Re: [iwar] Comments on the Dartmouth Security Study

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-09-27 08:19:02


Return-Path: <sentto-279987-2434-1001603893-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com>
Delivered-To: fc@all.net
Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Thu, 27 Sep 2001 08:20:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 3049 invoked by uid 510); 27 Sep 2001 15:19:24 -0000
Received: from n18.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.68) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 27 Sep 2001 15:19:24 -0000
X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-2434-1001603893-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com
Received: from [10.1.1.223] by mr.egroups.com with NNFMP; 27 Sep 2001 15:19:07 -0000
X-Sender: fc@big.all.net
X-Apparently-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 27 Sep 2001 15:18:13 -0000
Received: (qmail 46241 invoked from network); 27 Sep 2001 15:18:13 -0000
Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by 10.1.1.223 with QMQP; 27 Sep 2001 15:18:13 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta2 with SMTP; 27 Sep 2001 15:19:06 -0000
Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id IAA14081 for iwar@yahoogroups.com; Thu, 27 Sep 2001 08:19:02 -0700
Message-Id: <200109271519.IAA14081@big.all.net>
To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
In-Reply-To: <20010927150837.43142.qmail@web14505.mail.yahoo.com> from "e.r." at Sep 27, 2001 08:08:37 AM
Organization: I'm not allowed to say
X-Mailer: don't even ask
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1]
From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com
Precedence: bulk
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2001 08:19:02 -0700 (PDT)
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [iwar] Comments on the Dartmouth Security Study
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Per the message sent by e.r.:

> suspect actions of kids have cost this cost a great deal of money.
> Nothing is a joke any longer.

I think that the question is how to use our finite resources wisely and
what we should indicate as the most important things to tell top
decision makers.

> --- "B.K. DeLong" <bkdelong@pobox.com> wrote:

> > At 07:02 AM 09/27/2001 -0700, you wrote:
> > > > 2.  Report of suspicious activity to law enforcement immediately> > to
> > > > facilitate the warning and investigative processes (Page 19)
> > >
> > >As in (1) above, this is likely to further overburden law enforcement
> > >and create an inability to differentiate or respond to the most
> > >important events.
> > 
> > Agreed and how do you quantify what should really be reported to law 
> > enforcement? Even prior to said terrorist events there is an incredible 
> > amount of "suspicious activity", much of which caused by kids and 
> > ex-employees of companies within the US.

I think that the key here is for LE to indicate what they believe to be
important and to have industry provide it.  Unfortunately, LE won't tell
anyone what they think is important or provide any feedback - which is
one of the reasons they don't get the information that would be most
helpful to them.  They (as well asl most in the government sector) tend
to remain in the world of central and hierarchical systems and fail to
realize that in a distributed environment such as the Internet, you need
distributed and cooperative action and control.

> > I must say, scanning through this report I am QUITE disappointed with all 
> > the "events" pointed out from Israel/Palestine to US - Chinese plane 
> > incident to Kashmir to Yugoslavia. All of which were perpetrated by script 
> > kiddies in their respective countries. There might have been a few 
> > incidents in the Israel/Palestine conflict that may have been specifically 
> > targeted but the rest of this is just bullshit kidiot activity.
> > 
> > If Vatis REALLY wanted to put the fear of god in people he'd mention in 
> > 1994 when some idiot who thought it might be funny to shut off a rival 
> > hacker's power hacked into some hydroelectric dam and had access to the 
> > floodgates. Or perhaps a security system of an airport in Florida that had 
> > an open dialup without password protection. What about the REAL 
> > infrastructure issues like power, water, etc? Why aren't we hearing real 
> > stories about that? Besides the California Power grid being stumbled upon? 
> > Or the age-old story of the kid who got into the ATC system of a Worcester 
> > airport?

I think that the problem was and remains that things that the rest of us
know are still classified by the government.  I looked at a classified
threat assessment for a major DoD command some time back and found that
it was ludicrously poor to the point of being practically useless. 
Every one of the small number of identified incidents was in the press
within a week of its occurence and yet the report has them classfied for
10 years.  Vatis was privy to the classified information when in
government and thus it would be a violation of law for him to include it,
even though it is in the press.


--This communication is confidential to the parties it is intended to serve--
Fred Cohen		Fred Cohen & Associates.........tel/fax:925-454-0171
fc@all.net		The University of New Haven.....http://www.unhca.com/
http://all.net/		Sandia National Laboratories....tel:925-294-2087


------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-->
Get your FREE VeriSign guide to security solutions for your web site: encrypting transactions, securing intranets, and more!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/UnN2wB/m5_CAA/yigFAA/kgFolB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------~->

------------------
http://all.net/ 

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 



This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-09-29 21:08:50 PDT