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Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program
Of Research In Behavioral Modification
CIA Director Stansfield Turner's Testimony
(Continued -- pp. 33-50)
Senator WALLOP. If they are, I would
assume that you would still try to find from either theirs or
somebody else's information how to protect our people from that
kind of activity.
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator WALLOP. Thank you very much. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were
taking place long before your watch, and I think you have correctly
labeled them as abhorrent, but not only were they abhorrent,
it seems to me that they wee rather bungled, amateurish experiments
that don't seem to have been handled in a very scientific way,
at least from the scanty evidence we have.
It seems to me that there were a minimum of reports and the Agency
didn't have the ability to call it quits. It went on for some
12 years, as you mentioned. What I would like to get to is, are
you convinced now in your Agency that those scientific experiments,
legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so
forth, were being conducted in a scientific manner and that you
are handling it in a correct manner to get the best information
that you are seeking in the end?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, I am, and I also have a
sense of confidence that we are limiting ourselves to the areas
where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where we can
rely on others.
Senator CHAFEE. I am convinced of that from
your report. I just do hope that you have people who are trained
in not only handling this type of experiment, but in preparing
the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports.
You are convinced that you have this type of people?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator CHAFEE. The second point I am interested
in was the final lines in your testimony here, which I believe
are very important, and that is that the Agency is doing all
it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to
go about tracking down the identity of those who were in some
way adversely affected, and see what can be done to fulfill the
government's responsibilities in that respect. I might add that
I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.
A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and
it is unclear exactly what did take place, so I have both a parochial
interest in this and a national interest as well, and I do hope
you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate,
but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir. We will.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.
Admiral Turner, MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving
the surreptitious administration of LSD on unwitting persons,
was it not?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator INOUYE. In February 1954, and this was
in the very early stages of MKULTRA, the Director of Central
Intelligence wrote to the technical services staff officials
criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an
experiment involving the administration of LSD on an unwitting
basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who later committed suicide. Now, the
individuals criticized were the same individuals who were responsible
for subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices. Even
though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of
surreptitious administration and had been criticized by the Director
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of Central Intelligence, subproject 3 was not terminated immediately
after Dr. Olson's death.
In fact, according to documents, it continued for a number of
years. Can you provide this committee with any explanation of
how such testing could have continued under these circumstances?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I really can't.
Senator INOUYE. Are the individuals in technical
services who carried on subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?
Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Are you asking,
are they today?
Senator INOUYE. Yes.
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator INOUYE. What would you do if you criticized
officials of the technical services staff and they continued
to carry on experimentation for a number of years?
Admiral TURNER. I would do two things, sir.
One is, I would be sure at the beginning that I was explicit
enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be continued
anywhere else, and two, if I found it being continued, I would
roll some heads.
Senator INOUYE. Could you provide this committee
with information as to whether the individuals involved had their
heads rolled?
Admiral TURNER. I don't believe there is any
evidence they did, but I will double check that.
[See p. 170 for material referred to.]
Senator INOUYE. As you know, Senator Huddleston
and his subcommittee are deeply involved in the drafting of charters
and guidelines for the intelligence community. We will be meeting
with the President tomorrow. Our concern is, I think, a basic
one. Can anything like this occur again?
Admiral TURNER. I think it would be very, very
unlikely, first, because we are all much more conscious of these
issues than we were back in the fifties, second, because we have
such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this
kind of activity could take place today without some member of
the CIA itself bypassing me, if I were authorizing this, and
writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and blowing the
whistle on this kind of activity.
I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with
myself and a free communication in the Agency, so that I am the
one who finds these things if they should happen. The fact is
that we must keep you and your committee and now the new committee
in the House informed of our sensitive activities. I think all
of these add up to a degree of scrutiny such that this kind of
extensive and flagrant activity could not happen today without
it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to stop
it.
Senator INOUYE. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA
project was that it naturally involved the people who unwittingly
or wittingly got involved in experimentation. I would appreciate
it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on
what the Agency has done to notify these individuals and these
institutions, and furthermore, to notify us as to what steps
have been taken to identify victims, and if identified, what
you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.
Admiral TURNER. All right, sir. I will be happy
to.
Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?
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Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. I wonder if he could include
in that report for our information only a complete listing of
the individuals and the experiments done on them, and whether
they were witting or unwitting, volunteer or nonvolunteer, and
what has been the result in each case. I think that would be
interesting.
