[iwar] [fc:The.case.of.the.missing.code:.Are.al-Qaida.terrorists.hiding.their.secrets.in.eBay.photos?]

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Date: 2002-07-17 19:38:36


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:The.case.of.the.missing.code:.Are.al-Qaida.terrorists.hiding.their.secrets.in.eBay.photos?]
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The case of the missing code: Are al-Qaida terrorists hiding their secrets in eBay photographs?

By Farhad Manjoo, Salon, 7/17/02
<a href="http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/07/17/steganography/print.html">http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/07/17/steganography/print.html>

If you were a terrorist schooled in fundamentalist Islam, mass violence,
digital cryptography and, not least, the pack-rat ethos peculiar to
eBay, in which corner of that vast auction site might you hide your
plans for America's end? 
Would you favor the popular items, stuffing nuclear secrets into one of
the nearly 4,000 Pez-related listings? Or would you go for something
more obscure -- the date and time of al-Qaida's next operation concealed
in a $3 glossy press photo from the old television sitcom "My Two Dads"?
Or, displaying your flair for irony, would you conduct your terrorist
business right under the kitsch-loving noses of the Americans who hate
you most, those who would buy a "Boy Peeing on Osama" pickup-truck
decal? 
Silly as they seem, U.S. intelligence agents consider these questions
key to their victory in the war on terrorism, according to unnamed
sources who have been quoted in media reports over the past year. Since
before Sept. 11, a series of articles have quoted experts suggesting
that al-Qaida may be especially Internet-savvy and could be mounting a
full-scale "cyberwar" against the United States. 
While much of it comes off as alarmist speculation, one hard-to-prove
fact has slowly gained a patina of credibility: that terrorists are
hiding coded messages in the image files on eBay and other sites that
allow public posting. These images would appear normal to most eBay
shoppers, but they are actually brimming with guile. A terrorist who
knew their true purpose could download the files, decode them with his
secret password and perhaps find out where to strike next. 
Jack Kelley, a veteran foreign correspondent for USA Today, has been at
the forefront of these reports. In February 2001, Kelley reported that
hidden "in the X-rated pictures on several pornographic Web sites and
the posted comments on sports chat rooms may lie the encrypted
blueprints of the next terrorist attack against the United States or its
allies." 
His report prompted a flurry of follow-up stories in other publications,
including one Wired News story in which a security expert said that his
company, WetStone Technologies, had found several hidden messages on
eBay and Amazon. After Sept. 11, dozens of newspapers, including the New
York Times and the Washington Post, cited WetStone in reports that eBay
may be crawling with terrorists. These accounts were almost universally
dismissed by Internet-rights types, who said that they wouldn't believe
the stories until they saw proof that "steganography" -- the practice of
digitally hiding messages in media files -- is indeed on the rise. 
On July 10, USA Today prompted renewed interest in the steganography
debate by adding some meat to the eBay story. "Lately, al-Qaida
operatives have been sending hundreds of encrypted messages that have
been hidden in files on digital photographs on the auction site
eBay.com," reported Jack Kelley. "The volume of the messages has nearly
doubled in the past month, indicating to some U.S. intelligence
officials that al-Qaida is planning another attack." Kelley added that
eBay did not return his calls for comment. 
The USA Today article has raised plenty of eyebrows -- eBay for example,
has no record of being contacted by Kelley, and stresses that no federal
agency has alerted it to any potential problems. There also appears to
be little, if any, publicly available hard evidence of the use of
steganography in files on the auction site. 
The frightful genius of steganography, though, is that, by design, you
don't know when it's being used. Independent researchers have devised
numerous methods to search for signs of its proliferation on the Web,
and some have reported that they've found nothing, and there's
consequently no reason to be afraid. But when you think about these
studies, the results become about as comforting as homeland security
advisor Tom Ridge's color-coded alert system. After all, if you search
for hidden messages on the Web and find nothing, what should you
conclude -- that there are no messages, or that the terrorists are too
sophisticated, and your tools don't work? 
The answer to this question turns out to be a highly personal one, a
matter of individual psychology and interest rather than a reasoned
decision based on collective safety and the immutable laws of math. Ask
security types, or people who make software to aid security types, and
they say that steganography is a grave threat to our safety. Defenders
of steganography, and its cousin cryptography, take the opposite view.
These are people who become easily exercised over the prospect of the
government monitoring the Web, and they say that if researchers haven't
found secret messages, the messages are likely not there. But amid this
politicking, one important question tends to get left by the wayside: if
steganography is, or eventually becomes, the preferred tool of
terrorists, can we ever thwart it? According to many experts, the answer
is probably no. 
The USA Today article was the first to put a number on how many
stego-messages were on eBay -- a number so high that many doubted it
immediately. Kelley's was also the first story to suggest that the
government is specifically watching eBay, as opposed to other public Web
sites. The detail that the messages "have been sent from Internet cafes
in Pakistan and public libraries throughout the world" suggested that
the messages found inside the image files had been encrypted, and the
only thing the government was able to determine about them was the IP
address of their servers. 
The story had Internet libertarians crying foul. Technology reporter
Declan McCullagh's Politech mailing list, one of the last bastions of
circa-1995 government wariness on the Net, featured dozens of messages
from readers who were sure the piece was bogus. Politech even challenged
readers to find and decode an al-Qaida missive hidden in an image file
on the Web. 
Libertarian skepticism does not appear to be misplaced; there are
several reasons to question USA Today's story. Kevin Pursglove, an eBay
spokesman, says that while it's possible that the company somehow missed
Jack Kelley's phone call, Pursglove and his associates in P.R. don't
recall hearing from the reporter. Moreover, eBay has never been
contacted by any government agency regarding possible terrorist
communications on its site. "I'm not saying what he's reporting is not
