[iwar] [fc:Terror.threat.overblown,.says.expert]

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Date: 2002-08-11 06:05:51


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Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2002 06:05:51 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:Terror.threat.overblown,.says.expert]
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Terror threat overblown, says expert

By Christian Bourge
UPI think tank correspondent
From the Think Tanks &amp; Research Desk
Published 8/10/2002 12:24 AM
View printer-friendly version

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 (UPI) -- The response of U.S. policymakers to the Sept.
11 terrorist attacks is based upon an overestimate of the threat of
terrorism, and ignores the lessons that can be gained from an
interdisciplinary approach to the problem, according to some think tank
experts who are analyzing the issue.

"I basically think we are really overreacting to this in a fairly large
way," said George Mason University economist Roger Congleton. "I think it
would be useful for the press and the government to be reminded that the
risks are not as gigantic as we seem to have been encouraged to believe over
the last year."

In an essay entitled "Terrorism, Interest-Group Politics, and Public Policy:
Curtailing Criminal Modes of Political Speech," in the summer edition of the
Independent Institute's Independent Review, Congleton argues that
policymakers should be taking a closer look at just how great a risk is
posed by terrorist activities, as well as how much effort and money should
be committed to address that threat, versus the other risks faced by
society.

He also notes that much can be learned by comparing terrorist groups with
non-violent political action groups. Congleton believes that many
anti-terrorism policies are effective, just like similar policies aimed at
limiting legal forms of political action.

But critics of Congleton's quantitative approach to antiterrorism policy
argue that although a multi-disciplinary view is required to address the
thicket of policy concerns raised by terrorist threats, a qualitative review
is a much better means for developing an effective policy response.

Congleton says that the risks of dying in more ordinary crimes or accidents
-- being run over by a car, killed in the traffic accident while driving, or
even being murdered -- are much higher than those of being killed in a
terrorist act.

"All of these risks are historically vastly larger than the risks we face
from terrorists," he told UPI. "The right thing to do is to seek perspective
and then to think about the costs associated with policy."

He noted that about 15,000 people were murdered last year in the United
States, and that the 10-year national average for murders is around 20,000
people per year, compared to the 2,800 who died in the World Trade Center
and Pentagon attacks.

In 2001, he says, the risk of death from terrorism was less than one-fourth
that of being murdered, and far smaller than the risk of being involved in a
fatal car accident.

Despite this, he says, the $20 billion allocated last September in the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for fiscal 2002, earmarked for
increased spending on antiterrorism activities, represents about 20 percent
of the funds used annually for highway safety, and one-third of the money
used to provide daily police protection in the United States. This is
spending is unnecessary, given the risk of terrorism, he says.

Congleton says the drama of the Sept. 11 attacks makes the overreaction
understandable but that the statistical reality of the terror threat should
be the key to allocating resources.

"When you have 3,000 people killed at once it is a very shocking and trying
event, but that many people were killed in highway accidents in September
2001," said Congleton. "This is no less shocking for the people who lost
loved ones."

But Mark Burgess, a research analyst at the Center for Defense Information,
argues that a qualitative examination of policy, not a quantitative one, is
necessary to ensure an effective terror policy.

"I feel this sort of quantitative approach to terrorist incidents doesn't
really take into consideration the true nature of terrorism," said Burgess.
"It is one thing to say that maybe a person is more at risk of being run
down by a bus than they are of being killed by a terrorist, but that is
neither here nor there."

John Parachini, a terrorism expert at the RAND Corp., agreed that
Congleton's approach of managing risk is important and should be part of the
"portfolio of ideas" used to evaluate terrorism policy.

"One of the problems we have, particularly in this country, is assessing the
risk of terrorism," Parachini told UPI. "We tend to exaggerate the actual
impact because of the unknown nature of it. "

He noted that the General Accounting Office -- the investigative arm of
Congress -- has long been urging the use of risk management as a means of
maintaining budgetary discipline and ensuring effective policy decisions.

