharov tested his magnetic compression generator 40 years
ago + Altshuler, Voitenko and Bichenkov ) Russia for decades.  The
concept arose through early nuclear testing when scientists realized
that high altitude atomic blasts produced an electro-magnetic pulse
capable of destroying delicate electronics systems on the ground.  Any
thermonuclear war would have started with such ionospheric blasts.  One
consequence was that military computer and electronic systems were
"hardened" to minimize such damage, but civil systems remain vulnerable. 
Two types of non-nuclear EMP devices have been developed.  One uses
conventional explosives to induce the EMP; another uses a single-use,
high-power microwave generation device.  EMP capabilities were discussed
in a paper published by the RAAF Air Power Studies Center in 1996.  Its
author, defense analyst Carlo Copp, [1] concluded that the design and
deployment of electro-magnetic warheads for bombs and missiles was
technically feasible in the next decade.  "Providing that satisfactory
solutions can be found for these problems, electro-magnetic munitions
for bomb and missile applications promise to be an important and robust
weapon in both strategic and tactical operations, offering significantly
reduced collateral damage and lower human casualties than established
weapons," he said.  "High Power Electro-magnetic Pulse generation
techniques and High Power Microwave technology have matured to the point
where practical E-bombs (Electro-magnetic bombs) are becoming
technically feasible, with new applications in both Strategic and
Tactical Information Warfare.  The development of conventional E-bomb
devices allows their use in non-nuclear confrontations.  This paper
discusses aspects of the technology base, weapon delivery techniques and
proposes a doctrinal foundation for the use of such devices in warhead
and bomb applications." It can be used by special forces teams who
infiltrate the enemy's and detonate a device near their electronic
devices.  It destroys the electronics of all computer and communication
systems in a quite large area.  The EMP bomb can be smaller than a HERF
gun to cause a similar amount of damage and is typically used to damage
not a single target (not aiming in one direction) but to damage all
equipment near the bomb.  [2] The efficient execution of an Information
Warfare campaign against a modern industrial or post-industrial opponent
will require the use of specialized tools designed to destroy
information systems.  High Power Electro-magnetic Pulse generation
techniques and High Power Microwave technology have matured to the point
where practical electro-magnetic bombs are becoming technically
feasible, with new applications in both Strategic and Tactical IW
(Information Warfare).  Targets of the E-bombs: The telecommunication
systems The national power grid Finance and banking systems The national
transporting systems The mass media Because these systems based on
electronic systems.  An Radio Frequency Weapon is one that uses intense
pulses of RF energy to destroy or degrade the electronics in a target. 
These weapons can be employed in a narrow beam over a long distance to a
point target.  They are categorized as High Power Microwave Weapons
(HPM) and Ultra Wide Band Weapon (UWB).  The phrase non-nuclear
electro-magnetic pulse is sometimes used.  Advantages of the HPM: All
weather Low cost per engagement Possible to engage multiple targets
Non-lethal to humans Not able to detect attacks

Electro-magnetic effects The high temperatures and energetic radiation
produced by nuclear explosions also produce large amounts of ionized
(electrically charged) matter which is present immediately after the
explosion.  Under the right conditions, intense currents and
electro-magnetic fields can be produced, generically called EMP
(Electro-magnetic Pulse), that are felt at long distances.  Living
organisms are impervious to these effects, but electrical and electronic
equipment can be temporarily or permanently disabled by them.  Ionized
gases can also block short wavelength radio and radar signals (fireball
blackout) for extended periods.  The occurrence of EMP is strongly
dependent on the altitude of burst.  It can be significant for surface
or low altitude bursts (below 4,000 m); it is very significant for high
altitude bursts (above 30,000 m); but it is not significant for
altitudes between these extremes.  This is because EMP is generated by
the asymmetric absorption of instantaneous gamma rays produced by the
explosion.  At intermediate altitudes the air absorbs these rays fairly
uniformly and does not generate long range electro-magnetic
disturbances. 

