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Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program
Of Research In Behavioral Modification
TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Accompanied by Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical
Services; Al Brody, Office of Inspector General; Ernest Mayerfield,
Office of General Counsel; and George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to begin by thanking you and Senator Kennedy for having a joint
hearing this morning. I hope this will expedite and facilitate
our getting all the information that both of your committees
need into the record quickly.
I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks
today by reminding us all that the events about which we are
here to talk are 12- to 24-years old. They in no way represent
the current activities or policies of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
What we are here to do is to give you all the information that
we now have and which we did not previously have on a subject
known s Project MKULTRA, a project which took place from 1953
to 1964. It was an umbrella project under which there were numerous
subprojects for research, among other things, on drugs and behavioral
modification. What the new material that we offer today is a
supplement to the considerable material that was made available
in 1975, during the Church committee hearings, and also to the
Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research.
At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents
it believed it had available. The principal one available at
that time that gave the greatest amount of information on this
subject was a report of the CIA's Inspector General written in
1963, and which led directly to the termination of this activity
in 1964, 13 years ago.
The information available in 1975 to the various investigating
groups was indeed sparse, first because of the destruction of
material that took place in 1973, as detailed by Senator Kennedy
a minute ago, with the concurrence of the then Director of Central
Intelligence and under the supervision of the Director of the
Office of Technical Services that supervised Project MKULTRA.
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The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA
people who had been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity
had retired from the Agency. I would further add that I think
the material was sparse in part because it was the practice at
that time not to keep detailed records in this category.
For instance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes:
Present practice is to maintain no records
of the planning and approval of test programs.
In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after
the destruction of 1973.
What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you
know what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topic,
and I will start by describing how the material was discovered
and why it was not previously discovered. The material in question,
some seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center
outside of the Washington area. It was discovered that as the
result of an extensive search by an employee charged with the
responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs
and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on
this subject.
During the Church committee investigation of 1975, searches for
MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the active
and the retired records of all of the branches of CIA considered
likely to have had an association with MKULTRA documents. The
retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch
that was responsible for such work were not searched, however.
This was because the financial paper associated with sensitive
projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained by the branch
itself under the project title, MKULTRA, not by the Budget and
Fiscal Section under the project title, MKULTRA, not by the Budget
and Fiscal Section under a special budget file.
In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had
been sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget
and Fiscal Section of this branch as part of its own retired
holdings. In short, what should have been filed by the branch
itself was filed by the Budget and Fiscal Section, and what should
have been filed under the project title, MKULTRA, was filed under
budget and fiscal matters. The reason for this departure from
the normal procedure of that time is simply not known, and as
a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction
in 1973, as well as discovery in 1975.
The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone
unturned in his efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information
Act request, or several of them, in fact. He reviewed all of
the listings of material of this branch, stored at the Retired
Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section,
and thus discovered the MKULTRA-related documents, which had
been missed in the previous searches.
In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents
in 1973, in the process of attempting to destroy them. It similarly
failed to locate them in 1975, in response to the Church committee
hearings. I am personally persuaded that there is no evidence
of any attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.
Moreover, as we will discuss as we proceed, I do not believe
the material itself is such that
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there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this,
having disclosed what it did in 1975.
Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material.
It is important to remember what I have just noted, that these
folders that were discovered are finance folders. The bulk of
the material in them consists of approvals for the advance of
funds, vouchers, and accountings and such, most of which are
not very informative as to the nature of the activities that
they were supporting. Occasional project proposals or memoranda
commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout
this material. In general, however, the recovered material does
not include overall status reports or other documents relating
to operational considerations, or to the progress on various
subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated
does appear from time to time.
There are roughly three categories of projects. First, there
are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some
connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition
and testing, or administering drugs surreptitiously. Second,
there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including
audit reports and financial statements from intermediary funding
mechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research
projects.
Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain
intelligence activities previously funded under MKULTRA but which
have nothing to do either with behavioral modifications, drugs
or toxins, or any closely related matter.
We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149
subprojects into categories under descriptive headings. In broad
outline, at least, this presents the contents of these files.
The following 15 categories are the ones we have divided these
into.
First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol.
Within this, there are 17 projects probably not involving human
testing. There are 14 subprojects definitely involving testing
on human volunteers. There are 19 subprojects probably including
tests on human volunteers and 6 subprojects involving tests on
unwitting human beings.
Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including
two involving hypnosis and drugs in combination.
Third, there are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals
or drugs.
