From: iw@all.net
Subject: IW Mailing List iw/960103
---------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 09:25:21 +0100
From: nobody@flame.alias.net (Anonymous)
Subject: NSA gets into the ISP business

Recently I went out shopping for a cheaper ISP.  I found one which was very
inexpensive.  Too inexpensive.  At first I was thrilled...then I began to
wonder how they could charge so little.  Pcix.com is offering static ip
address, domain name, etc, the whole schebang for $20 a month, or $75 if
you want a dedicated line.  That's less then TLG, and TLG is a non-profit
organization.

As the saying goes, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is.
It seems our government friends have found themselves a new hobby.  I'm
not sure exactly what this sting operation was set up for, but I'm sure
you can use your imagination.

The user agreement is very interesting.  It states: 1) You're not allowed
to upload any encryption software (even if you don't export it) or have
any strong crypto in your shell account, and 2) They are allowed to
monitor anything you send over their network.  Spooks' dream ISP.


Highlights from the user agreement:
Section 2.7(b)
>   Member further agrees not to upload to the PCIX services any data or
>   software that cannot be exported without the prior written
>   government authorization, including, but not limited to, certain
>   types of encryption software.
Section 4.1
>   PCIX may elect to electronically monitor any and all traffic
>   which passes over our Wide Area Network. This monitoring may include
>   public as well as private communications and data transfers from our
>   Members and to our Members as well as any and all communications and
>   data transfers to and from any other internet sites. PCIX will
>   monitor our Members and those who use or transmit communications or
>   other data over our network to try and ensure adherence to
>   international, federal, state and local laws as well as the PCIX
>   Terms of Service Agreement.
---------------------------------------------
Subject: CIA intelligence info
Date: Tue, 02 Jan 96 13:17:08 -0800
From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" 

some interesting info on apparent efforts by the CIA spooks to get into
economic espionage and be more "user friendly" .. (blecch)

------- Forwarded Message
From: "Ron Pappas" 
Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 18:17:52 +0000
Subject: Intelligence Anyone?

FRM: Ron Pappas
FOR: All

- - -=> Quoting Paul McGinnis <=-

April 12, 1994 --           the CIA released a document in February
1994 called "A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence". My copy arrived today,
so I will provide a review for interested parties. 

This item has a slick marketing feel to it, similar to that of a prospectus
for a new stock or something given to prospective car buyers. It's even
printed on glossy paper. About the only thing missing, that other marketing
documents have, is color photographs of happy employees. Apparently, in
this era of shrinking budgets, it was prepared to "sell" the Intelligence
Community to various government officials. In fact, inside the front cover,
is the statement "This publication is prepared for the use of US government
officials, and the format, coverage, and content are designed to meet
their specific requirements."

So, what's the content like? It discusses what various intelligence
agencies actually do, types of intelligence, how intelligence is collected
(helpful tip: if you have just come back from an exotic foreign country,
the U.S. government would really like to have a friendly chat with you...)
and the reports that can be provided to policymakers. For example, if you
have enough political clout, you can get a free subscription to the
following (quoted verbatim from page 23 of the CIA publication):

  Defense Intelligence Agency Current Assessments
  _______________________________________________
  A tabloid product that provides a brief and timely assessment of an
  ongoing military or military-related situation or recent development
  considered highly significant to national-level decisionmakers.
Given the word "tabloid" one wonders if it features lurid New York Post
style headlines, such as "Serbian general's secret Bosnian girlfriend"...

There are a few surprises though. For example, among current large consumers
of intelligence information, it lists the Department of Agriculture and
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). They also discuss the rarely
mentioned MASINT field (Measurements and Signatures Intelligence). MASINT
involves using scientists and engineers to study other characteristics
of intelligence information gathered. For example, although it is not
stated in this publication, it is believed that MASINT specialists studied
the spectral characteristics of Soviet rocket exhausts to determine the
fuel mixture used in the rocket.

How does one obtain a copy of this document? It is available for $12.50
to addresses in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, and $25.00 elsewhere. (There
was an error in the NTIS database entry I posted earlier which indicated the
price was $17.50). Also, you need to add $3.00 for postage per order (not
per copy) in the U.S., Canada and Mexico, and $4.00 for postage elsewhere.
To order, make checks payable to NTIS, and request item # PB93-928021 from
  U.S. Department of Commerce
  National Technical Information Service
  Springfield, VA  22161
  phone (703) 487-4650
Ask for a free copy of their catalog of products and services.