Figure 1.  Typical electro-magnetic pulse

The formation EMP begins with the very intense, but very short burst of
gamma rays caused by the nuclear reactions in the bomb.  About 0.3% of
the bomb's energy is in this pulse, but it last for only 10 nanoseconds
or so.  These gamma rays collide with electrons in air molecules, and
eject the electrons at high energies through a process called Compton
scattering.  These energetic electrons in turn knock other electrons
loose, and create a cascade effect that produces some 30,000 electrons
for every original gamma ray.  In low altitude explosions the electrons,
being very light, move much more quickly than the ionized atoms they are
removed from and diffuse away from the region where they are formed. 
This creates a very strong electric field which peaks in intensity to 10
nanoseconds.  The gamma rays emitted downward however are absorbed by
the ground which prevents charge separation from occurring.  This
creates a very strong vertical electric current which generates intense
electro-magnetic emissions over a wide frequency range (up to 100 MHZ)
that emanate mostly horizontally.  At the same time, the earth acts as a
conductor allowing the electrons to flow back toward the burst point
where the positive ions are concentrated.  This produces a strong
magnetic field along the ground.  Although only about 3x10^-10 of the
total explosion energy is radiated as EMP in a ground burst (10^6 joules
for 1 Mt bomb), it is concentrated in a very short pulse.  The charge
separation persists for only a few tens of microseconds, making the
emission power some 100 gigawatts.  The field strengths for ground
bursts are high only in the immediate vicinity of the explosion.  For
smaller bombs they aren't very important because they are strong only
where the destruction is intense anyway.  With increasing yields, they
reach farther from the zone of intense destruction.  With a 1 Mt bomb,
they remain significant out to the 2 psi overpressure zone (5 miles). 

High altitude explosions produce EMPs that dramatically more
destructive.  About 3x10^-5 of the bomb's total energy goes into EMP in
this case, 10^11 joules for a 1 Mt bomb.  EMP is formed in high altitude
explosions when the downwardly directed gamma rays encounter denser
layers of air below.  A pancake shaped ionization region is formed below
the bomb.  The zone can extend all the way to the horizon, to 2500 km
for an explosion at an altitude of 500 km.  The ionization zone is up to
80 km thick at the center.  The Earth's magnetic field causes the
electrons in this layer to spiral as they travel, creating a powerful
downward directed electro-magnetic pulse lasting a few microseconds.  A
strong vertical electrical field (20-50 KV/m) is also generated between
the Earth's surface and the ionized layer, this field lasts for several
minutes until the electrons are recaptured by the air.  Although the
peak EMP field strengths from high altitude bursts are only 1-10% as
intense as the peak ground burst fields, they are nearly constant over
the entire Earth's surface under the ionized region.  The effects of
these field on electronics is difficult to predict, but can be profound. 
Enormous induced electric currents are generated in wires, antennas, and
metal objects (like missiles, airplanes, and building frames). 
Commercial electrical grids are immense EMP antennas and would be
subjected to voltage surges far exceeding those created by lightning,
and over vastly greater areas.  Modern VLSI chips are extremely
sensitive to voltage surges, and would be burned out by even small
leakage currents.  Military equipment is generally designed to be
resistant to EMP, but realistic tests are very difficult to perform and
EMP protection rests on attention to detail.  Minor changes in design,
incorrect maintenance procedures, poorly fitting parts, loose debris,
moisture, and ordinary dirt can all cause elaborate EMP protections to
be totally circumvented.  It can be expected that a single high yield,
high altitude explosion over an industrialized area would cause massive
disruption for an indeterminable period, and would cause huge economic
damages (all those damaged chips add up).  A separate effect is the
ability of the ionized fireball to block radio and radar signals.  Like
EMP, this effect becomes important with high altitude bursts.  Fireball
blackout can cause radar to be blocked for tens of seconds to minutes
over an area tens of kilometers across.  High frequency radio can be
disrupted over hundreds to thousands of kilometers for minutes to hours
depending on exact conditions. 

