[iwar] [fc:Next.Steps.in.Electronic.Attack]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-06-29 13:39:49
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From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
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Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2002 13:39:49 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:Next.Steps.in.Electronic.Attack]
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The sophistication, mobility, and "hybridization" of adversary air defenses
spell trouble a few years down the line.
Next Steps in Electronic Attack
By John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor

This month the armed services formally present their preferred plans for
conducting Airborne Electronic Attack through the next two decades.
Candidate approaches, identified in a two-year joint service study and
ranging in cost from $20 billion to $82 billion, hit the desk of
Undersecretary of Defense Edward C. Aldridge, the Pentagon's acquisition
chief.

All signs are that these plans will affect air warfare for decades to come.

The AEA options were developed by a Navy-led analysis of alternatives team,
which wrapped up its work in December. In a 10-volume classified study, the
team examined how the services could replace the capability of the Navy's
EA-6B Prowler and other Electronic Warfare systems now nearing the end of
their planned or useful service lives. The study included input from 125
government and contractor organizations and set benchmark prices for many of
the options considered.

The analysis was spurred by two facts:

    * The inventory of EA-6Bs, used jointly by the Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps--a low-density, high-demand asset--won't meet minimum
requirements in 2009 because of the aircraft's age and expected attrition.
* Recent conflicts have demonstrated that a continuing, vigorous AEA
capability will be needed for virtually any future air campaign.

Although Aldridge will review the service plans and send them back for
further refinement--especially in the area of cost--he is expected to allow
the Navy to pursue a replacement aircraft for the EA-6B, a move the Air
Force also supports. In its turn, the Air Force will, for now, concentrate
on a variety of programs--emitter pods, decoys, some classified
programs--that will address the issue for this decade. A longer-range plan
could see the Air Force acquiring its own jammer airplane, although service
officials have not been pushing such an option.

In Operation Allied Force, the Balkan air war of 1999, the limited supply of
EA-6Bs as an escort jammer for certain missions "constrained" NATO's ability
to strike at the time of its choosing, particularly after many weeks of
operations, said a study participant. Recent groundings of the Prowler for
mechanical problems have heightened the Navy's sense of urgency in seeking a
replacement.

The Air Force gave up its last EF-111 escort jammer (foreground) in 1998,
agreeing to share the fleet of 126 EA-6Bs (background) with the Navy.
Already stretched thin, the fleet drops below bare minimums in 2009. (USAF
photo by SSgt. Greg L. Davis)

Pressing Issue

The AEA issue is a pressing one for all of the services. Afghanistan offered
a "fairly benign" air defense environment, but the next US opponent may be
far better equipped for air warfare, warned Lt. Gen. Charles F. Wald, Air
Force deputy chief of staff for air and space operations.

"We're OK," for now, said Wald, speaking at a March air and space symposium
in Washington, D.C. However, he added, the current adequacy of AEA
capabilities may be short-lived.

"If we had to fight today" against an enemy equipped with typical air
defenses, "I would be comfortable with what we have," said Wald. "I think
we'd do a great job. Two or three years from now--maybe five years from
now--it's going to change."

Wald, who commanded US air forces in Afghanistan during the early days of
Operation Enduring Freedom, cited several reasons for projecting this change
of events.

First, advanced anti-aircraft defense systems such as the Russian S-300 and
S-400 family are now on sale around the world and starting to complicate US
air planning. The new systems mark a sharp improvement over the systems the
US has faced in battle during the 1990s. They pose an unprecedented peril to
unstealthy combat aircraft--which constitute the majority of US military
aircraft.

The new opposition air defense systems "can reach out further," said Maj.
Gen. Daniel P. Leaf, the Air Force's director of operational requirements.
New systems can both detect aircraft at much longer ranges than before and
have longer-legged missiles that can reach the targets farther away. Older
systems have also benefitted from integration of previously unrelated
components, said Leaf, in a process that is sometimes called "hybridization
of air defense weaponry."