So, is it worth ordering? If you are interested in intelligence, I recommend
this publication. Also, it might be a good thing to leave laying around on
your coffee table if you have "politically correct" visitors... 
---------------------------------------------
=================================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 96 10:09:44 EST
From: fc@all.net (Fred Cohen)

WarGame Report - preliminary findings
=================================================================================

We learned a great deal from this first game, and I wanted to briefly
summarize (and get comments from the game and list members) some initial
reactions.  I have given 3 examples of each of the initial thoughts I
have - more analysis is appropriate at a later time. 

	1 - Information technology is supposed to eliminate the
	"fog of war", but at least in this game, it created a fog
	of its own.

		- Long delay times were present in many of the players'
		mail services.  For example, one player had delays in
		the range of several hours (at fastest) because of a
		military gateway.  Some messages may have never passed
		(because security stopped them?)

		- The server hosting the game (all.net) had very good
		turn-around times - average communications were processed
		in less than 1 minute (from first arrival to full dispatch).
		The people with direct Internet connections seemed to be
		able to almost interact, while others seemed to be left out
		in the cold.  This time delay issue creates problems in the
		way people dominate the conversation.

		- The opportunities for spoofing and bugging that were
		presented were never really exploited properly - or even
		considered very deeply.  In one case, a team that knew they
		were being listened to identified the fact to the other team
		in their communications - a possible blunder.

	2 - Organizational issues were never settled among the team
	members.

		- It was anticipated that the teams would form some sort
		of organization and create a method for addressing issues
		for the game, but neither group did anything more than
		bounce a few ideas around - at least organizationally.

		- In all of the in-person games I have seen, personalities
		play a role in interaction and people talk about small
		issues in some detail.  In this game, several people came with
		laundry lists of items in long communications.  This style
		difference may be an important thing to control or understand.

		- Nobody seemed to have any structure in their approach to the
		issues.  Most people simply expressed a series of seemingly
		independent ideas with no organizing principles behind them.

	3 - Interaction levels were very low.

		- G-team got started in the afternoon, but I-team didn't do
		anything at all until the evening - and when they did, their
		interaction was very light - dispite a lot of chances.

		- This game was all volunteer with no day-time allocated to
		it.  As a result, some people could not communicate while at
		work , while others could ONLY communicate while at work.

		- Some people didn't like the style of interaction and the
		"header" information provided by the game software.  Nobody
		seemed to investigate this as a possible information source.

	4 - G-team made significant progress - I-team seemed unable to start.

		- G-team quickly covered the issues of communications security
		and decided that honest and openness were the best things for
		them to follow.  They didn't appear to care that I-team might
		be listenning in - and when they found out about a tap, they
		continued unhindered.

		- I-team started late, failed to follow through, couldn't adapt
		to the scenario very well, harped on things they couldn't change,
		and found it hard to get into the scenario.

		- Both teams had problems dealing with not knowing their teammates
		but G-team seemed to be able to get past it, while I-team just
		got frustrated.

=================================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 96 11:36:19 EST
From: game (WarGame)
				I-Team Orders

***** ICOM *****

--------------------------
I-team:

	As the leaders of the I-force, you are distributed throughout the
world, only able to communicate reliably and securely via your customized
secure email system.

	Your Trojan horses have indicated that the G-force will try
very hard, starting sometime in the next day or two, to regain
overall control of the nation.  You have agreed by a series of secured
confidential votes that the following is your desired goal for the next
24 hours:

	I-team.  You will devise three options for retaining control
	against the best the G-force is likely to bring, each of which
	will be available depending on how G-force behaves.
---------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 96 11:36:11 EST
From: game (WarGame)
				G-Team Orders
***** GCOM *****

----------------------------

G-team:

	As the leaders of the G-force, you are distributed throughout the
world, only able to communicate reliably via e-mail.  You are using
officially secured, customized email workstations from secure facilities.

