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Project MKULTRA, The CIA's
Program Of Research In Behavioral Modification
APPENDIX A
XVII. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biological
Agents By The Intelligence Community
Under its mandate [1] the Select Committee has studied the testing
and use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies.
Detailed descriptions of the programs conducted by intelligence
agencies involving chemical and biological agents will be included
in a separately published appendix to the Senate Select Committee's
report. This section of the report will discuss the rationale
for the programs, their monitoring and control, and what the
Committee's investigation has revealed about the relationships
among the intelligence agencies and about their relations with
other government agencies and private institutions and individuals.
[2]
Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical
and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led
to the development of a defensive program designed to discover
techniques for American intelligence agencies to detect and counteract
chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon
became secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain
information from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.
Research and development programs to find materials which could
be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s
and early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included
testing of drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated
in tests using unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. These
tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical
or biological agents when used operationally against individuals
unaware that they had received a drug.
The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the
intelligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within
the agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that
either the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of
them. The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be
explained in part by an observation made by the CIA Inspector
General that, "the knowledge that the Agency is engaging
in unethical and illicit activi-
[1] Senate
Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities to investigate a number of issues:
"(a) Whether agencies within the intelligence community
conducted illegal domestic activities (Section 2 (1) and (2));
"(b) The extent to which agencies within the intelligence
community cooperate (Section 2 (4) and (8));
"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional
oversight of intelligence activities (Section 2 (7) and (11));
"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights
of American citizens (Section 2 (13))."
[2] The details of these programs may never
be known. The programs were highly compartmented. Few records
were kept. What little documentation existed for the CIA's principal
program was destroyed early in 1973.
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ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its
missions." [3]
The research and development program, and particularly the covert
testing programs, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights
of American citizens, sometimes with tragic consequences The
deaths of two Americans [3a] can be attributed to these programs;
other participants in the testing programs may still suffer from
the residual effects. While some controlled testing of these
substances might be defended, the nature of the tests, their
scale, and the fact that they were continued for years after
the danger of surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting
individuals was known, demonstrate a fundamental disregard for
the value of human life.
The Select Committee's investigation of the testing and use of
chemical and biological agents also raise serious questions about
the adequacy of command and control procedures within the Central
Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, and about the
relationships among the intelligence agencies, other governmental
agencies, and private institutions and individuals. The CIA's
normal administrative controls were waived for programs involving
chemical and biological agents to protect their security. According
to the head of the Audit Branchof the CIA, these waivers produced
"gross administrative failures." They prevented the
CIA's internal review mechanisms (the Office of General Counsel,
the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff) from adequately supervising
the programs. In general, the waivers had the paradoxical effect
of providing less restrictive administrative controls and less
effective internal review for controversial and highly sensitive
projects than those governing normal Agency activities.
The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers
of normal administrative controls, but also by a high degree
of compartmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded
the CIA's Medical Staff from the principal research and testing
program employing chemical and biological agents.
It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing
and inconsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA
component involved.
Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by jurisdictional
conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spirit of
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially
characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers withheld
information from the CIA, ignoring suggestions for coordination
from their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information
to the military on the CIA's testing program. This failure to
cooperate was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army
to conceal
[3] CIA
Inspector General's Survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
[3a] On January 8, 1953, Mr. Harold Blauer died
of circulatory collapse and heart failure following an intravenous
injection of a synthetic mescaline derivative while a subject
of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under
a contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee's
investigation into drug testing by U.S. intelligence agencies
focused on the testing of LSD, however, the committee did receive
a copy of the U.S. Army Inspector General's Report, issued on
October 1975, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Blauer's
death. His death was directly attributable to the administration
of the synthetic mescaline derivative.
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their overseas testing program, which included surreptitious
administration of LSD, from the CIA. Learning of the Army's program,
the Agency surreptitiously attempted to gain details of it.
The decision to institute one of the Army's LSD field testing
projects had been based, at least in part, on the finding that
no long-term residual effects had ever resulted from the drug's
administration. The CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death
which resulted from the surreptitious administration of LSD to
unwitting Americans may well have resulted in the institution
of an unnecessary and potentially lethal program.
The development, testing, and use of chemical and biological
agents by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about
the relationship between the intelligence community and foreign
governments, other agencies of the Federal Government, and other
institutions and individuals. The questions raised range from
the legitimacy of American complicity in actions abroad which
violate American and foreign laws to the possible compromise
of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover
by intelligence agencies.
A. THE PROGRAMS INVESTIGATED
1. Project CHATTER
Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of
1947. Responding to reports of "amazing results" achieved
by the Soviets in using "truth drugs," the program
focused on the identification and testing of such drugs for use
in interrogations and in the recruitment of agents. The research
included laboratory experiments on animals and human subjects
involving Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine, and mescaline
in order to determine their speech-inducing qualities. Overseas
experiments were conducted as part of the project.
The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and
ended shortly after the war, in 1953.
2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE
The earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of
chemical and biological agents, Project BLUEBIRD, was approved
by the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:
(a)
discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent unauthorized
extraction of information from them by known means, (b)
investigating the possibility of control of an individual by
application of special interrogation techniques, (c)
memory enhancement, and (d) establishing defensive
means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel. [4]
As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the
project, another goal was added -- the evaluation of offensive
uses of unconventional interrogation techniques, including hypnosis
and drugs. In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE.
Project ARTICHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation
techniques, conducted "under medical and security controls
which would ensure
[4] CIA
memorandum to the Select Committee, "Behavioral Drugs and
Testing," 2/11/75.
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that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the
experiments. [5] Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination
of sodium pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric
examinations of the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.
The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which studied scientific
advances by hostile powers, initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE
efforts. In 1952, overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was transferred
from OSI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), predecessor
to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Services
and Medical Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would
retain liaison function with other government agencies. [6] The
change in leadership from an intelligence unit to an operating
unit apparently reflected a change in emphasis; from the study
of actions by hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and
defensive purposes, of special interrogation techniques -- primarily
hypnosis and truth serums.
Representatives from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE met
almost monthly to discuss their progress. These discussions included
the planning of overseas interrogations [8] as well as further
experimentation in the U.S.
Information about project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953 is
scarce. The CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956, but
evidence suggests that Office of Security and Office of Medical
Services use of "special interrogation" techniques
continued for several years thereafter.
3. MKNAOMI
MKNAOMI was another major CIA program in this area. In 1967,
the CIA summarized the purposes of MKNAOMI:
(a) To provide
for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements.
(b) To stockpile
severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific
use of TSD [Technical Services Division].
(c) To maintain
in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination
of biological and chemical materials.
(d) To provide
for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading, and evaluation
of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects
and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational
conditions. [9]
Under an agreement reached with the Army in 1952, the Special
Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in
developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery
[5] Memorandum
from Robert Taylor, O/DD/P to the Assistant Deputy (Inspection
and Security) and Chief of the Medical Staff, 3/22/52.
[6] Memorandum from H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant
Director, Scientific Intelligence, to the Deputy Director/Plans
(DDP) "Project ARTICHOKE," 8/29/52.
[8] "Progress Report, Project ARTICHOKE."
1/12/53.
[9] Memorandum from Chief, TSD/Biological Branch
to Chief, TSD "MKNAOMI: Funding. Objectives, and Accomplishments."
10/18/67, p. 1. For a fuller description of MKNAOMI and the relationship
between CIA and SOD, see p. 360.
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systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill,
and facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited
for CIA use.
SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills containing
several different biological agents which could remain potent
for weeks or months. SOD developed a special gun for firing darts
coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate
a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog
to consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to
develop a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also physically
transferred to CIA personnel biological agents in "bulk"
form, and delivery devices, including some containing biological
agents.
In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use
against humans, it also asked SOD to study use of biological
agents against crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the
CIA stated:
Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against
crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated
under field conditions. This was accomplished in anticipation
of a requirement which was later developed but was subsequently
scrubbed just prior to putting into action. [9a]
MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25,1969, President
Nixon renounced the use of any form of biological weapons that
kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of existing stocks
of bacteriological weapons. On February 14, 1970, the President
clarified the extent of his earlier order and indicated that
toxins -- chemicals that are not living organisms but are produced
by living organisms -- were considered biological weapons subject
to his previous directive and were to be destroyed. Although
instructed to relinquish control of material held for the CIA
by SOD, a CIA scientist acquired approximately 11 grams of shellfish
toxin from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick which were stored in
a little-used CIA laboratory where it went undetected for five
years. [10]
4. MKULTRA
MKULTRA was the principal CIA program involving the research
and development of chemical and biological agents. It was "concerned
with the research and development of chemical, biological, and
radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations
to control human behavior." [11]
In January 1973, MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical
Services Division personnel acting on the verbal orders of Dr.
Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and
former Director Helms has confirmed, that in ordering the records
destroyed, Dr. Gottlieb was carrying out the verbal order of
then DCI Helms.
MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Director
for Plans, Richard Helms, to the DCI, outlining a special
[9a]
Ibid. p. 2.
[10] Senate Select Committee, 9/16/75, Hearings,
Vol. 1.
[11] Memorandum from the CIA Inspector General
to the Director, 7/26/63.
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funding mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and development
projects that studied the use of biological and chemical materials
in altering human behavior. The projects involved:
Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological
and chemical materials. This area involves the production of
various physiological conditions which could support present
or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensive potential,
the development of a comprehensive capability in this field of
covert chemical and biological warfare gives us a thorough knowledge
of the enemy's theoretical potential, thus enabling us to defend
ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the
use of these techniques as we are. [12]
MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the lines
proposed by ADDP Helms.
Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special funding
mechanism was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General's
survey of MKULTRA in 1963 noted the following reasons for this
sensitivity:
a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior
is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields
to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputation of professional
participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy.
b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of
legality implicit in the, original charter.
c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products
places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.
d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA
activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public
opinion. as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action
in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services. [13]
Over the ten-year life of the program, many "additional
avenues to the control of human behavior" were designated
as appropriate for investigation under the MKULTRA charter. These
include "radiation, electroshock, various fields of psychology,
psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harassment
substances, and paramilitary devices and materials." [14]
The research and development of materials to be used for altering
human behavior consisted of three phases: first, the search for
materials suitable for study; second, laboratory testing on voluntary
human subjects in various types of institutions; third, the application
of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.
The search for suitable materials was conducted through standing
arrangements with specialists in universities, pharmaceutical
houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private
research organi-
[12]
Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab A, pp.
1-2. [13] I.G. Report on MKULTRA, 1963, pp.
1-2. [14] Ibid, p. 4.
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zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were
made under ostensible research foundation auspices, thereby concealing
the CIA's interest from the specialist's institution.
The next phase of the MKULTRA program involved physicians, toxicologists,
and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals,
and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the basic
research phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subjects.
One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute
of Mental Health. This study was intended to test various drugs,
including hallucinogenics, at the NIMH Addiction Research Center
in Lexington, Kentucky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center,"
as it was then called, was a prison for drug addicts serving
sentences for drug violations.
The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking
a brief physical examination and signing a general consent form,
were administered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation
in the program, the addicts were provided with the drug of their
addiction.
LSD was one of the materials tested in the MKULTRA program. The
final phase of LSD testing involved surreptitious administration
to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by
undercover officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the
CIA.
The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials
under accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full
pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational
situations." [15]
According to the CIA, the advantage of the relationship with
the Bureau was that
test subjects could be sought and cultivated
within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects have been
informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the
[Bureau of Narcotics] has obtained results of operational value
through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of
the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and
low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and
testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within
these categories. [Emphasis added.] [16]
A special procedure, designated MKDELTA, was established to govern
the use of MKULTRA materials abroad. Such materials were used
on a number of occasions. Because MKULTRA records were destroyed,
it is impossible to reconstruct the operational use of MKULTRA
materials by the CIA overseas; it has been determined that the
use of these materials abroad began in 1953, and possibly as
early as 1950.
Drugs were used primarily as an aid to interrogations, but MKULTRA/MKDELTA
materials were also used for harassment, discrediting, or disabling
purposes. According to an Inspector General Survey of the Technical
Services Division of the CIA in 1957 -- an inspection which did
not discover the MKULTRA project involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer
[15]
Ibid, P. 21.
[16] Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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subjects -- the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use
and they had been used in six different operations on a total
of thirty-three subjects. [17] By 1963 the number of operations
and subjects had increased substantially.
In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General
survey of the Technical Services Division, a member of the Inspector
General's staff, John Vance, learned about MKULTRA and about
the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD
to unwitting, nonvoluntary human subjects. As a result of the
discovery and the Inspector General's subsequent report, this
testing was halted and much tighter administrative controls were
imposed on the program. According to the CIA, the project was
decreased significantly each budget year until its complete termination
in the late 1960s.
5. The Testing of LSD by the Army
There were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In
the first, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers
who volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments.
In the second phase, Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteers
received LSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential
intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRD
CHANCE and DERBY HAT, 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects were
interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational field
tests.
B. CIA DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS
1. The Rationale for the Testing Programs
The late 1910s and early 1950s were marked by concern over the
threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union, the People's
Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United
States concern over the use of chemical and biological agents
by these powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had
used chemical and biological agents in interrogations, brainwashing,
and in attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel
created considerable pressure for a "defensive" program
to investigate chemical and biological agents so that the intelligence
community could understand the mechanisms by which these substances
worked and how their effects could be defeated. [18]
Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had received
reports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts
to produce LSD; and that the Soviet Union had attempted to purchase
the world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was
deeply involved in work with this drug described the climate
of the times: "[It] is awfully hard in this day and age
to reproduce how frightening all of this was to us at the time,
particularly after the drug scene has become as widespread and
as knowledgeable in this country as it did. But we were literally
terrified, because this was the one material that we
[17]
Ibid, 1957, p. 201.
[18] Thus an officer in the Office of Security
of the CIA stressed the "urgency of the discovery of techniques
and method that would permit our personnel, in the event of their
capture by the enemy, to resist or defeat enemy interrogation."
(Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53.)
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had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic
possibilities if used wrongly." [19]
But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical
and biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect
techniques... for the abstraction of information from individuals
whether willing or not" and in order to "develop means
for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals
whether willing or not." [20] One Agency official noted
that drugs would be useful in order to "gain control of
bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process
of removing personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack.
[21] In other programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile,
and maintain in operational readiness materials which could be
used to harass, disable, or kill specific targets. [22]
Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the
People's Republic of China, and the Communist Bloc countries
provided the basis for the transmutation of American programs
from a defensive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of
the Medical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in
1952:
There is ample evidence in the reports of
innumerable interrogations that the Communists were utilizing
drugs, physical duress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis
against their enemies. With such evidence it is difficult not
to keep from becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are
forced by this mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive
role in the development of these techniques, but must be cautious
to maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that
could be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands. [23]
In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security,
substantial programs for the testing and use of chemical and
biological agents -- including projects involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at
all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign"
-- were conceived, and implemented. These programs resulted in
substantial violations of the rights of individuals within the
United States.
[19]
Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 33.
[20] Memorandum from the Director of Security
to ARTICHOKE representatives, Subject: "ARTICHOKE Restatement
of Program."
[21] ARTICHOKE memorandum, 7/30/53.
[22] The Inspector General's Report of 1957
on the Technical Services Division noted that "Six specific
products have been developed and are available for operational
use. Three of them are discrediting and disabling materials which
can be administered unwittingly and permit the exercise of a
measure of control over the actions of the subject."
A memorandum for the Chief, TSD, Biological Branch to the Chief,
TSD, 10/18/67, described two of the objectives of the CIA's Project
MKNAOMI as: "to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal
materials for the specific use of TSD and "to maintain in
operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination
of biological and chemical materials."
[23] Memorandum from the Chief of the Medical
Staff, 1/25/52.
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Although the CIA recognized these effects of LSD to unwitting
individuals within the United States, the project continued.
As the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led
to tile cessation of unwitting testing:
While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which
tends to intrude upon an individual's private and legal prerogatives,
I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain a central
role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities the
manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability.
[25]
There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial
aspects of these programs from the executive branch or Congress.
The nature and extent of the programs were closely held secrets;
even DCI McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program
involving the surreptitious administration of LSD until 1963.
It was deemed imperative that these programs be concealed from
the American people. As the CIA's Inspector General wrote in
1957:
Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations from
exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these activities
from the American public in general. The knowledge that the Agency
is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious
repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be
detrimental to the accomplishment of its mission. [26]
2. The Death of Dr. Frank Olson
The most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the
death of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, who
died on November 27, 1953. His death followed his participation
in a CIA experiment with LSD. As part of this experiment, Olson
unwittingly received approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a
glass of Cointreau he drank on November 19, 1953. The drug had
been placed in the bottle by a CIA officer, Dr. Robert Lashbrook,
as part of an experiment he and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed
at a meeting of Army and CIA scientists.
Shortly after this experiment, Olson exhibited symptoms of paranoia
and schizophrenia. Accompanied by Dr. Lashbrook, Olson sought
psychiatric assistance in New York City from a physician, Dr.
Harold Abramson, whose research on LSD had been funded indirectly
by the CIA. While in New York for treatment, Olson fell to his
death from a tenth story window in the Statler Hotel.
[24]
Even during the discussions which led to the termination of the
unwitting testing, the DDP turned down the option of halting
such tests within the. U.S. and continuing them abroad despite
the fact that the Technical Services Division had conducted numerous
operations abroad making use of LSD. The DDP made this decision
on the basis of security noting that the past efforts, overseas
had resulted in "making an inordinate number of foreign
nationals witting of our role in the very sensitive activity."
(Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from
the Deputy Director for Plans, 12/17/63, p. 2.)
[25] Ibid., pp. 2-3.
[26] I.G. survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
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a. Background. -- Olson, an expert in aerobiology
who was assigned to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of
the U.S. Army Biological Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland. This
Division had three primary functions:
(1) assessing
the vulnerability of American installations to biological attack;
(2) developing
techniques for offensive use of biological weapons; and
(3) biological
research for the CIA. [27]
Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in
both the Army and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson's immediate
superior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact
with Olson. According to Colonel Ruwet: "As a professional
man... his ability... was outstanding." [28] Colonel Ruwet
stated that "during the period prior to the experiment...
I noticed nothing which would lead me to believe that he was
of unsound mind." [29] Dr. Lashbrook, who had monthly contacts
with Olson from early 1952 until the time of his death, stated
publicly that before Olson received LSD, "as far as I know,
he was perfectly normal." [30] This assessment is in direct
contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson's emotional
stability made in CIA internal memorandum written after Olson's
death.
b. The Experiment. -- On November 18, 1953, a group of
ten scientists from the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual
review and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek
Lake, Maryland. Three of the participants were from the CIA's
Technical Services Staff. The Detrick representatives were all
from the Special Operations Division.
According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division
participants "agreed that an unwitting experiment would
be desirable." [31] This account directly contradicts Vincent
Ruwet's recollection. Ruwet recalls no such discussion, and has
asserted that he would remember any such discussion because the
SOD participants would have strenuously objected to testing on
unwitting subjects. [32]
In May, 1953, Richard Helms, Assistant DDP, held a staff meeting
which the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this
meeting Helms "indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite
and that he should be advised at all times when it was intended
to use it." [33] In addition, the then DDP, Frank Wisner,
sent a memorandum to TSS stating the requirement that the DDP
personally approve the use of LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the
experiment, [34] securing the ap-
[27]
Staff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, 8/13/75, p. 3.
