[iwar] [fc:How.To.Win.A.War.Against.Al.Qaeda]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-09-18 08:12:46


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:How.To.Win.A.War.Against.Al.Qaeda]
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Wall Street Journal
September 18, 2001
How To Win A War Against Al Qaeda
By Kenneth M. Pollack
What exactly would it mean to wage a war on Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda
terrorist network? Al Qaeda isn't a country with a defined geography, a
uniformed military, or a physical political infrastructure. As a result,
while many have called for war, few have been able to explain what such a
war might look like. Indeed, one of today's great frustrations is coming to
grips with this amorphous adversary.
If the U.S. concludes that bin Laden's Al Qaeda is responsible for last
week's attacks, it would be difficult, but quite feasible, for the U.S. to
wage a war against the network. Our goal should be to destroy Al Qaeda as a
functioning organization that is capable of attacking the U.S. or
threatening our interests. An important secondary goal will be to convince
or compel other nations either to join us in this task or to make it
possible for us to do so ourselves. Our strategy in such a war should
consist of four broad efforts:
Four efforts
*Define the sides. In nearly every war we have fought we have sought allies,
and this effort has always served us well. This time should be no different.
We should actively canvas our allies around the globe for those who are
willing to take up arms with us in this effort. So far, the Bush
administration appears to have this effort well in hand. 
However, we also need to call bin Laden's supporters on the carpet. We
should make very clear that unless the Afghan government turns over bin
Laden and every other member of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to us within a
reasonable amount of time (72 hours to 96 hours seems about right) we will
consider Afghanistan to be at war with the U.S.
The Taliban has already turned down the first such ultimatum, delivered by
the Pakistanis. If they continue to do so, perhaps the most important step
we could take would be to furnish large-scale arms, training and other
support to the Northern Alliance, the Taliban's principal foe in
Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance is the last force stopping the Taliban
from taking complete control over Afghanistan, and with U.S. assistance it
might be able to cause considerable pain to the Taliban.
Beyond this, we need to make clear that those states that support or protect
either Al Qaeda personnel or Afghanistan will also be considered to be at
war with the U.S. Since the list of the Taliban's admirers is short, we are
mainly talking about Pakistan, whom the Bush administration has rightly made
its principal focus.
Pakistan is ruled by a shaky military dictatorship, has close ties to the
Taliban, and bin Laden enjoys popular support there. Nevertheless, we will
need to convince Islamabad that it has only two choices: side with the
Taliban and face horrible consequences, or side with the U.S. and enjoy the
possibility of a better tomorrow. So far, the administration's efforts
appear to be working, but Islamabad is likely to feel strong pressure to do
as little; the administration will have to hold Pakistan's feet to the fire
with sustained pressure.
We should be willing to reward Pakistani cooperation with meaningful
economic and political assistance. On the other hand, if Pakistan reneges on
its pledges, we should place them on the list of state sponsors of
terrorism, sever all diplomatic and economic ties, seize Pakistani assets in
the U.S., and actively work to undermine Pakistani interests. In particular,
we might turn our budding friendship with India into a full-scale military
relationship, including arms sales, training and intelligence exchanges.
*Roll out an intelligence campaign. A critical element of any war strategy
would be to wage a covert operations campaign to go after the Al Qaeda
network itself, which consists of thousands of personnel and hundreds of
global safe houses, weapons factories and other facilities. We should go to
those nations that are either harboring elements of Al Qaeda or turning a
blind eye toward Al Qaeda activities on their soil, and demand that they
arrest the organization's personnel, seize their facilities, and confiscate
their assets. 
We should be prepared to impose sanctions on those countries who refuse to
do so. Such sanctions must have real teeth, and might include denying
national airlines the right to land in the U.S., seizing or freezing assets,
and severing economic and diplomatic relations.
In addition, we should work to disrupt Al Qaeda's network ourselves. Al
Qaeda is a dispersed network that is heavily reliant on high technology and
long-distance communications that we should disrupt and deceive. In
addition, we should look to capture Al Qaeda operatives we have identified
in foreign countries and bring them back to the U.S. to stand trial.
Alternatively, we could kill them.
There is no law prohibiting assassination, only an executive order that
could be reversed. Our past history has given good reasons for the existence
of this executive order and we should think long and hard about whether we
are opening a Pandora's box, but we should also consider that effectively
waging war against a shadowy organization like Al Qaeda might require new
weapons.
*Take direct military action. Direct military action may prove to be less
central in waging such a campaign than determined diplomacy and far-reaching
intelligence operations, but it should still play an important role.
Assuming the Taliban chooses not to hand over bin Laden and his associates,
we should conduct direct military operations against Afghanistan and Al
Qaeda facilities there. We should target the entire range of terrorist
facilities, from training camps to weapons dumps, barracks to recruiting
centers. 
We should be looking to kill his people. In the past, we have demonstrated
an unwillingness to inflict casualties-even military casualties. This time,
we should be looking to maximize casualties; trained personnel are bin
Laden's crucial asset.
Although Afghanistan's extreme backwardness will constrain our targeting,
there is still a range of relatively high-value assets we could strike to
coerce the Taliban to turn over bin Laden and his minions. We could go after
the Taliban's ministries of defense and intelligence, the remnants of the
Taliban's air force, key garrisons, weapons dumps, motor transport pools,
communications nodes, and other military bases.
Ideally, we would use a combination of manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and
special-forces operations in a sustained campaign to destroy the Al Qaeda
infrastructure in Afghanistan, hunt down Al Qaeda personnel there, and
destroy Taliban military capabilities. We might even be able to provide
direct support to the military operations of the Northern Alliance. However,
it will be extremely difficult to mount airstrikes or special-forces
operations in Afghanistan without the use of Pakistani airspace and
bases-another reason why bringing Pakistan on board will be crucial.
*Step up security at home. Often, a good offense starts with a strong
defense. Al Qaeda has demonstrated an ability to target and kill Americans.
We will need to do more, especially at home, to protect U.S. facilities and
personnel. This will include putting sky marshals on planes and security
officers on trains and other forms of mass transportation, increasing
security at public venues, and intensifying inspections of ships wishing to
dock in U.S. ports. 
Making Sacrifices
Fighting a war against Al Qaeda will not be easy. No war ever is, and bin
Laden is a new kind of foe. Fighting a war will require the commitment of
significant U.S. resources and political capital. It will undoubtedly entail
further loss of American lives. Fighting a war might mean making important
sacrifices on other issues of importance to us: Will the Russians demand
concessions on North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlargement or missile
defense in return for taking an active role in the fight? What will be
required to bring Pakistan on board?
We should be ready to confront these kinds of decisions. But if we are
committed and willing to make the sacrifice, the nebulous nature of our foe
should not be an impediment to waging a successful war against Al Qaeda and
its accomplices.
Kenneth M. Pollack is the deputy director for national security studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations. He was formerly a director for Near East
and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, and a Persian Gulf
military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.

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