[iwar] My article on urban warfare in Hindustan Times, 06 Nov 2002, Wed

From: Ravi V Prasad (r_v_p@yahoo.com)
Date: 2002-11-10 08:04:55
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From: "Ravi V Prasad" <r_v_p@yahoo.com> 
Subject: My article on urban warfare in Hindustan
Times, 06 Nov 2002, Wed 
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http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_97594,00120001.htm

Hindustan Times, Edit page
Wednesday, 06 November 2002

Street fighting men 
Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
November 05 
 
Following the terrorist attack at the Akshardham
temple in Gujarat last month and the aborted mission
at Ansal Plaza in south Delhi on Sunday, it is clear
that India is going to be subjected to many more
incidents of urban guerilla warfare.

There may even be a scenario like that witnessed in
Moscow recently that we will have to face.

India’s security planners of the early Eighties had
the foresight to envision that prominent Indian
buildings — especially religious shrines — would be
subjected to hostage-taking terrorist attacks. When
they established the National Security Guards, only
Israel had comparable agencies specialising in urban
warfare, and Britain’s SAS and the US’s Berets had not
had any operational experience whatsoever.

For over 15 years, the Indian army had already been
practising in Kashmir, Punjab and the North- east what
General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the US Marine
Corps, articulated in 1997 as the ‘Three Block War of
the Future’: “In one city block, a marine will provide
food and medicine to an emaciated child. In the next
block, this marine will be separating two warring
tribes. Then, in the third city block, this same
marine will engage in intense house-to-house fighting
with hostile forces.”

Compared to India and Israel, other armies lagged far
behind in urban warfare doctrines and operations,
being stuck in the Cold War and Gulf war mentality of
fighting in open terrain. The US’s last experience of
fighting inside cities was during its unsuccessful
campaign at Hue during the Vietnam war. After the US
Marines’ lack of experience of fighting inside
buildings showed up in their many bungled operations
against Aideed’s forces in Mogadishu, Major General
Robert Scales decreed that the US would engage in
warfare in built-up areas only as a last resort.

In contrast, Indian forces had already successfully
carried out Operations Blue Star and Black Thunder at
the Golden Temple. But it was the humiliating defeat
of Russia’s army in Grozny, Chechnya, which jolted
western military planners into developing urban
warfare doctrines, tactics and procedures. Still stuck
in the World War II mindset of artillery and tank
assaults on city buildings, the Russian army found
that “its armoured thrust into Grozny was anticipated
by Chechen guerillas who ambushed them from the sides,
rear, and above… Grozny’s narrow streets were soon
blocked by burning Russian vehicles, making it
impossible for the embattled Russian armoured columns
to advance, counter-manoeuvre, or even withdraw.”

During wargaming simulations, the US army was shocked
to discover that its field commanders would have acted
exactly as the Russian ones did in Grozny.

Lt.  General Paul K. Van Riper then formulated “A
Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanised
Terrain” in 1997. The Pentagon also found that US
Marines had difficulties in adapting the
‘Close-Quarters Battle Techniques’ that they had been
taught to fighting inside built-up areas, which turned
out to be the cause of their deaths in Somalia. The
Marine Corps Combat Development Command then developed
‘Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Military
Operations on Urbanised Terrain’ in 1999.

While the training programme of the NSG compares with
the world’s best, those of state police commandos, who
would be the first to arrive on the scene, need to be
enhanced greatly. The US’s Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication describes detailed tactics, techniques and
procedures for offensive and defensive operations in
five types of urban layouts, which are also found in
Indian cities:

* Dense, random construction (eg. Chandni Chowk),

* Closed orderly blocks of buildings (eg. DDA flats),

* Dispersed residential areas (eg. Friends Colony,
Civil Lines),

* High-rise buildings (eg. Nehru Place),

* Industrial/Transportation areas (eg. Okhla).

Another indicator of the NSG’s expertise is the
extremely low number of casualties it has suffered.
During the 10-day Operation Black Thunder at the
Golden Temple in May 1988, the NSG killed 38 members
of the Khalistan Commando Force and captured over 200,
without suffering even a single casualty. Only three
security personnel were killed at Akshardham.

In contrast, during exercises and simulations
performed by the US’s Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory, Marine casualties were projected to range
from 30 to 75 per cent of the defending forces.
Operation Black Thunder is now regarded by urban
warfare units worldwide as a paradigm to be emulated.

Where India can learn from the US is in the
development of urban warfare technologies and
equipment, advance scenario planning  and coordination
of rescue and medical plans with civilian authorities.
Fortunately, the priests of the Swaminarayan temple
were able to immediately provide the NSG with layout
maps. The temple authorities also had the
telecommunications facilities to alert worshippers to
immediately shut several doors.

But how many buildings in Indian cities have their
blueprints readily available? Or how many of them have
sophisticated communications, firefighting and medical
facilities installed? While it is heartening that the
Delhi government has got its commandos familiarised
with the layout of prominent buildings in Delhi, this
procedure should be immediately carried out in all
major Indian towns and religious shrines.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) should immediately begin to develop new
technologies suited to Indian urban warfare
conditions.

Colonel Robert F. Hahn, director of the US army’s
urban warfare projects, listed the futuristic
technologies that have to be developed and provided to
the US Urban Warfighter Corps by 2025:

* Communication: The urban warfighter of 2025 should
be provided with comprehensive situational awareness
capabilities, easy-to-use integrated communications
and navigational systems that can provide him
real-time updates, the capabilities to connect with
and employ a wide variety of robotic systems, unmanned
aerial vehicles  and other sensor systems to determine
who or what is in the buildings or streets around him
— day or night. He needs to be able to communicate and
see through walls.

* Firepower: He must possess precision lethal fire
assault weapons, and should be able to access digital,
voice-activated fires from a variety of robotic
systems operating semi-autonomously… He also must have
direct access to precision fire support from distant
platforms.

* Mobility: He will require enhanced individual
mobility in both the horizontal and vertical
dimensions. (US defence researchers are already
working on developing unmanned ground vehicles,
individual aerial assault systems and a vertical
assault urban light transporter that will give a
soldier the ability to leap to the top of a
four-storey building.)

* Survivability: By 2025, uniforms themselves must
guarantee survival. Uniforms must be light, offer
protection from bullets, chemical-biological agents,
cold and heat; they must also provide low signature
and chameleon camouflage.

* Sustainability: He needs to carry lighter and more
concentrated rations, and individual water
purification kits, enabling him to subsist for at
least a week.

The DRDO should begin to develop similar technologies
specifically suited to Indian urban warfare
conditions, as well as strong, flexible, light-weight
body armour; acoustic sniper detection devices; and
optical equipment that will allow commandos to look
around corners.

The writer heads a group which analyses C4ISRT
(Command, Control, Communications and Computers
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and
Targeting) in South Asia


http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_97594,00120001.htm




=====
Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad & AssociatesManagement Consultants in Information Technology, Internet, Telecom, Softwarervp@lycos.com, rvp@excite.com, rvp@yifan.net, rvp@50g.com, rp@k.sthttp://42.4t.com, http://37.s5.comModerator of the following discussion groupsSoftware Industry in India at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/sw-indTelecommunications Industry in India at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/tel-ind

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