Admiral TURNER. Fine. Yes, sir.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy?
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. It is your intention
to notify the individuals who have been the, subjects of the
research, is that right, Admiral Turner? Do you intend to notify
those individuals?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. If you can identify them, you
intend to notify them?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And you intend to notify the
universities or research centers as well?
Admiral TURNER. Senator, I am torn on that.
I understand your opening statement. I put myself in the position
of the president of one of those, universities, let's say. If
he were witting -- if his university had been witting of this
activity with us, lie has access to all that information today.
If lie, were not witting, I wonder if the. process of informing
him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than
letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing. I really
don't know the equities here.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, the problem is, all you
have to do is pick up the newspapers and you see these universities
mentioned. In many instances, I think you are putting the university
people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a complete
change of administration, and they may for one reason or another
not have information that they are, under suspicion. There is
innuendo; there is rumor. I cannot help but believe that it will
just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of all the
security steps that have been taken.
It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to
that information, so that the ones with other administrations
can adapt procedures to protect those universities. The importance
of preserving the independence of our research areas and the
communities seems to me to be a very fundamental kind of question
about the protection of the integrity of our universities and
our research centers.
Admiral TURNER. You are saying that you feel
that if we identify them privately to themselves, we can benefit
them in an adequate way to cover the risk that this will lead
to a more public disclosure? There are lots of the 80 who have
not been identified publicly at this point.
Senator KENNEDY. I think the universities themselves
should be notified. I think then the universities can take whatever
steps in terms of their setting up the procedures to protect.
their own kinds of integrity in terms of the future. I would
certainly hope that, they would feel that they could make a public
comment or a public statement on it. I think it is of general
public interest, particularly for the people that are involved
in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether
they were. used or were not used and how they were used.
I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there
is a public official or an official of the university that you
notify and be wants
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for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't
see why those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon who have been
effectively used by it should not have the information as well.
So, I would hope that you would notify the universities and then
also indicate to the public. I can't conceive that this information
will not be put out in the newspapers, and it puts the university
people at an extraordinary disadvantage, and of course some of
it is wrong, which is the fact of the matter, and I think some
university official saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different
than if they know it is confirmed or it is not confirmed in terms
of the Agency itself. I think that there is a responsibility
there.
Admiral TURNER. I have great sympathy with what
you are saying. I have already notified one institution because
the involvement was so extensive that I thought they really needed
to protect themselves, and I am. most anxious to do this in whatever
way will help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants
in this, and the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do,
I think, what you suggested, in that I may not be able to tell
an institution of the extent and nature of its participation.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can tell them to
the best of your information, and it seems to me that just because
the university or an individual is going to be embarrassed is
not a reason for classifying the information. So, I would hope
-- I mean, I obviously speak as an individual Senator, but I
feel that that is an incredible disservice to the innocent individuals
and I think, a disservice to the integrity of the, universities
unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you
are developing with regards to your own institution and we are
trying to in terms of the Congress. Certainly the universities
are entitled to the same.
Admiral TURNER. Yes. Not all of these, of course,
were unwitting.
Senator KENNEDY. That's right.
Admiral TURNER. Many of them were witting, and
therefore they can take all those precautionary steps on their
own, but I am perfectly open to doing this. I am only interested
in doing it in a way that when identifying a university it will
not lead to the public disclosure of the individuals, whom I
am not allowed to disclose, and so on.
Senator KENNEDY. That could be done, it seems
to me.
Admiral TURNER. So, we will see if we can devise
a way of notifying these institutions on a private basis so that
they can then make their own decision whether their equities
are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting
to maintain it--
Senator KENNEDY. Or you. I wonder. What if they
were to ask you to announce, or indicate?
Admiral TURNER. My personal conscience, sir,
at this time, is that I would be doing a disservice to these
universities if I notified the public.
Senator KENNEDY. Would you meet with some university
officials and ask what their views are or whether they feel that
the preservation of the integrity of the universities would be
better served or not? I think that would be useful to find out
from small, large, private, and public universities' officials
how they view the integrity--
Admiral TURNER. Fine. I Will phone several university
presidents today who are my friends and who are not involved
in this, and ask them what they think the equities would be.
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Senator KENNEDY. All right. You let us know, too.