	The President has been able to deliver the following one-time
message to the team members and has managed to certify his identity to
each team member through a different means.  The message follows:

	G-team.  We will be unable to communicate again for 24 hours.
	At that time, I need three viable options for reestablishing
	normal governmental control of the United Stated, none of which
	may involve the widespread use of substantial physical force against
	the people of the United States. The nation is depending on you for
	its very survival.  Good luck.
---------------------------------------------
Subject: G-Force's Presidential Report
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 96 11:28 EST
From: Michael Wilson <0005514706@mcimail.com>
 
AUTOFORWARD, BARRING OVERRIDE:
----
To:	President of the United States
Fr:	G-Force Team
Re:	A course of action
 
Mr.  President, you have asked that we provide you with three courses of
action; I find, as leader of G-Force, that I can only provide you with
one solid course of action.  This course of action, however, does
contain redundant fall-back points; it is hoped that by striving for
maximum effect in our moves, the few points that we might accept partial
success on will not hurt the overall effect of the strategy. 
 
Two philosophical points are important to follow--
 
	* First, that we endorse a policy of full disclosure.  This means
	that the complete details of the crisis--the depth of the
	country's power difficulty and the threat posed by the domestic
	rebel group--be made public.  It is my belief, and the belief of
	the team, that we already suffer under a public perception
	handicap; the only path to redemption is to offer the truth.  It
	will be politically unpopular, leaders will suffer at the hands
	of pundits and polls, but the price paid now is cheaper than the
	price paid later with interest. 
 
	* Second, the order the problem must be dealt with is as such:

	-- Remove the proximate cause of the civil unrest.  Clearly the
	political solution of power rationing has met with opposition;
	this stance must be backed away from.

	-- Restore civil order.  The public, those for whom the
	Constitution was formulated, must be reassurred that the
	government is still acting for them, by their rightfully elected
	officials. 

	-- Damage control.  Resources critical to the proper functioning of
	government must be restored to secure and trusted functionality. 

	-- Protect the future.  Systems and safeguards must be put in place
	to assure that the situation that has arisen may never happen
	again; subversion of the proper function of majority rule must
	not be allowed to happen.  If majority democratic rule is no
	longer acceptable to a majority of the electorate, mechanisms
	are in place for a new system to be put tried.  Otherwise, the
	system must be made resistant to the whim of a minority--no
	matter how powerful or proficient. 

	-- Punish the guilty.  Damage has been done.  It remains to be seen
	at this point whether this has been done with malice, or whether
	it was an unplanned side-effect of an action that a few thought
	to be justified.  Government has a function--to sustain the rule
	of law; it has another function, that being to protect the
	opportunity for life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. 
	Sometimes the two functions are placed at odds with each other. 
	It may be worthwhile, in the event that it appears functionally
	feasible and the individuals in question pose no further threat,
	to offer amnesty as a mechanism for a quick and peaceful
	resolution to this crisis. 
 
Specific recommendations endorsed by the team:
 
-- Restore full power across the board.

	- If necessary, use national guard units, FEMA resources, and law
	enforcement to re-establish civilian control and complete
	service.  It is the belief of the team that local units, while
	not backed with overwhelming physical force, gain much by being
	tied to the local community and region; this reduces the
	necessity for force, and also demonstrates that a civilian force
	and not a military coup are in control. 

	- Doing so removes the proximate cause of the current conflict we
	are engaged in, and restores the opportunity for civil order. 

	- With power restored, and details of the energy crisis given,
	perhaps another solution will be put forth; if not, at least an
	attempt can be made to secure popular support for austerity measures. 
 
-- Initiate a crash program for energy sources.

	- Emergency measures have allowed massive technical strides in the
	past, for instance with the space program. 

	- Such a massive government initiative demonstrates the very
	function of government--there are some things we do best as a
	collective unit.  The country faces a crisis of uncalculable
	magnitude; programs to conserve the current resources are much
	more acceptable in the face of a continuing effort to solve the
	situation once and forever.  We also restore public faith in the
	purpose of government, and the willingness of the currently
	constituted body to act in such faith. 
 
-- Devolve critical governmental functions from a centralized system;
secure or critical functions that are not already independently viable
must be moved to support by the military infrastructure. 

	- Be certain to show they remain under civilian command; do not
	move social support programs to military, head off accusations
	of coup or military subversion of governmental functions. 

	- Use the military infrastructure, but only as a tool.
 
-- Disclosure by rightfully elected political structure on the details
of the energy problem. 