The technology base for E-bombs Explosively Pumped Flux Compression
Generators (FCG) The central idea behind the construction of FCGs is
that of using a fast explosive to rapidly compress a magnetic field,
transferring much energy from the explosive into the magnetic field. 
The initial magnetic field in the FCG prior to explosive initiation is
produced by a start current.  The start current is supplied by an
external source, such a a high voltage capacitor bank (Marx bank), a
smaller FCG or the MHD device.  A number of geometrical configurations
for FCGs have been published.  The most commonly used arrangement is
that of the coaxial FCG

Figure 2.  Explosively pumped coaxial magnetic flux compressors The
coaxial arrangement is of particular interest in this context, as its
essentially cylindrical form factor lends itself to packaging into
munitions.  In principle, any device capable of producing a pulse of
electrical current of the order of tens of kiloAmperes to MegaAmperes
will be suitable.  Explosive and Propellant driven MHD Generators The
fundamental principle behind the design of MHD devices is that a
conductor moving through a magnetic field will produce an electrical
current transverse to the direction of the field and the conductor
motion.  In an explosive or propellant driven MHD device, the conductor
is a plasma of ionized explosive or propellant gas, which travels
through the magnetic field.  Current is collected by electrodes which
are in contact with the plasma jet.  The electrical properties of the
plasma are optimized by seeding the explosive or propellant with
suitable additives, which ionize during the burn. 

High Power Microwave Sources (Vircator) The fundamental idea behind the
Vircator is that of accelerating a high current electron beam against a
mesh (or foil) anode.  Many electrons will pass through the anode,
forming a bubble of space charge behind the anode.  Under the proper
conditions, this space charge region will oscillate at microwave
frequencies.  If the space charge region is placed into a resonant
cavity which is appropriately tuned, very high peak powers may be
achieved.  Coupling modes The major problem area in determining
lethality is that of coupling efficiency, which is a measure of how much
power is transferred from the field produced by the weapon into the
target.  Front door coupling occurs typically when power from a
electro-magnetic weapon is coupled into an antenna associated with radar
or communications equipment.  The antenna subsystem is designed to
couple power in and out of the equipment.  Back Door Coupling occurs
when the electro-magnetic field from a weapon produces large transient
currents or electrical standing waves (when produced by a HPM weapon) on
fixed electrical wiring and cables interconnecting equipment, or
providing connections to mains power or the telephone network.  A low
frequency bomb built around an FCG will require a large antenna to
provide good coupling of power from the weapon into the surrounding
environment.  Whilst weapons built this way are inherently wide band, as
most of the power produced lies in the frequency band below 1 MHz
compact antennas are not an option.  Microwave bombs have a broader
range of coupling modes and given the small wavelength in comparison
with bomb dimensions, can be readily focussed against targets with a
compact antenna assembly.  The importance of glide-bombs as delivery
means for HPM warheads is threefold.  Firstly, the glide-bomb can be
released from outside effective radius of target air defenses, therefore
minimizing the risk to the launch aircraft.  Secondly, the large
standoff range means that the aircraft can remain well clear of the
bomb's effects.  Finally the bomb's autopilot may be programmed to shape
the terminal trajectory of the weapon, such that a target may be engaged
from the most suitable altitude and aspect.  Targeting Electro-magnetic
Bombs The task of identifying targets for attack with electro-magnetic
bombs can be complex.  Certain categories of target will be very easy to
identify and engage.  Buildings housing government offices and thus
computer equipment, production facilities, military bases and known
radar sites and communications nodes are all targets which can be
readily identified through conventional photographic, satellite, imaging
radar, electronic reconnaissance and humint operations.  These targets
are typically geographically fixed and thus may be attacked providing
that the aircraft can penetrate to weapon release range.  With the
accuracy inherent in GPS/inertially guided weapons, the electro-magnetic
bomb can be programmed to detonate at the optimal position to inflict a
maximum of electrical damage. 