A Navy-led study came up with 27 alternatives to replace the EA-6B as the US
electronic attack platform. One option is to outfit a civil wide-body or a
bomber, like this B-52H, with jamming gear. (Photo by Ted Carlson)

Hybridization

In the 1999 Balkan War, Leaf explained, Serb forces used radars not
previously associated with anti-aircraft systems. He added that they also
inventively linked "visual reports, cell phones, [and] ham radios to cue the
air defense net in a simple but relatively effective network."

Though the Serbs succeeded in downing just two NATO aircraft during the
course of the conflict, they fired about 700 missiles, forcing NATO to use
jamming and defense suppression aircraft until the very end of the
operation.

Second, the emerging hybridization of air defenses means that Western air
forces cannot be sure of winning the electronic battle simply by application
of "radiated power at the face of the enemy radar aperture"--Leaf's words.
The brute-force blinding of enemy radars with high-energy emitters will be
difficult.

"It's much more refined than that," Leaf said. Weapons, deception,
information warfare, and decoys "are all going to have to continue to
improve."

Third, the growing mobility of adversary air defenses is changing the whole
structure of the AEA mission. Leaf said that old-style fixed strategic
systems and transportable systems that could be moved, set up, employed, and
then moved again are giving way to much more nimble and elusive systems that
can virtually shoot on the move.

"Everything is migrating to being much more mobile," he observed, "and that
makes sense, because if they're not mobile, we'll find them and kill them."

Leaf was one of the senior Air Force members of the team that produced the
analysis of alternatives. He cautioned that the options developed were
intended to "provide a capability at least as comprehensive as that which
will be offered by the EA-6B with the Improved Capabilities [or] ... ICAP
III" system upgrade.

"That's a pretty specific focus," said Leaf. "It will not answer all our
needs for countering air defenses or even for Electronic Warfare, probably,
especially as threats continue to mature."

According to an unclassified summary of the analysis of alternatives, the
participants concluded that an effective AEA solution must have two parts: a
"core" system of reusable aircraft operating in enemy airspace and an
"expendable" system that will work close to enemy sensors and air defense
systems--too close for the core platform to survive.

The summary stated that no emerging technology or mix of technologies will
eliminate the need for a comprehensive AEA capability in US air superiority
forces, even accounting for the advance of stealth technology, the
availability of increasingly powerful self-protection systems, and the
advent of small, electronically scanned array radars now being fitted on
fighter aircraft.

The analysis looked at combinations of platform options which ranged from
new-start aircraft to business jets, variants of existing and planned
fighters and bombers, "wide-bodies" such as Electronic Warfare versions of
the 737 and 757, and unmanned aerial vehicles, both armed and unarmed.
Various combinations of land- and sea-based capabilities were considered.


Fixed threats such as this SA-6 in Afghanistan aren't the big worry; they
can be hit quickly and effectively. The danger lies in mobile and
man-portable SAMs that can "shoot and scoot," cued by hybrid air defense
systems. (USMC photo by Capt. Charles G. Grow)

Smorgasbord

The analysis amounted to what one industry participant called a "Consumer
Reports list" of available products that could do the job, at various levels
of effectiveness, and at various prices.

The cheapest option was pegged at about $20 billion. It would be based on a
"new-start, high-flier" program patterned on the Global Hawk high-altitude
unmanned aerial vehicle, used in conjunction with a smaller system, such as
a loitering drone or missile, that could directly attack enemy radars and
sensors.

At the other end of the spectrum, the most expensive and comprehensive
option--at about $82 billion--included electronic attack variants of the
Navy F/A-18E/F fighter, Air Force F-22 fighter, and USAF B-52 heavy bomber,
along with a close-in attack system.

The study expressed cost in "total ownership" terms, which includes military
construction, training, maintenance, and the like. In the case of the three
most expensive options, prices were quoted by system program offices as well
as the Pentagon's cost assessment improvement group, which the Pentagon
maintains to provide independent appraisals. Costs were for comparative
purposes only and not to be considered predictive.