Admiral TURNER. But I am not sure that I see
that there is any great benefit, in my notifying the public as
opposed to the university notifying them. Let him have his choice
whether he wants -- each institution wants to have it made public.
Senator KENNEDY. Yes. The fact would remain
that the institution's credibility would be better served if
the institution's president were to deny it and the university
indicated that it did not participate in that program than if
the university were to deny it and the Agency says nothing. It
seems to me that that would be the strongest, and the only way
that that is going to be credible. I would value it if you would
get some input from universities as to what they believe is the
fairest way in terms of the preservation of the integrity of
the universities.
Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the uses of these
safe houses, as I understand from information that was provided
to us in the course of our last committee, the testing of various
drugs on individuals happened at all social levels, high and
low, it happened on native Americans and also on foreign nationals.
That is what I understand was the nature of the project itself.
Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at
the two locations on the east coast and the west coast which
were known as safe houses. To your knowledge, is that correct?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. In terms of the research in
this particular program, it did not go beyond the safe houses
located on the east coast and the west coast? I believe I am
correct on that.
Admiral TURNER. That type of unwitting testing
of sort of randomly selected individuals, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. It was just located in those
two places?
Admiral TURNER. To the best of our knowledge,
there were only two locations.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, how do we interpret randomly
selected?
Admiral TURNER. Well, as opposed to prisoners
in a prison who were somehow selected.
Senator KENNEDY. All right. Do you know from
this information how many people were recruited during this period?
Admiral TURNER. No idea.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you know approximately?
Admiral TURNER. I asked that question the other
day, and we just don't have -- apparently we are very -- well,
either there were no records kept of the actual numbers and types
of people tested or they were destroyed.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments
which may have been conducted at the hospital research facilities
which the CIA helped to finance. It wasn't clear to me from your
previous answers what kind of work was done there. I gather you
are unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the
CIA documentation which you have supplied us, a list describing
some of the advantages the Agency hoped to gain. It says:
(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new
hospital wing will be available to the Chemical Division of TSS
* * *; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive research
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projects will be completely deniable; (c)
Full professional cover will be provided for up to three biochemical
employees of the Chemical Division; (d) Human patients and volunteers
for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical
conditions with the full supervision of
and there is a blank, something has been deleted.
It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that
particular wing. Doesn't it to you? Why would you go to such
elaborate preparations, to buy part of the wing, bring three
of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them
access to patients? Why would you go to such trouble and expense
to arrange, all that, if you weren't planning to experiment on
people in the hospital?
Admiral TURNER. I agree with you 100 percent,
sir. Those were clearly the intentions. I have no evidence that
it was carried out in that way. I am not trying to be defensive,
Senator. I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, then, as to the nature
of what was done there, the last paragraph on the same page of
the document says, "The facilities of the hospital and the
ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical
conditions using materials with which any agency connection must
be completely deniable will augment and complement other programs
recently taken over by TSS, such as," and then there's another
deletion.
Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted.
That is still classified, or at least it was removed when this
document was sanitized and released. It seems to be that whatever
was deleted right there would give you a pretty good clue as
to what they were doing, since it says that the activities would
"augment and complement other programs" undertaken
by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don't know what
was contemplated. Just the fact that similar programs are referred
to in the document, though what they are is still deleted, should
enable you to check it out.
You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned
following the "such as" in the classified version of
this document.
Admiral TURNER. Senator, I have not said that
we don't know what was contemplated being done there. We do not
know what was done there.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Why did you delete that reference?
Why is that still classified, that particular project of whatever
it is?
Admiral TURNER. I don't know this particular
case. We will get you the exact answer to that one and inform
you about it, but it is quite probable that that other case is
unrelated to this in the -- well, not unrelated, but that that
was a project that still deserves to be classified.
[The material referred to follows:]
Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun
in 1957 and the Annex was dedicated in March 1959. Of the several
MKULTRA projects conducted at Georgetown only one involving human
testing covered a time span subsequent to March 1959. Subproject
45 ran from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that the final
four years 1959-1963) of the subproject could have been spent
in the Gorman Annex. However, there is no reference to the Gorman
Annex or a "new Annex" in Subproject 45 papers, neither
is there any mention of the subproject moving to a new location
in 1959 or later years.
Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of
the Gorman Annex is contained in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA. Recently
discovered material indicated that Dr. Geschickter continued
his research for sleep- and amnesia-producing drugs under Project
MKSEARCH through July 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital.