[28] Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom
It May Concern, no date, p. 2.
[29] Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.
[30] Joseph B. Treaster, New York Times,
7/19/75, p. 1.
[31] Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick,
12/1/53, p. 1.
[32] Ruwet (staff summary), 8/1.3/75, p. 6.
[33] Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53.
[34] Ibid. Dr. Gottleib has testified
that he does not remember either the meeting with Helms nor the
Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 16.)
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proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS
nor the DDP specifically authorized the experiment in which Dr.
Olson participated. [35]
According to Gottlieb, [36] " a "very small dose"
of LSD was placed in a bottle of Cointreau which was served after
dinner on Thursday, November 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur
by Robert Lashbrook. All but two of tie SOD participants received
LSD. One did not drink; the other had a heart condition. [37]
About twenty minutes after they finished their Cointreau, Gottlieb
informed the other participants that they had received LSD.
Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment,"
he observed nothing unusual in Olson's behavior. [37a] Once the
experiment was underway, Gottlieb recalled that "the drug
had a definite effect on the group to the point that they were
boisterous and laughing and they could not continue the meeting
or engage in sensible conversation." The meeting continued
until about 1: 00 a.m., when the participants retired for the
evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others, complained
of "wakefulness" during the night. [38] According to
Gottlieb on Friday morning "aside from some evidence of
fatigue, I observed nothing unusual in [Olson's] actions, conversation,
or general behavior." [39] Ruwet recalls that Olson "appeared
to be agitated" at breakfast, but that he "did not
consider this to be abnormal under the circumstances." [40]
c. The Treatment. -- The following Monday, November 23,
Olson was waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7:30 a.m.
For the next two days Olson's friends and family attempted to
reassure him and help him "snap out" of what appeared
to be a serious depression. On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet
and, after an hour long con-
[35]
Dr. Gottlieb testified that "given the information we knew
up to this time, and based on a lot of our own self-administration,
we thought it was a fairly benign substance in terms of potential
harm." This is in conflict not only with Mr. Helms' statement
but also with material which had been supplied to the Technical
Services Staff. In one long memorandum on current research with
LSD which was supplied to TSD, Henry Beecher described the dangers
involved with such research in a prophetic manner. "The
second reason to doubt Professor Rothland came when I raised
the question as to any accidents which had arisen from the use
of LSD-25. He said in a very positive way, 'none.' As it turned
out this answer could be called overly positive, for later on
in the evening I was discussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl,
Jr., a psychiatrist in Bleulera's Clinic in Zurich where I had
gone at Rothland's insistence. Stohl, when asked the same question,
replied, 'yes,' and added spontaneously, 'there is a case Professor
Rothland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who had been
subject to depression to some extent took LSD-25 in an experiment
and became severely and suddenly depressed and committed suicide
three weeks later. While the connection is not definite, common
knowledge of this could hardly have allowed the positive statement
Rothland permitted himself. This case is a warning to us to avoid
engaging subjects who are depressed, or who have been subject
to depression.'" Dr. Gottlieb testified that he had no recollection
of either the report or that particular section of it. (Sidney
Gottlieb testimony, 10/19/75, p. 78.)
[36] Memorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the
record, 11/28/53, p. 2.
[37] Lashbrook (staff summary), 7/19/75, p.
3.
[37a] Gottlieb Memorandum, 12/7/53. p. 2.
[38] Edwards memorandum, 11/28/53, p. 3.
[39] Gottlieb memorandum. 12/7/53, p. 3.
[40] Ruwet memorandum, p. 3.
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versation, it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson
was desirable. [41]
Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson
was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention."
[42] Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told
Ruwet to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded
to Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for
New York at about 2:30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.
At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist practicing
medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychiatry, but
was associated with research projects supported indirectly by
the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely
in the early 1950s. [43] Since Olson needed medical help, they
turned to Dr. Abramson as the doctor closest to Washington who
was experienced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.
Ruwet, Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days
of consultations with Abramson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953,
the three flew back to Washington so that Olson could spend Thanksgiving
with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that
he was afraid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion,
it was decided that Olson and Lashbrook would return to New York,
and that Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain these events
to Mrs. Olson. [44]
Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again
for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in
a Long Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city
with Abramson. In further discussions with Abramson, it was agreed
that Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at
an institution closer to his home. [45]
d. The Death. -- Because they could not obtain air transportation
for a return trip on Friday night, Lashbrook and Olson made reservations
for Saturday morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. Between
the time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television,
visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and
dinner. According to Lashbrook, Olson "was cheerful and
appeared to enjoy the entertainment." He "appeared
no longer particularly depressed, and almost the Dr. Olson I
knew prior to the experiment." [46]
After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about
an hour, and at 11:00, Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying
that "he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since
[they] came to New York." [47] Olson then left a call with
the hotel operator to wake them in the morning. At approximately
2:30 a.m. Saturday, November 28. Lashbrook was awakened by a
loud "crash of glass." In his report on the incident,
he stated only that Olson "had crashed through the closed
window blind and the closed window and he fell to his death from
the window of our room on the 10th floor." [48]
[41]
Ibid., p. 4.
[42] Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 1.
[43] Staff summary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview,
7/29/75, p. 2.
[44] Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, P. 3.
[45] Abramson memorandum, 12/4/53.
[46] Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.
[47] Ibid., p. 4.
[48] Ibid.
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Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death,
Lashbrook telephoned Gottlieb at his home and informed him of
the incident. [49] Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of
Olson's death at approximately 2:45 a.m. [50] Lashbrook then
called the hotel desk and reported the incident to the operator
there. Lashbrook called Abramson and informed him of the occurrence.
Abramson told Lashbrook he "wanted to be kept out of the
thing completely," but later changed his mind and agreed
to assist Lashbrook. [51]
Shortly thereafter, uniformed police officers and some hotel
employees came to Lashbrook's room. Lashbrook told the police
he didn't know why Olson had committed suicide, but he did know
that Olson "suffered from ulcers." [52]
e. The Aftermath. -- Following Dr. Olson's death, the
CIA made a substantial effort to ensure that his family received
death benefits, but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances
surrounding his demise. The Agency also made considerable efforts
to prevent the death being connected with the CIA, and supplied
complete cover for Lashbrook so that his association with the
CIA would remain a secret.
After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investigation
of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investigation,
the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General, stating:
I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude on
the part of TSS representatives to the way this experiment was
conducted and the remarks that this is just one of the risks
running with scientific experimentation. I do not eliminate the
need for taking risks, but I do believe, especially when human
health or life is at stake, that at least the prudent, reasonable
measures which can be taken to minimize the risk must be taken
and failure to do so was culpable negligence. The actions of
the various individuals concerned after effects of the experiment
on Dr. Olson became manifest also revealed the failure to observe
normal and reasonable precautions. [53]
As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal
letter to the Chief of Technical Operations of the Technical
Services Staff who had approved the experiment criticizing him
for "poor judgment... in authorizing the use of this drug
on such an unwitting basis and without proximate medical safeguards."
[54] Dulles also sent a letter to Dr. Gottlieb, Chief of the
Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff, criticizing
him for recommending the "unwitting application of the drug"
in that the proposal "did not give sufficient emphasis for
medical collaboration and for the proper consideration of the
rights of the individual to whom it was being administered."
[55]
[49]
CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
[50] Ruwet Memorandum, p. 11.
[51] CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Memorandum from the General Counsel
to the Inspector General. 1/4/54.
[54] Memorandum from DCI to Chief, Technical
Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
[55] Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb,
2/12/54.
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The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read and
returned. Although the letters were critical, a note from the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed
him to inform the individuals that: "These are not reprimands
and no personnel file notation are being made." [56]
Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them
as such, these notes were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did
participation in the events which led to Dr. Olson's death have
any apparent effect on the advancement within the CIA of the
individuals involved.
3. The Surreptitious Administration of LSD to Unwitting NonVolunteer
Human Subjects by the CIA After the Death of Dr. Olson
The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as some argued at the
time, as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the
testing of new substances. It might be argued that LSD was thought
to be benign. After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the
surreptitious administration of LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued
or initiated [57] a project involving the surreptitious administration
of LSD to nonvolunteer human subjects. This program exposed numerous
individuals in the United States to the risk of death or serious
injury without their informed consent, without medical supervision,
and without necessary follow-up to determine any long-term effects.
Prior to the Olson experiment, the Director of Central Intelligence
had approved MKULTRA, a research program designed to develop
a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical
agent materials." In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr.
Helms, then ADDP, wrote the Director that:
we intend to investigate the development of
a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant
mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably
well predicted for each individual. This material 'could potentially
aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implanting
suggestions and other forms of mental control. [58]
On February 12, 1954, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency wrote TSS officials criticizing them for "poor judgment"
in administering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without
proximate medical safeguards" to Dr. Olson and for the lack
of "proper consideration of the rights of the individual
to whom it was being administered." [59] On the same day,
the Inspector General reviewed a report on Subproject Number
3 of MKULTRA, in which the same TSS officers who had just received
letters from the Director were quoted as stating that one of
the purposes of Subproject Number 3 was to
[56]
Note from DDCI to Richard Helms, 2/13/54.
[57] The 1963 IG Report, which described the
project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD, placed
the project beginning In 1955. Other CIA documents reveal that
it was in existence as early as February 1954. The CIA has told
the Committee that the project began in 1953 and that the experiment
which led to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project.
[58] Memorandum from ADDP items to DOI Dulles,
4/3/53, tab A, p. 2.
[59] Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb,
2/12/54; and memorandum from DCI to Chief of operations, TSS,
2/12/54.