"At the moment we might be spending big, but we are not necessarily spending
smart," he said.

Parachini says although Congleton's type of approach helps to clarify ideas
and organize them in a useful way, relying only on a historical analysis to
drive terrorism policy fails to show the entire picture and does not provide
insurance against an increase in the threat.

In addition, he says it is unclear whether the actions of the al Qaida
terrorist organization represent a deviation from the historical trend in
terrorism.

"What we don't know is that we may be in a moment that is a historical
disjuncture," said Parachini. "We only know what we see looking in the
rearview mirror."

Burgess believes it is important to understand that al Qaida does not act in
the same way as more traditional terrorist groups like the Irish Republican
Army. They do not have a steadfast political agenda or the specific goals
that result in the more easily described patterns of action of some other
groups.

"If you think of terrorism as being asymmetrical warfare, al Qaida is
asymmetrical terrorism," said Burgess.

Parachini agrees, noting that reducing our responsiveness to terrorism,
based on a quantitative conclusion such as the historical likelihood of
attack, holds problems because it is so difficult to predict al Qaida's
motivations and therefore predict its probable next actions.

"When you look at that situation of (Islamic) terrorism, you don't see a
simply one-dimensional political decision, " said Parachini. "It is a
combination of factors that motivate them."

He noted that Islamic terrorists often attack primarily to create fear, as
did both Osama Bin Laden and Ramsey Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the
1993 attack on the World Trade Center, have said.

Parachini says that while we know that some of the motives driving the
actions of Islamic terrorists are religious and political, along with a
desire for revenge these terrorist attacks are also driven by the egos of
the group and its leaders, so they can show terrorists can play on the same
global stage as a super power like the United States.

Parachini even compared their actions to those of arsonists who are
irresistibly drawn -- by a uncontrollable psychological obsession or
yearning -- to watch the fires they start.

"The mass killer, particularly in using explosives, is drawn by a similar
thirst," he said.

Parachini believes that the White House's declaration of war against the
terrorists can lead to policy abuses.

"I think that as a tool, war can justify a lot of activities, but there
needs to be a recognition that this isn't a war like World War II, World War
I or even Vietnam," he said. "It is a 'war,' in quotes, in the same sense
that we have a war on crime or drugs. You can't ever reduce the risk to
zero, that is impossible."

Congleton believes that the declaration of war may lead the government to
overstep societal boundaries with unwarranted "drastic new domestic
policies," given the potential threat.

"However, given the risks that we currently face and have faced for decades,
discouraging criminal forms of political expression can be -- and should --
be accomplished within our existing Constitutional framework," he writes.

Despite his disagreement about the value of qualitative analysis like
Congleton's, Burgess does believe a multi-disciplinary approach is important
to understanding terrorists and crafting an appropriate response to their
actions.

"In terms of how we see the perpetrators, I feel we are not seeking to get
as textured an understanding of them as possible," he said.

Burgess noted that the same could be said about the threats of war made
against Iraq by the administration of President George W. Bush. He says that
although Iraq is a nation-state and the White House is responding with
policy designed with this in mind, Saddam Hussein acts more like a
traditional tribal leader than the leader of a nation.

This lack of understanding of Saddam's cultural basis shows that the
analysis that underpins terror policy requires the kind of understanding
that can only be gained by anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists,
working hand in hand with the political and military strategists who
dominate such policy matters, he said.

A prime example of the dangers of not fully understanding the nature of the
terrorist threat, says Burgess, is President Bush's early statement
characterizing the U.S. fight against al Qaida as a crusade. This undercut
the validity of the American position by evoking an image equating it with
the Christian Crusades against the Islamic world during the Middle Ages, and
only gave Islamic terrorists more fuel for their cause.

"The President's declaration of a 'crusade' against bin Laden just feeds
into bin Laden's world view and I don't want to do that," said Burgess. "I
want to reduce him to the indiscriminate killer that he is."

Copyright © 2002 United Press International

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