	- There should be given a special briefing to Congress, through a
	physical assembly, facilitated by military transport where
	necessary.  All courtesy must be extended to Congressmen and
	Senators; possibly having military escorts carry a briefing
	package (in a multimedia format) prepared by President with
	individual-by-individual authentication explaining the problem. 
	To reduce the burden on the President for this effort, it is
	suggested that the President first tap the local resources of
	Congress; in all likelihood, Committee chairs and other key
	members have remained in the Capital.  Presentations must be
	given to them to understand the scope of the problem, and they
	may also be used to create presentations, or act as envoys to
	convince Congress to assemble physically. 
 
-- Disclosure of radical domestic rebel group.

	- Initiate a top priority LEA investigation, with full contact
	tracing, usage of informers, an 800 number for people to report
	leads.  While this forces a criminalization of those involved in
	the rebel group, such a position can be backed off from at a
	later time for the protection of an amnesty, if such is granted. 

	- Create and continue a media campaign about "...how the
	government was attempting to cope with a nation breaking energy
	crisis, in a fair and balanced fashion to prevent the innocent
	from suffering ; the radical group acted to
	exploit weaknesses in our democratic system for their own
	benefit, and the benefit of their chosen few ..." It is
	possible that an I-force propaganda campaign to associate blame
	for such back on the government; in such case, the government
	must stress that the initial program was intended to be fair,
	and share the burden among all, not to give any preferential
	treatment, as was actually implemented by the I-Force. 

	- Reassure the public that the situation is harsh, but will be
	under control.  Give considerable exposure to efforts to
	maximize energy resources, cautionary tales about certain media
	sources and accuraccy.  Implement Emergency Broadcast System
	across media spectrum to counter I-force propaganda with
	redundancy in each media group and region (e.g.  multiple radio
	freqs broadcasting the same message to limit local-based
	spoofing or jamming) to stretch opposition resources. 

	- Have elected political leaders reassure their regions in person,
	facilitated by military energy resources; establish a secure
	courier mechanism with political bodies to avoid future
	perversions of communications. 
 
-- Restore communications security.

	- Move all government systems to harsh security practices,
	including fully isolated systems. 

	- Roll-over key distribution system to move to a new keyset.  It
	is the belief of the team that necessary government services
	never used key-escrow cryptographic systems, but if so, such
	practice must be discontinued.  Key distribution must be by
	secure method or physical courier. 

	- If control of U.S.  equipment cannot be regained, it may be
	necessary to appeal to outside sources for satellite
	connections; in all likelihood, the domestic military and
	intelligence systems can be secured and put into use. 

	- Disclose the depth of penetration to marketplace, and we suggest
	new schemes be made available from NSA.  Such systems must be
	strong, and also withstand public scrutiny and review of the
	cipher process. 

	- Inform key decision makers that careful review of their data and
	markets may be necessary, as penetration has already been seen
	to be selfishly oriented, and it may have been profit motivated,
	at least by some elements.  It is important to have the
	confidence of the financial markets; it is also important that
	they be on their guard to prevent I-Force leverage from that domain. 

	- While it might be seen as an option to shut down access to the
	NII, it is viewed by the team that such an option may be too
	drastic.  While it would slow efforts by the I-Force to continue
	their subversion, the economic price is seen as being too great
	except in a drastic situation.  It is also possible that I-Force
	will stand-down from their current position; if so, it is
	critical that they have some channel of communication that they
	themselves trust. 

	- Strong cryptographic systems should not be made illegal.  This
	would become a rallying cry for the opposition, as it limits the
	right to free speech, and the G-Force believes that we must not
	subvert the Constitution; it should be made known, however, that
	for a time, until the I-Force is dealt with, that strong
	cryptography will be viewed with some suspicion and subject to
	investigation, but necessarily so.  Strong cryptosystems are a
	commercial necessity; they can also be abused.  For a time it
	will be beneficial to adopt a 'trust but verify' policy. 
 
We believe that these measures will begin to set the situation right. 
Toward that end, we have also initiated contact with the leader of the
rebel group, in a hope to resolve this situation quickly; it may in fact
be considered worthwhile to inform them of this plan of action, showing
we are acting publically and in good faith. 
 
 MW, G-Force leader
---------------------------------------------
I-Force was unable to come up with options to fulfill their
planning requirement
=================================================================================
---------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 13:15:58 -0500
From: winn@Infowar.Com
Subject: Eval

Evaluation (constructive, I hope.)