Fourth, four subprojects on the aspects of the magician's art,
useful in covert operations, for instance, the surreptitious
delivery of drug-related materials.
Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior,
sleep research, and behavioral change during psychotherapy.
Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants
at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modifications.
Seventh, there are 23 projects on motivational studies, studies
of defectors, assessments of behavior and training techniques.
Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.
Ninth, there are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for
MKULTRA's external research activities.
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Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins,
and biologicals in human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens,
and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery
systems.
Eleventh, there are three subprojects involving funding support
for unspecified activities conducted with the Army Special Operations
Division at Fort Detrich, Md. This activity is outlined in Book
I of the Church committee report, pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix
A, pp. 68-69).
Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army assisted the CIA in developing,
testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems
for use against humans as well as against animals and crops.
Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in such areas as the
effects of electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive
use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays
and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material
sabotage.
Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following:
blood grouping research; controlling the activities of animals;
energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and stimulus
and response in biological systems.
Finally, 15th, there are three subprojects canceled before any
work was done on them having to do with laboratory drug screening,
research on brain concussion, and research on biologically active
materials.
Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds
to what has previously been reported to the Church committee
and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. The answer is
basically additional detail. The principal types of activities
included in these documents have for the most part been outlined
or to some extent generally described in what was previously
available in the way of documentation and which was supplied
by the CIA to the Senate investigators.
For example, financial disbursement records for the period of
1960 to 1964 for 76 of these 149 subprojects had been recovered
by the Office of Finance at CIA and were made available to the
Church committee investigators. For example, the 1963 Inspector
General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church Committee
and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment
substances, covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the search
for new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals
and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division
of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of
human behavior.
For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General
report was also made available to the Church committee staff,
and that report discusses the techniques for human assessment
and unorthodox methods of communication, discrediting and disabling
materials which can be covertly administered, studies on magicians'
arts as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics.
The most significant new data that has been discovered are, first,
the names of researchers and institutions who participated in
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MKULTRA projects, and second, a possibly improper contribution
by the CIA to a private institution. We are now in the possession
of the names of 185 nongovernment researchers and assistants
who are identified in the recovered material dealing with these
149 subprojects.
There are also names of 80 institutions where work was done or
with which these people were affiliated. The institutions include
44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundation or chemical
or pharmaceutical companies or the like, 12 hospitals or clinics,
in addition to those associated with the universities, and 3
penal institutions.
While the identities of some of these people and institutions
were known previously, the discovery of the new identities adds
to our knowledge of MKULTRA.
The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution
are as follows. One project involves a contribution of $375,000
to a building fund of a private medical institution. The fact
that that contribution was made was previously known. Indeed,
it was mentioned in the 1957 report of the Inspector General
on the Technical Service Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA,
and pertinent portions of this had been reviewed by the Church
committee staff.
The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this
contribution was made through an intermediary, which made it
appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution
was then matched by Federal funds. The institution was not made
aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved
by the then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in
by CIA's top management including the then General Counsel, who
wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.
The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into
the scope of an unwitting nature of the drug testing, but contribute
little more than that. We now do have corroborating information
that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried out in what
is known in the intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco
and in New York City, and we have identified that three individuals
were involved in this undertaking, whereas we previously reported
there was only one person.
We also know that some unwitting testing took place on criminal
sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally
research was done on a knockout or K drug in parallel with research
to develop painkillers for cancer patients.
These, then, are the principal findings identified to date in
our review of this recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe
the detail on the identities of researchers and institutions
involved in CIA sponsorship of drug and behavioral modification
research is a new element and one which poses a considerable
problem. Most of the people and institutions involved were not
aware of CIA sponsorship. We should certainly assume that the
researchers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a witting
basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding
their Government in a legitimate and proper purpose.
I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers
and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassment
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or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities
might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the
Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual
researchers without their consent.
This is especially true, of course, for those researchers and
institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA sponsored
activities.
Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize the right and
the need of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research
to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever
detail you consider necessary. I am providing your committee
with all of the documentation, including all of the names, on
a classified basis. I hope that this will facilitate your investigation
while still protecting the individuals and the institutions involved.
Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24 years
in the past, and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in
either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General on this
matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever
materials he may deem necessary to any investigations that he
may elect to undertake. Beyond that, we are also working with
the Attorney General to determine whether it is practicable from
this new evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs
were administered, but we are now trying to determine if there
are adequate clues to lead to their identification, and if so
how best to go about fulfilling the Government's responsibilities
in this matter.
Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with that process of attempting to
identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper
responsibility to them, I will keep both of these committees
fully advised. I thank you, sir.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Admiral
Turner. Your spirit of cooperation is much appreciated. I would
like to announce to the committee that in order to give every
member an opportunity to participate in this hearing, that we
would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.
Admiral Turner, please give this committee the genesis of MKULTRA.
Who or what committee or commission or agency was responsible
for dreaming up this grandiose and sinister project, and why
was it necessary? What is the rationale or justification for
such a project and was the President of the United States aware
of this?
Admiral TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to
ask Mr. Brody on my right, who is a long-time member of the CIA
to address that in more detail. I believe everything that we
know about the genesis was turned over to the Church committee
and is contained in that material. Basically, it was a CIA-initiated
project. It started out of a concern of our being taken advantage
of by other powers who would use drugs against our personnel,
and it was approved in the Agency. I have asked the question
you just asked me, and have been assured that there is no evidence
within the Agency of any involvement at higher echelons, the
White House, for instance, or specific approval. That does not
say there was not, but we have no such evidence.
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Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please?
Mr. BRODY. Mr. Chairman, I really have very
little to add to that. To my knowledge, there was no Presidential
knowledge of this project at the time. It was a CIA project,
and as the admiral said, it was a project designed to attempt
to counteract what was then thought to be a serious threat by
our enemies of using drugs against us. Most of what else we know
about is in the Senate Church committee report.
Senator INOUYE. Are you suggesting that it was
intentionally kept away from the Congress and the President of
the United States?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir. We are only saying
that we have no evidence one way or the other as to whether the
Congress was informed of this particular project. There are no
records to indicate.
Senator INOUYE. Admiral Turner, are you personally
satisfied by actual investigation that this newly discovered
information was not intentionally kept away from the Senate of
the United States?
Admiral TURNER. I have no way to prove that,
sir. That is my conviction from everything I have seen of it.
Senator INOUYE. Now, we have been advised that
these documents were initially discovered in March of this year,
and you were notified in July of this year, or June of this year,
and the committee was notified in July. Can you tell us why the
Director of Central Intelligence was notified 3 months after
its initial discovery, why the delay?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. All this started with
several Freedom of Information Act requests, and Mr. Laubinger
on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to pursue
these requests with great diligence, and got permission to go
to the Retired Records Center, and then made the decision to
look not only under what would be the expected subject files,
but through every file with which the branch that conducted this
type of activity had any conceivable connection.
Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes. He arranged
to have them shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washington,
to our headquarters. They arrived in early April. He advised
his appropriate superiors, who asked him how long he thought
it would take him to go through these and screen them appropriately,
clear them for Freedom of Information Act release.
There are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here. We now
think that was an underestimation, and it may be closer to 8,000
pages. He estimated it would take about 45 days or into the middle
of May to do that. He was told to proceed, and as he did so there
was nothing uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that
appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the
knowledge that had already been given to the Church committee,
some details, but no major revelations.
He and his associates proceeded with deliberateness, but not
a great sense of urgency. There were other interfering activities
that came and demanded his time also. He was not able to put
100 percent of his time on it, and there did not appear to be
cause for a great rush here. We were trying to be responsive
to the Freedom of Information Act request within the limits of
our manpower and our priorities.
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In early June, however, he discovered two projects, the one related
to K drugs and the one related to the funding at the institution,
and realized immediately that he had substantial new information,
and he immediately reported this to his superiors.
Two actions were taken. One was to notify the lawyers of the
principal Freedom of Information Act requestor that we would
have substantial new material and that it would be forthcoming
as rapidly as possible, and the second was to start a memorandum
up the chain that indicated his belief that we should notify
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of this discovery
because of the character at least of these two documents.
As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we
had to go through the legal office, the legislative liaison office
and at each echelon about the same question was asked of him:
Have you gone through all of this, so that when we notify the
Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important
revelations and not the other half? The last thing I want, Mr.
Chairman, is in any way to be on any topic, give the appearance
on any topic of being recalcitrant, reluctant, or having to have
you drag things out of me, and my subordinates, much to my pleasure,
had each asked, have you really gone through these 8,000 pages
enough to know that we are not going to uncover a bombshell down
at the bottom?
By late June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy.
He notified me after his review of it on the 7th of July, which
is the first I knew of it. I began reading into it. I asked the
same probing question directly. I then notified my superiors,
and on the 15th delivered to you my letter letting you know that
we had this, and we have been working, many people, many hours
since then, to be sure that what we are telling you today does
include all the relevant material.