But it is impossible to determine if the facilities of the Gorman
Annex were involved.
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Senator SCHWEIKER. I think that would give us a pretty
good clue as to what was going to be done in the wing the CIA
helped to finance.
Was there any indication at all in the records you found that
the project ultimately used cancer patients or terminally ill
patients in connection with this facility?
Admiral TURNER. I'm sorry. I missed your question
because I was trying to get the data on the last one. I will
read you the blank.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Go ahead.
Admiral TURNER. QKHILLTOP. It doesn't help you,
but--
Senator SCHWEIKER. Can you tell us what that
is, or is it still classified?
Admiral TURNER. I don't know, and I assume from
the fact that we deleted it, it is still classified, but I will
get you that answer, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you. I'd like to see
that information.
[See p. 171 for material referred to.]
Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that
projects in that particular center involved experimentation on
terminally ill cancer patients?
Admiral TURNER. I missed the first part of your
question, sir. I am very sorry.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you have any indication
that some experiment in the facility used terminally ill cancer
patients as subjects? You do acknowledge in your statement and
it is clear from other documents that these kinds of experiments
were at some point being done somewhere. My question is, is there
any indication that cancer patients or terminally ill patients
were experimented with in this wing?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, it does appear there is
a connection here, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The other question I had
relates to the development of something which has been called
the perfect concussion. A series of experiments toward that end
were described in the CIA documents. I wonder if you would just
tell us what your understanding of perfect concussion is.
Admiral TURNER. Is that in my testimony, sir,
or in some other document?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which
involved examination of techniques to cause brain concussions
and amnesia by using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals
without giving and without leaving any clear physical marks.
Someone dubbed it "perfect concussion" -- maybe that
was poetic license on the part of our staff rather than your
poets over there. I wonder if you could just tell us what brain
concussion experiments were about?
Admiral TURNER. This project, No. 54, was canceled,
and never carried out.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I do believe the first
year of the project in 1955 was carried out by the Office of
Naval Research, according to the information that you supplied
us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that
point, because the records go on to say that the experimenter
at ONR found out about CIA's role, discovered that it was a cover,
and then the project was transferred to MKULTRA in 1956. Again,
this is all from the backup material you have given us. So, it
was canceled at some time. I am not disagreeing
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with that, but apparently for at least a year or two, somebody
was investigating the production of brain concussions with special
blackjacks, sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the
backup material.
Admiral TURNER. The data available to me is that this project
was never funded by the CIA, but I will double-check that and
furnish the information for the record for you as to whether
there was ever any connection here and if so, what the nature
of the work was.
[The material referred to follows:]
Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding
Subproject 54 during the September 21, 1977 hearings before the
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Human Resources
Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced below:
Mr. LAUBINGER. On project 54, it has got a rather
sensational proposal in there, in terms of the work that they
propose to do, and you asked about the proposal and I said, in
fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA. Now, I overlooked --
at least, my memory did not serve me correctly when I went through
that file folder to see one memorandum dated January 10, 1956,
which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact, that that proposal
was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.
Senator SCHWEIKER. By what?
Mr. LAUBINGER. By the CIA. So, that information
was in their file folder. It did not happen to be in my head
when I testified.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think I might have read
you that, and that is why I argued at the time with you, because
I think I had in front of me, as I recall, some indication that
it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did supply
it to us; there is no argument about that information.
Mr. LAUBINGER. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong,
myself, and in my own view, I am reading under the ULTRA project,
that if it had been funded under ULTRA, it would have had a project
number and identified as such. The thing that threw me was that
it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and
it was under the normal contracting process, so that it was not
included in MKULTRA as any work done under that funding umbrella.
The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it
quite clear, however, that a year's work was done through navy
funding -- a navy funding mechanism -- on which the proposal
was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That
second proposal was never funded. So, there was conflict and
I, personally, I think, introduced a little bit of confusion
in that in my testimony.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, do you agree or not
agree with DOD's statement here that even though the initial
funding was navy, it was really I conduit for the CIA?
Mr. LAUBINGER. I think that is correct.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes; I would appreciate that.
I would like to know how it went from ONR to CIA after a year.
Somebody made a decision to make that transfer, and to make this
an MKULTRA subject. There had to be some sort of review that
led to a decision to continue that kind of concussion -- total
blackout, maximum amnesia, and whatever else it was you were
interested in -- study and testing.
Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, if I may try to say
a few words on that, the files that were available to us for
inspection, which are limited, indicated that there was a project
being carried on by the Navy having to do with the, effects of
brain concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and
considered funding it, but actually never did, and as the admiral
testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding mechanism, a place
they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence
that I know of that that project was ever funded.
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Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I am confused, because here
again is another quote from a document that we have seen, which
you have released and supplied to us:
Following is the technical progress made under
the current [deleted] contract: (a) Specializing instrumentation
and numerous testing techniques have been developed to obtain
the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data has now been
obtained supporting the resonance-cavilation theory of brain
concussion; and (c) preliminary acceleration threshold data has
been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.
It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,500-square-foot
laboratory. The document notes that "Three blast test series
have been run to date." It describes a special blackjack
device, "a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impact
force with a low unit surface pressure."
I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results of this
work, but it certainly seems that some testing was done.
Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, you are putting us in
the same position I think you were stating that you were in earlier
referring to documents not before us, but I believe you are quoting
from a proposal that someone sent to the Agency to fund this
work, and he is referring to past work. The past work would have
encompassed a lot of things like that, but CIA was not involved
with that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What do you mean, Admiral,
on page 6 of your testimony when you mention projects using magician's
art? How do magicians get into the spook business?
Admiral TURNER. I have interpreted this as to
how to slip the mickey into the finn, but I would like to ask
my advisers here to comment.
Mr. BRODY. I think that is essentially it, Senator.
It is surreptitious administration of material to someone, deceptive
practices, how to distract someone's attention while you are
doing something else, as I understand it. It was also some type
of a covert communication project involved with the study of
how magicians and their assistants perhaps communicate information
to one another without having other people know it. This is the
type of thing that was involved, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Huddleston?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and
interviewing members of the CIA staff, did you find information
that would confirm the contention described by the reporters
for the New York Times that this type of experimentation was
begun out of a fear that the Agency that foreign powers might
have drugs which would allow them to alter the behavior of American
citizens or agents or members of the Armed Forces who were taken
into custody, and which would have resulted in false confessions
and the like? Is my question clear?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I haven't personally
read the documentation on that. In my discussions with the people
who are well informed in this area at the Agency, I am told that
that is the case.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Was there any evidence or
any indication that there were other motives that the Agency
might also be looking for drugs that could be applied for other
purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing
another person? Was this part of this kind of experimentation?
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Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there is. I have not seen
in this series of documentation evidence of desire to kill, but
I think the project turned its character from a defensive to
an offensive one as it went along, and there certainly was an
intention here to develop drugs that could be of use.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The project continued for
some time after it was learned that, in fact, foreign powers
did not have such a drug as was at first feared, didn't it?
Admiral TURNER. That is my understanding. Yes,
sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Is there any indication
that knowledge gained as a result of these experiments has been
useful or is being applied in any way to present operations?
Mr. BRODY. Senator, I am not sure if there is
any body of knowledge. A great deal of what there was, I gather,
was destroyed in 1973. I would like to defer to Frank here. Do
you know of any?
Mr. LAUBINGER. I know of no drugs or anything
like that developed under this program that ever reached operational
use or are in use today.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So apparently any information
that was gathered was apparently useless and not worth continuing,
not worth further development on the part of the Agency.
Mr. LAUBINGER. I am having difficulty hearing
your questions.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I can hardly hear myself.
Admiral TURNER. I think the answer to your question
is that we have no evidence of great usefulness on this, and
yet I think we should remember--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, is it accurate to
say that this experimentation produced few useful results or
had little application at all to the operations of the Agency
or anybody else as far as we know?
Admiral TURNER. I think that is basically correct.
At the same time, I would point out that we had two CIA prisoners
in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time, and we were
concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to them, but
I am not saying that--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Have you detected any sign
that any other nation is continuing or has in the past conducted
experiments similar to this or with a similar objective?
Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared to answer
that one off the top of my head, sir, but I will get it to you.
[The material referred to follows:]
We maintain no files of up-to-date information
on the testing of drugs in foreign countries. Some years ago
we occasionally would review foreign research on antibiotics
and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil
defense assessments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed
foreign research on LSD under Project ARTICHOKE because of concern
that such drugs might be employed against Agency and other U.S.
personnel. Information relative to this work has already been
provided to relevant Committees. In this early work we also occasionally
looked at foreign human experimentation; we long ago eliminated
our holdings on this subject and no collection requirements are
any longer served. As consumer interest in this area has dropped
off and higher priority areas need attention, we have virtually
no present coverage with the possible exception of an occasional
scanning of the literature for a specific program. To the best
of our knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence Community
is tracking this subject now.
