Re: [iwar] [fc:Research.slaps.crypto-banning.Feds] (fwd)

From: Tony Bartoletti (azb@llnl.gov)
Date: 2001-09-24 12:26:40


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Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2001 12:26:40 -0700
To: fc@all.net
From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov>
Subject: Re: [iwar] [fc:Research.slaps.crypto-banning.Feds] (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <200109241910.MAA05774@big.all.net>
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At 12:10 PM 9/24/01 -0700, you wrote:
>You haven't visited out lab lately...
>
>FC

:)

No excuse on my part!

I am sure that researchers apply a great variety of means to attempt to 
ferret out hidden content.  But we also recognize that "one-time-pad" is 
both low-tech and unbreakable, and in conjunction with steganography, 
suffices to obscure even the existence of a hidden content.

Granted, use of otp presents logistical difficulties (pre-agreement of keys).

Of course, I assume it was not your lab that claimed to assert no 
significant steganography was in use.

Central to my point, though, is that one cannot generally establish the 
non-existence of something by failing to find it.

____tony____



>Per the message sent by Tony Bartoletti:
>
>Although the hype about "widespread use of crypto/steganography by
>terrorists" is probably overblown, I am curious how any group could examine
>a graphic image to determine if steganography were in use.  Aside from
>thousands of possible encoding schemes that could be used to embed a
>"plain-text" message, one must consider that the text could easily be
>obscured beforehand by some combination of compression or otherwise "weak"
>encryption.  The combinations and variations are staggering, and if you
>don't hit upon the right one, you see nothing out of the ordinary.
>
>As much as I oppose "crypto-banning" in general, I find the statement "The
>researchers discuss, and dismiss, the possibility
>that strong passwords were being used" to be patently self-serving.
>
>____tony____
>
>--This communication is confidential to the parties it is intended to serve--
>Fred Cohen              Fred Cohen & Associates.........tel/fax:925-454-0171
>fc@all.net              The University of New Haven.....http://www.unhca.com/
>http://all.net/         Sandia National Laboratories....tel:925-294-2087

Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov>
Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, CA 94551-9900



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