Senator INOUYE. I would like to commend Mr.
Laubinger for his diligence and expertise, but was this diligence
the result of the Freedom of Information Act or could this diligence
have been exercised during the Church hearings? Why was it not
exercised? Admiral TURNER. There is no question
that theoretically this diligence could have been exercised at
any time, and it may well be that the Freedom of Information
Act has made us more aware of this. Would you speak for yourself,
please.
Mr. LAUBINGER. I really don't attribute it,
Senator, to diligence so much as thoroughness. If you can imagine
the pressures under an organization trying to respond, which
I think the CIA did at the time of the Church committee hearings,
the hallways of the floor I am on were full of boxes from our
records center. Every box that anyone thought could possibly
contain anything was called up for search. It was one of a frantic
effort to comply.
When the pressure of that situation cools down, and you can start
looking at things systematically, you are apt to find things
that you wouldn't under the heat of a crash program, and that
is what happened here.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Senator
Kennedy?
Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Turner, this is an
enormously distressing report that you give to the American Congress
and to the American people today. Granted, it happened many years
ago, but what we are
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basically talking about is an activity which took place in the
country that involved the perversion and the corruption of many
of our outstanding research centers in this country, with CIA
funds, where some of our top researchers were unwittingly involved
in research sponsored by the Agency in which they had no knowledge
of the background or the support for.
Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely
unknowing in terms of taking various drugs, and there are perhaps
any number of Americans who are walking around today on the east
coast or west coast who were given drugs, with all the kinds
of physical and psychological damage that can be caused. We have
gone over that in very careful detail, and it is significant
and severe indeed.
I do not know what could be done in a less democratic country
that would be more alien to our own traditions than was really
done in this narrow area, and as you give this report to the
committee, I would like to get some sense of your own concern
about this type of activity, and how you react, having assumed
this important responsibility with the confidence of President
Crater and the overwhelming support, obviously, of the Congress,
under this set of circumstances.
I did not get much of a feeling in reviewing your statement here
this morning of the kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity
which I think the American people would certainly deplore and
which I believe that you do, but could you comment upon that
question, and also perhaps give us what ideas you have to insure
that it cannot happen again?
Admiral TURNER. Senator Kennedy, it is totally
abhorrent to me to think of using a human being as a guinea pig
and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health, no matter
how great the cause. I am not here to pass judgment on my predecessors,
but I can assure you that this is totally beyond the pale of
my contemplation of activities that the CIA or any other of our
intelligence agencies should undertake.
I am taking and have taken what I believe are adequate steps
to insure that such things are not continuing today.
Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us a little
bit about that?
Admiral TURNER. I have asked for a special report
assuring me that there are no drug activities extant, that is,
drug activities that involve experimentation. Obviously, we collect
intelligence about drugs and drug use in other countries, but
there are no experimentations being conducted by the Central
Intelligence Agency, and I have had a special check made because
of another incident that was uncovered some years ago about the
unauthorized retention of some toxic materials at the CIA. I
have had an actual inspection made of the storage places and
the certification from the people in charge of those that there
are no such chemical biological materials present in our keeping,
and I have issued express orders that that shall not be the case.
Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command
and direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude
I have just expressed to you in this regard.
Senator KENNEDY. I think that is very commendable.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. I think it is important that
the American people understand that.
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You know, much of the research which is our area of interest
that was being done by the Agency and the whole involved sequence
of activities done by the Agency, I am convinced could have been
done in a legitimate way through the research programs of the
National Institutes of Mental Health, other sponsored activities,
I mean, that is some other question, but I think you went to
an awful lot of trouble, where these things could have been.
Let me ask you specifically, on the followup of MKULTRA, are
there now -- I think you have answered, but I want to get a complete
answer about any experimentations that are being done on human
beings, whether it is drugs or behavioral alterations or patterns
or any support, either directly or indirectly, being provided
by the Agency in terms of any experimentation on human beings.
Admiral TURNER. There is no experimentation
with drugs on human beings, witting or unwitting, being conducted
in any way.
Senator KENNEDY. All right. How bout the nondrug
experimentation our Committee has seen -- psychosurgery, for
example, or psychological research?
Admiral TURNER. We are continually involved
in what we call assessment of behavior. For instance, we are
trying to continually improve our polygraph procedures to, you
know, assess whether a person is lying or not. This does not
involve any tampering with the individual body. This involves
studying records of people's behavior under different circumstances,
and so n, but it is not an experimental thing. Have I described
that accurately, Al?