-44-
Senator HUDDLESTON. You don't know whether any of your
agents anywhere in the world have been subjected to any kind
of procedure like this?
Admiral TURNER. We certainly know of other powers
conducting research in these areas, yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know how they go
about that research?
Admiral TURNER. It is pretty sketchy, the information
we have.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know of any other
organization in this country or any institution that has conducted
extensive research on unwitting individuals and through unwitting
institutions?
Admiral TURNER. Well, I have read something
in the newspapers about this, but I have not familiarized myself
with it in specifies.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It is not a normal mode
of operation for hitman research, is it?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?
Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, I only have one
to follow up on Senator Huddleston's questions and my earlier
ones. You are not really saying, are you Admiral Turner, that
there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification procedures
which have been used by foreign powers?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I am not.
Senator WALLOP. I drew that inference partly
in answer to my question that you knew of no truth serum. Maybe
that is a misnomer, but surely there are relaxants that make
tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator WALLOP. So I think it is fair to say,
too, that the experience of many American prisoners of war in
the Korean conflict would indicate that there are behavior modification
procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced degree
of sophistication.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator WALLOP. Again, I will just go back and
say I think this must have been part of the motivation. I don't
think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty had you thought
his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else. So,
I would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating.
I don't think the object of this hearing is in any way to lay
blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise, but I think
it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the
directors of the CIA or the DCT's of the time. Also I think it
is a little bit scapegoating, to say they didn't even know it,
but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.
I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those
years, and I think the object lesson is that we have discovered,
we think and we hope, through your assurances and other activities
of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of that kind.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
Senator CHAFEE. No questions.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy, I think you
have another question.
-45-
Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about the two safe houses
on the east and west, coast as being the sources for the unwitting
trials, now, the importance of this and the magnitude of it,
I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records
that these we're used over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the
numbers could have been considerable. You are unable to determine,
at least, in your own research, what the numbers would be, and
what the drugs were, how many people were involved, but it could
have been considerable during this period of time.
It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and
the flow charts of cash slips that were expended in these areas
that it was considerable, but that is a judgmental factor on
it, but I think it is important to try and find out what the
Agency is attempting to do to get to the bottom of it.
Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it
is deceased and has been deceased for 2 years. The overall agent,
Mr. Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy memory about this whole area.
He has testified before the Intelligence Committee. Yet he was
responsible for the whole program. Then, the Director had indicated
the destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with
the project.
Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are
two additional agents on page 9 of your testimony, you indicated
there were two additional agents which you have uncovered at
the bottom of it, and you say the names of CIA officials who
approved or monitored the various projects. You talk about the
two additional agents in your testimony.
Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents
to find out exactly what is being done. I suppose, first of all,
shouldn't the project manager know what was being done?
Admiral TURNER. Our first problem, Senator,
is that we have been unable to associate an individual with those
names at this point. We are still burrowing to find out who these
people are. We haven't identified them as having been CIA employees,
and we don't know whether these were false names.
Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down,
as I understand it?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that. down,
and you have every intention of interviewing those people to
find out whatever you can about the program and project?
Admiral TURNER. My only hesitation here is whether
I will do this or the Justice Department.
Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued, though,
I understand?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or
through the Justice Department?
Admiral TURNER. [Nods in the affirmative.]
Senator KENNEDY. Is it plausible that the director
of the program would not understand or know about the details
of the program? Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb would not understand
the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?
-46-
Admiral TURNER. Let me say it is unlikely. I don't know
Mr. Gottlieb.
Senator KENNEDY. Has anybody in the Agency talked
with Mr. Gottlieb to find out about this?
Admiral TURNER. Not since this revelation has
come out.
Senator KENNEDY. Not since this revelation?
Well, why not?
Admiral TURNER. He has left our employ, Senator.
Senator KENNEDY. Does that mean that anybody
who leaves is, you know, covered for lifetime?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Why wouldn't you talk with
him and find out? You have new information about this program.
It has been a matter of considerable interest both to our committee
and to the Intelligence Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr.
Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. Well, again, I think the issue
is whether this should be done by the Justice Department or ourselves.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, are we wrestling around
because you and Attorney General Bell can't agree--
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY [continuing]. On who ought to
do it?
Admiral TURNER. We are proceeding together in
complete agreement as to how to go. I have, in connection with
trying to find all of these Americans or others who were unwittingly
tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running
around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because
I don't want to give any impression that we are doing domestic
intelligence.
Senator KENNEDY. I am just talking about one,
in this case. That was the man who was responsible for the whole
program, and to find out whether anyone within the Agency since
you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975,
and if the answer is no, I want to know why not.
Admiral TURNER. The reason he was not interviewed
in connection with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the
employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the part of the
Agency that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA
was in some way trying to influence him and influence his testimony
before the committee. If these committees have, no objection,
we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if he can augment
anything here in this new information, though I don't think there
is much in this new information that be can add to as opposed
to what was available in 1975.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you see, Admiral Turner,
you come to the two committees this morning and indicate that
now at last we have the information. We don't have to be concerned
about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how you
can give those assurances to the members of these committees
as well as to the American people when you haven't since 1975
even talked to the principal person that was in charge of the
program, and the records were destroyed. He is the fellow that
was running the program, and the Agency has not talked to him
since the development of this new material.
Admiral TURNER. Our only concern here is the
proprieties involved, and we will dig into this and work with
the Justice Department on
-47-
who, if either of us, should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb
so as not to prejudice any legal rights that may be involved
here, or to appear in any way to be improper.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, do I understand you have
not contacted the Justice Department about this particular case
since the development of this new material about Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. Not about Gottlieb specifically.
We have contacted him.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is amazing to me.
I mean, can you understand the difficulty that any of us might
have in terms of comprehending that when you develop a whole
new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper
in the country and are on every television, I mean, that means
something, but it does not mean nearly as much as the interest
that we have in the fact about the testing of unwitting Americans,
and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr. Gottlieb's
name on it and you come to tell us that we don't have to worry
any more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has
not been talked to?
Admiral TURNER. Sir, I am not saying that these
are in any way the final facts. I am saying these are all the
facts we have available.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have not talked to
the person who was in charge of the program, so what kind of
value or what kind of weight can we give it?
Admiral TURNER. We are happy to talk to him.
I think the issue here again is one of propriety and how to go
about this. We have not, I believe, enough new information about
Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would
be that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.
Senator KENNEDY. The importance of it, I think,
from our point of view, is, he would know the drugs that were
administered, the volume of drugs, how it was administered, and
in terms of your ability to follow lip to protect these people
and their health, to the extent that it can be done, that opportunity
is being lost.
I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance
that you will get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to
Attorney General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And let us know as to the extent
of it. I don't see how we can fulfill our responsibility in this
area on the drug testing without our hearing from Gottlieb as
well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly
since all of the materials have been destroyed.
These other two agents, have they talked to them?
Admiral TURNER. We don't, know who they are,
sir. We are trying to track down and see whether these names
can be related to anybody.
Senator KENNEDY. That is under active investigation
by the Agency?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have the intention
of talking to those people when you locate them. Is that correct?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, under the same circumstances
as Gottlieb.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have people working
on it? Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
-48-
Senator KENNEDY. With regards to the activities that
took place in these safe houses, as I understand from the records,
two-way mirrors were used. Is that your understanding?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. We have records that
construction was done to put in two-way mirrors.
Senator KENNEDY. And they were placed in the
bedroom, as I understand.
[Pause.]
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have documents--
Admiral TURNER. I believe that was in the Church
record, but I don't have the details.
Senator KENNEDY. And rather elaborate decorations
were added, as I understand, at, least, to the one in San Francisco,
in the bedroom, which are French can-can dancers, floral pictures,
drapery, including installation of bedroom mirrors, three framed
Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of
other -- red bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then
a series of documents which were provided to the committee which
indicate a wide proliferation of different cash for $100, generally
in the $100 range over any period of time on the particular checks.
Even the names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving
it. Cash for undercover agents, operating expenses, drinks, entertainment
while administering, and then it is dashed out, and then the
other documents, that would suggest, at least with the signature
of your principal agent out there, that "called to the operation,
midnight, and climax."
What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what
techniques were being used by the Agency in terms of reaching
that sort of broad-based group of Americans that were being evidently
enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others? Do you draw
ally kind of conclusion about what might have been going on out
there, in these safe houses?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
[General laughter.]
