Subject: IW Mailing List iw/960119
[Moderator's Note: Per the request of the participants,
the game has been extended till Monday at 5PM.]
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 22:19:58 -0500
From: winn@Infowar.Com
Subject: Re: IW Mailing List iw/960118

On Thu, 18 Jan 96, wrote: 

>My question to this august group is: was the
>Soviet telemetry deception IW? Can and should our working definition of
>IW include such stuff?

There is no doubt about it. One of the components of IW is the use of PsyOps, 
deception, and exploitation of Binary Schizophrenia - (I need technology, I 
don;t trust technology; which technology can I trust.)

The working definition of IW that I have proposed, (the SecDef has used a 
similar one) is the use of info or infotech (IT) as offensive and defensive 
tools against info or IT targets. 

I particularly like Fred Cohen's digestation which sincerely echoes my 
sentiments: He said:

	...Based on postings to this list to date, my summary of IW is:
	"Conflict where [information or information technology] is the
	weapon, the target, the objective, or the method." ...

Within that model, I maintain that Infowar should be studied and considered 
without the use of bombs or bullets.
From: fc (Fred Cohen)
Subject: A+E Voyages looks at IW
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 22:57:49 -0500 (EST)

I am now watching a program called Voyages on the Arts and Entertainment
Network.  The concentration is Information Warfare - and it stars many
of the members of this forum and other experts.  (Jan 18, 22:00
Eastern).  Here are some interesting points they have made:

3rd wave warfare implies demassification of warfare.  (ala the Tofflers)

IW implies decentralization - Ron Knecht says this better (in my
opinion) when he says "Centralized control, decentralized execution."

DeCaro tells us that perception management is becoming more important
than the ability to follow Clausewitzian war - use violence to constrain
the enemy to submit to our will.  We are increasingly using non-violent
perception management techniques to constrain the enemy to our will.
And they are using PM against us to constrain our activities.

PsyOps are nicely highlighted with examples from recent conflicts - the
objective being to control the enemy emotionally.  The media's role in
Samalia was brought out.  Leaflets in water bottles are used to
misdirect the enemy.  Broadcast from airplanes on local television
channels is used in Haiti to calm the public, reassure them the US is on
their side, and tell them their president is returning. 

The projection of bloodless victory was used in Desert Storm - the
concentration was on Scuds and Patriots - and smart sterile bombs - the
goal to keep the US public from seeing the human on human aspects of
war.  Of course it wasn't bloodless, but for public consumption it was
made to appear that way. 

29 million leaflets sent into Iraq in the Gulf War.  87,000 surrender,
17,000 desert. 

Sticky weapons, slippery weapons, new tactics and options for non-lethal

Ideology can no longer be controlled by controlling the information
sources.  In the Internet and with the protection of cryptography,
free speech is virtually guaranteed - this also implies that power
no longer belongs to the rich - it belongs to anyone with a computer
who can get enough others to support them.

All in all, it was a very interesting show. 
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 22:26:43 -0500
From: winn@Infowar.Com
Subject: Re: IW Mailing List iw/960118

Cadet David A.  Koewler asked about Economic warfare via IW:

>I'm looking for sources/ideas on using IW for Economic Warfare.  I'm not
>so interested in corporate battles but more along the lines of nation vs
>nation.  Perhaps crashing Wall street or devaluing the dollar. 

Look at the Iranian Super Bill (counterfeit $100s) which have been
printed by the billions in an effort to destroy the US economy.  (Where
are all of the $100s? In Russia, the mid-East and in SOuth America. 
Guess who's got 'em?)

Look at what the Somolians did to us? Starving babies bring the military
into help, and then one dead soldier sends us home again.  PsyOps
through the media. 

Consider the development of anonymous electronic banks which retransmit
funds globally from international locations.  Call it Criminal Central,
but if they ever come to reality (as proposed) then trace-less money
becomes a very viable tool to fight IW. 

Along the more prosaic lines, we have been developing those kinds of
models for a number of groups, but I am not comfortable with details on
the Net for obvious reasons.  Gimme a call, and we can chat; but you are
definitely looking in the right directions. 
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 96 07:34:28 EST
From: "Tom Hart" 
Subject: [C4I-Pro] IW and deception....

MHewitt006 is credited with asking, on 17 Jan 96, if the definition of
IW could or should include deception IW.  I am quite sure that we will
have very much discussion of this issue. 
     >Date: Wed, 17 Jan 1996 10:18:27 -0500 
     >My question to this august group is: was the Soviet telemetry 
     >deception IW? Can and should our working definition of IW include 
     >such stuff?
[I think] the Soviet telemetry deception techniques referred to in this
instance would clearly be a legitimate example of IW.  In any instance
in which an adversary, known or unknown, is believed to be gathering
your own critical information (whether tactical or as a measure of
capabilities), successful "deceptive IW" pays high dividends.  If you
are able to "allow" the adversary to gather information that will make
them dramatically underestimate (or overestimate) your capabilities, or
lead them to believe you are pursuing a goal that is known to you to be
unattainable or to have little/no relevance to your actual pursuits, the
adversary will probably expend valuable resources (computer time,
personnel time) on the proverbial wild goose chase.  You have then won
the first minor skirmish in that particular IW issue. 
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 20:33:46 -0900
From: "Charles M. Preston" 
Subject: industrial esp.


The Canadian Security Intelligence Service warns that companies eager to
do business in competitive global markets must be vigilant about foreign
companies trying to acquire information through less-than-legal means,
particularly when it becomes economic espionage sponsored by foreign
governments.  Since 1992, CSIS has investigated security concerns at
about 500 companies and found economic espionage in about 70% of the
cases.  (Toronto Star 15 Jan 96 E2)