Mr. BRODY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is limited to those
areas?
Admiral TURNER. Yes; it does not involve attempting
to modify behavior. It only involves studying behavior conditions,
but not trying to actively modify it, as was one of the objectives
of MKULTRA.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we are scarce on time,
but I am interested in the other areas besides polygraph where
you are doing it. Maybe you can either respond now or submit
it for the record, if you would do that. Would you provide that
for the record?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
[The material on psychological
assessments follows:]
Psychological assessments are performed as a
service to officers in the operations directorate who recruit
and/or handle agents. Except for people involved in training
courses, the subjects of the assessments are foreign nationals.
The assessments are generally done to determine the most successful
tactic to persuade the subject to accept convert employment by
the CIA, and to make an appraisal of his reliability and truthfulness.
A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists,
some of whom are stationed overseas. The assessments they do
may be either direct or indirect. Direct assessments involve
a personal interview of the subject by the psychologist. When
possible the subject is asked to complete a formal "intelligence
test" which is actually a disguised psychological test.
Individuals being assessed are not given drugs, nor are they
subjected to physical harassment or torture. When operating conditions
are such that a face-to-face interview is not possible, the psychologist
may do an indirect assessment, using as source materials descriptions
of the subject by others, interviews with people who know him,
specimens of his writings, etc.
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The other psychological assessments
involve handwriting analysis or graphological assessment. The
work is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted by
a small number of measurement technicians. They generally require
at least a page of handwritten script by the subject. Measurements
are made of about 30 different writing characteristics, and these
are charted and furnished to the graphologist for assessments.
The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment
to group of operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities
to size up people. As part of the training course, the instructor
does a psychological assessment of each student. The students
are writing participants, and results are discussed with them.
It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are
only a service to the operations officers. In the final analysis,
it is the responsibility of the operations officer to decide
how a potential agent should be approached, or to make a judgment
as to whether any agent is telling the truth.
Admiral TURNER. The kind of thing we
are interested in is, what will motivate a man to become an agent
of the United States in a difficult situation. We have to be
familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expect
from people we approach to for one reason or another become our
spies, but I will be happy to submit a very specific listing
of these.
Senator KENNEDY. Would you do that for the committee?
In the followups, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the CHICKWIT,
could you give us also a report on those particular programs?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Did they involve experimentation,
human experimentation?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. None of them?
Admiral TURNER. Let me say this, that the CHICKWIT
program is the code name for the CIA participation in what was
basically a Department of Defense program. This program was summarized
and reported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I
have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last
2 days here, I have not had time to go through and personally
review them. I have ascertained that all of the files that we
had and made available before are intact, and I have put a special
order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch
them without my permission at this point, but they are in the
Retired Records Center outside of Washington, and they are available.
I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply
haven't read into that part of our history, but in addition I
would suggest when we want to get into that we should get the
Department of Defense in with us.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you will supply that
information to the Intelligence Committee, the relevant, I mean,
the health aspects, obviously, and the research we are interested
in?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Will you let us know, Admiral
Turner?
Admiral TURNER. I will be happy to.
[See p. 169 for the material referred to.]
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. I am running out
of time. Do you support the extension of the protection of human
subjects legislation to include the CIA and the DOD? You commented
favorably on that
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before, and I am hopeful we can get that on the calendar early
in September, and that is our strong interest.
Admiral TURNER. The CIA certainly has no objection
to that proposed legislation, sir. It is not my role in the administration
to be the supporter of it or the endorser of it.
Senator KENNEDY. As a personal matter, since
you have reviewed these subjects, would you comment? I know it
is maybe unusual, but you can understand what we are attempting
to do.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. From your own experience in
the agency, you can understand the value of it.
Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional
information, it seems quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct
in very careful detail this whole project in terms of the responsible
CIA officials for the program. You have so indicated in your
testimony. Now with the additional information, and the people,
that have been revealed in the examination of the documents,
it seems to be pretty clear that you can track that whole program
in very careful detail, and I would hope, you know, that you
would want to get to the bottom of it, as the Congress does as
well. I will come back to that in my next round. Thank you very
much.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Goldwater?
Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on
page 12, where you discuss the contribution to the building fund
of a private medical institution. You state, "Indeed, it
was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical
Services Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which had been
reviewed by the Church committee staff." I would like to
have you consider this question very carefully. I served as a
member o the original Church committee. My staffer did a lot
of the work that you are referring to here. He made notes on
the IG's report. My question to you is, are you saying that the
section that specifically delineates an improper contribution
was in fact given to the Church committee staff to see?
