[iwar] [fc:Doomsday.Talk]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-07 09:50:48


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From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net>
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Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 09:50:48 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Doomsday.Talk]
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Doomsday Talk
By Amy Smithson

Sunday, October 7, 2001; Page B07 

If Americans are to regain peace of mind about their everyday lives, the
government must broach with more clarity the all too frightening
subjects of chemical and biological terrorism.  Already reeling from the
events of Sept.  11, the country has been bombarded by the media with
warnings that terrorists will turn next to poison gas or germ weapons. 

The subject of unconventional terrorism is easy prey for commentators
and individuals all too readily labeled "expert," even those with a
somewhat tenuous grasp of the topic or financial interests at play.  The
public and far too many policymakers do not understand the substantial
technical hurdles associated with making and dispersing chemical and
biological agents so that massive casualties result.  That's why people
usually believe the worst of what they hear. 

A case in point is the dust-up about crop-dusters.  Press reports
implied that these instruments of America's agricultural prowess were
just a snap away from raining chemical or biological warfare agents on
hapless citizens.  Practically everyone has been scared stiff. 

In fact, a pilot with limited experience, such as those who flew the
ill-fated aircraft on Sept.  11, would need lengthy instruction just to
avoid crashing a loaded crop-duster on takeoff.  Because the close-knit
aerial spraying community tends to clam up when strangers get nosy,
Mohamed Atta was not even allowed to peer into the cockpit of one of
those planes. 

True, crop-dusters spray chemicals, but wind currents will disperse and
carry away a toxic hazard.  People can gain a great deal of protection
just by going inside if they see a crop-duster overhead.  Moreover, the
sprayers on crop-dusters are not geared to dispense biological agents in
the droplet size needed to make people fall ill. 

The federal government needs to calm apprehensions about this and other
myths circulating about chemical and biological terrorism, such as the
misperceptions about how easily a city's water supply could be poisoned. 
All of the doomsday talk has made many feel that chemical or biological
attacks are inevitable when that is far from the case. 

Another terrorist gang, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, illustrates how
even a group flush with cash and technical capabilities could not
overcome some of the more arcane aspects of chemical and biological
warfare.  Aum unleashed the nerve agent sarin in Tokyo's subway on March
20, 1995.  A dozen persons were killed and 54 seriously injured, but
practically all of those usually reported as casualties resulted from
the panic the attack caused.  Understandably frightened, thousands of
others fled to hospitals, although they incurred little if any physical
harm. 

Despite years of effort, Aum's corps of roughly 100 scientists and
technicians could not make its $10 million state-of-the-art production
facility churn out the huge quantities of sarin needed to kill
thousands.  Many press reports have credited Aum with successfully
dispersing anthrax and botulinum toxin.  In actuality the cult's
biowarfare program was a total flop.  Americans should know that they
are much likelier to be struck by lightning than to fall victim to a
chemical or bioterrorist attack. 

Thus far Bush administration statements about chemical and biological
terrorism have erred on the side of being brief and ominous, which has
exacerbated the palpable fear pervading the nation.  Accordingly, there
has been a run on gas masks.  Buyers are probably unaware that masks
will do them little good if users are not properly fitted and instructed
in their use.  Some citizens also are stockpiling antibiotics, an unwise
practice that could backfire.  Should people jump to the conclusion that
a case of the sniffles indicates an exposure to anthrax, they are likely
to self-medicate, hampering the ability of doctors to help them in a
time of true medical need. 

Americans do not expect their government to give them absolute
guarantees that nothing bad will happen in the future.  Sept.  11
shattered that illusion.  Rather, they deserve to hear straight talk
about difficult subjects and the steps their government is taking to
address problems.  Along those lines, President Bush did well to tell
people that they should strive to return to business as usual.  To bring
people back to the skies, Washington moved quickly to institute new
airline safety procedures. 

Now a similarly high-profile, sustained federal push must be made to
make Americans understand that chemical and biological calamity does not
automatically await them in their homes, at parks, in their places of
work and at sporting and entertainment venues.  The sooner that facts
replace spin, the better off the country will be. 

The writer directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Project at the
Henry L.  Stimson Center.  She is the principal author of "Ataxia: The
Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the U.S.  Response."

© 2001 The Washington Post Company

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