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"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned
after having been given a drug." [60] There is no evidence
that Subproject Number 3 was terminated even though the officers
were unequivocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious
administration of LSD and the necessity of obtaining informed
consent and providing medical safeguards. Subproject Number 3,
in fact, used methods which showed even less concern than did
the OLSON experiment for the safety and security of the participants.
Yet the evidence indicates the project continued until 1963.
[61]
In the project, the individual conducting the test might make
initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random
in a bar. He would then invite the person to a "safehouse"
where the test drug was administered to the subject through drink
or in food. CIA personnel might debrief the individual conducting
the test, or observe the test by using a one-way mirror and tape
recorder in an adjoining room.
Prior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects.
There was also, obviously, no medical prescreening. In addition,
the tests were conducted by individuals who were not qualified
scientific observers. There were no medical personnel on hand
either to administer the drugs or to observe their effects, and
no follow-up was conducted on the test subjects.
As the Inspector General noted in 1963:
A significant limitation on the effectiveness
of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific
observation of results. The [individuals conducting the test]
are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom
accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may
be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying
surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and
side-effect. [62]
This was particularly troublesome as in a
number of instances,... the test subject has
become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at
least one case, and the agent could only follow up by guarded
inquiry after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible
sickness and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent
effects of the testing. [61]
Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the
safety of foreign nationals against whom LSD was used abroad.
In several cases medical examinations were performed prior to
the use of LSD. [64]
[60]
Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review,
on Subproject #3 of MKULTRA, 2/10/54.
[61] IG Report on MKULTRA, 1903.
[62] Ibid., p. 12.
[63] Ibid. According to the IG's survey
in 1963, physicians associated with MKULTRA could be made available
in an emergency.
[64] The Technical Services Division which was
responsible for the operational use of LSD abroad took the position
that "no physical examination of the subject is required
prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A
physician need not be present. There is no danger medically in
the use of this material as handled by TSS trained personnel."
The Office of Medical Services had taken the position that LSD
was "medically dangerous." Both the Office of Security
and the Office of Medical Services argued that LSD "should
not be administered unless preceded by a medical examination...
and should be administered only by or in the presence of a physician
who had studied it and its effect." (Memorandum from James
Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Operations,
12/12/57, pp. 1-2.
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Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant observation
made possible because the material was being used against prisoners
of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally, during
certain of the LSD interrogations abroad, local physicians were
on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD
and would not be told that hallucinogens had been administered.
[65]
The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration
of LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally
halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course
of an Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division.
When the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to
the Deputy Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should
be briefed. The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy
were generally familiar with MKULTRA. He indicated, however,
that he was not sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that
point.
On May 24,1963, the DDP advised the Inspector General that he
had briefed the Director on the MKULTRA program and in particular
had covered the question of the surreptitious administration
of LSD to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector
General, the DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement
and therefore the testing will continue." [66]
One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA
was prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination
of the surreptitious administration project. The project was
suspended following the Inspector General's report.
On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a
memo to the DDCI, who with the Inspector General and the Executive
Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted
two aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine
Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for
influencing human behavior;" and (2) "testing arrangements
in furtherance of this mission should be as operationally realistic
and yet as controllable as possible." Helms argued that
the individuals must be "unwitting" as this was "the
only realistic method of maintaining the capability, considering
the intended operational use of materials to influence human
behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting.
Should the subjects of the testing not be unwitting, the program
would only be "pro forma" resulting in a "false
sense of accomplishment and readiness." [67] Helms continued:
[65]
Physicians might be called with the hope that they would make
a diagnosis of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting
the individual who was the subject of the CIA interest.
[66] Memorandum for the Record prepared by the
Inspector General, 5/15/63, p. 1.
[67] Ibid., p. 2.
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If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this
unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing, there
is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously, the
testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit the
opportunity to observe the results of the administration on the
target. It also goes without saying that whatever testing arrangement
we adopt must afford maximum safeguards for the protection of
the Agency's role in this activity, as well as minimizing the
possibility of physical or emotional damage to the individual
tested. [68]
In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June,
1964, Helms again raised the issue of unwitting testing. At that
time General Carter, then acting DCI, approved several changes
in the MKULTRA program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotiations
between the Inspector General and the DDP. In a handwritten note,
however, Director Carter added that "unwitting testing will
be subject to a separate decision." [69]
No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing
had been halted and, according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant
to DCI McCone, the DCI was not inclined to take the positive
step of authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through
the summer, the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964,
the DDP raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling
the Director's attention to what he described as "several
other indications during the past year of an apparent Soviet
aggressiveness in the field of covertly administered chemicals
which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing."
[70]
Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing,
the Agency's "positive operational capability to use drugs
is diminishing, owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing
knowledge of the state of the art, we are less capable of staying
up with Soviet advances in this field. This in turn results in
a waning capability on our part to restrain others in the intelligence
community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations
in this area." [71]
Helms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the
high risk of embarrassment to the Agency as well as the "moral
problem." He noted that no better covert situation had been
devised than that which had been used, and that "we have
no answer to the moral issue." [72]
Helms asked for either resumption of the testing project or its
definitive cancellation. He argued that the status quo of a research
and development program without a realistic testing program was
causing the Agency to live "with the illusion of a capability
which is becoming minimal and furthermore is expensive."
[73] Once again no formal action was taken in response to the
Helms' request.
[68]
Memorandum from DDP Helms to DDCI Carter, 12/17/63.
[69] Memorandum from DDP Helms to DCI, 6/9/64,
p. 3.
[70] Ibid., 11/9/64, p. 1.
[71] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[72] Ibid., p. 2.
[73] Ibid.
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From its beginning in the early 1950's until its termination
in 1963, the program of surreptitious administration of LSD to
unwitting nonvolunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure
of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights
of individuals and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees.
Though it was known that the testing was dangerous, the lives
of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were ignored
during the ten years of testing which followed Dr. Olson's death.
Although it was clear that the laws of the United States were
being violated, the testing continued. While the individuals
involved in the Olson experiment were admonished by the Director,
at the same time they were also told that they were not being
reprimanded and that their "bad judgment" would not
be made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing
project was terminated in 1963, none of the individuals involved
were subject to any disciplinary action.
4. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and Use of Chemical
and Biological Agents by the CIA
The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring
and control of the testing and use of chemical and biological
agents within the CIA. [74] An analysis of the failures can be
divided into four sections: (a) the waiver of
normal regulations or requirements; (b) the
problems in authorization procedures; (c) the
failure of internal review mechanisms such as the Office of General
Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff; and (d)
the effect of compartmentation and competition within the CIA.
a. The Waiver of Administrative Controls. -- The internal
controls within any agency rest on: (1) clear and coherent regulations;
(2) clear lines of authority; and (3) clear rewards for those
who conduct themselves in accord with agency regulations and
understandable and immediate sanctions against those who do not.
In the case of the testing and use of chemical and biological
agents, normal CIA administrative controls were waived. The destruction
of the documents on the largest CIA program in this area constituted
a prominent example of the waiver of normal Agency procedures
by the Director.
These documents were destroyed in early 1973 at the order of
then DCI Richard Helms. According to Helms, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb,
then Director of TSD:
... came to me and said that he was retiring
and that I was retiring and he thought it would be a good idea
if these files were destroyed. And I also believe part of the
reason for our thinking this was advisable was there had been
relationships with outsiders in government agencies and other
organizations and that these would be sensitive in this kind
of a thing but that since the program was over and finished and
done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as
[74]
Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee to examine:
the "extent to which United States intelligence agencies
are governed by Executive Orders, rules, or regulations either
published or secret."
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well, so that anybody who assisted us in the
past would not be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment,
if you will. [75]
The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation,
CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records."
As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote
in regulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of
convenience or of storage but of conscious judgment in the application
of the rules modified by knowledge of individual component needs.
The heart of this judgment is to ensure that the complete story
can be reconstructed in later years and by people who may be
unfamiliar with the events." [76]
The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible for
the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of
the largest CIA research program involving chemical and biological
agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating
and providing medical assistance to the individuals who were
subjects in the program. Finally, it prevented the Committee
from determining the full extent of the operations which made
use of materials developed in the MKULTRA program. [77]
From the inception of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were waived.
In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans,
proposed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the proposal six
percent of the research and development budget of TSD would be
expended "without the establishment of formal contractual
relations" because contracts would reveal government interest.
Helms also voted that qualified individuals in the field "are
most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which
connect them with this activity since such a connection would
jeopardize their professional reputa-
[75]
Richard Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 5.
Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with
individuals and organizations are retained without public disclosure.
Moreover, in the case of MKULTRA the CIA had spent millions of
dollars developing both materials and delivery systems which
could be used by the Clandestine Services; the reconstruction
of the research and development program would be difficult if
not impossible, without the documents, and at least one assistant
to Dr. Gottlieb protested against the document destruction on
those grounds.
[76] Clandestine Services Institution (CSI)
70-10. When asked by the Select Committee about the regularity
of the procedure by which he authorized Dr. Gottlieb to destroy
the MKULTRA records, Helms responded:
"Well, that's hard to say whether it would be part of the
regular procedure or not, because the record destruction program
is conducted according to a certain pattern. There's a regular
record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored by certain
people and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that,
I suppose, would have been unusual. In other words, there were
documents being destroyed because somebody had raised this specific
issue rather than because they were encompassed in the regular
records destruction program. So I think the answer to your question
is probably yes." (Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 6.)
[77] Even prior to the destruction of documents,
the MKULTRA records were far from complete. As the Inspector
General noted in 1963:
"Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking
in evaluative statements that might give perspective to management
policies over time. A substantial portion of the MKULTRA record
appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers and
is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures."