Admiral TURNER. The answer to your question
is "Yes." The information that a contribution had been
made was made available, to the best of my knowledge.
Senator SCHWEIKER. To follow this up further,
I'd like to say that I think there was a serious flaw in the
way that the IG report was handled and the Church committee was
limited. I am not making any accusations, but because of limited
access to the report, we have a situ-
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ation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that
material or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the
report under the procedures we had to follow. We were limited
by notetaking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what
was seen and what was not seen. I certainly hope that the new
Intelligence Committee will not be bound by procedures that restrict
its ability to exercise effective oversight.
I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that
we used a subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction
grant funds to finance facilities for these sorts of experiments
on our own people? Because as I understand what you are saying,
while the CIA maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a response
on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith
basis matching hospital funds at the same level. We put up more
than $1 million of matching funds, some based on an allegedly
private donation which was really CIA money.
Isn't there something basically wrong with that?
Admiral TURNER. I certainly believe there is.
As I stated, the General Counsel of the CIA at that time rendered
a legal opinion that this was a legal undertaking, and again
I am hesitant to go back and revisit the atmosphere, the laws,
the attitudes at that time, so whether the counsel was on good
legal ground or not, I am not enough of a lawyer to be sure,
but it certainly would occur to me if it happened today as a
very questionable activity.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I think those of us
who have worked on and amended the Hill-Burton Act and other
hospital construction assistance laws over the years, would have
a rather different opinion on the legal intent or object of Congress
in passing laws to provide hospital construction project money.
These funds weren't intended for this.
It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which
turned up when I was on the Church committee. The Public Health
Service was used to produce a deadly poison with Public Health
money. Here we are using general hospital construction money
to carry on a series of drug experimentation.
Admiral TURNER. Excuse me, sir. If I could just
be, I think, accurate, I don't think any of this $375,000 or
the matching funds were used to conduct drug experiments. They
were used to build the hospital. Now, the CIA the put more money
into a foundation that was conducting research on the CIA's behalf
supposedly in that hospital, so the intent was certainly there,
but the money was not used for experimentation.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I understand it was
used for bricks and mortar, but the bricks were used to build
the facility where the experiments were carried on; were they
not?
Admiral TURNER. We do not have positive evidence
that they were. It certainly would seem that that was the intent,
but I do not want to draw inferences here --
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, why else would they
give this money for the building fund if the building was not
used for a purpose that benefited the CIA program?
Admiral TURNER. I certainly draw the inference
that the CIA expected to benefit from it, and some of the wording
says the General
-21-
Counsel's opinion was that this was legal only if the CIA was
going to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, there is
no evidence of what benefit was derived.
Senator SCHWEIKER. There must have been some
pretty good benefits at stake. The Atomic Energy Commission was
to bear a share of the cost, and when they backed out for some
reason or another, the CIA picked up part of their tab. So, at
two different points there were indications that CIA decisionmakers
thought there was great benefit to be derived from whatever happened
within the brick and mortar walls of that facility.
Admiral TURNER. You are absolutely right. I
am only taking the position that I cannot substantiate that there
was benefit derived.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The agreement documents say
that the CIA would have access to one-sixth of the space involved
in the construction of the wing, so how would you enter into
an agreement that specifically says that you will have access
to and use of one-sixth of the space and not perform something
in that space? I cannot believe it was empty.
Admiral TURNER. Sir, I am not disputing you
at all, but both of us are saying that the inference is that
one-sixth of the space was used, that experimentation was done,
and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on as
a result of that payment or what went on in that hospital. It
is just missing. It is not that it didn't happen.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Admiral Turner, one other--
Senator KENNEDY. Would the Senator yield on
that point?
Senator SCHWEIKER. I understand that in the
agency's documents on the agreement it was explicitly stated
that one-sixth of the facility would be designated for CIA use
and made available for CIA research are you familiar--
Mr. BRODY. Senator, as I recall, you are right
in that there is a mention of one-sixth, but any mention at all
has to do with planning. There are no subsequent reports as to
what happened after the construction took place.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Admiral Turner, I read in
the New York Times that part of this series of MKULTRA experiments
involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
to test LSD surreptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New
York and San Francisco. Some of the subjects became violently
ill and were hospitalized. I wonder if you would just briefly
describe what we were doing there and how it was carried out?
