Subject: IW Mailing List history/951205
Moderator's note(s):
Note 1	Due to a configuration error, the IW list did not properly
	queue mail that was not immediately deliverable for several
	days.  The problem was fixed and list members should, by now,
	have gotten all of the back issues.  Sorry about the delay.

Note 2	I think it might be valuable to get a laundry list of IW issues
	related to the upcoming Bosnian deployment.  Without telling us
	anything we don't already know, perhaps the members of this list
	could list the areas of concern they see as interesting.
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 1995 22:17:22 -0500
From: winn@Infowar.Com
Subject: Re: Fake $100

This story is merely resurfacing, after a hiatus of about 3 years.  The
'stolen' plates, in the original story were not stolen, but made by
master engravers using legally acquired US equipment. 
"A New York Post headline reported, 'Iran's Plot to Bankrupt America.'
(July 2, 1992, Page 1) According to the House Task Force on Terrorism
and Unconventional Warfare, Iran and Syria printed billions of dollars
in $100 bills in an attempt 'to destabalize the United States' economy
by undermining confidence in the dollar.' (That report, July 1, 1992)
And the US Government taught them exactly how to do it.  The task force
noted, 'The high quality $100 bills are printed in the Iranian official
mint in Tehran, using equipment and knowhow purchased from the US during
the reign of the Shah.' (ibid) The task force concluded, 'The
governments of Iran and Syria are actively engaged in economic warfare
against the United States.'" (ibid)

You see - this is just a rehash, and most of the cash is lining drug
Moderator's note:
	Forging US bills that fool the scanners at Federal Reserve Banks
	may require newer technology than was available when the Shaw was
	in power.  New US bills have a magnetic strip and microprinting.
	To quote from the article: "The bills are so good they could
	fool currency scanners at Federal Reserve Banks, said Boston
	federal prosecutor Paul Kelly, who was involved in an
	investigation by Secret Service agents."  I would like to see
	someone on the list check this out to determine if it is the
	same incident reported in 1992 and to what extent this really
	impacts the US economy.
From: VonBuettner Ken Maj USAFE/INXY 
Date: Tue, 05 Dec 95 11:02:00 PST

I pretty much subscribe to the standard definitions I see describing IW
as using information to one's advantage while denying it to the
adversary, and protecting our own systems.  What I'm having more trouble
with is the lines between military aspect/applications, and civil or
economic aspects.  While I don't expect to get a clear answer, I would
at least like to get a better grip on the beast with the food for
thought pieces I see for example on the C4I list.  In the Air Force, the
doctrine folks are putting the final touches to the draft document 1-1,
which will drive my thinking in my military job.  Yet from a larger
national perspective, IW will include folks other than the military. 

Iam particularly interested in the national security aspect of IW. 
Perhaps Netwar may be the best term to phrase this, to borrow from the
Arquilla and Ronfeldt piece.  If there are other sites on the internet
to get more thought provoking pieces, I'd appreciate them. 
Date: Tue,  5 Dec 95 11:05:00 UTC 0000

IW is a repackaging of several of the ancient principles of war, a lot of
new technology and a dash of hype and budgetary politics.
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 95 22:42:18 -0500
From: (A. Padgett Peterson, P.E. Information Security)

Warfare has been called "the extension of diplomacy by other means".  It
is about affecting the balance of power by augmenting that of the home
team and or (preferably and) reducing that of the adversary. 

Information warfare is about the use of information specifically to
accomplish this end.  In terms of the "good guys", this means can mean
four things:

1) Reducung the power of the information available to the adversary
2) Adding to the power of your own
3) Transferring power from the adversary to your side.
4) Causing an overall reduction of power such that the adversary loses more
   than you do
5) Causing an overall increase of power such that your side gains more than
   your adversary.

While the first three are well understood, in modern times, it is the
last two which has been the most important. 

a) In the recent East-West conflict, there is evidence that the leakage
   of technology from the west to the east transferred the dynamics from
   technological to economic. The East went broke first but the current
   stagnation/recession in the West shows that it was a near thing.

b) In mideastern conflicts, denial of technology on the battlefield aids
   the least-technologicaly advanced opponent the most. Guerilla warfare
   is an excellent example. 

A very effective means of denial is to push a weapons system beyond its
envelope repeatedly so that it appears to fail while doing exactly what
it is supposed to do.  Examples range from crying "wolf" to claiming
that a missile designed for anti-aircraft use is a failure at
anti-missile use (Patriot for those who might be interested did exactly
what it was designed to do during the gulf was.  That it was not the
best thing to do as it was used was irrelevant to the media.  That it
was the only thing available also was lost). 
From: (Peter da Silva)
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 1995 09:30:41 -0600 (CST)

Information Warfare, like any other form of warfare, is the
institutionalised use of what would otherwise be criminal activity in
the service of the state. 

Studying information warfare will give us a leg up on the crooks, since
what the state does today is what the criminals will be doing next year. 
From: fc (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen)
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 1995 09:03:14 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Libicki's Information Corps

I found it interesting while reading Libicki's book (The Mesh and the
Net) that while on one hand, he tells us that everything in information
technology favors small distributed IT (i.e., Chapter 2), on the next
page, he tells us that the US should have a centralized information
corps (i.e., Chapter 3).

Although I don't fully buy into his underlying assumptions on either
side, it seems clear that if highly distributed IT is what we need,
a central information corps is unlikely to be the way to attain it.