(IG Report on MKULTRA, p. 23.)
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tions". [78] Other Agency procedures, i.e., the forwarding
of document, in support of invoices and the provision for regular
audit procedures, were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953,
then DCI Allen Dulles approved MKULTRA, noting that security
considerations precluded handling the project through usual contractual
agreements.
Ten years later investigations of MKULTRA by both the Inspector
General and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which
resulted from the waivers. Because TSD had not reserved the right
to audit the books of contractors in MKULTRA, the CIA had been
unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another
firm had failed to establish controls and safeguards which would
assure "proper accountability" in use of government
funds with the result that "funds have been used for purposes
not contemplated by grants or allowable under usual contract
relationship." [79] The entire MKULTRA arrangement was condemned
for having administrative lines which were unclear, overly permissive
controls, and irresponsible supervision.
The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits:
led us to see MKULTRA as frequently having provided a device
to escape normal administrative controls for research that is
not especially sensitive, as having allowed practices that produce
gross administrative failures, as having permitted the establishment
of special relationships with unreliable organizations on an
unacceptable basis, and as having produced, on at least one occasion,
a. cavalier treatment of a bona fide contracting organization.
While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanisms
for handling sensitive projects, the Chief of the Audit Branch
wrote that "both the terms of reference and the ground rules
for handling such special projects should be spelled out in advance
so that diversion from normal channels does not mean abandonment
of controls.
Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of
highly sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal
internal control mechanisms, such waivers should not be extended
to less sensitive operations. Moreover, only those regulations
which would endanger security should be waived; to waive regulations
generally would result in highly sensitive and controversial
projects having looser rather than stricter administrative controls.
MKNAOMI, the Fort Detrick CIA project for research and development
of chemical and biological agents, provides another example where
efforts to protect the security of agency activities overwhelmed
administrative controls. No written records of the transfer of
agents such as anthrax or shellfish toxin were kept, "because
of the sensitivity of the area and the desire to keep any possible
use of materials like this recordless." [81] The
[78]
Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab. A, p.
2.
[79] Memorandum from IG to Chief, TSD, 11/8/63,
as quoted in memorandum from Chief, Audit Branch.
[80] The memorandum suggested that administrative
exclusions, because of the importance of such decisions, should
require the personal approval of the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence on an individual case basis. Present CIA policy
is that only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.
[81] Sidney Gottlieb testimony, 10/18/75, Hearings,
Vol. 1, p. 51.
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result was that the Agency had no way of determining what materials
were on hand, and could not be certain whether delivery systems
such as dart guns, or deadly substances such as cobra venom had
been issued to the field.
b. Authorization. -- The destruction of the documents
regarding MKULTRA made it difficult to determine at what level
specific projects in the program were authorized. This problem
is not solely a result of the document destruction, however.
Even at the height of MKULTRA the IG noted that, at least with
respect to the surreptitious administration of LSD, the "present
practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval
of test programs." [82]
While it is clear that Allen Dulles authorized MKULTRA, the record
is unclear as to who authorized specific projects such as that
involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting
nonvolunteer human subjects. Even given the sensitive and controversial
nature of the project, there is no evidence that when John McCone
replaced Allen Dulles as the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency he was briefed on the details of this project and asked
whether it should be continued . [83] Even during the 1963 discussions
on the propriety of unwitting testing, the DDP questioned whether
it was "necessary to brief General Carter", the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director's "alter
ago," because CIA officers felt it necessary to keep details
of the project restricted to an absolute minimum number of people.
[84]
In May of 1963, DDP Helms told the Inspector General that the
covert testing program was authorized because he had gone to
the Director, briefed him on it and "the Director indicated
no disagreement and therefore the testing will continue."
[85] Such authorization even for noncontroversial matters is
clearly less desirable than explicit authorization; in areas
such as the surreptitious administration of drugs, it is particularly
undesirable. Yet according to testimony
[82]
IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963, p. 14.
[83] According to an assistant to Dr. Gottlieb,
there were annual briefings of the DCI and the DDP on MKULTRA
by the Chief of TSD or his deputy. However, a Nay 15, 1963 Memorandum
for the Record from the Inspector General noted that Mr. McCone
had not been briefed in detail about the program. Mr. McCone's
Executive Officer, Walter Elder, testified that it was "perfectly
apparent to me" that neither Mr. McCone nor General Carter,
then the DDCI, was aware of the surreptitious administration
project "or if they had been briefed they had not understood
it." (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 13.) Mr. McCone testified that
lie "did not know" whether he talked to anyone about
the project but that no one had told him about it in a way that
"would have turned on all the lights." (John McCone
testimony, 2/3/76, p. 10.)
[84] According to Elder's testimony, "no
Deputy Director, to my knowledge, has ever been briefed or was
it ever thought necessary to brief them to the extent to which
you would brief the Director."
[85] IG Memorandum for the Record. 5/15/63.
On the question of authorization of the covert testing program,
Elder testified as follows:
"But my reasonable judgment is that this was considered
to be in the area of continuing approval, having once been approved
by the Director."
The theory of authorization carrying over from one administration
to the next seems particularly inappropriate for less visible,
highly sensitive operations which, unless brought to his attention
by subordinates, would not come to the attention of the Director.
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before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement
is even more prevalent in sensitive situations. [86]
The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon
and his subordinates, in violation of a Presidential Directive,
may have resulted from the failure of the Director to issue written
instructions to Agency officials. The retention was not authorized
by senior officials in the Agency. The Director, Mr. Helms, had
instructed Mr. Karamessines, the Deputy Director of Plans, and
Dr. Gottlieb, the Chief of Technical Services Division, to relinquish
control to the Army of any chemical or biological agents being
retained for the CIA at Fort Detrick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this
instruction on to Dr. Gordon. While orders may be disregarded
in any organization, one of the reasons that Dr. Gordon used
to defend the retention was the fact that he had not received
written instructions forbidding it. [87]
In some situations the existence of written instructions did
not prevent unauthorized actions. According to an investigation
by the CIA's Inspector General TSD officers had been informed
orally that Mr. Helms was to be "advised at all times"
when LSD was to be used. In addition TSD had received a memo
advising the staff that LSD was not to be used without the permission
of the DDP, Frank Wisner. The experiment involving Dr. Olson
went ahead without notification of either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms.
The absence of clear and immediate punishment for that act must
undercut the force of other internal instructions and regulations.
One last issue must be raised about authorization procedures
within the Agency. Chemical agents were used abroad until 1959
for discrediting or disabling operations, or for the purpose
of interrogations with the approval of the Chief of Operations
of the DDP. Later the approval of the Deputy Director for Plans
was required for such operations. Although the medical staff
sought to be part of the approval process for these operations,
they were excluded because, as the Inspector General wrote in
1957:
Operational determinations are the responsibility of the DDP
and it is he who should advise the DCI in these respects just
as it is he who is responsible for the results. It is completely
unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief Medical Staff,
(what, in effect, would be authority over clandestine operations.)
[88]
Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation
of the Medical Staff might well have been useful.
Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those,
agencies which assisted the CIA. For instance, the project involving
the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer
human subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. There is some question as to
the Commissioner of Narcotics' knowledge about the project.
[86]
Mr. Elder was asked whether the process of bringing forward a
description of actions by the Agency in getting approval through
the absence of disagreement was a common one. He responded, "It
was not uncommon.... The more sensitive the project the more
likely it would lean toward being a common practice, based on
the need to keep the written record to a minimum."
[87] Nathan Gordan testimony, 9/16/75, Hearings,
Vol. 1.
[88] 1957 IG Report.
-88-
In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD
had been briefed about the project, but the IG's report did not
indicate the level of detail provided to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified
that "I remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general
feeling that he was aware." [89] Another CIA officer did
not recall any discussion of testing on unwitting subjects when
he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Commissioner Anslinger.
In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that
Harry Giordano, who replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb
that when he became Commissioner he was "only generally
briefed on the arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and
said he didn't want to know the details." The same memorandum
states, however, that there were several comments which indicated
to Dr. Gottlieb that Mr. Giordano was aware of the substance
of the project. It is possible that the Commissioner provided
a general authorization for the arrangement without understanding
what it entailed or considering its propriety. A reluctance to
seek detailed information from the CIA, and the CIA's hesitancy
to volunteer it, has been found in a number of instances during
the Select Committee's investigations. This problem is not confined
to the executive branch but has also marked congressional relationships
with the Agency.
c. Internal Review. -- The waiver of regulations and the
absence of documentation make it difficult to determine now who
authorized which activities. More importantly, they made internal
Agency review mechanisms much less effective. [90] Controversial
and highly sensitive projects which should have been subject
to the most rigorous inspection lacked effective internal review.
Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the
surreptitious administration of LSD to Dr. Olson, it would have
seemed likely that he would be asked about the legality or propriety
of any subsequent projects involving such administration. This
was not done. He did not learn about this testing until the 1970's.
Nor was the General Counsel's opinion sought on other MKULTRA
projects, though these had been characterized by the Inspector
General in the 1957 Report on TSD as "unethical and illicit."
[91]
There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's
survey of TSD of the project involving the surreptitious administration
of LSD. That project was apparently not brought to the attention
of the survey team. The Inspector who discovered it during the
IG's 1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,
[89]
Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 28.
[90] The IG's report on MKULTRA in 1963 stated:
"The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain
exacting control of MKULTRA activities. in so doing, however,
TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation in keeping
with the high sensitivity of some of the projects. Some files
were found to present a reasonably complete record, including
most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives
contained little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records
precluded use of routine inspection procedures and raised a variety
of questions concerning management and fiscal controls."
[91] CIA, Inspector General's report on TSD,
1957, p. 217.