I assume it was through a safe house operation. I don't believe
your statement went into much detail.
Admiral TURNER. I did mention the safe house
operation in my statement, sir, and that is how these were carried
out. What we have learned from the new documentation is the location
and the dates at which the safe houses were run by the CIA and
the identification of three individuals who were associated with
running those safe houses. We know something about the construction
work that was done in them because there were contracts for this.
Beyond that, we are pretty much drawing inferences as to the
things that went on as to what you are saying here.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, the subjects were unwitting.
You can infer that much, right?
Admiral TURNER. Right.
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Senator SCHWEIKER. If you happened to be at the wrong
bar at the wrong place and time, you got it.
Mr. BRODY. Senator, that would be -- contacts
were made, as we understand it, in bars, et cetera, and then
the people may have been invited to these safe houses. There
really isn't any indication as to the fact that this took place
in bars.
Admiral TURNER. We are trying to be very precise
with you, sir, and not draw an inference here. There are 6 cases
of these 149 where we have enough evidence in this new documentation
to substantiate that there was unwitting testing and some of
that involves these safe houses. There are other cases where
it is ambiguous as to whether the testing was witting or voluntary.
There are others where it was clearly voluntary.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course, after a few drinks,
it is questionable whether informed consent means anything to
a person in a bar anyway.
Admiral TURNER. Well, we don't have any indication
that all these cases where it is ambiguous involved drinking
of any kind. There are cases in penal institutions where it is
not clear whether the prisoner was given a choice or not. I don't
know that he wasn't given a choice, but I don't positively know
that he was, and I classify that as an ambiguous incident.
Senator INOUYE. Your time is up, Senator.
Senator Huddleston?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced
there was no attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation
during the earlier searches. Did you question the individuals
connected with the earlier search before you made that judgment?
Admiral TURNER. Yes; I haven't, I don't think,
questioned everybody who looked in the files or is still on our
payroll who looked in the files back in 1975, but Mr. Laubinger
on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over
it with him in some detail.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But you have inquired, you
think, sufficiently to assure yourself that there was no intent
on the part of any person to conceal these records from the previous
committee?
Admiral TURNER. I am persuaded of that both
by my questioning of people and by the circumstances and the
way in which these documents were filed, by the fact which I
did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these
were not the official files. The ones that we have received or
retrieved were copies of files that were working files that somebody
had used, and therefore were slipped into a different location,
and again I say to you , sir, I can't imagine their deliberately
concealing these particular files and revealing the other things
that they did reveal in 1975. I don't see the motive for that,
because these are not that damning compared with the overall
material that was provided.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Is this the kind of operation
that if it were continuing now or if there were anything similar
to it, that you would feel compelled to report to the Select
Committee on Intelligence?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. You mean, if I discovered
that something like this were going on without my knowledge?
Yes, I would feel absolutely the requirement to --
-23-
Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were going on with your
knowledge, would you report it to the committee? I assume you
would.
Admiral TURNER. Yes. Well, it would not be going
on with my knowledge, but theoretically the answer is yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, then, what suggestions
would you have as we devise charters for the various intelligence
agencies? What provision would you suggest to prohibit this kind
of activity from taking place? Would you suggest that it ought
to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out
the parameters of the permissible operation of the various agencies?
Admiral TURNER. I think that certainly is something
we must consider as we look at the legislation for charters.
I am not on the face of it opposed to it. I think we would have
to look at the particular wording as we are going to have to
deal with the whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you
want to be in delineating restraints and curbs on the intelligence
activities.
Senator HUDDLESTON. In the case of sensitive
type operations, which this certainly was, which might be going
on today, is the oversight activity of the agency more intensive
now than it was at that time?
Admiral TURNER. Much more so. I mean, I have
briefed you, sir, and the committee on our sensitive operations.
We have the Intelligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure
in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive
operations. I think the amount of spotlight focused on these
activities is many, manyfold what it was in these 12 to 24 years
ago.
Senator HUDDLESTON. How about the record keeping?
Admiral TURNER. Yes; I can't imagine anyone
having the gall to think that he can just blithely destroy records
today with all of the attention that has come to this, and certainly
we are emphasizing that that is not the case.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Admiral, I was particularly
interested in the activity that took place at the U.S. Public
Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr. Harris
Isbell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients
there. There was a narcotics institution, I take it, and Dr.
Isbell was, according to the New York Times story, carrying on
a secret series of correspondence with an individual at the agency
by the name of Ray. Have you identified who that person is?