true," Pursglove said, "but it's just that nobody from the federal
government has contacted us. We've got an investigations team here that
has extensive contacts with federal authorities, with the FBI, the State
Department, the CIA, the military. We have not had any contact at all
about this." 
Salon called several federal agencies to see whether they were indeed
watching eBay, but the calls went unanswered. Jack Kelley, too, did not
return calls. But many security experts, even those who believe that
terrorists use steganography, disputed the specifics of Kelley's report. 
Chet Hosmer, the president of WetStone Technologies, the company that
first reported the possibility of hidden messages on eBay and which
makes what many people say is the most advanced publicly available
steganographic-detection software, said that in his research, very few
messages on eBay show signs of being infected by terrorists. About one
in 100,000 pictures "appears suspicious," but a much smaller number --
"one in every 15 to 20 million files" -- is "something that we really
believe is a real hidden message." 
Under this standard, for the government to have found 100 stego files,
it would have had to have analyzed something on the order of 1 or 2
billion images. According to eBay's first quarter financial results, the
site hosted a record 138 million auctions last quarter. Extrapolating
that number out for the 300 or so days since Sept. 11, we see that there
have been less than half a billion eBay listings since the attacks --
simply not enough to account for "hundreds" of hidden messages. 
Now, this back-of-the-envelope calculation rests on several assumptions;
the most important is that the government isn't using a stego-detector
more sophisticated than WetStone's. WetStone has received funding from
the Department of Defense, but Hosmer says that the government could
have much fancier technology, and so it could find stego-messages at
rates much higher than one in 15 million. There's also a chance that the
feds have information that allows them to narrow their search to
specific sections of eBay, which would make their job considerably
easier. 
There's no question that tools to hide messages in image files are
easily available on the Web, and most of them are point-and-click simple
to use. But as these tools scramble the message into different parts of
the image file, they add some discernible "pattern" of bits -- detecting
stego is all about finding that anomalous statistical pattern in the
code of what looks like an otherwise normal image. 
Unfortunately, that process turns out to be what's known, in the jargon,
as "computationally expensive." It's also somewhat buggy; there's a high
false-positive rate. Consequently, when an image is suspected to have
some hidden info inside it, it could take as much as 30 seconds, Hosmer
said, to fully test it. That's why you wouldn't want to monitor all of
eBay, as it would take quite some time to go through just one day's
worth of images. "With our computer power, what we tend to look at is
images that we may have sources saying are suspicious, and then test
those. We would act like detectives in the real world," he said. 
Acting like a real-world detective requires thinking like a terrorist,
and asking yourself hard questions: If you were a terrorist, where on
eBay would you hide your loot? To describe the difficulty of the task,
Hosmer once coined a phrase that is often repeated by others who study
steganography: "It's not like finding a needle in a haystack. It's like
finding the right piece of straw in a haystack." 
But the task is in fact more difficult than that, because after you find
what you think is your piece of straw, there's really no way to know
that you've got the right one. Earlier this year, Niels Provos, a
graduate student at the University of Michigan, reported that after
checking 2 million eBay listings, he'd found no suspect images. But when
he described the study, he added, darkly, that "I can't answer the
question of whether or not there is hidden content on the Internet. My
negative result doesn't indicate that the hidden communications aren't
there." 
More recently, in response to the Politech challenge, Brian Ristuccia, a
computer science student in Massachusetts, reported that he'd run some
tests on Azzam.com, a pro-jihad site, and found that it had a very high
positive rate for stego-images. Because these could be false positives,
he's trying to use a brute-force "dictionary attack" to break into the
messages -- but he doesn't hold out hopes that he'll find anything of
substance. If he manages to crack open an image and find a message
inside, Ristuccia says he's sure the message will be encrypted. Would
that mean he's found the right straw in the haystack, the straw that
hints at future terror? Short of cracking the encryption scheme -- a
tremendously computationally expensive task -- he'll never know. 
While the challenges in fingering steganography may cast some suspicion
over the USA Today report, they also don't help make a case for the
libertarian argument that the technology is relatively harmless. Neil
Johnson, a steganography expert, says that he's aware that stego could
be harmful, but he says much good can come of it, too. There are many
scenarios "where the observation that you and I are communicating could
cause a problem for one or both of us," he said, suggesting dictatorial
regimes, military missions, that kind of thing. The argument has the
flavor of a gun-rights rant -- secret messages can be used for evil, but
if everyone used them, society would, on balance, be better.
Steganography doesn't kill people, terrorists do. 
For now, that argument doesn't seem especially crazy; but if, after the
next terrorist attack, it's shown that the attackers used steganography
to communicate with each other, governments are probably going to move
against the technology. 
To prevent disaster, Hosmer says that commercial sites and ISPs should
take it upon themselves, now, to scrub their sites free of
steganography. He suggests that sites that accept public images for
posting scan each new image. He admitted that "there's no question that
that certainly benefits us, but really there is no other way to police
this. There's no way you can scan all the current information for the
presence of this. It's too vast to police it any way, but these
companies could detect it early and come up with information before it's
too late." 
EBay has no plans to do this, Pursglove said. "It would have such a
negative impact on the site as a whole," he said, explaining that eBay
doesn't host its own images, which would make such scans technically
difficult. EBay already has many safeguards, including requiring sellers
to provide a credit card and a physical address, which would leave a
paper trail to any would-be terrorist. And, Pursglove added, if the
government came to eBay and told the company about some suspicious
material, "We would certainly cooperate with the authorities."

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