-89-
rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially
sensitive project. [92]
Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the
principal internal mechanisms for the control of possibly improper
actions, were excluded from regular reviews of the project. When
the project was discovered the Executive Director Comptroller
voiced strong opposition to it; it is possible that the project
would have been terminated in 1957 if it had been called to his
attention when he then served as Inspector General.
The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function
through the examination of Agency expenditures, also encountered
substantial difficulty with MKULTRA. When MKULTRA was first proposed
the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This was
soon changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual
procedures" in MKULTRA increased the likelihood of "irregularities"
as well as the difficulty in detecting them. The head of the
Audit Branch characterized the MKULTRA procedures as "having
allowed practices that produced gross administrative failures,"
including a lack of controls within outside contractors which
would "assure proper accountability in use of government
funds." It also diminished the CIA's capacity to verify
the accountings provided by outside firms.
d. Compartmentation and Jurisdictional Conflict Within the
Agency. -- As has been noted, the testing and use of chemical
and biological agents was treated as a highly sensitive activity
within the CIA. This resulted in a high degree of compartmentation.
At the same time substantial jurisdictional conflict existed
within the Agency between the Technical Services Division, and
the Office of Medical Services and the Office of Security.
This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have
led to duplication of effort within the CIA and to Agency policymakers
being deprived of useful information.
During the early 1950's first the BLUEBIRD Committee and then
the ARTICHOKE Committee were instituted to bring together representatives
of the Agency components which had a legitimate interest in the
area of the alteration of human behavior. By 1957 both these
committees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the
Technical Services Division (a component supposedly represented
on the ARTICHOKE Committee) about ARTICHOKE operations being
conducted by the Office of Security and the Office of Medical
Services. The Technical Services Division which was providing
support to the Clandestine Services in the use of chemical and
biological agents, but provided little or no information to either
the Office of Security or the Office of Medical Services. As
one TSD officer involved in these programs testified: "Although
we were acquainted, we certainly didn't share experiences."
[93]
[92]
Even after the Inspector came upon it the IG did not perform
a complete investigation of it. It was discovered at the end
of an extensive survey of TSD and the Inspector was in the process
of being transferred to another post within the Agency.
[93] Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p.
14.
-90-
QKHILLTOP, another group designed to coordinate research in this
area also had little success. The group met infrequently -- only
twice a year -- and little specific information was exchanged.
[94]
Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure
to share information, [95] but this appears not to be the only
reason. A TSD officer stated that the Office, of Medical Services
simply wasn't "particularly interested in what we were doing"
and never sought such information. [96] On the other hand, a
representative of the Office of Medical Services consistently
sought to have medical personnel participate in the use of chemical
and biological agents suggested that TSD did not inform the Office
of Medical Services in order to prevent their involvement.
Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office
of Security, which had been assigned responsibility for direction
of ARTICHOKE, consistently sought to bring TSD operations involving
psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The Office of Medical
Services sought to have OMS physicians advise and participate
in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector General described
it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned with the extent
of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff,
over the activities of TSD which encroach upon or enter into
the medical field," and which are conducted by TSD "without
seeking the prior approval of the Chief, Medical Staff, and often
without informing him of their nature and extent." [91]
As was noted previously, because the projects and programs of
TSD stemmed directly from operational needs controlled by the
DDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of these activities
by the Medical Staff:
It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief,
Medical Staff, what, in effect, would be authority over clandestine
operations. Furthermore, some of the activities of Chemical
Division are not only unorthodox but unethical and sometimes
illegal. The DDP is in a better position to evaluate the justification
for such operations than the Chief, Medical Staff. [98] [Emphasis
added.]
Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for
"evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and
because the knowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical
and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political
and diplomatic circles," the IG recommended that the Director
of Security be fully advised of TSD's activities in these areas.
Even after the Inspector General's Report of 1957, the compartmentation
and jurisdictional conflict continued. They may have had a sub-
[94]
The one set of minutes from a QKHILLTOP meeting indicated that
individuals in the Office of Medical Services stressed the need
for more contact.
[95] When asked why information on the surreptitious
administration of LSD was not presented to the ARTICHOKE committee,
Dr. Gottlieb responded: "I imagine the only reason would
have been a concern for broadening the awareness of its existence."
[96] CIA Officer, 11/21/75, p. 14
[97] IG Survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
[98] Ibid.
-91-
stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Agency. As the
Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff noted in 1958,
due to the different positions taken by TSS, the Office of Security,
and the Office of Medical Services, on the use of chemical or
biological agents, it was possible that the individual who authorized
the use of a chemical or biological agent could be presented
with "incomplete facts upon which to make a decision relevant
to its use." Even a committee set up by the DDP in 1958
to attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have access to
records of testing and use. This was due, in part, to excessive
compartmentation, and jurisdictional conflict.
C. Covert Testing On Human Subjects By Military
Intelligence Groups: Material Testing Program EA 1729, Project
Third Change, and Project Derby Hat
EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program
for lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Interest in LSD was originally
aroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories by open literature
on the unusual effects of the compound. [99] The positive intelligence
and counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like
LSD, and suspected Soviet interest in such materials, [100] supported
the development of an American military capability and resulted
in experiments conducted jointly by the U.S. Army Intelligence
Board and the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.
These experiments, designed to evaluate potential intelligence
uses of LSD, were known collectively as "Material Testing
Program EA 1729." Two projects of particular interest conducted
as part of these experiments, "THIRD CHANCE" and "DERBY
HAT", involved the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects
in Europe and the Far East.
In many respects, the Army's testing programs duplicated research
which had already been conducted by the CIA. They certainly involved
the risks inherent in the early phases of drug testing. In the
Army's tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights were
also subordinated to national security considerations; informed
consent and followup examinations of subjects were neglected
in efforts to maintain the secrecy of the tests. Finally, the
command and control problems which were apparent in the CIA's
programs are paralleled by a lack of clear authorization and
supervision in the Army's programs.
[99]
USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program, EA 1729,"
10/15/59, p. 4.
[100] This same USAINTC study cited "A
1952 (several years prior to initial U.S. interest in LSD-25)
report that the Soviets purchased a large quantity of LSD-25
from the Sandoz Company in 1951, reputed to be sufficient for
50 million doses." (Ibid., p. 16.)
Generally accepted Soviet methods and counterintelligence concerns
were also strong motivating factors in the initiation of this
research:
"A primary justification for field experimentation in intelligence
with EA 1729 is the counter-intelligence or defense implication.
We know that the enemy philosophy condones any kind of coercion
or violence for intelligence purposes. There is proof that his
intelligence service has used drugs in the past. There is strong
evidence of keen interest in EA 1729 by him. If for no other
purpose than to know what to expect from enemy intelligence use
of the material and to, thus, be prepared to counter it, field
experimentation is justified. (Ibid, p. 34)
-92-
1. Scope of Testing
Between 1955 and 1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical
Corps to evaluate the potential for LSD as a chemical warfare
incapacitating agent. In the course of this research, LSD was
administered to more than 1,000 American volunteers who then
participated in a series of tests designed to ascertain the effects
of the drug on their ability to function as soldiers. With the
exception of one set of tests at Fort Bragg, these and subsequent
laboratory experiments to evaluate chemical warfare potential
were conducted at the Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories, Edgewood,
Maryland.
In 1958 a new series of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood.
These experiments were conducted as the initial phase of Material
Testing Program EA 1729 to evaluate the intelligence potential
of LSD, and included LSD tests on 95 volunteers. [101] As part
of these tests, three structured experiments were conducted:
1. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a
simulated social reception to volunteer subjects who were unaware
of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were participating;
2. LSD was administered to volunteers who were
subsequently polygraphed; and
3. LSD was administered to volunteers who were
then confined to "isolation chambers".
These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity
of the traditional security training all subjects had undergone
in the face of unconventional, drug enhanced, interrogations.
At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of Material Testing
Program EA 1729 in 1960, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence (ACSI) authorized operational field testing of LSD.
The first field tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special
Purpose Team (SPT) during the period from May to August of 1961.
These tests were known as Project THIRD CHANCE and involved eleven
separate interrogations of ten subjects. None of the subjects
were volunteers and none were aware that they were to receive
LSD. All but one subject, a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft
of classified documents, were alleged to be foreign intelligence
sources or agents. While interrogations of these individuals
were only moderately successful, at least one subject (the U.S.
soldier) exhibited symptoms of severe paranoia while under the
influence of the drug.
The second series of field tests, Project DERBY HAT, were conducted
by an Army SPT in the Far East during the period from August
to November of 1962. Seven subjects were interrogated under DERBY
HAT, all of whom were foreign nationals either suspected of dealing
in narcotics or implicated in foreign intelligence operations.
The purpose of this second set of experiments was to collect
additional data on the utility of LSD in field interrogations,
and to evaluate any different effects the drug might have on
"Orientals."
[101]
Inspector General of the Army Report. "Use of Volunteers
in Chemical Agent Research," 3/10/76, p. 138.
-93-
2. Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agencies
On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared
a lengthy staff study on Material Testing Program EA 1729. The
stated purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the
desirability of EA 1729 on non-US subjects in selected actual
operations under controlled conditions. [102] It was on the basis
of this study that operational field tests were later conducted.