Figure 3.  Lethal footprint of low frequency E-bomb in relation Mobile
and camouflaged targets which radiate overtly can also be readily
engaged.  Mobile and relocatable air defense equipment, mobile
communications nodes and naval vessels are all good examples of this
category of target.  While radiating, their positions can be precisely
tracked with suitable Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Emitter
Locating Systems (ELS) carried either by the launch platform or a remote
surveillance platform.  In the latter instance target coordinates can be
continuously data-linked to the launch platform.  As most such targets
move relatively slowly, they are unlikely to escape the footprint of the
electro-magnetic bomb during the weapon's flight time.  Mobile or hidden
targets which do not overtly radiate may present a problem, particularly
should conventional means of targeting be employed.  A technical
solution to this problem does however exist, for many types of target. 
This solution is the detection and tracking of Unintentional Emission
(UE).  UE has attracted most attention in the context of TEMPEST
surveillance, where transient emanations leaking out from equipment due
poor shielding can be detected and in many instances demodulated to
recover useful intelligence.  Termed Van Eck radiation, such emissions
can only be suppressed by rigorous shielding and emission control
techniques, such as are employed in TEMPEST rated equipment.  Whilst the
demodulation of UE can be a technically difficult task to perform well,
in the context of targeting electro-magnetic bombs this problem does not
arise.  To target such an emitter for attack requires only the ability
to identify the type of emission and thus target type, and to isolate
its position with sufficient accuracy to deliver the bomb.  Because the
emissions from computer monitors, peripherals, processor equipment,
switch-mode power supplies, electrical motors, internal combustion
engine ignition systems, variable duty cycle electrical power
controllers (thyristor or triac based), super-heterodyne receiver local
oscillators and computer networking cables are all distinct in their
frequencies and modulations, a suitable Emitter Locating System can be
designed to detect, identify and track such sources of emission. 

A good precedent for this targeting paradigm exists.  During the SEA
(Vietnam) conflict the United States Air Force (USAF) operated a number
of night inter-diction gun-ships which used direction finding receivers
to track the emissions from vehicle ignition systems.  Once a truck was
identified and tracked, the gun-ship would engage it. 

Figure 4.  GPS Guided bombs (glide-bomb kits) Because UE occurs at
relatively low power levels, the use of this detection method prior to
the outbreak of hostilities can be difficult, as it may be necessary to
over-fly hostile territory to find signals of usable intensity.  The use
of stealthy reconnaissance aircraft or long range, stealthy Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV) may be required.  The latter also raises the
possibility of autonomous electro-magnetic warhead armed expendable
UAVs, fitted with appropriate homing receivers.  These would be
programmed to loiter in a target area until a suitable emitter is
detected, upon which the UAV would home in and expend itself against the
target.  Defense against E-bombs The most effective defense against
electro-magnetic bombs is to prevent their delivery by destroying the
launch platform or delivery vehicle, as is the case with nuclear
weapons.  This however may not always be possible, and therefore systems
which can be expected to suffer exposure to the electro-magnetic weapons
effects must be electro-magnetically hardened.  The most effective
method is to wholly contain the equipment in an electrically conductive
enclosure, termed a Faraday cage, which prevents the electro-magnetic
field from gaining access to the protected equipment.  However, most
such equipment must communicate with and be fed with power from the
outside world, and this can provide entry points via which electrical
transients may enter the enclosure and effect damage.  While optical
fibers address this requirement for transferring data in and out,
electrical power feeds remain an ongoing vulnerability.  Where an
electrically conductive channel must enter the enclosure,
electro-magnetic arresting devices must be fitted.  A range of devices
exist, however care must be taken in determining their parameters to
ensure that they can deal with the rise time and strength of electrical
transients produced by electro-magnetic devices.  Reports from the US
indicate that hardening measures attuned to the behavior of nuclear EMP
bombs do not perform well when dealing with some conventional microwave
electro-magnetic device designs.  It is significant that hardening of
systems must be carried out at a system level, as electro-magnetic
damage to any single element of a complex system could inhibit the
function of the whole system.  Hardening new build equipment and systems
will add a substantial cost burden.  Older equipment and systems may be
impossible to harden properly and may require complete replacement.  In
simple terms, hardening by design is significantly easier than
attempting to harden existing equipment.  Intermittent faults may not be
possible to repair economically, thereby causing equipment in this state
to be removed from service permanently, with considerable loss in
maintenance hours during damage diagnosis.  This factor must also be
considered when assessing the hardness of equipment against
electro-magnetic attack, as partial or incomplete hardening may in this
fashion cause more difficulties than it would solve.  Indeed, shielding
which is incomplete may resonate when excited by radiation and thus
contribute to damage inflicted upon the equipment contained within it. 
Other than hardening against attack, facilities which are concealed
should not radiate readily detectable emissions.  Where radio frequency
communications must be used, low probability of intercept (i.e..  spread
spectrum) techniques should be employed exclusively to preclude the use
of site emissions for electro-magnetic targeting purposes.  Appropriate
suppression of UE is also mandatory. 