For purposes of the analysis, options did not have to meet budgetary limits.
In the choices that go to Aldridge this month, however, the services will
have to show how they will plan to pay for their preferred approaches.

Leaf said a new body--the countering air defenses joint requirements working
group--was formed to eliminate redundant capabilities among the services,
look for complementary capabilities, and determine whether the services
should pursue entirely new systems.

The Air Force has been roundly criticized for its decisions to retire the
F-4G Wild Weasel dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses aircraft and
the EF-111 escort jammer, in 1995 and 1998 respectively. Critics say the Air
Force was overly enamored with stealth and paid insufficient attention to
Electronic Warfare.

USAF substituted the F-16CJ with the HARM targeting system for the F-4G and
agreed to share the EA-6B with the Navy when the EF-111 was phased out.

Leaf said neither retirement decision was taken lightly.

"We were making some very tough decisions," he insisted. "We didn't get rid
of those aircraft because we wanted less capability. There were very serious
downsizing constraints as the force grew smaller."

The decision to rely on the Navy's Prowler fleet was "a tough choice," he
added.

The Air Force's near-term options mostly revolve around systems that can be
appended to existing airframes. These included towed decoys, targeting pods,
new munitions, information warfare systems, directed energy weapons, and the
Miniature Air-Launched Decoy, or MALD.

"Where we're headed is to balance fiscal reality with the requirements and
opportunities," Leaf said.

The Air Force would like to avoid a repeat of the Balkans situation by
ensuring that enemy surface-to-air missile sites are not just suppressed but
actually destroyed.

"Shoot and Scoot" Systems

"We must do a better job of killing surface-to-air systems," Leaf said. "We
can't give [the enemy] the capability to 'shoot and scoot' and hide
throughout [the conflict]."

The Air Force is already emphasizing quick location and destruction of
mobile and time-critical targets, Leaf said, and its programs will all bend
in that direction.

A senior Air Force official said the service is satisfied with the Navy as a
partner on the EA-6B and added that USAF has had access to the jammer
aircraft whenever it wanted such access. "All these assets are on the ATO
[Air Tasking Order]," the official said. "The decision as to who gets what
and when is made at the level of the JFACC [Joint Force Air Component
Commander]."

"We don't run solo operations much, so we get that support when it is
appropriate for us to have it," he observed.

The EA-6B is a 1960s-technology airplane. Though it has profited from an
ongoing, state-of-the-art avionics upgrade, it is still an aging aircraft,
frequently beset by mechanical problems. The Navy would like to move to a
new airplane, easier to fix and with greater capability.

Ever since the Navy opted to pursue the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, it has had a
policy of shrinking, whenever possible, the number of aircraft types on its
carrier decks. It does this to reduce the number of parts inventories and
repair capabilities that it must maintain. The Super Hornet and its smaller
predecessors, the F/A-18A-D models, have a high commonality of parts, and
the sea service would like its EA-6B follow-on to be a Super Hornet variant
as well.

Boeing has developed the "EA-18" proposal to meet the requirement and said
it has been working on the project since 1993.

"We call it the 'Growler,'" said Paul Summers, Boeing's director for F/A-18
derivative programs. "This concept is extremely mature."

Summers asserted that Boeing has thoroughly worked out the internal design
of the EA-18 and has endeavored to make it compatible with the EA-6B's ICAP
III jammer pods with only minor modifications. Flight tests to check the fit
of the external systems have already been flown. Including internal
processors, the EA-18 would have 70 percent commonality with the EA-6B's
Electronic Warfare systems, Summers said.

The Navy's preferred option is to replace the EA-6B with the EA-18, a
variant of the Super Hornet. Speed and commonality with the rest of the
Navy's fleet are its chief selling points, but USAF doubts that this is the
way to go. (Boeing photo)

Just In Time

Because the F/A-18E/F test program is far along--and the EA-18 is externally
almost identical to the F model--Boeing believes it could have the first
nine EA-18s available for duty in 2009. That is exactly when the Navy will
begin to run short on EA-6Bs and would assume a go-ahead in 2004.