He also states that:

"Technology, used correctly, begets doctrine; doctrine begets
organization.  To the extent that tomorrow's military power is defined
by expertise at information rather than the application of force,
military superiority may flow to those organized for the former task
rather than the latter one.
Operations sit atop; all else supports them.  Current weapons have
accommodated the information revolution by taking advantage of
additional data inputs, but the military remains organized around units
of force.
Tomorrow's winners may build their forces around a central
information processing core.  Such a core would launch information
probes into the media of war (that is, into ground, air, sea, or space
arenas, or the spectrum per se)."

I may have it wrong, but I thought that operations were always sitting
under things like political will, strategic planning, tactical planning,
fuel budgets, etc.  All of this is highly information oriented and has
always been so.  From the politicians through the foot soldiers,
everyone in the organization is using their informational capabilities
to guide their physical capabilities, and always has been.

I (simplisticly) think that the reason we have an Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marines are because these represent land, sea, air, and the
interface points between these.  The reason to have in info-force, in my
opinion, would be to engage in battle in the infosphere, and not to
perform support functions.

-> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL
Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 95 7:47:06 MST
From: "MAJ Donna G. Schutzius, 472-3697" 

I facilitate a seminar at the USAF Academy on Information Warfare for
cadets in lieu of their core course on Air Power Theory and Doctrine.  I
try to get across to the cadets that conflict in the information age may
be different (and I believe it will) than conflict in the past.  The
course covers almost all the discussions DoD and the civilian world are
having concerning what is and what is not IW.  We cover most everyones
definitions.  ( I try not to influence them with my own personal
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 95 08:41:51 EST
From: (Steve Schuster)
Subject: DOD's interest in IW

Thought that this may be of interest to the group.

>     A Defense Science Board study has been commissioned to focus on how DoD 
>can protect information systems crucial to national security from attack by 
>potential saboteurs, according to Pentagon and industry officials.
>     The study will "identify the information users of national interest who 
>can be attacked through the shared elements of the national information 
>infrastructure," DoD acquisition chief Paul Kaminski told the chairman of 
>the DSB in an Oct. 4 memo laying out the study's terms of reference.
>     The task force members will assess the vulnerabilities of systems not 
>only used by DoD, but also those of other federal agencies who perform 
>support tasks.  "This should include telecommunications, public 
>transportation, financial services, public safety, and the mission essential 
>functions of the Department of Defense," Kaminski says.
>C4I News, November 23, 1995, Page 1
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 1995 12:13:58 -0500 (EST)
From: "John Sulfaro 
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 1995 16:42:09 -0800
Subject: Re: [C4I-Pro] Hype and IW

The French knew about the longbow's effects at Agincourt, they had been
wasted over 70 years earlier at Crecy and Poitiers.  So at Agincourt
they advanced on foot.  At Agincourt the big problem for the French was
Command and Control.  Plus the English were better trained, better
organized and on the defensive.  The French were also overconfident and
had spent the night before celebrating their coming victory. 

Napoleon won most of his battles for the same reason the English did
during the Hundred Years War.  Napoleon was also way ahead of everyone
else when it came to staff work and planning.  The English were still
ahead of them, however.  Take a good look at the superior British use of
command, control and deception during the campaign in Spain. 
Date: Tue, 05 Dec 1995 14:49:12 -0500
From: (Brian Spink)

Per your initial request our definition of IW is:
	All actions, strategic and tactical, designed to deny, exploit,
	corrupt, destroy, protect and manipulate knowledge or perception. 

	On a broader scale INFORMATION DOMINANCE - refers to the
	advantageous disparity obtained by creating, disseminating,
	accessing, and manipulating information for ones own ends while
	controlling information available to and perceived by
	competitors or adversaries. 

One additional step in defining terms:

	- Information: Knowledge acquired in any manner

	- Knowledge: Any body of facts gathered by study, observation and
	the ideas inferred from these facts

	- Warfare: Conflict, struggle or Hostility

I hope this fits in with other peoples definitions, as the RL IPT spent
a good deal of time working out the meanings of each of these terms
before we started moving forward to develop a RL IW program. 
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 1995 15:37:58 -0800 (PST)
From: Jim Manley 

My interests in information warfare are:

- Determining what the IW threat to tactical forces using our software
will be and ensuring known (or postulated, if feasible) vulnerabilities
are not introduced in our designs and implementations. 

- Providing the capability in our software to identify and, if users
desire, track IW activity that may affect their operations. 

- Eventually provide the capability in our software to allow users to
perform "what-if" postulation of the potential effects of offensive and
defensive IW activity by own forces or other personnel, using modeling
and simulation techniques as available from other systems or internal to
the SS and MDB where they are not (a very challenging problem for which
we are attempting to lay the foundation for a solution which will take
several years). 

We define information warfare as any offensive or defensive use of
information itself, or the human or machine means for collecting,
processing, producing or disseminating information (to include
constituent raw data or executable code), for the purposes of confusing
(e.g., disinformation), temporarily disabling (e.g., disruption) or
eliminating (e.g., destruction) the ability of individuals or
organizations to exploit information.  We consider time-honored
techniques such as deception and feints to be information warfare equal
in importance to the more recent manifestations such as computer viruses
and network-based break-ins. 

We agree with most of what has been posted on the C4I Pro mailing list
that restricting discussions of IW to software/hardware implementations
is simply short-sighted, much like the decades-long bore-sight on
technical security (e.g., Tempest, COMSEC, COMPUSEC, etc.) to the
detriment of personnel security (e.g., Walker, Whitworth, Pollard, Ames,
etc.).  Both human and technical elements of IW must be considered in
detail, as we are not fighting robots, at least none that Alan Turing
couldn't expose in short order (from what I've seen on TV lately,
though, there are probably some people that couldn't pass Turing's