After noting that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experiments
with LSD on humans in 1955 and had administered the drug to over
1,000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study
concluded:
There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study
of the prolific scientific literature on LSD-25 and personal
communication between U.S. Army Chemical Corps personnel and
other researchers in this field have failed to disclose an authenticated
instance of irreversible change being produced in normal humans
by the drug. [103]
This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were
inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body
of this same study it is noted that:
The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially dangerous
drug, whose pharmaceutical actions are not fully understood and
there has been cited the possibility of the continuance of a
chemically induced psychosis in chronic form, particularly if
a latent schizophrenic were a subject, with consequent claim
or representation against the U.S. Government. [104]
An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by
careful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting
evidence that the drug might be hazardous, the study continued:
The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729 is an
unproven hypothesis based on the characteristic effect of the
material. While the added stress of a real situation may increase
the probability of permanent adverse effect, the resulting
risk is deemed to be slight by the medical research personnel
of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories. To prevent even such
a slight risk, the proposed plan for field experimentation calls
for overt, if possible, or contrived-through-ruse, if necessary,
physical and mental examination of any real situation subject
prior to employment of the subject. [105]
This conclusion was drawn six years after one death had occurred
which could be attributed, at least in part, to the effects of
the very drug the Army was proposing to field test. The USAINTC
staff, however, was apparently unaware of the circumstances surrounding
Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the
[102]
USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program EA 1729,"
10/15/59, p. 4.
[103] Ibid, p. 4.
[104] Ibid, p. 25.
[105] Ibid.
-94-
general lack of interagency communication on drug related research.
As the October 1959 study noted, "there has been no coordination
with other intelligence agencies up to the present." [106]
On December 7, 1959, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ACSI, apparently a General Willems) was briefed on the proposed
operational use of LSD by USAINTC Project Officer Jacobson, in
preparation for Project THIRD CHANCE. General Willems expressed
concern that the project had not been coordinated with the FBI
and the CIA. He is quoted as saying "that if this project
is going to be worth anything, it [LSD] should be used on higher
types of non-U.S. subjects" in other words "staffers."
He indicated this could be accomplished if the CIA were brought
in. The summary of the briefing prepared by Major Mehovsky continues:
"Of particular note is that ACSI did not direct coordination
with CIA and the FBI but only mentioned it for consideration
by the planners." [107]
After the briefing, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels and
Major Mehovsky met to discuss interagency cooperation with CIA
and FBI. The group consensus was to postpone efforts toward coordination:
Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with CIA
we should have more factual findings from field experimentation
with counterintelligence cases that will strengthen our position
and proposal for cooperation. This approach red to by the conferees.
[108]
Had such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments
might have been viewed differently and the tests themselves might
have been seen as unnecessary.
3. Subordination of Individual Rights to National Security
Considerations
Just as many of these experiments may have been unnecessary,
the nature of the operational tests (polygraph-assisted interrogations
of drugged suspects) reflects a basic disregard for the fundamental
human rights of the subjects. The interrogation of an American
soldier as part of the THIRD CHANCE 1961 tests is an example
of this disregard.
The "trip report" for Project THIRD CHANCE, dated September
6, 1961, recounts the circumstances surrounding and the results
of the tests as follows:
[The subject] was a U.S. soldier who had confessed to theft of
classified documents. Conventional methods had failed to ascertain
whether espionage intent was involved. A significant, new admission
by subject that he told a fellow soldier of the theft while he
still had the documents in his possession was obtained during
the EA 1729 interrogation along with other variations of Subject's
previous account. The interrogation results were deemed by the
local operational authority satisfactory evidence of Subject's
claim of innocence in regard to espionage intent. [109]
[106]
Ibid, p. 6
[107] Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60, p. 1.
[108] Ibid, p. 2.
[109] SPT Trip Report, Operation THIRD CHANCE,
9/6/61, p. 5.
-95-
The subject apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and
the interrogation, while productive, was difficult. The trip
report concluded:
(1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate
a subject profitably throughout a highly sustained and almost
incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.
(2) The apparent value of bringing a subject
into the EA 1729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.
(3) The usefulness of employing as a duress
factor the device of inviting the subject's attention to his
EA 1729 influenced state and threatening to extend this state
indefinitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to
bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was
shown to be effective.
(4) The need for preplanned precautions against
extreme paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.
(5) It was brought to attention by this case
that where subject has undergone extended intensive interrogation
prior to the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly
during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same version
while under EA 1729 influence, however extreme the reaction,
may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the ability
to adhere to a well rehearsed story. [110]
This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort
this individual suffered were exploited by the use of traditional
interrogation techniques. While there is no evidence that physical
violence or torture were employed in connection with this interrogation,
physical and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD
CHANCE experiments to exploit the subjects' altered mental state,
and to maximize the stress situation. Jacobson described these
methods in his trip report:
Stressing techniques employed included silent treatment before
or after EA 1729 administration, sustained conventional interrogation
prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of food, drink, sleep
or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation prior to EA 1729 administration,
hot-cold switches in approach, duress "pitches", verbal
degradation and bodily discomfort, or dramatized threats to subject's
life or mental health. [111]
Another gross violation of an individual's fundamental rights
occurred in September 1962 as part of the Army's DERBY HAT tests
in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent was given
6 micrograms of LSD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration
of the drug was completed at 1035 that morning:
At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready. He
was placed in a supine position. He began groaning with expiration
and became semicomatose. [112]
[110]
Ibid, pp. 17-18.
[111] Ibid, p. 13.
[112] "DERBY HAT" Medical and Pharmacological
Report: Case #1, 9/20/62, 1). p. D10-2.
-96-
For the next 28 minutes, the subject remained semicomatose.
At 1148, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved.
At 1155, he was helped to a sitting position.
At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine position.
At 1212, he was more alert and able to sit up with help.
At 1220, Subject was assisted to the interrogation table.
At 1230, he began moaning he wanted to die and usually ignored
questions. Rarely he stated "he didn't know."
At 1250, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently refocused
his eyes with eyelid assistance. He frequently threw his head
back with eyes closed.
At 1330, he was slightly more alert. He was forced-walked for
5 minutes. He physically would cooperate until he became shocky
again (sweating, thready pulse, pale). [113]
For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same
condition. Continued attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant
answers. Six hours after receiving the drug, the subject began
giving relevant answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours
after the initial dosage, the subject was polygraphed. The interrogation
continued for seventeen and one-half hours after the drug was
administered.
There was some psychological and medical screening of the individuals
tested within the United States, in Europe, and in Asia. The
proposal for the field experimentation in fact called for such
examinations. The fact of prescreening did not eliminate tile
risk of injury; the availability of medical staff did, however,
limit injury and may well have prevented the death of one or
more of the subjects. As the medical corps member of the team
which surreptitiously administered the LSD noted, "one subject...
did collapse after the interrogation and the presence of the
medical officer was not only of value to the subject but to the
interrogation team who were thus assured that an unnecessary
untoward result would not occur." [115]
In the October 15, 1959, USAINTC staff study, moral and legal
ramifications of covert administration of LSD in field conditions
were considered.
It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic American
principle of the dignity and welfare of the individual will not
be violated. A more meticulous regard for the prohibition against
violence or duress is taken in practice when the suspect is a
US citizen or ally as against an actual or potential enemy, in
peace as against war, and in respect to the nature of the crime....
In intelligence, the stakes involved and the interests of national
security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical
values, but not legal limits, through necessity. Any claim
[113]
Ibid., p. D10-3.
[115] SPT Trip Report, Operation THIRD CHANCE,
7/25/61, p. 1.
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against the US Government for alleged injury due to EA 1729 must
be legally shown to have been due to the material. Proper security
and appropriate operational techniques can protect the fact of
employment of EA 1729. [116]
On the basis of this evaluation, the study concluded that in
view of "the stakes involved and the interests of national
security," the proposed plan for field testing should be
approved.
The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects
by the Army raises serious constitutional and legal issues. The
consideration given these issues by the Army was wholly insufficient.
The character of the Army's volunteer testing program and the
possibility that drugs were simply substituted for other forms
of violence or duress in field interrogations raises serious
doubts as to whether national security imperatives were properly
interpreted. The "consent" forms which each American
volunteer signed prior to the administration of LSD are a case
in point. These forms contained no mention of the medical and
psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they mention
the nature of the psychotropic drug to be administered:
The general nature of the experiments in which I have volunteered
have been explained to me from the standpoint of possible hazards
to my health. It is my understanding that the experiments
are so designed, based on the results of animals and previous
human experimentation, that the anticipated results will justify
the performance of the experiment. I understand further that
experiments will be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and medical suffering and injury, and that I will
be at liberty to request that the experiments be terminated at
any time if in my opinion I have reached the physical or
mental state where continuation of the experiments becomes undesirable.
I recognize that in the pursuit of certain experiments
transitory discomfort may occur. I recognize, also, that
under these circumstances, I must rely upon the skill and
wisdom of the physician supervising the experiment to institute
whatever medical or surgical measures are indicated. [Emphasis
added.] [118]
The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD
in these forms raises serious doubts as to their validity. An
"understanding... that the anticipated results will justify
the performance of the experiment" without full knowledge
of the nature of the experiment is an incomplete "understanding."
Similarly, the nature of the experiment limited the ability of
both the subject to request its request its termination and the
experimenter to implement such a request. Finally, the euphemistic
characterization of "transitory discomfort" and the
agreement to "rely on the skill and wisdom of the physician"
combine to conceal inherent risks in the experimentation and
may be viewed as dissolving the experimenter of personal responsibility
for damaging aftereffects. In summary, a "volunteer"
program in which subjects are not fully informed of potential
hazards to their persons is "volunteer" in name only.
[116]
USAINTC staff study, Material Testing Program EA 1729,"
10/15/59, p. 26.
[118] Sample volunteer consent form.
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This problem was compounded by the security statements signed
by each volunteer before he participated in the testing. As part
of this statement, potential subjects agreed that they would:
... not divulge or make available any information related to
U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest or participation in the
Department of the Army Medical Research Volunteer Program to
any individual, nation, organization, business, association,
or other group or entity, not officially authorized to receive
such information.
I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of this
statement will render me liable to punishment under the provisions
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. [119]
Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing aftereffects
of the test might have been unable to seek immediate medical
assistance.