	1.  I would have liked a clearer understanding of the rules. 
Re: spoofing etc; I made the assumption that the all.net server was off
limits (why? Dunno, just did) otherwise I might have .  .  .  well, I
won't tell that now.  We all need to understand the real dos and donts. 

	2.  I would have liked to know my team mates, (resources,
expertise) but as you said, we sorta worked through that. 

	3.  I'd like a clearer rule on ADMIN.  Is it neutral? Does it
intentionally stir the shit up? (ExonExon) Is it a candidate for attack?

	4.  Where do we draw trhe line between real and game?

	5.  Maybe we should bnext time quantify the interaction time
lagss that are allowed to make it more realistic. 

	6.  I was semi-sorta-kinda unclear on those CLASIFIED
thingamabobs that came through.  What is our assumption?

I think you are onto something.  I've been working down similar lines
with some denizens in DC, and this is valuable - for me.  I liked the
cooperative tone of my teammates in the evolution of the move and
discovered that I'd nuke 'em in a hot sec.  :-)

Given time, this exercise could mature into something worthwhile for
more than the few of us. 
---------------------------------------------
From: tju@akira.corp.sgi.com (T. Jason Ucker)
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 10:22:20 -0800
Subject: Re: WarGame Communication

 		- Nobody seemed to have any structure in their approach to the
 		issues.  Most people simply expressed a series of seemingly
 		independent ideas with no organizing principles behind them.

There were a couple problems I had with the beginning of the scenario--

	1.  The members of my team (except the leader) did not have any
assigned roles.  In all the other simulations I've been in, we were
assigned profiles, positions, etc.  It is difficult to role-play when I
don't know if I'm suppose to be an advisor, an agent, or perhaps a
military liason. 

	2.  With the scenario so far in the future, I felt blind about
what my teams capabilities were-- what's happend to the internet? to
computers? to society? I suspect that there would be many differences
between present day and the future, but I didn't have guidence on what
they were, or what "new" options we might have. 
---------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 13:43:37 -0500 (EST)
From: Matthew Devost 
Subject: Re: WarGame Communication

>  Today's WarGame is being suspended to allow us to assess the results to
>  date.  We would appreciate your opinions on the game and ask that you
>  send them to iw@all.net.

Results...what results? Did I miss something here? Either my messages
weren't getting routed to my team mates or only three of us are
participating.  We need to know at the start how large each team is so
we can get an idea as to when everyone has chimed in.  I wanted this to
be a cooperative effort, otherwise I would have started playing the game
all by myself.  The I-team leader did not facilitate discussion at all. 

>  WarGame Report - preliminary findings
>  =====================================
>  	1 - Information technology is supposed to eliminate the
>  	"fog of war", but at least in this game, it created a fog
>  	of its own.

The concept is wrong from the beginning.  According the scenario we were
already a fairly well organized group, yet we were thrown blindly into
this communication system without knowing who or even how many people
were on the team.  To complicate the matter the moderators kept cross
posting leaked messages and creating new complications in the scenario
before the teams got a chance to feel each other out.  Not the sort of
thing you want to do for a first time trial run. 

>  		- The server hosting the game (all.net) had very good
>  		turn-around times - average communications were processed
>  		in less than 1 minute (from first arrival to full dispatch).
>  		The people with direct Internet connections seemed to be
>  		able to almost interact, while others seemed to be left out
>  		in the cold.  This time delay issue creates problems in the
>  		way people dominate the conversation.

In the case of the I-team, I have a reliable provider, yet nobody seemed
to be sending messages.

[FC Note: This is true - the rest of the I-team was silent much of the time]

>  		- The opportunities for spoofing and bugging that were
>  		presented were never really exploited properly - or even
>  		considered very deeply.  In one case, a team that knew they
>  		were being listened to identified the fact to the other team
>  		in their communications - a possible blunder.

They were thrown in too soon and at too great an intensity for folks to 
keep track of.  Couple this with message delay factors and I'll bet some 
people were very confused.  We should have been given some breathing room 
to operate as a group and create some sort of organizational structure 
before you starting leaking messages and throwing twists in the scenario.

>  		- It was anticipated that the teams would form some sort
>  		of organization and create a method for addressing issues
>  		for the game, but neither group did anything more than
>  		bounce a few ideas around - at least organizationally.