Admiral TURNER. Sir, I find myself in a difficult
position here at a public hearing to confirm or deny these names
in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act not
to disclose the names of individuals here.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I am just asking you if
you have identified the person referred to in that article as
Ray. I am not asking you who he was. I just want to know if you
know who he is.
Admiral TURNER. No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y
or R-a-y?
Senator HUDDLESTON. It is listed in the news
article as R-a-y, in quotations.
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, we have not identified
him.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So you have no knowledge
of whether or note is still a member of your staff or connected
with the Agency in any way. Have you attempted to identify him?
-24-
[Pause.]
Admiral TURNER. Senator, we have a former employee
whose first name is Ray who may have had some connection with
these activities.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You suspect that but you
have not verified that at this time, or at least you are not
in a position to indicate that you have verified it?
Admiral TURNER. That is correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?
Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, not all of the -- and in no way trying to excuse
you of the hideous nature of some of these projects, but not
all of the projects under MKULTRA are of a sinister or even a
moral nature. Is that a fair statement?
Admiral TURNER. That is correct.
Senator WALLOP. Looking down through some of
these 17 projects not involving human testing, aspects of the
magician's art, it doesn't seem as though there is anything very
sinister about that. Studies of human behavior and sleep research,
library searches. Now, those things in their way are still of
interest, are they not, to the process of intelligence gathering?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I have not tried to
indicate that we either are not doing or would not do any of
the things that were involved in MKULTRA, but when it comes to
the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs, that is
certainly verboten, but there are other things.
Senator WALLOP. Even with volunteer patients?
I mean, I am not trying to put you on the spot to say whether
it is going on, but I mean, it is not an uncommon thing, is it,
in the prisons of the United States for the Public Health Service
to conduct various kinds of experiments with vaccines and, say,
sunburn creams? I know in Arizona they have done so.
Admiral TURNER. My understanding is, lots of
that is authorized, but I am not of the opinion that this is
not the CIA's business, and that if we need some information
in that category, I would prefer to go to the other appropriate
authorities of the Government and ask them to get it for us rather
than to in any way--
Senator WALLOP. Well, you know, you have library
searches and attendants at the national seminars. This is why
I wanted to ask you if the bulk of these projects were in any
way the kinds of things that the Agency might not do now. A President
would not have been horrified by the list of the legitimate types
of things. Isn't that probably the case?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator WALLOP. And if it did in fact appear
in the IG report, is there any reason to suppose that the President
did not know of this project? You said there was no reason to
suppose that he did, but let me reverse that. Is there any reason
to suppose that they did not?
Admiral TURNER. No.
Senator WALLOP. Well, you know, I just cannot
imagine you or literally anybody undertaking projects of the
magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it, not
informing your superior that
-25-
these were going on, especially when certain items of it appear
in the Inspector General's report on budget matters.
Admiral TURNER. Well, I find it difficult when
it is that far back to hypothesize what the procedures that the
Director was using in terms of informing his superiors were.
It is quite a different climate from today, and I think we do
a lot more informing to day than they did back then, but I find
it very difficult to guess what the level of knowledge was.
Senator WALLOP. I am really not asking you to
second-guess it, but it just seems to me that, while the past
is past, and thank goodness we are operating under different
sets of circumstances, I think it is naive for us to suppose
that these things were conducted entirely without the knowledge
of the Presidents of the United States during those times. It
is just the kinds of research information that was being sought
was vital to the United States, not the means, but the information
that they were trying to find.
Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Your question is,
was this vital? Did we view it as vital?
Senator WALLOP. Well, your implication at the
beginning was that it was a response to the kinds of behavior
that were seen in Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and other things.
I mean, somebody must have thought that this was an important
defensive reaction, if nothing else, on the part of the United
States.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I am sure they did,
but again I just don't know how high that permeated the executive
branch.
Senator WALLOP. But the kinds of information
are still important to you. I mean, I am not suggesting that
anyone go back and do that kind of thing again, but I'm certain
it would be of use to you to know what was going to happen to
one of your agents assuming someone had put one of these things
into his bloodstream, or tried to modify his behavior.
Admiral TURNER. Absolutely, and you know, we
would be very concerned if we thought there were things like
truth serums or other things that our agents or others could
be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs by other powers
against our people or agents.
Senator WALLOP. Are there? I don't ask you to
name them, but are there such serums?
Admiral TURNER. I don't know of them if there
are. I would have to answer that for the record, sir.
Senator WALLOP. I would appreciate that.
[The material referred to follows.]
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