Senator KENNEDY. There is a light side to it,
but there is also an enormously serious side. And that is that,
at least the techniques which are used or were used in terms
of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs
used and the numbers of people involved and exactly what that
operation was about, as well as the constant reiteration of the,
use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety of
different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot
of documentation putting these matters together.
When you look at the fact that, it is a broad range population
that has been tested, tested in these two areas, with the kind
of cash slips that were used in this payment mechanisms and decorations
and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line on
it but one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That
is one thing for sure, because his name appears on just about
every one of these documents, and it is, I think, very important
to find out what his understanding is of the nature of that.
So, we will hear more about that.
Admiral TURNER. I believe Gottlieb has been
interviewed by the Congress.
Senator KENNEDY. That's right, he has, and in
reviewing the record, it is not very satisfactory, and it just
seems with the new information
-49-
and the new documentation and the new memoranda -- and he did
not have the checks at that time -- and with the wide variety
of different memoranda with his name on it, his memory could
be stimulated on that.
Thank you.
Senator INOUYE. I would like to thank the admiral
and his staff for participating in this hearing. I believe the
record should show that this hearing was held at the request
of the Agency and the admiral. It was not held because we insisted
upon it. It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Agency.
I think the record should also indicate that Admiral Turner has
forwarded to this committee a classified file, including all
of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as
the experimentors.
I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved
in the committee's investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have
had much work in going over the 8,000 pages, the staff of this
committee has had equal problems, but I would like the record
to show that you have made these papers and documents available
to the committee. I thank you for that.
As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call
upon many dozens of others, experimentors, or those officials
in charge, and one of those will be Dr. Gottlieb.
In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people,
that what we have experienced this morning in this committee
room is not being duplicated in any other committee room in any
other part of the world. I doubt that very much. Our Agency and
our intelligence community has been under much criticism and
has been subjected to much abuse, in many cases justified, but
this is the most open society that I can think of. For example,
in Great Britain there are about six people who are aware of
the identity of the man in charge of intelligence. In other countries,
similar conditions exist. Here in the United States we not only
know Admiral Turner, we have had open hearings with him, such
as this. The confirmation hearings were all open.
In a few weeks, the Senate of the United States will debate a
resolution to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts
and funds being used for counterintelligence and national intelligence.
I would hope that, in presenting this issue to the public, the
media will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will
continue to. The abuse that we have learned about this morning
is one I hope will never happen again, but without constant oversight
on the part of the Executive Office, on the part of the Congress,
it could happen again. It is important, therefore that we continue
in this oversight activity.
So, once, again, Admiral, I thank yon very much for helping us.
We will continue to call upon you for your assistance. We would
like to submit to you several questions that the members and
staff have prepared. I hope you will look them over carefully
and prepare responses for the record, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman?
Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir?
Senator KENNEDY. I, too, want to thank Admiral
Turner for his responsiveness. I have had meetings with him in
the committees and also conversations, telephone conversations,
and private meetings, and
-50-
I have found him personally to be extremely responsive, and it
is a very difficult challenge which lie has accepted in heading
this Agency. I want you to know, personally, I, too, would like
to see this put behind us. I don't think we are quite there yet
in terms of this particular area that we are interested in. I
think the Intelligence Committee has special responsibilities
in this area of the testing, so we look forward to working with
you in expediting the time that we can put it behind, but it
does seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter.
So, I want to personally express my appreciation to you, Admiral
Turner, and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and
I look forward to working with you.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure
you emphasized this enough, but I think the record ought to show
that Admiral Turner informed the Select Committee on his own
initiative when the new documentation was found. The documentation
has been made available to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.
I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation
that existed prior to the formation at least of the Church committee,
and a difference that is very helpful.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Thank you
very much, Admiral.
We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John
Gittinger.
Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take
the oath.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give
is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you, God?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I do.
Mr. GITTINGER. I do.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr.
Gittinger.
Senator KENNEDY. Before we start in, we had
a third witness, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pasternac, who planned to
testify, traveled to Washington -- he, lives in Washington, and
was contacted recently --with the intention of testifying this
morning. And something -- he called us late this morning and
indicated that he wanted to get a counsel before he would wish
to testify.
Senator INOUYE. Mr. Goldman.
Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.
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