Figure 5.  Computer room hardened against EM attack

Communications networks for voice, data and services should employ
topologies with sufficient redundancy and failover mechanisms to allow
operation with multiple nodes and links inoperative.  This will deny a
user of electro-magnetic bombs the option of disabling large portions if
not the whole of the network by taking down one or more key nodes or
links with a single or small number of attacks. 

Virtual prototyping of RF weapons Complex and expensive experimental
efforts are more timely and cost-effective if they are tested by
theoretical and computational modeling.  Such computations are made
tractable by viewing the device as a system consisting of a pulsed power
source, microwave source, and an antenna.  Electro-magnetic bombs are
Weapons of Electronical Mass Destruction with applications across a
broad spectrum of targets, spanning both the strategic and tactical.  As
such their use offers a very high payoff in attacking the fundamental
information processing and communication facilities of a target system. 
The massed application of these weapons will produce substantial
paralysis in any target system, thus providing a decisive advantage in
the conduct of Electronic Combat, Offensive Counter Air and Strategic
Air Attack.  Because E-bombs can cause hard electrical kills over larger
areas than conventional explosive weapons of similar mass, they offer
substantial economies in force size for a given level of inflicted
damage, and are thus a potent force multiplier for appropriate target
sets. 

Conclusions Electro-magnetic bombs are Weapons of Electronical Mass
Destruction with applications across a broad spectrum of targets,
spanning both the strategic and tactical.  As such their use offers a
very high payoff in attacking the fundamental information processing and
communication facilities of a target system.  The massed application of
these weapons will produce substantial paralysis in any target system,
thus providing a decisive advantage in the conduct of Electronic Combat,
Offensive Counter Air and Strategic Air Attack.  Because E-bombs can
cause hard electrical kills over larger areas than conventional
explosive weapons of similar mass, they offer substantial economies in
force size for a given level of inflicted damage, and are thus a potent
force multiplier for appropriate target sets.  The non-lethal nature of
electro-magnetic weapons makes their use far less politically damaging
than that of conventional munitions, and therefore broadens the range of
military options available.  This paper has included a discussion of the
technical, operational and targeting aspects of using such weapons, as
no historical experience exists as yet upon which to build a doctrinal
model.  The immaturity of this weapons technology limits the scope of
this discussion, and many potential areas of application have
intentionally not been discussed.  The ongoing technological evolution
of this family of weapons will clarify the relationship between weapon
size and lethality, thus producing further applications and areas for
study.  E-bombs can be an affordable force multiplier for military
forces which are under post Cold War pressures to reduce force sizes,
increasing both their combat potential and political utility in
resolving disputes.  Given the potentially high payoff deriving from the
use of these devices, it is incumbent upon such military forces to
appreciate both the offensive and defensive implications of this
technology.  It is also incumbent upon governments and private industry
to consider the implications of the proliferation of this technology,
and take measures to safeguard their vital assets from possible future
attack.  Those who choose not to may become losers in any future wars. 

Other Links Carlo Coop: The Electro-magnetic Bomb : A Weapon of
Electronic Mass Destruction <a
href="http://www.hut.fi/~zam/ew/mirror/apjemp.html">http://www.hut.fi/~zam/ew/mirror/apjemp.html>

HERF and EMP <a
href="http://www.hut.fi/~zam/ew/herf_and_emp.html">http://www.hut.fi/~zam/ew/herf_and_emp.html>

Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP)&amp;TEMPEST Protection for Facilities <a
href="http://jya.com/emp.htm">http://jya.com/emp.htm>

Joint Economic Committee Hearing Radio Frequency Weapons and
Proliferation: Potential Impact on the Economy 1998.  <a
href="http://cryptome.org/rfw-jec.htm">http://cryptome.org/rfw-jec.htm>

EMP shielded rooms and much more www.spyking.com/herf.html

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