[iwar] [fc:Hornet.Squadrons.'Overstated'.Readiness]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-02 05:36:40


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Hornet.Squadrons.'Overstated'.Readiness]
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Defense Week
October 1, 2001
Hornet Squadrons 'Overstated' Readiness
By John M. Donnelly

The majority of Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet fighter jet squadron commanders
have "overstated" their units' readiness, a new report says. The Naval Audit
Service said that nine of the 15 squadrons were less ready than their
commanders said they were, mainly because they had "inaccurately reported"
the number and condition of their airplanes and the extent to which aircrews
had met training requirements.

The report said "this situation could adversely affect decisions at the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commands and service levels and increase the
risk of loss of life and/or aircraft."

U.S. military leaders have acknowledged that the United States does not have
enough functioning equipment to fight two major wars without a high risk of
casualties. Nevertheless, despite all the candid talk in recent years about
readiness, if fitness documents are as overstated in other services as they
are with Marine Corps' Hornets, the brass may even now have a rosy picture
of U.S. capabilities. The Aug. 10 report, "Marine Corps F/A-18 Readiness
Reporting," has been circulated to numerous offices in the Defense
Department.

The audit doesn't directly say that squadron commanders falsified their
readiness reports. However, one Defense Department official who has seen the
audit said the Marines "found loopholes in the system to make themselves
look as good as they possibly could." The problem, the official said, is
"the commanders of the squadrons write their own report cards."

The Marines say that, to the extent they made mistakes, they were due to
misunderstandings by squadron personnel, not because they intended to
mislead. Among the nine squadrons at issue are three now deployed.

One squadron is on the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), the carrier that
steamed to sea with great fanfare from Norfolk, Va., on Sept. 19, as the
United States bulked up its forces near the Middle East and South Asia. The
other two deployed Hornet squadrons are based on land in Japan.

When military units deploy, they are typically provided what they need to
fight, even if they didn't have it up until then. So experts say the
readiness shortfalls don't likely affect the deployed squadrons, though if
one or more wars were to break out, the risk of not deploying fully capable
aircraft and trained crews on schedule would increase, they say.

Two Marine Corps officials responded that the deployed Hornet squadrons are
ready to fight. They also said the reporting system at issue-the Status of
Resources and Training System, or SORTS-is but one of the ways commanders
measure their units' readiness. And, they said, the system doesn't
necessarily predict performance in combat.

"It's just one piece of the puzzle," one Marine Corps officer said of SORTS.
Still, they conceded, SORTS is "the major way" that the brass measures
readiness.

Most pilots undertrained

"In the aggregate, we found that SORTS readiness indicators were
inaccurately reported for all nine squadrons reviewed," the audit said.
The Marine Corps "did not have the control procedures in place to verify the
accuracy and completeness of data prior to input to the SORTS," it said. "We
consider this a systemic material control weakness. As a result of
inaccuracies reported in the resource areas, the overall readiness category
ratings (C-level) for all nine squadrons reviewed were overstated."

Military units are rated on a scale of C-1 to C-5. The overall grade
reflects the lowest grade the unit receives in four subcategories: training,
equipment on hand, equipment condition and personnel. The Hornet squadrons
were not at the lowest levels of readiness, a Defense Department official
said. But they often were not at the level of C-2, which is typically the
required mark for units to be considered fit to deploy, the official said.
The biggest overstated factor in Marine Corps Hornet squadrons' readiness
reports was the level of training-and that was exaggerated by a significant
amount. The audit found that 128 out of 190 Hornet pilots and weapons
systems officers "were reported as operationally ready, ... although they
had not completed the minimum number of training events."

The Marines agree that squadrons had been incorrectly marking themselves as
adequately trained. But the Marines contend it's just a matter of educating
squadrons on the requirements, whereas the auditors think the guidance
itself needs to be clarified and that better records need to be kept.
Equipment shortfalls The Marine Corps has 215 Hornets in 15 active duty
squadrons. The aircraft are used for air-to-air combat and ground attack.
Of the nine squadrons reviewed by Navy auditors, six of them incorrectly
stated the number of Hornets on hand and not undergoing repair. And the
percentage of mission-capable aircraft was overstated in eight of the nine
squadrons, the audit said. One squadron reported an 86-percent mission
capable rate-but its actual rate was 46 percent, the audit said. A lack of
internal controls to verify data was largely to blame, the report said.
In addition, the Marine Corps squadrons did not include any equipment as
critical to the operation of the F/A-18s other than the jets themselves.
Even the jets' engines were not counted as contributing to the Hornets'
equipment readiness in the SORTS reports.

However, 72 of 75 spare engines "were not ready for issue as replacement
engines if needed," the report said. A Marine Corps official said the audit
did not show evidence that those particular unavailable engines were ever
called for, so he questioned the harm of not reporting their unready status.
The auditors, by contrast, said that the health of the engines really is
important to the operation of the planes and should be included in readiness
reports. Besides engines, seven other kinds of "critical" equipment-from
ailerons to hydraulic pump assemblies-should also be tracked, it said.
"Furthermore," the report said, "including support equipment and supply
items critical to the F/A-18 mission in the SORTS would make the reports
more comprehensive and eliminate automatic system defaults to a higher
rating, which could present erroneous overall readiness ratings at the
highest decision-making levels."

The Corps officials said the joint staff allows them the option to include
in the reports whatever equipment they wish. "Reporting critical items
because they would provide a more 'comprehensive' report is not a sufficient
justification to do so," said the Marine Corps commandant office's written
response, included in the audit document. Besides, the response said, other
reporting systems provide information on the secondary equipment, so
including it in SORTS "gives no added value."

The dispute between the Marines and the auditors over what equipment to
include remains unresolved, officials said. The Marine Corps' written
response also said the auditors' statement about risk to life and aircraft
is "hyperbolic" and the report's finding that overall readiness levels would
be lower than reported is "unsubstantiated."

The auditors returned the Marines' fire: "it is not an exaggeration to say
that if an aircrew is not trained to service-specified requirements for
combat readiness, the potential risk for loss of life and/or aircraft does
increase. ... For the Marine Corps to indicate otherwise is, in effect, to
question the need for standardized training requirements."

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