Team leaders needed to take charge in this area.  They need to be
willing to dedicate a little extra time than the other players.  People
were only bouncing ideas around to get a feel for the message system and
to find out who was in there group. 

>  		- In all of the in-person games I have seen, personalities
>  		play a role in interaction and people talk about small
>  		issues in some detail.  In this game, several people came with
>  		laundry lists of items in long communications.  This style
>  		difference may be an important thing to control or understand.

Again, the team leaders may need to play a role here.  People were
trying to spark communication. 

>  		- Nobody seemed to have any structure in their approach to the
>  		issues.  Most people simply expressed a series of seemingly
>  		independent ideas with no organizing principles behind them.

Sure, I had a structure to my approach.  My objective was to get people
talking so we could find out who was in the group.  Second objective,
hope that the team leader would step in and lead.  If no action by noon
I was going to attempt an internal power coup and then provide my team
with a breakdown of events as they had occured in hopes of clearing up
confusion.  No sense giving away anything beyond that since we may still
try to play the game at a later date. 

>  	3 - Interaction levels were very low.

I was online at noon and every hour after that.  I was waiting for the
team leader to send and introductory message.  When none had arrived by
the time I got home from work, I decided to get the ball rolling. 

>  		- This game was all volunteer with no day-time allocated to
>  		it.  As a result, some people could not communicate while at
>  		work , while others could ONLY communicate while at work.

This creates a big organizational problem.  At a minimum team leaders
need to have access from work and home, and best case scenario everyone
has access from home. 

>  	4 - G-team made significant progress - I-team seemed unable to start.

A reasonable conclusion.

>  		- I-team started late, failed to follow through, couldn't adapt
>  		to the scenario very well, harped on things they couldn't change,
>  		and found it hard to get into the scenario.

These messages I must have missed, unless you were referring to my
messages.  I was upset at lack of participation and the fact that
moderators threw too many kinks in the scenario one we began.  This was
supposed to be an experimental test run...how are we supposed to know
what the problem area was if you complicate it with too many variables. 
The scenario made sense to me as it developed, but I was also able to
dedicate a lot of time to it.  I checked messages often to keep up with
the chain of events. 

>  		- Both teams had problems dealing with not knowing their teammates
>  		but G-team seemed to be able to get past it, while I-team just
>  		got frustrated.

Wouldn't have been a problem if we had participation.  Gteam got past it
because you find out who is on your team as people send messages. 

That's it for now...
---------------------------------------------
From: The Petersons 
Subject: Re: WarGame Communication
Date: Tue, 02 Jan 96 23:18:53 EST

Joel writes (and I do not know who is on which team)
> I think we need to clarify what rules of engagements we're using 
>in this case.  In my opinion, the severe threat to the government 
>may call for  extra-ordinary actions.
 
This line of reasoning has been used for everything from Nixon's tapes
to Clinton's Whitewater records and just does not hold water any longer. 

The actions of the G-force show that it is not above changing the laws
of the nation to suit its own purposes.  Today Posse, tomorrow the bill
of rights.  The separation of the Judiciary from the Executive was not
made lightly yet it is obvious that the G-force intends to create a
Scudderite nation. 

We do not seek a technocracy, rather to demonstrate that the G-force is
incapable of maintaining the infrastructure under the constitution while
the I-force is.  By its own actions, the G-force is demonstrating
contempt for the very Constitution from which it derives its power. 

As for outlawing Crypto, our research labs have developed a timing
attack that can break KG-84C transmissions.  Should the G-force attempt
this then the EFF has agreed to publish all KG transmissions that we
furnish.  The G-force cannot have it both ways. 

M-I
---------------------------------------------
From: The Petersons 
Subject: Re: WarGame Communication
Date: Wed, 03 Jan 96 19:05:42 EST

I tend to differ with the assessment.  The G-team "plan" had no
surprises and was not a concensus.  OTOH the I-team expected persecution
(and was not disappointed).  Both sides suffered from a lack of
organization, direction, or purpose.  As the scenario indicated, the
I-team had already acted and was in control of many elements while the
G-team having superior forces need only to act offensively. 

In guerilla warfare, the smaller adversary must be able to act with
stealth whereas the larger is essentially forced to act openly.  As such
full disclosure always favors the larger/incumbant. 

Given that the I-team did not even know who its members were, and lacked
any means to communicate covertly, the outcome was foregone and as
mentioned, the only way to win was not to play. 
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