From: iw@all.net
Subject: IW Mailing List iw/960224
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Date: Fri, 23 Feb 1996 08:02:05 -0500 (EST)
From: Robert Steele 
Subject: Re: IW Mailing List iw/960222

	I know Charles Swett personally, and have found that he is among
the more open-minded policy bureaucrats in the Pentagon.  He has, for
instance, understood and attempted to advance Pentagon appreciation for
open sources of information, where many would prefer to restrict
themselves to the customary diet of classified sources which often know
nothing about Somalias, Burundis, and so on... 

	The fact that his report was unclassified rather than Secret or
Top Secret should be everyone's best assurance that this is an honest
man who means well--the archtype lightweight bureaucrat would have opted
for secrecy as a means of both falsely enhancing the value of their
work, and protecting themselves from being judged as ignorant. 

	The Pentagon *is* changing in positive ways, and folks like
Charles Sweet and many others are gradually making their open mindedness
and common sense "a common virtue". 
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Date: Thu, 22 Feb 1996 14:47:54 -0500 (EST)
From: Robert Steele 
Subject: Automation of Contagion Vigilance (fwd)

Automation of Contagion Vigilance 

Abstract

The very long latency between HIV infection and the appearance of AIDS
imposes extensive information processing requirements on partner
notification efforts.  The apparently contradictory needs of maintaining
the right to privacy of infected persons, while simultaneously providing
information to persons at risk of infection, impose severe security
requirements.  These requirements can be satisfied by a Contagion
Management System based upon networked personal computers of a kind now
becoming available.  Security of information is based upon cryptographic
protocols that implement anonymous partner notification (contact
tracing) and privacy preserving negotiation.  The proposed scheme has
the following properties: (a) Contact tracing is automated, (b) contacts
remain anonymous, (c) sensitive information is kept private, and (d)
risk conscious users can act in a manner indistinguishable from that
occurring if secured information were made public.  Optimal health
protection can thus be obtained while securing informational rights. 
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