Return-Path: <sentto-279987-2753-1002473374-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Sun, 07 Oct 2001 09:50:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 26730 invoked by uid 510); 7 Oct 2001 16:49:32 -0000 Received: from n27.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.77) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 7 Oct 2001 16:49:32 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-2753-1002473374-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.53] by n27.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 07 Oct 2001 16:49:34 -0000 X-Sender: fc@big.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 7 Oct 2001 16:49:34 -0000 Received: (qmail 17608 invoked from network); 7 Oct 2001 16:49:33 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l7.egroups.com with QMQP; 7 Oct 2001 16:49:33 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta1 with SMTP; 7 Oct 2001 16:49:33 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id JAA31791 for iwar@onelist.com; Sun, 7 Oct 2001 09:49:33 -0700 Message-Id: <200110071649.JAA31791@big.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 09:49:33 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] [fc:The.Best.Antidote?.Acting.Rationally] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The Best Antidote? Acting Rationally By Wendy Orent Sunday, October 7, 2001; Page B03 For the past four weeks, Bush administration officials have warned us to expect further terrorist attacks. Last weekend, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card suggested that future terrorism could involve biological or so-called poor man's nuclear weapons, which disperse lethal bacteria or viruses into the air or water supply. And while the federal government has been preparing scientists to face this threat for several years (emergency pharmaceutical supplies, including antibiotics and vaccines, are stockpiled in eight secret locations around the country), it hasn't begun preparing its citizenry for what to expect and how to cope if something were to happen. The training exercises that have been conducted suggest that a biological attack would rapidly achieve the very goals a terrorist covets: widespread panic, flight, a frenzied scramble for personal safety at any cost. Based on elaborate scenarios developed in Denver in May 2000 and at Andrews Air Force Base earlier this year, experts predicted diseases spiraling out of control and spreading across the country. If people were to panic as envisioned, the public health community would find it very hard to reach and identify victims and the people they had had contact with, and our limited supply of emergency drugs would soon run dry. But the horrifying events of Sept. 11 suggest that American citizens are less willing to be tools in the terrorists' hands than these scenarios would have us believe. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, people were extraordinarily amenable to reason -- and even performed acts of self-sacrifice. Tens of thousands managed, in some semblance of calm and order, to evacuate the 110-story buildings, some stopping to help others as they went. Stories of courage abounded, not only among emergency workers, but also among civilians, including, most notably, the passengers of United Flight 93 who tackled the hijackers. The specter of biological terrorism is frightening. But well-prepared citizens, armed with the kind of presence of mind displayed last month, are much less likely to let it become the catastrophic horror it might otherwise be. Experts in biological defense, including Ken Alibek, a former Soviet bioweapons expert who defected to the United States in 1992, cite dozens of agents that could be used as biological weapons. But three are generally of most concern: anthrax, plague and smallpox. The bacteria that cause plague and anthrax are available in nature, although preparing and dispersing them as weapons would be challenging; the smallpox virus, which was eradicated in the general population in 1978 and now only exists in laboratories, would be harder for terrorists to obtain -- unless, as some experts have speculated, it is already in the hands of several unfriendly nations. In the event of contamination with any of these diseases, the natural human tendency to flee would be the worst thing we could do -- for ourselves and for the nation. Anthrax, the bacterial disease most feared by American experts, produces durable spores that can contaminate land for years. Obtaining, processing and disseminating these spores is a sophisticated process, but once inhaled they produce a lethal respiratory infection -- and they do so very quickly. The disease is not contagious, though, so there's no need to isolate patients, and, if treated within a few hours of exposure, it can be cured. After an attack, we would need to stay put, so emergency antibiotics could quickly reach people in the affected area. Afterward, new disinfection technology, developed at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, could be used to disinfect the environment -- as could ordinary diluted household bleach. Plague, once known as the Black Death, terrifies us with its very name, and a small natural outbreak in Surat, India, in 1994 triggered the kind of mass flight we need to avoid. An airborne attack using this agent (which was made into weapons by the Soviets) would be far more dangerous than that. If we reacted the same way as the people of Surat, we would plunge into chaos. Airborne plague is extremely contagious. If antibiotic treatment is not started within hours of symptoms appearing, pneumonic plague, the inhaled form of the disease (as opposed to bubonic plague, which is carried by rat fleas) is almost always fatal. Exploiting the terrors of plague, Soviet bioweapons scientists developed antibiotic-resistant plague strains. But even this does not mean an inevitable revisit of the Black Death. Wu Lien-Teh, a Cambridge-educated Chinese physician, is widely credited with breaking the back of the Manchurian plague epidemic that cost about 50,000 lives in 1910-11 -- long before the invention of antibiotics. Wu demonstrated that plague cannot spread effectively from person to person in the open air. He and his staff protected themselves by wearing simple gauze masks, which blocked the tiny infectious droplets from reaching their lungs. Furthermore, we now know that plague germs are relatively fragile, compared with anthrax and smallpox, so ground contamination outdoors is unlikely. Normal disinfection processes in hospitals should eliminate the germs, and sick people would have to be isolated, along with all their contacts. Anyone working with them would have to wear masks -- as would members of the public whenever they left their houses. With aggressive isolation and treatment of infected individuals, if the rest of the public stayed mostly at home, avoided crowds and did necessary errands wearing a mask covering their noses and mouths, those who had not been affected by the initial attack would have a good chance of remaining plague-free, even in the terrible event of an antibiotic-resistant outbreak. Smallpox is both contagious and durable. But it isn't as deadly as plague or anthrax. Before its eradication, the most virulent strains killed between 30 and 50 percent of those infected. Like plague victims, smallpox sufferers would have to be quarantined, and anyone they had contact with would have to be vaccinated -- as well as others at risk of contracting the disease. Wearing masks in public places would also help prevent the spread. Supplies of smallpox vaccine are still quite low, since the United States stopped routine childhood vaccination in 1972, and adults who received the shots probably have a very low level of immunity now. Staying put would increase one's chances of receiving vaccination or one of the antiviral drugs now being tested. Running from an epidemic is all very well if you are not infected. But how could you be sure? Contagious diseases have differing incubation periods. Pneumonic plague comes on quickly; you might feel fine one hour and deathly ill the next. Smallpox may take two weeks to show itself, and it often begins with mild flu-like symptoms -- but people are contagious even before they show symptoms. The terrorists may not have the technological ability to infect the population of a whole city or even a football stadium, but they might be able to introduce one of these diseases to a much smaller gathering of people. Panicked flight could spread the disease around the country and the world. Staying where you are, therefore, serves both selfish and national interests. If the threat of bioterrorist attack becomes a reality, we are not completely helpless, no matter how deadly or infectious the agent. There are things we can do to protect society and ourselves. Rather than simply letting people know that we now face another hideous threat, the administration and those who are in charge of planning for such catastrophes both at the federal and local levels should talk directly to the American people. Tell them what could happen, even under the worst circumstances. Explain to them how panic and flight would exacerbate the problem. And trust them to do the right -- and rational -- thing. Wendy Orent writes frequently about biological weapons and emerging infectious diseases. © 2001 The Washington Post Company ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Get your FREE VeriSign guide to security solutions for your web site: encrypting transactions, securing intranets, and more! http://us.click.yahoo.com/UnN2wB/m5_CAA/yigFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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