"This is an integration program," Summers insisted, and the Navy can save a
great deal of money because it doesn't need to certify the type or repeat
flight testing. So common are the aircraft that the Navy has also asked for
quotes on making all F model Super Hornets capable of using the
interchangeable Electronic Warfare pods and internal systems, to ease
decking considerations and broaden the interchangeability of its fleet. The
EA-18 would retain all the combat and tanking capability and weapon stations
that the F model has, without the internal gun. The additional onboard gear
to make the F model an EA-18 is about 350 pounds, a figure that would be
reduced to 200 pounds if fiber optics supplant coaxial cable in the
aircraft.

While the Navy currently fields a fleet of 122 EA-6Bs, the Air Force and
Navy agree that number is too low and that it would be desirable to fix the
low-density, high-demand problem.

"Pricing for 180 airplanes has been requested by the Navy," Summers
acknowledged. "That number assumes they will continue to support Air Force
requirements. If they don't have to, the number will be lower."

Summers said that Prowler crews have looked over the layout of the two-man
EA-18 and believe it can, with automation improvements, do the job that the
four-seat Prowler now does.

Besides commonality and manufacturing and development savings, the EA-18
offers the Navy and Air Force an opportunity to recover the escort jammer
role that was surrendered when the EF-111 left the inventory.

"This is an airplane that can go supersonic ... and keep up with the strike
package, if that's something you want to do," Summers pointed out. Because
it retains combat capability even with some jamming pods carried, it could
do some of the SEAD mission as well, he added.

According to the AEA analysis of alternatives, an Electronic Warfare plan
focused on the EA-18, adding new-technology jammer pods, would cost about
$40 billion over the life of the program. Another option--restarting the
EA-6 line and building brand-new EA-6C aircraft with new-technology
pods--would cost about $34 billion.

One of the most attractive options, said one participant, was an AEA version
of the Joint Strike Fighter. Both a carrier capable and conventional takeoff
version could be developed and fielded for about $38 billion, but "there
would be a long wait before we could get those airplanes ... unless we did
them simultaneously with the [conventional] attack version," he said. The
F-35 JSFs don't begin to roll off the assembly line until 2008, and the
first units will not be equipped until 2010.

The Stealth Factor

The Air Force's unique requirements for AEA are still being worked out, Leaf
said.

"We've got to ask ourselves, will we have the right Electronic Warfare
capability to support a fleet that's going to become increasingly stealthy,
... some element of which will operate at supercruise?"

With the F-22 entering the battle zone at Mach 1.5 or more, "we've got to
make sure we have responsive, flexible EW support to match that kind of
capability. Some of that ... may be inherent to the F-22 itself. An EF-22 is
among the options the Air Force is considering."

Wald said that replacing the EA-6B is "probably necessary. ... We support
the Navy's initiative to replace some of their EA-6s."

However, "there are additional capabilities we're going to have a look at,"
Wald added. Some of these are nontraditional, such as the Air Force's SEAD
unmanned combat aerial vehicle.

The "replacement in capability, if not in kind, of the EA-6B is probably not
going to meet our needs in the next decade," Leaf acknowledged. "We're
probably going to have to go beyond [it] ... and that may require a new
platform."

The Air Force is "committed to Electronic Warfare," Wald asserted. "We're
not committed to a single platform. We're committed to multiple platforms,
... to a synergistic approach, maybe some nonconventional ways of doing some
of this that haven't been talked about before." These will include
"traditional methods as well as information operations, space capabilities,
... and perhaps some emerging technologies that are still classified."

In an apparent nod to criticisms that the Air Force has not taken the EW
mission seriously enough, Wald said, "It's not a simple problem. It goes to
this debate over suppression of enemy air defense and destruction of enemy
air defense. As if it was either-or. There is no either-or."

The Pentagon's plan of addressing AEA with add-on systems first, followed by
a new platform at the 10-year point, and more sophisticated new technologies
after that, "will meet the threat of the future," Wald said, "as long as we
stick with it."

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