This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is
inexcusable. Further, the absence of any comprehensive long-term
medical assistance for the subjects of these experiments is not
only unscientific; it is also unprofessional.
4. Lack of Normal Authorization and Supervision
It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that
the Army's testing programs often operated under informal and
nonroutine authorization. Potentially dangerous operations such
as these testing programs are the very projects which ought to
be subject to the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels
of the military command structure. There are numerous examples
of inadequate review, partial consideration, and incomplete approval
in the administration of these programs.
When the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in
"field stations" was authorized in May 1955, the Arm
violated its own procedures in obtaining approval. Under Army
Chief of Staff Memorandum 385, such proposals were to be personally
approved by the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was
submitted to him on April 26, 1956, the Secretary issued no written
authorization for the project, and there is no evidence that
he either reviewed or approved the plan. Less than a month later,
the Army Chief of Staff issued a memorandum authorizing the tests.
[120]
Subsequent testing of LSD under Material Testing Program EA 1729
operated generally under this authorization. When the plans for
this testing were originally discussed in early 1958 by officials
of the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and representatives
of the Chemical Warfare Center at Edgewood Arsenal, an informal
proposal was formulated. This proposal was submitted to the Medical
Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of the Army
Intelligence Board on June 3, 1958. There is no evidence that
the plan was approved at any level higher than the President
of the Intelligence Board or the Commanding General of Edgewood.
The approval at Edgewood appears to have been issued by the Commander's
Adjutant. The Medical Research Laboratories did not submit the
plan to the Surgeon General for approval (a standard procedure)
because
[119]
Sample Volunteer Security Statement.
[120] Inspector General of the Army Report,
"Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research," 3/10/76,
p. 109.
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the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations
granted in May 1956. [121]
The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIRD
CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the Army Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General Willems) on December
7, 1960. [122] This verbal approval came in the course of a briefing
on previous drug programs and on the planned field experimentation.
There is no record of written approval being issued by the ACSI
to authorize these specific projects until January 1961, and
there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the
Secretary of the Army.
On February 4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI,
forwarded a copy of the THIRD CHANCE Trip Report to Army Chief
of Staff, General Earl Wheeler. [123] Wheeler had apparently
requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through
a General Hamlett. While this report included background on the
origins of the LSD tests, it appears that General Wheeler may
only have read the conclusion and recommendations. [124] The
office memorandum accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler's
initials. [125]
5. Termination of Testing
On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSIs office on
the results of Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both SPT's
concluded that more field testing was required before LSD could
be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interrogations.
During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General Leonard
(Deputy ACSI) directed that no further field testing be undertaken.
[126] After this meeting the ACSI sent a letter to the Commanding
General of the Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) requesting
that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT and "make a net
evaluation concerning the adoption of EA 1729 for future use
as an effective and profitable aid in counterintelligence interrogations."
[127] On the same day the ACSI requested that the CDC Commander
revise regulation FM 30-17 to read in part:
... in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interrogations
in counterintelligence or security operations without prior permission
of the Department of the Army. Requests to use drugs as an investigative
aid will be forwarded through intelligence channels to the ACSI,
DA, for approval....
Medical research has established that information obtained through
the use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid....
It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a prerequisite
for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal, medical and
political problems inherent in their use for intelligence purposes.
[128]
[121]
Ibid, pp. 135, 137, 138.
[122] Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60.
[123] Memorandum from Leonard to Wheeler, 2/4/63.
[124] SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett,
2/5/63.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Maj. F. Barnett, memorandum for the
record, 8/12/63.
[127] Yamaki memorandum for the record, 7/16/63.
[128] Ibid.
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The subsequent adoption of this regulation marked the effective
termination of field testing of LSD by the Army.
The official termination date of these testing Programs is rather
unclear, but a later ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred
in September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a meeting was
held between Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis (Chemical
Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General Deholm
and Colonel Schmidt). "As a result of this conference a
determination was made to suspend the program and any further
activity pending a more profitable and suitable use." [129]
D. Cooperation And Competition Among The Intelligence
Community Agencies And Between These Agencies And Other Individuals
And Institutions
1. Relationships Among Agencies Within the Intelligence
Community
Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this area
varied considerably over time, ranging from full cooperation
to intense and wasteful competition. The early period was marked
by a high degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence
community. Although the military dominated research involving
chemical and biological agents, the information developed was
shared with the FBI and the CIA. But the spirit of cooperation
did not continue. The failure by the military to share information
apparently breached the spirit, if not the letter, of commands
from above.
As noted above, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
was briefed on the proposed operational testing of LSD under
Project THIRD CHANCE, and expressed concern that the project
had not been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request,
no coordination was achieved between the Army and either of these
agencies. Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this project
may have been evaluated in a different light.
The competition between the agencies in this area reached bizarre
levels. A military officer told a CIA representative in confidence
about the military's field testing of LSD in Europe under Project
THIRD CHANCE, and the CIA promptly attempted to learn surreptitiously
the nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time
Mr. Helms argued to the DDCI that the unwitting testing program
should be continued, as it contributed to the CIA's capability
in the area and thus allowed the CIA "to restrain others
in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense)
from pursuing operations. [130]
The MKNAOMI program was also marked by a failure to share information.
The Army Special Forces (the principal customer of the Special
Operations Division at Fort Dietrick) and the CIA rather than
attempting to coordinate their efforts promulgated different
requirements which varied only slightly. This apparently resulted
in some duplication of effort. In order to insure the security
of CIA operations, the Agency would request materials from SOD
for operational use without fully or accurately describing the
operational requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's
ability to assist the CIA.
[129]
Undated ASCI memorandum, p. 2.
[130] Memorandum from the DDP to the DCI, 11/9/64,
p. 2.
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2. Relationship Between the Intelligence Community
Agencies and Foreign Liaison Services
The subjects of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and
biological agents abroad were generally being held for interrogation
by foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information
about the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organizations,
cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security of
CIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the
American Government in a position of complicity in actions which
violated the rights of the subjects, and which may have violated
the laws of the country in which the experiments took place.
Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations
in foreign countries was not limited to relationships with the
intelligence or internal security organizations. Some MKULTRA
research was conducted abroad. While this is, in itself, not
a questionable practice, it is important that such research abroad
not be undertaken to evade American laws. That this was a possibility
is suggested by an ARTICHOKE memorandum in which it is noted
that working with the scientists of a foreign country "might
be very advantageous" since that government "permitted
certain activities which were not permitted by the United States
government (i.e., experiments on anthrax, etc.)." [131]
3. The Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies
and Other Agencies of the U.S. Government
Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts
of intelligence agencies in this area. One form of assistance
was to provide "cover" for research contracts let by
intelligence agencies, in order to disguise intelligence community
interest in chemical and biological agents.
Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Although
the CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration
of LSD was conducted by Bureau of Narcotics personnel, there
was no open connection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency.
The Bureau was serving as a "cut-out" in order to make
it difficult to trace Agency participation. The cut-out arrangement,
however, reduced the CIA's ability to control the program. The
Agency could not control the process by which subjects were selected
and cultivated, and could not regulate follow-up after the testing.
Moreover, as the CIA's Inspector General noted: "the handling
of test subjects in the last analysis rests with the [Bureau
of Narcotics] agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of
critical results from the top CIA management is an inherent risk
in these operations." [132] The arrangement also made it
impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to
end the surreptitious administration of LSD would be honored
by the Bureau personnel.
The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics was described as
"informal." [133] The informality of the arrangement
compounded the problem is aggravated by the fact that the 40
Committee has had vir-
[131]
ARTICHOKE Memorandum, 6/13/52.
[132] IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963, p.14.
[133] Ibid This was taken by one Agency
official to mean that there would be no written contract and
no formal mechanism for payment. (Eider, 12/18/75, p. 31.)
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apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership
to ask for details, and the CIA's hesitation in volunteering
information. These problems raise serious questions of command
and control within the Bureau.
4. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies
and Other Institutions and Individuals, Public and Private
The Inspector General's 1963 Survey of MKULTRA noted that "the
research and development" phase was conducted through standing
arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceutical
houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private
research organizations" in a manner which concealed "from
the institution the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key
individuals" in each institution were "made witting
of Agency sponsorship." The research and development phase
was succeeded by a phase involving physicians, toxicologists,
and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals
and prisons, who are provided the products and findings of the
basic research projects and proceed with intensive testing on
human subjects." [134]
According to the Inspector General, the MKULTRA testing programs
were "conducted under accepted scientific procedures...
where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants
in the programs." [135] This was clearly not true in the
project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD, which
was marked by a complete lack of screening, medical supervision,
opportunity to observe, or medical or psychological follow-up.
The intelligence agencies allowed individual researchers to design
their project. Experiments sponsored by these researchers (which
included one where narcotics addicts were sent to Lexington,
Kentucky, who were rewarded with the drug of their addiction
in return for participation in experiments with LSD) call into
question the decision by the agencies not to fix guidelines for
the experiments.
The MKULTRA research and development program raises other questions,
as well. It is not clear whether individuals in prisons, mental,
narcotics and general hospitals can provide "informed consent"
to participation in experiments such as these. There is doubt
as to whether institutions should be unwitting of the ultimate
sponsor of research being done in their facilities. The nature
of the arrangements also made it impossible for the individuals
who were not aware of the sponsor of the research to exercise
any choice about their participation based on the sponsoring
organization.
Although greater precautions are now being taken in research
conducted on behalf of the intelligence community agencies, the
dilemma of classification remains. The agencies obviously wished
to conceal their interest in certain forms of in order to avoid
stimulating interest in the same areas by hostile governments.
In some cases today contractors or researchers wish to conceal
their connection with these agencies. Yet the fact of classification
prevents open discussion and debate upon which scholarly work
depends.
[134]
Ibid p. 9.
[135] Ibid p. 10.
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