Return-Path: <sentto-279987-2754-1002473449-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Sun, 07 Oct 2001 09:52:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 26811 invoked by uid 510); 7 Oct 2001 16:50:48 -0000 Received: from n33.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.83) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 7 Oct 2001 16:50:48 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-2754-1002473449-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.55] by n33.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 07 Oct 2001 16:50:50 -0000 X-Sender: fc@big.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 7 Oct 2001 16:50:49 -0000 Received: (qmail 32275 invoked from network); 7 Oct 2001 16:50:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 7 Oct 2001 16:50:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta1 with SMTP; 7 Oct 2001 16:50:49 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id JAA31825 for iwar@onelist.com; Sun, 7 Oct 2001 09:50:48 -0700 Message-Id: <200110071650.JAA31825@big.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 09:50:48 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] [fc:Doomsday.Talk] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Doomsday Talk By Amy Smithson Sunday, October 7, 2001; Page B07 If Americans are to regain peace of mind about their everyday lives, the government must broach with more clarity the all too frightening subjects of chemical and biological terrorism. Already reeling from the events of Sept. 11, the country has been bombarded by the media with warnings that terrorists will turn next to poison gas or germ weapons. The subject of unconventional terrorism is easy prey for commentators and individuals all too readily labeled "expert," even those with a somewhat tenuous grasp of the topic or financial interests at play. The public and far too many policymakers do not understand the substantial technical hurdles associated with making and dispersing chemical and biological agents so that massive casualties result. That's why people usually believe the worst of what they hear. A case in point is the dust-up about crop-dusters. Press reports implied that these instruments of America's agricultural prowess were just a snap away from raining chemical or biological warfare agents on hapless citizens. Practically everyone has been scared stiff. In fact, a pilot with limited experience, such as those who flew the ill-fated aircraft on Sept. 11, would need lengthy instruction just to avoid crashing a loaded crop-duster on takeoff. Because the close-knit aerial spraying community tends to clam up when strangers get nosy, Mohamed Atta was not even allowed to peer into the cockpit of one of those planes. True, crop-dusters spray chemicals, but wind currents will disperse and carry away a toxic hazard. People can gain a great deal of protection just by going inside if they see a crop-duster overhead. Moreover, the sprayers on crop-dusters are not geared to dispense biological agents in the droplet size needed to make people fall ill. The federal government needs to calm apprehensions about this and other myths circulating about chemical and biological terrorism, such as the misperceptions about how easily a city's water supply could be poisoned. All of the doomsday talk has made many feel that chemical or biological attacks are inevitable when that is far from the case. Another terrorist gang, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, illustrates how even a group flush with cash and technical capabilities could not overcome some of the more arcane aspects of chemical and biological warfare. Aum unleashed the nerve agent sarin in Tokyo's subway on March 20, 1995. A dozen persons were killed and 54 seriously injured, but practically all of those usually reported as casualties resulted from the panic the attack caused. Understandably frightened, thousands of others fled to hospitals, although they incurred little if any physical harm. Despite years of effort, Aum's corps of roughly 100 scientists and technicians could not make its $10 million state-of-the-art production facility churn out the huge quantities of sarin needed to kill thousands. Many press reports have credited Aum with successfully dispersing anthrax and botulinum toxin. In actuality the cult's biowarfare program was a total flop. Americans should know that they are much likelier to be struck by lightning than to fall victim to a chemical or bioterrorist attack. Thus far Bush administration statements about chemical and biological terrorism have erred on the side of being brief and ominous, which has exacerbated the palpable fear pervading the nation. Accordingly, there has been a run on gas masks. Buyers are probably unaware that masks will do them little good if users are not properly fitted and instructed in their use. Some citizens also are stockpiling antibiotics, an unwise practice that could backfire. Should people jump to the conclusion that a case of the sniffles indicates an exposure to anthrax, they are likely to self-medicate, hampering the ability of doctors to help them in a time of true medical need. Americans do not expect their government to give them absolute guarantees that nothing bad will happen in the future. Sept. 11 shattered that illusion. Rather, they deserve to hear straight talk about difficult subjects and the steps their government is taking to address problems. Along those lines, President Bush did well to tell people that they should strive to return to business as usual. To bring people back to the skies, Washington moved quickly to institute new airline safety procedures. Now a similarly high-profile, sustained federal push must be made to make Americans understand that chemical and biological calamity does not automatically await them in their homes, at parks, in their places of work and at sporting and entertainment venues. The sooner that facts replace spin, the better off the country will be. The writer directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Project at the Henry L. Stimson Center. She is the principal author of "Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the U.S. Response." © 2001 The Washington Post Company ------------------------ Yahoo! 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This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-12-31 20:59:54 PST